

THE
SPANISH
ARENA

WILLIAM FOSS
AND
CECIL GERAHTY

GIFFORD

THE SPANISH ARENA



FRANCISCO FRANCO: *EL CAUDILLO*

[Frontispiece]

THE SPANISH ARENA

BY

WILLIAM FOSS AND CECIL GERAHTY

FOREWORD BY

HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF ALBA AND BERWICK

ILLUSTRATED

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FOREWORD

BY HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF ALBA AND BERWICK,
Director of the Royal Academy of History of Spain

SPAIN has a weighty message to deliver, and one of the greatest services that can be rendered her is to spread that message by making the facts concerning Nationalist Spain and her Leader known. Those facts are, I believe, conscientiously and truthfully recorded by the authors of this book. Its publication should, therefore, greatly assist in extending the sympathy for the Nationalist Cause which is already felt by many in England and the English-speaking countries who are aware of the true position.

Nationalism is at stake not only in Spain; it is threatened in many other countries by international forces. What has happened to the Spanish nation in the last few years may well happen, if it is not already on the way to happen, to others. That is why the Spanish question has become the burning question of the day. Once again Spain is fulfilling her historic mission; she stands in the forefront of nations, fighting the battles of Europe. At the blast of the Nationalist trumpets the Pyrenees have fallen down for the world to behold the struggle of a Western David against an Eastern Goliath, of Franco against the hydra-headed monster of International Communism.

Spain has for some years been the storm centre of Europe. Two generations ago the restoration of the Monarchy brought her internal peace. When, towards the turn of the century, the last burden of Empire fell from her shoulders, she set out resolutely on the path of progress, which in the course of a single successful reign was to lead her to what proportionately was an unequalled height of prosperity. Then Spain herself seems to have lost the sense of proportion. Not content with enjoying the peace and prosperity conferred upon her by that political system, she must needs exchange it for another. The

Monarchy fell and was beneficent even in its fall; for, as Peman the poet has well said, the pacific entry of the Republic* was not a first success of the new regime, but the last act of generosity of the old.

Before the Republic was a month old, the ship of state had run upon the rocks, when the Communist incendiaries made their first rehearsal. In October 1934 followed a second rehearsal on a larger scale, when an attempt was made by Russian agents at staging a social revolution in Spain. On the failure of that attempt, a more insidious method of attack was adopted; following the usual tactics employed by Russia, the Popular Front was formed and allowed to seize power. Then began an interregnum in which a travesty of legality left the field free for confiscation, outrage and murder.

Spain was in an evil way. She had been accustomed, for the maintenance of law and order, to lean on the support of the Throne, the Church and the Army. Now that the Throne had fallen, that the Church was being persecuted and outraged, there remained only the Army, which in the latter years had partly recovered from the earlier, ruthless attacks upon its organization.

All hope of salvation thus resting with the Army, the question arose as to who should be its leader. As ever, the crisis produced the man. Franco's prestige was great among all who had followed his work in Morocco, and among none greater than among men such as Mola, Queipo de Llano and Sanjurjo, who had been his senior officers there. The story of his life, which is told in this book, will show that he has always been first and foremost a soldier, with no taste for politics. Refusing to be the hero of any *pronunciamiento*, he thought it his duty to warn the Government of the danger he clearly foresaw. Finally he realized that only the Army could save the country in the dire straits into which it had fallen, and with characteristic courage placed himself at the head of the troops in Morocco, which were practically the sole organized force left.

The Rising started as a protest against a ruthless tyranny, and Franco's soldiers, as they marched up from the sea to the Tagus and on to Toledo, were hailed as deliverers. That great march, which followed the route once taken by the Moorish invaders and partly that of Wellington, was an epitome of the whole struggle. It was the triumph of quality over quan-


ity, of the spirit over matter; for the Reds, although superior in numbers and material, were lacking in soul. Toledo, whose heroic defence will live for ever in epic story, had become an emblem. At the relief of the Alcazar, a wave of patriotic enthusiasm swept over the country, the new Spain was born, and Franco acclaimed as her Chief.

In Franco's Spain religion was restored and order re-established; class hatred disappeared, and the truly democratic feeling that is typical of Spain, where differences of rank and fortune are considered accidental, revived after five years of social strife. Amid extraordinary enthusiasm the youth of the country flocked to the colours, the old red and orange flag restored by Franco, whilst men and women of all classes, aware that their very existence was at stake, were eager to share in the sacrifice.

Spain was never lower than in the fifteenth century under the degrading rule of Enrique IV. Yet only a few years later, thanks to the unification of the country brought about by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, she entered on a period of glory such as has scarcely been equalled by any nation. The emblem of King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella were the Yoke and Arrows. That emblem has now been incorporated in the national coat of arms. Thus the spirit of the new Spain is wedded to the glory of the old.

Spain, who was the bulwark of Europe against Islam in the Middle Ages, who shattered the Turkish sea-power in the sixteenth century, and who rose against Napoleon in the early nineteenth century, is engaged in a new crusade. This is the first time that Bolshevism is being challenged in Western Europe, and the credit belongs to Spain and her Leader. The struggle is costly in blood and treasure, but Spain, as history shows, has surprising powers of recovery. On emerging victorious from the present ordeal, crowned with laurels worthy of her proud past, she may look forward to a brilliant future. Her faith in her Leader and in that future is voiced in the cry that springs unanimously from the heart of all true Spaniards: *Viva Franco! Arriba Espana!*

ALBA.



CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

THE BATTLEFIELD

	PAGE
The country and people of Spain—The special agricultural difficulties—The invasions: Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Goths, Moors—The <i>latifundios</i> —The distribution of property throughout Spain—Church property—Laws of succession and death-duties—Varying characteristics of individual groups of inhabitants—Religion—Anarchism—Asceticism—Bad Government—Local reactions to new and old ideas	i*

CHAPTER II

THE FALL OF A MONARCHY

The historical factors—Parliamentary and party government—The Army—The Labour Organizations: their history and clandestine nature—Reasons for the Dictatorship: Social disorder, political interference in Morocco, Separatism—The U.G.T.—Education—Virtues and faults of the Dictatorship—The Electoral Register—The fall of Primo de Rivera—The Municipal Elections—King Alfonso XIII's departure	42
---	----

CHAPTER III

THE GOOD SOLDIER

General Franco—Not a Fascist leader—Franco and the Phalanx—His Army career with the 68th African Regiment; with the ** Regulares"—Captain at twenty-two years of age—The Foreign Legion—The Legion's <i>credo</i> —Exploits of Franco and the Legion—Xauen—Alhucemas Bay—Promoted Brigadier-General in 1925 at the age of thirty-three	60
--	----

CHAPTER IV

THE GOOD REPUBLICAN AND THE BOGUS REPUBLIC

General Franco's attitude—His address to the cadets at Zaragoza—Early signs of the Republican insincerity—The Constitution and the Law for the Defence of the Republic—Attacks on justice, law, the Church, property and social order, and the corruption of the U.G.T.—The suppression of liberties—Social disorders—Castilblanco—The Russian Communist intervention—The methods—The continental masons—The origin of the funds—Lenin's injunctions, and the basis of class hatred—The Anarchists, the Communists and the United Front—The creation of the " pre-requisites of revolution "	80
--	----

CHAPTER V

THE RUSSIAN VIRUS

The Times evidence—Victor Serge's introduction to Maurin—Maurin's record of the attack on Spain—"Separatism"—The Communist programme for the attack on England—The version of Pope Pius XI—Atheistic Communism—Its methods and propaganda—Class warfare—The Pasionana's version—Mr. Baldwin in the House of Commons 112

CHAPTER VI

SECRET SOCIETIES

The anti-Christian movement—Continental Freemasonry—Its proclaimed intervention—The revolutionary Lodges—Their work—The Jewish question—Distinction between atheistic Bolshevik Jews and others—Lord Londonderry's letter—The importance of the Spanish resistance.

CHAPTER VII

THE TRAINING SCHOOL

Religious persecution—The agrarian "reforms"—The contrasted theory' and practice—Persistent disorders and Russian intervention—Communist State proclaimed 1931—Again in 1932—The plots of 1933 and Casas Vicjas—"A normal day"—The Elections of 1933—The Asturian rebellion of 1934 . 152

CHAPTER VIII

THE CAULDRON BOILS OVER

Franco and the Asturian rebellion—Mistaken Government leniency and policy
—Franco reorganizes the Army—The Soviet's activities—Demoralization
and disorder—Its "organization"—The Elections of 1936—Chaos—
Franco's letter warning the Government—The murder of Calvo Sotelo—
Civilization v. Barbarism

CHAPTER IX

THE GREAT ADVENTURE

The rising in Morocco—The relative strengths of the two sides—The Moors
The Government's material superiority—The Fleet goes over to the
Government. The rising in Spain: Seville—Oviedo—Valencia—Avila
Valladolid—Leon—Cadiz—Zaragoza and Aragon—Huelva—Cordoba—
Granada—The Canaries—A typical incident in Badajoz—Navarre—
Cdeceres. The Fleet—The Air Force. The Revolution in Red Spain—
Barcelona—Santander—The official report on atrocities in the south
west—The ^{definite} ^{of} ^{the} ^{area} ⁱⁿ ^{the} ^{vicinity} ^{of} ^{the} ^{city} ^{of} ^{Avila}—Cabreros—Madrid. The Sanctuary of the
Virgen de la Cabeza. Appendix: Instructions issued to militia—Com
unist operation orders

CHAPTER X

CORDONS SANITAIRES

	PAGE
The real meaning of the voting at the Elections—The "Liberals"—The small number of "Fascists". The rush for the passes—Badajoz—The safety of communications—The Alto de Leon—Irun and San Sebastian—The <i>Requestes</i> —The Eastern wall—Antequera and Ronda—Merida, Oropesa and Talavera—San Martin de Valdeiglesias—Maqueda—Toledo—Oviedo Navalcamero—Ciempozuelos—Sigienza and the Battalion of Crime—The attempted <i>coup</i> on Madrid—Aerial bombardments—The International Brigades—Franco's choice	271

CHAPTER XI

THE REDEMPTION OF THE PROVINCES

The division of the country and of its inhabitants—The Italian, German and Russian or Comintern intervention—The Malaga Campaign—Communist "rule" in Malaga—The attack on Guadalajara—The Bilbao Campaign—The "Iron Belt"—The Red failure at Brunete—The Santander Campaign—The Red "advance at Sargentos"—Franco shoots one in ten" (after taking 90,000 prisoners)—The Military* Courts—The death penalty—The Red "victory" at Belchite—The "Durruti" column—The "Iron" column—Discipline—The Asturian Campaign	310
---	-----

CHAPTER XII

THE MANY-HEADED HYDRA

The Third International—Anti-Imperialist, Youth and Peace Leagues—Pius XI on Communist ramifications. French intervention: Letter of Fernando de Los Rios—Land traffic—Aeroplanes—The volunteers—War material captured by the Nationalists—International collection of funds. Various forms of intervention: cash, "milk", medical, motor chassis, etc.—The International Brigades—Belligerent Rights—The Basque children—"Piracy*". The League of Nations and the Orient Freemasons—Soviet and Communist aims—War for its own sake—Franco's declaration to the League—Dangers of Communism in England	367
---	-----

CHAPTER XIII

THE WRECKERS AND THE BUILDERS

The Red "Government"—Communist control—The criminals in "office" and in command—The attack on morality—Valencia—Blasphemy, murder, theft: the inversion of the Ten Commandments—The need to rebuild— <i>The Times</i> confirmation in 1938 of our contentions—Finance—Press control—Need of moral basis for education—The Grand Council—The Red and the Nationalist outlook	410
---	-----

CHAPTER XIV

THE FICTION FACTORY

The propaganda machinery in Spain—Methods used—Tests for complicity—Anti-Hitler influences—The News Agencies—Guernica—Trials of aviators
--

PAGE	
—The B.B.C. " The bombing of hospitals "—Bombing civilians—The Government bombs "military objectives in retaliation"!—Ghosted interviews—The one-sided " humanitarian " appeal. Red methods with Correspondents. Inversions—The concealment of internal dissension—The " invasion of France "—Cangas de Onis—" Fascist atrocities "—Interference with mails and wireless—The Left Book Club—The great machine: views of Pope Pius XI, Comrade Victor Serge, M. Flandin and Dean Inge —The nature of the Press and its dangers 429	429

CHAPTER XV

THE DRAGON IS MORTALLY WOUNDED

Teruel—The counter-stroke—Its value not appreciated in England—The great drive to the River Ebro and the sea—The usual horrors in the liberated towns and villages—Morale the chief factor in the victory .	476
---	-----

CHAPTER XVI

"ARRIBA ESPANA!"

Spain and the World Revolution—The effects of propaganda—The proposed remedy—Liberalistic " free competition " and class hatred—The Corporative experiment—Its proposed machinery—The ideals and the " ideology " contrasted—The Nationalist trust in Franco .	486
--	-----

INDEX .	• 503
---------	-------

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

PLATES

	<i>Frontispiece</i>
	<i>Facing</i>
	<i>page</i>
FRANCISCO FRANCO: <i>El Caudillo</i>	20
THE ROMAN AMPHITHEATRE, ITALICA (SEVILLE)	36
THE ALHAMBRA, GRANADA	44
COCA CASTLE, SEGOVIA	54
MOUNTAINS IN ASTURIAS	70
<i>El Gran Mutilado</i> , GENERAL MILLAN ASTRAY	78
MOROCCO: THE JALIFA AT A REVIEW	78
SALAMANCA: THE MOORISH BODYGUARD	94
THE 14TH CENTURY CLOISTERS OF SAN JUAN DE LOS REYES, TOLEDO	106
THE VAL D'ARAN: PYRENEES FRONT	122
SEVILLE: THE GIRALDA	138
CHURCH OF SAN FRANCISCO, BURNED BY THE REDS (BUJALANCE, CORDOBA)	>5°
SALAMANCA: A BATTALION AT MASS	168
SCENE ON THE LEON FRONT	180
MORELLA, THE KEY TO THE MAESTRAGO	180
IN NAVARRE	198
THE PICOS DE EUROPA: ADVANCING ON GIJON	216
GENERAL QUEIPO DE LLANO, THE AUDACIOUS SAVIOUR OF SEVILLE	216
GENERAL MOSCARD6, THE DEFENDER OF THE ALCAZAR, TOLEDO	242
VICE-ADMIRAL DON MANUEL DE VIERRA	242
VICE-ADMIRAL FRANCISCO MORENO FERNANDEZ	242
ADMIRAL DON JUAN CERVERA, CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF	250
CABO MAYOR, SANTANDER	274
1. GENERAL FRANCO, WITH GENERAL DAVILA, ON HIS LEFT, AND COLONEL VIGON.	
2. GENERAL GARCIA VALERO. 3. GENERAL VARELA. 4. GENERAL YAGUE.	
5. GENERAL MOLA. 6. GENERAL SOLCHAGA 274	
TOLEDO	294

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

	<i>Facing page</i>
THE WALLS OF AVILA	314
TYPICAL FIGHTING COUNTRY IN NORTHERN SPAIN	334
TARNA, ASTURIAS: RED DEFENCES	360
COPY OF THE OPENING OF A LETTER SENT BY SEÑOR FERNANDO DE LOS RIOS TO THE SPANISH PRIME MINISTER, JOSÉ GIRAL	367
THE SANCTUARY OF THE VIRGEN DE LA CABEZA, JAEN	386
PONTOON BRIDGE OVER THE EBRO NEAR QUINTO	386
ON THE HUESCA FRONT, UPPER ARAGON	418
TRENCHES, CASTELLON FRONT	434
1. COLONEL SANCHEZ. 2. GENERAL TELLA. 3. GENERAL ARANDA. 4. GENERAL KINDELAN, WITH THE "ACE", COMMANDANTE GARCIA MORATO. 5. GENERAL MONASTERIO. 6. GENERAL GARCIA ESCAMEZ	448
ALIAGA (THE MONTALBAN FRONT), TERUEL	464
SNOW ON THE TERUEL FRONT	478
FARMING: SANTANDER PROVINCE	490
GENERALISSIMO FRANCO, WITH HIS WIFE AND DAUGHTER	498

LINE ILLUSTRATIONS

	<i>Page</i>
THE BILBAO CAMPAIGN	339
THE BATTLE OF BRUNETE	343
THE SANTANDER CAMPAIGN	349
THE ASTURIAN CAMPAIGN	363
STAGES OF THE TERUEL-PYRENEES OFFENSIVE, FEBRUARY-MAY 1938	477
PROPOSED CROSS AT VENTA DE FARIÑAS	483

CHAPTER I

THE BATTLEFIELD

Two years ago Spain was of little concern to the majority of those who had no direct interests in that country. Francisco Franco was a name little known except to his professional associates. To-day Spain's tragedy has become linked with international complications, and the name of Franco, in too many countries, especially in England, stands, quite erroneously, for a hated or feared "Dictator", an enemy of freedom and the antithesis of personal liberty. The "civil war" in Spain has been skilfully insinuated throughout the world as the revolt of a military clique against the free will of their fellow countrymen.

This is in no way true. There have been forces concerned in concealing the facts. There is ample evidence of this, as this book will amply demonstrate.

We are witnessing to-day, perhaps for the first time in history, the growth of a doctrine, spread by an organization whose intention is to destroy, with violence, the existing order in every country, not by open attack from without, but by social disorder from within, with a view to imposing its will upon the nations of the world.

This is the essence of the War in Spain which broke out into open conflict in July 1936. It is a "civil war", but it is no ordinary civil war. Its cause was not some national evil or political difference resulting in a violent protest. It is a war between that part of the population seduced by this new and alien doctrine, and those who resisted in defence of the traditional rights of their country.

Spain has merely been the unfortunate land chosen as the latest battlefield. It is not the first. But, for reasons explained

later, little publicity has been given to battles already fought by those sections of other populations who also rejected the "ideology" which it was attempted to impose upon them. It is not that there were no grievances in the countries concerned. On the contrary, there have usually been grounds ready to be exploited in the service of the group which introduced this foreign creed. But this has merely helped—and been used—to conceal the facts.

Thus, in order to understand what has occurred in Spain, it must be appreciated that, initially, this war was due to an attempt to impose a foreign yoke upon Spain; and, secondly, that Spain was chosen because those who were engaged in this plot considered that the conditions there, and in particular the character of the people, conduced to success more readily than elsewhere.

Although Spain is a part of the European continent, its people and its culture are very different from those of other European countries. South of the Pyrenees the influences which have operated strongly in the rest of Europe have made but little impression in many directions. This is partly because communications are poor, the agricultural inhabitants—and they are in the majority—have been too intensely occupied with earning their living, and partly also because, wisely or not, they have not always regarded change as progress. The Spaniards, too, are a blend of different races, rather than a single race, and, as Professor Sencourt has so truly stated, there are times, particularly in the south, when the sun gets into men's blood. Perhaps it is this which at times produced those fierce outbursts of cruelty which are to be remarked throughout Spanish history. The Spaniard is a strong individualist. But there are many types of individual, for Spain may be described as the greatest anthropological museum in the world.

It is not possible to judge the problems of Spain, or events in Spain, by the standards of the ordinary Englishman. The ordinary Spaniard, for example, is not passionately attached to democracy. Perhaps that is because he has found from bitter experience how it has worked for him in practice. There was a Republic in Spain some sixty years ago, and they have had many years of parliamentary government. Whilst the Spaniard himself loathes restraints, he has seen the results of the slackening of authority and weakness in Governments. At

the same time, when power and privilege were exercised, often arbitrarily, by the few, without proper guarantees or consideration for the many, the law-breaker was not regarded as the enemy of the people. In the days when banditry was rife—and it is not so long ago that it was stamped out—the bandit was regarded largely in a "Robin Hood" spirit, as the avenger of the poor and the down-trodden.

In general, too, Spain is not a rich country for its size, nor in general are its inhabitants wealthy; moreover, it is notorious for the cynical corruption of its officials. Yet the ordinary Spaniards, poor as they are, do not regard money as a predominant consideration in life. They will often refuse payment for services where, in rendering them, they are making a great personal sacrifice from their meagre means; nor would their dignified pride permit it to be known by the person receiving the service. Though in some parts the difficulty of earning a living has inevitably produced a defensive attitude which the uncomprehending foreigner might regard as a fierce selfishness, those who know the Spaniard intimately are aware that no man is more capable of heroic self-sacrifice and generosity when his heart is touched. The crowd that would clamour for the blood of a common malefactor may be the first to threaten the authorities later if they felt impelled to impose the penalty which the crowd itself had but recently so insistently demanded.

Spain is far larger than England. It is the third largest country in Europe. But it has huge barren areas like the *páramos* where nothing useful has ever grown, or, probably, ever will. It has an amazingly varied climate. In some parts, such as Granada, sugar grows within a few miles of the perpetual snow of the Sierra Nevada. In general its rainfall is not high, but, when rain falls, the storms are of the greatest violence. Then, owing to the steep gradients of the mountain slopes, the water rushes down and the dry beds of streams become roaring torrents. It is by no means unheard of for cattle, and men, to be caught unawares and drowned, and hillsides, where left unprotected by trees or plants, are quickly stripped of soil. The centre of Spain is a vast plateau, scarred by great mountain ranges from which the water finds its way tumultuously to the sea; and the great problem, over a large area, is to find any water at all.

In the centre of Spain there is not much of the country

forces frequent ploughing. It has been authentically computed by an English expert that the Castilian farmer has to do about twice as much work as his English contemporary in return for about one-half the yield. Nor does this investigator see any known practicable manner of improving this position which nature has imposed.

The foreigner who has never tried to farm wheat for himself in Spain may sneer at the local Roman plough still in use in many areas, but the Spanish cereal farmer is by no means unreasonably conservative. He has found out what suits him best, and pays him best, by a process of trial and much costly error. The yield for work ratio is a tempting field for the agitator; but where he has been misled, the peasant has learnt from experience the fallacies with which he has been made to experiment.

The people who inhabit Spain are the product of a number of successive invasions. The original inhabitants of most parts have been broadly grouped as Celt-Iberians—a general term which disposes of a highly complex group. Little is known of its composition. There have been other groups in loosely defined areas, such as the curious Maragatos, and the Basques, a race also of unknown origin, to-day probably with small resemblance to their original pure ancestors—if ever there were any. But the key to Spain is the fact that the African continent opposite its southern shores is separated by only a narrow strait of water, across which the high land is visible from the other side. In the north there is the great barrier of the Pyrenees. It has been said with some truth both that the frontier between Europe and Africa is the Pyrenees, and that Europe ends at the Atlas Mountains.

The peoples of the Mediterranean shores have been largely of kindred races, much intermingled. The Kabyles and Berbers, though a mixture of many strains, are of the Mediterranean-Caucasian stock. The Phoenicians probably did not themselves form colonies of any large extent, though, even so, it is extraordinary how widely distributed in Spain are the settlements which it is still possible to trace. But they were purely “business men”, and did not wander far from the mines or other concentrated sources of merchandise, or the markets.

With the Carthaginians, off-shoot of the Phoenicians, it was different. The extent of their occupation, and its effects, are



THE ROMAN AMPHITHEATRE, ITALICA (SEVILLE)



probably far greater than is generally appreciated. Carthage maintained almost exclusively mercenary' armies, recruited from all parts of the African coast and the Mediterranean islands and shores. These armies probably occupied the entire Peninsula. Like most powers which have maintained their position with mercenary' troops, the men recruited were usually moved far from their original home countries. The Carthaginians took the troops they recruited from Spain and transferred them to Africa, and vice versa. The number of men comprising these armies was very considerable, and they intermingled with the population throughout the Peninsula. When Hannibal set out on his great march from Spain through Gaul to Italy, his initial total force was no fewer than 150,000 men, and large African garrisons remained behind.

There were small colonies founded along the coasts by Greeks and trading communities at many periods of Spanish history, but the next great occupation was in the time of the Romans. The Roman occupation probably left less new blood than either the previous African influences or those that succeeded at a later date. On the other hand, the effect upon the language and civilization of the inhabitants was such that Latin became the language of the Peninsula and the people very Romanized.

It may be of interest to modern economists to record that after the reign of the Emperor Hadrian, Spanish trade was ruined for a considerable time through unscrupulous merchants putting base metals in the silver currency—the equivalent in those days of printing currency notes with the Government printing presses.

With the decline of the Roman Empire, there were great invasions of Spain from the north. The Vandals passed straight through and founded their kingdom in Africa. Many others also overran the country—the Suevi, one of the more important armies; and finally the Visigoths established their sway over practically the whole of the country.

Shortly after the beginning of the eighth century the Moors obtained a footing. They gradually extended over the whole Peninsula. It gives some idea of how firmly based they were upon the country that their conquering armies, which pushed northwards across the Pyrenees, were not stopped in their progress until they had reached within striking distance of Paris.

Of all die invasions those of the successive Moors and Berbers were the most important. In the ninth and the first half of the tenth centuries Cordoba became the centre of culture and the wealthiest city in Europe.

The influence of the Moors upon Spain is to be seen in every direction; in the modifications to the basic language, in music, in the architecture, and in the blood and character of the people. Speaking broadly of Spain as a whole, it may be said that it is a blend of many nations, but the Moorish ingredient, though in no sense predominant, is one of the largest of the many contributions.

During the wars between the many petty Christian and Moorish kings it was quite customary for Moorish states to be fighting in alliance with Christians against some other combination. When no Moorish kings remained, it was nearly 800 years after the first invasion in force. But it would not be true to say the Moors were expelled from Spain. The Moors' religion was expelled, and many Moors left the country. But a large number remained—the Mudejares—and the numerous offspring of their predecessors.

There were also many subsidiary factors, especially in the coastal regions, in the north from France, and in the south from various peoples of the Mediterranean.

In the different valleys, the mountain "pockets" in the different regions separated by the great sierras or by the barren spaces, groups from the various invasions settled down and blended with those already there. In almost every group there was an entirely different preponderance of many elements. Partly as a consequence of this the Spaniard has become fiercely individualistic. The inhabitants of each province are extremely conscious of the difference between themselves and the others, and the same applies, in many areas, between village and village, and even between the inhabitants of individual villages.

During the feudal period there were vast tracts of land owned both by individuals such as the Grandees and by the Church—a fact well enough known in England to enable an entirely false picture to be presented as to the conditions prevailing in the twentieth century. These large estates were known as *latifundios* or "broad lands", and many years ago they were maintained intact because land taxes were low, death-duties not high, and marriages between numbers of

adjacent big land-owning families not infrequently occurred. To preserve the estates, the Spanish law of inheritance was somewhat on the lines of the old English primogeniture, and the properties were entailed. But the laws were changed so as to allow all the offspring equal participation, and taxes known as "royal rights" (*derechos reales*) were imposed, and increased heavily. As a consequence, the landed estates of good quality were divided up and sold, completely transforming the nature of the country'. Only a few large estates remained intact, and they were of little agricultural value. During the twentieth century they certainly did not constitute a problem as regards unemployment.

We propose to substantiate this statement so that there can be no doubt about its accuracy.

In the northern region, between the Cantabrian Mountains and the sea—Galicia, Asturias, Santander and the Basque provinces—there was not a single *latifundio*. The majority of the agricultural holdings were the "pazos" in Galicia; the "praderias" in Asturias and Santander; and the "caserios" of the Basques—small homesteads and pasturages. None of them was anything like 1,000 hectareas (1 hectarea is under 2½ acres) in extent. They were principally used for cattle, or were planted with chestnuts, walnuts or trees for timber, or maize. The usual size of each holding was between 1 hectarea and 50 hectareas (say 125 acres). *One could count on the fingers of the hand those that exceeded the latter figure.* The current measure of land in this region, even nowadays used in legal documents and contracts, is the "carlo"—the area necessary for harvesting a "carro", or cartload, of grass; and that is so little that usually there are about 18 "carros" in each hectarea. In those parts no rich proprietor worked his estate. Anyone who had a number of small lots rented them out to lease-holders, who used them for their cattle.

In Navarre and Old Castile and Leon two areas must be considered. In the northern part, the position was almost exactly the same as that which we have described above. In the southern section, which enjoys more sunshine and better soil, the produce is mainly cereals.

In this latter part the ground is much subdivided, for it is the custom among proprietors to divide each estate, no matter how small it may be, amongst the heirs. The real problem to-day is, therefore, one of *minifundia*, a multitude of

estates so small that they are not worth the trouble of cultivating. Many are of one or two "cuartillos", a measure which is the fourth part of the "celemín", which in turn is one-twelfth part of a hectarea (i.e. one forty-eighth part of acres) $2\frac{1}{2}$

Throughout the whole of this zone slightly larger estates exist only in Salamanca, Zamora and Valladolid, but these were "dehesas" (grazing lands), woodlands and pasturage. There is good soil, but the country is sparsely populated, and the extremely dry climate in summer-time makes cereal growing very difficult. The number of these "dehesas" is growing yearly less. In no case did they exceed 3,000 "fanegas", or about 1,000 hectareas.

In Aragon and the interior of Catalonia, Castellon and Valencia there are also no large estates. The "vegas" or tracts of fruitful, level ground, are very scattered, and only in the mountains are there occasional properties of any size, only fit for use as pasturage.

Along the coast of the Levante—Castellon and Valencia—the whole of the good part of the irrigated land is very subdivided. The usual measure is the "hanegada", of which there are 22 to the hectarea. The majority of the "states", called "masias", in the Levante are scarcely two or three hundred "hanegadas"; and those which exceed that figure, like the Vallesa del Mandor, in Valencia, of the Count of Montovnes, are famous by reason of their rarity. Here again, therefore, is no ground for saying that the problem of *latifundia* exists.

In Estremadura—the provinces of Cáceres and Badajoz—there are larger and more important estates than in the foregoing regions. The soil generally is good, but the great heat and the drought of summer are almost intolerable. The summer there lasts from April to November. The "dehesas" are worked by labour, largely seasonal, of peasants from Galicia and elsewhere, who returned home with their wages to help them through the winter, and there are a number of estates of cork trees and *Encina bellota* (a kind of Spanish oak). The acorns are the fodder for most of the pigs of Spain. The average type of large "dehesas" is some 1,000 hectareas in extent, and quite incapable of producing a problem which could justify revolution in Spain. Nevertheless that is the place, perhaps, where outward appearances might have supported propaganda about the *latifundios*. As a con-

sequence it was there that the Republic carried out the much trumpeted distribution of lands, with the results which we shall later describe.

In New Castile generally the land is divided up into small parcels, but there are some estates of importance, especially in the provinces of Toledo and Ciudad Real. These *latifundios*—for so they were described in order to deceive the people—are of two classes in this region. Some are of the most unfertile description, others are rather more suitable for cultivation. Typical of the former were estates like that of “Cabáñeros”, situated in the mountains, where frequently the villages are 60 or 70 kilometres apart. It was maintained by its owner, the late Marqués de Valdelagrana, for goat-rearing and game-shooting. It hardly paid the expenses of keepers and taxes. These 12,000 hectares of rocky peaks and wild-strawberry bushes could never be cultivated, not even if those to whom they were distributed were given a cultivation subsidy. The other large estates of land that could be worked were all broken up and put under cultivation during the last twenty years. There are very few of them exceeding 1,000 hectares, and all of them are on lease to farmers who pay an average of 100 kilogrammes of corn per hectarea—say less than 50 lb. per acre. The largest estate of this kind, and the one which was most used for Marxist propaganda, was “El Alamin”, belonging to the Marqués de Comillas, situated between the provinces of Madrid and Toledo. It had an area of some 6,000 hectares (say 15,000 acres). Of these more than 5,000 were broken up for purposes of cultivation and were leased out, except for some 500, which the owner kept for his own use and his cattle.

In Andalusia the whole of the fertile lands of the *vegas* of Granada, Almeria, Cordoba, etc., are very widely distributed. The other lands, as in New Castile, were of two kinds, those of the Sierra and marshlands, useless for cultivation, and those in the level countryside which can only give an economic yield by employing tractors and a working capital beyond the means of small proprietors. Those described as the Andalusian “cortijos” (granges) are generally large estates. One of them which was parcelled out and given to small cultivators was soon abandoned and became waste land. The most noteworthy estate, which figured largely in the Marxist propaganda, was the “Coto de Donaña”, belonging to the late Duke

of Tarifa. Together with the “*marismas* (marshland) de Hinojos” it was some 50,000 hectareas in area. It is situated on the right bank at the mouth of the River Guadalquivir, and it is bounded by that river, the sea and inferior marshlands. Of this estate some 5,000 hectareas are sea sand, and constitute a desert bare of all vegetation; some 35,000 hectareas are marshland and lakes which, from October to November, are covered with water and form a kind of inland sea until April or May. During the summer a small area of shrubland becomes available, called the “*castañuela*” (so named from the tuberous-rooted cypress), and it is used for pasturing cattle and horses. The remainder of the estate, that is to say, some 10,000 hectareas, consists of scrub, mostly cystus, with cork trees and Spanish oak. This is worked by charcoal burners who live in cabins which they abandon when the waters inundate the marshland and cut off their cabins from the rest of the world. The following details give an idea of this much-discussed estate. The price at which the Duke of Tarifa purchased it from the Duke of Medina Sidonia, its former owner, was 600,000 pesetas; and no one could be found to give more for it. This works out at the average price of 12 pesetas per hectarea (about 3s. per acre). And in the administration accounts of the Duke of Tarifa it is shown that, since its purchase, there has never been any year when the revenues have exceeded the expenses. On average some 30,000 pesetas have been spent upon it annually, in addition to the rentals.

It will be seen that there is a great difference in the manner of the distribution of the land in Castile and in Andalusia, and that the land itself is very different in its nature. For 400 years these two great regions have been subject to the same political government and laws. Yet in the former the estates have become much divided, whilst in the latter they have remained large in comparison.

This is not due merely to the wishes of the proprietors, nor to legislative initiative. It has been due for the most part to the problems of climate and cultivation, which are not easily solved by lawyers in parliaments, nor by the demagogic speeches of politicians.

The regions broadly described above cover the whole of Spain. We will add a more detailed description of one particular area, Galicia, in the extreme north-west, which

illustrates the real problem in Spain, namely *minifundia*, or the diminutive size of the units in the more fertile areas.

Property in Galicia is often held by virtue of mediaeval title-deeds. "The enforced expropriation decreed, with all the rashness of youth, by the Cortes of the Republic, proved no remedy"?

Property is divided and subdivided to an extraordinary extent. In Galicia it may consist of a single tree, a tiny ruined granite mill, or a small pinewood on rocky soil above a *ria* (small estuary of Galicia, usually shallow). About Orense there are properties of two or three *copelos* (one *cojelo* = about half an acre). A house or hovel sometimes belongs to two or more persons. The classical instance of subdivision is officially given as follows:

"A property of 32 square metres in the Province of Coruña with three proprietors, one of whom 'possesses' the land, another its adjacent tree, whilst the third (as 'owner') receives 6 eggs yearly, paid alternately by the other two."

This sounds like a lawyer's paradise, though the costs might not be very tempting. The subdivision is complicated by the system of land tenure, by which the owner has for centuries ceased to possess the land, having parted with all right of use or interference to the tenant in return for a fixed *foro*.

The titles of these *foros* are often very ancient. Sometimes "rent" is payable in money, but more often in kind, e.g. wheat, maize, rye, eggs, jars of wine, capons, calves, trout, pots of honey, carts of manure, etc. One title-deed claims one black and one white chicken, others claim needles, wax, chestnuts, beans, pears, lard, etc. There were many variations: "One title-deed dated 1299 prescribes a sucking pig, a dozen eggs at Michaelmas and a measure of wine at Christmas and Easter. The *forero* seldom received the land for a definite number of years; more often it was for life, or for the duration of two or more lives, or for ever."²

And, as with our tithe payers, those owing any annual payment for their land are always anxious to get out of paying, even though the purchase price they paid for the land, as a business proposition, took into account the annual burden

¹ Aubrey Bell, *Spanish Galicia*, The Bodley Head, 1922. He was referring to the Republic of 1873.

³ *Ibid.*

upon the revenues from the property. However, it really amounted to little more than an age-old and perpetual local "grouse."

The over-division of property is to be found also in other provinces. In Soria, the largest province of Spain, where one of the great pine forests is to be found, property in individual pine trees is handed down, subdivided amongst the various members of a family, and again amongst their children and grandchildren.

In general the relations of landlord and tenant were far more human and intimate than in England. The proprietor, or members of the family, were frequently the godparents of the children of tenants; and they usually took the interest in them which that "spiritual relationship" enjoins. Moreover, though in Spain as throughout the world, the value of the currency expressed in land, houses or commodities has greatly decreased, the leases have often remained unaltered and have been renewed, generation after generation, on the original terms.

In case the above descriptions are insufficient indication of the falsity of the propaganda relating to the *latifundios*, in order to have an authentic and convincing proof of the current wide distribution of land we applied to the Santander-Mediterráneo Railway Company requesting them to furnish us with particulars of the land which they had to expropriate when building their railway. This railway, which, incidentally, was constructed with British capital, runs through three provinces, across the north-eastern corner of the Peninsula, for a distance of approximately 227 miles (367 kilometres). The number of properties which had to be acquired or leased was 15,313. In other words, there were about 42 to each kilometre, or 70 to every mile—on average, say, one estate every 25 yards. In the province of Burgos it worked out at about 80 properties per mile, or one every 20 yards or less; in the province of Zaragoza there was on average one every 50 yards; and in the province of Soria there were approximately 60 to the mile.

The area purchased or leased covered 1,136 hectares, of which 133 hectares were waste land and mountains belonging to the public authorities, or common land. Of the land acquired from private individuals, the average size was 670 square metres, which works out at approximately 75 £_{ee}t by

75 feet, and this average included such of the larger tracts of barren lands as were privately owned.

A railway in a country so mountainous and broken as Spain has to follow the gentle gradients, very largely along the old glacier beds and the valleys of the rivers and streams. These are naturally the more fertile parts, often the only fertile ones in the area, which partly accounts for the large number of holdings. Wherever land in Spain can successfully be worked in small holdings, it is worked in that manner. Almost everywhere the only large estates are totally unfit for cultivation, or of poor quality, and not suitable for working in small lots.

We inquired at the same time what proportion of this land acquired for the purposes of the railway had been property belonging to the Church or its religious orders. According to current propaganda, it ought to represent *at least* 60% of the total. We were informed, however, that *not one single hectare* of the land belonged to either.

Persistent statements of the wealth and power of the Church in Spain are, in our judgment on the evidence before us, Marxist inventions for political purposes, promulgated by the world-wide propaganda machinery which the international forces we describe later in this book have established. The reasons for that campaign of mendacity we also analyse later.

Take a typically inaccurate statement, made in a recent book, to the effect that the Catholic Church "came to own between 80% and 90% of the accumulated wealth of the Peninsula ~~that~~ not more than fifty years ago it owned at least 60%; and "*it has a hold on almost as much to-day*".¹ This statement, to anyone knowing Spain, is made from ignorance or inexperience. We have no hesitation in speaking so definitely, for any reputable Spanish banker—or, better still, the best half-dozen—will confirm that Señor Prieto's statement² is most regrettably incorrect.

We have already shown the position along a line drawn through 227 miles of the country. But elsewhere the falsity of the statement can be equally easily proved. Take anyone conversant with the *Catastral* registers of the various provinces, and inquire into the history of the owners. In case this is insufficient, consult the records of the *Compañia Arrendataria*

¹ Carlos Prieto, *Spanish Front*.

² We are informed that Carlos Prieto is Mr. Charles Duff, late of the Foreign Office, now editor of *Spain at War*.

de Tabacos and examine the *derechos* collected; or inquire from Hacienda officials concerning the collection of the *utilidades*, or profits taxes. They will all show clearly that the author is profoundly misinformed.

It need hardly be added that the poor village *cura* of the average Spanish village would also be anxious to contradict him; even the Red apologists admit the inadequate means available to him from all sources,¹ owing to the poverty of the Church in Spain in 1936. The property of the Church has been confiscated at successive intervals since early in the nineteenth century. Such wealth as it now has is mainly in the form of churches for public service and in artistic treasures, a liability for upkeep rather than an asset. The principal revenue is from the ordinary donations of the congregations. A few teaching Orders had some funds invested in various directions, the proceeds being mainly devoted to teaching and charity. Compared with the Church of England, either in percentage of national wealth, or in total annual revenue, the Church in Spain was unquestionably very poor indeed.

Among the people of the north-west, large numbers of their jokes are at the expense of the clergy. This might well give a false impression to the foreigner who did not know the country well. For, far from this being due to lack of religious feeling, or to disrespect, it was the natural outcome of ingrained and native religion, so familiar that they could afford to jest like a family concerning its parents and relatives. In Spain, the religion of the country has been so much part of its life that words based upon biblical incidents are part of the normal vocabulary¹, their origin and reason being quite lost from frequent use. For example, when a *matador* at a bullfight brings off a clever pass in which the cloak brushes the muzzle of the bull, it is known as a pretty *veronica*, after the legend of Saint Veronica, which relates how the image of Christ appeared on the cloth with which she wiped His face on the way to Calvary. But the Spaniard would quite rightly resent a suggestion that his use of the word was disrespectful.

We have dwelt at length on these important questions of the *latifundios* and the wealth of the Church. Great propaganda has been made out of wealthy Grandees and clerics battenning on the poor. This entirely erroneous picture has

¹ Enrique Moreno, *Catholics and the Spanish State*, issued by the Friends of Spain.

been established by the sheer force of repetition and a torrent of printed matter, some written by opponents with complete disregard of the facts, others by persons deceived by books written with malice. It is almost impossible for the ordinary reader to decide which books have been written in good faith. Famous names have been used to deceive; money has played a great part in this campaign of propaganda. It has been almost impossible for the truth to reach the British public except in specialized periodicals difficult to obtain, just as, at the same time, a dense smoke-screen has been spread over the real Spanish news. To those proofs brought forward above, we will therefore add the confirmation afforded by the Spanish laws of inheritance and death-duties.

In Spain, most families are larger than the average family in England, or indeed, in many other countries. Under Spanish law the estate of a deceased parent had to be divided into three parts, whether that estate was £50 or £500,000. One such part of the estate had to be divided equally between the children, irrespective of sex. The deceased, where he left several children, had the right by his will to give one other of such parts to one direct heir in preference to the others, but in practice this one-third was nearly always left in equal proportions also. Of the remaining one-third the testator could dispose as he thought fit. It was, therefore, by no means rare for a man with six children to divide his estate into six equal parts.

This legislation has been in force for a hundred years. Nobody but a political agitator would suggest that the evil of *latifundia* could long survive such legislation. The great agricultural problem facing Spain was, on the contrary, how to deal with the over-division of the properties.

Coupled with the above legislation, a heavy scale of death-duties was introduced. Like most Spanish legislation, it was complicated. The present scale was passed by decree on the 27th February, 1927, and a modification, increasing the taxes, was introduced on the 11th May, 1933. The taxes had been heavy long before either of these laws. There was a sliding scale upon a total of the estate; there was a variable scale upon the individual legacies; there were extra levies to provide a State fund for Workmen's Pensions, and, in the case of intestacy, a further increase of 25%. We will give two examples to show what happened to the larger fortunes.

A legacy from a brother, under the 1932 tariff, amounting to 6,000,000 pesetas (say £120,000 before the Civil War) would pay to the State 1,734,000 pesetas—that is to say, nearly 30% of the total. In the event of intestacy where the property passed to an heir of the fifth degree of relationship, it would pay 600,000 pesetas for the global tax, and surcharges totalling 3,030,500 pesetas—that is to say, altogether more than 60% of the total estate.

A mere relation of the facts concerning the laws of succession and death-duties is the strongest possible proof of the falsity of the Red propaganda, and is in itself sufficient evidence that the Reds intended, as they themselves said, to reject even the most drastic reform, because their object was violent revolution—with violence as a necessary condition of their doctrine.

Spain, though a country with great local possibilities, is, of necessity, sparsely populated. It is mainly agricultural, and local "colonies" have solved their own difficulties in the hard school of experience. The standard of living is not high, for, as a whole, it is not a very wealthy country. But the necessities of life vary very considerably with the particular climate of each region. The men of the mountains and the high plateaux eat meat. Many of the others do not, nor, for climatic reasons, do they need nor wish to do so. Though many are vegetarians, we may disregard such statements as the one widely circulated in England about vast numbers of people who have been living for decades upon grass. The problems are many: irregularity of water supplies, cost of irrigation, the denudation of the soil, and the great differences in the potentialities of production in the different parts. There is no city like London in the Lofoten Islands, nor on the coasts of Greenland, and for the same reason—namely, that the country could not support it. It is difficult for an Englishman who does not know Spain to appreciate its particular difficulties. Many in England, whether employers or employees, have found a means of living already provided by the past initiative of their ancestors and the natural and developed advantages which our country enjoys. But, in Spain, a much less industrialized country the inhabitants live far closer to nature—their own experience often bitter, has taught them that their livelihood must be wrung from the soil by their own persistent personal effort.

The problems of Spain are not made easier by the diver

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of the types of its inhabitants. Professor José Castillejo divides them into broad groups. The north-eastern group, Catalonia and the Levante, "practical, sensual, Mediterraneans, with more initiative than creative spirit . . . fond of grandeur and ostentation . . . industrious, thrifty and sociable." The south-eastern type he describes as the "main Semitic offspring, artistic . . . prone to mystic fanaticism or contemptuous scepticism, to ardent love or merciless hatred . . . hidden in the inscrutable Oriental depth of their souls".

To the Andalusian of the south he attributes "no ties, no memory of the past . . . boundless imagination . . . passionate explosions and an inexhaustible sense of humour". These main groups he describes as the principal unstable elements.

The Basques, Aragonese and the Navarros of the central north he describes as obstinate, self-confident, good-minded, but rough and inflexible.

The Galician of the north-west yields superficially, but keeps his thoughts to himself.

The chief characteristics of the people of Leon and Castile are a deep sense of dignity and honour; sobriety, without a great capacity for business; and political talent.

The Asturians and the people of Estremadura he regards as intermediate types, though differing very much from each other.¹

It is interesting and important, when one looks at this classification, to note that the stable elements of the nation are those who rallied to the standard of the Nationalists. Largely they are the cattle and wheatmen, the meat-eaters, the hardier men of the hills and plateaux. It has been said of Spain in the past that it derived its strength from Castile. It would appear safe to prophesy that history will once more repeat itself.

Religion is profoundly necessary to the Spanish temperament. Of no other country could it more truly be said that, in the words of Voltaire, "if there were no God it would be necessary to invent one". But that God may differ greatly according to the nature of the individual. Among the unstable elements this may result in a curious but passionate adherence to such creeds as *anarquismo*, which might be regarded as based upon an emotional religious impulse as much as upon a political doctrine.

It is this curiously intense note in the Spanish character

¹ Jos<5 Castillejo, *War of Ideas in Spain*.

which has made Spain so suitable a field of exploitation by agitators. To show the kind of beliefs and how they were in fact exploited, we reproduce, from the anarchist paper (of the C.N.T.) *Campo Libre*, an article upon "Anarquismo".

"To be a militant supporter of a doctrine, it is not by any means necessary to understand it. There are frequent cases of doctors who are no more than people who have paid a qualification fee and others who come to be directors without the smallest scrap of theoretical knowledge. Being initiated into the rudiments of a law does not imply sufficient qualification for a man to be considered more acceptable, and even an abundance of knowledge is no claim to leadership.

"Being an anarchist without knowing what it means does not impair one's quality as such, just as it is not increased by assimilating the writings of all the nihilists.

⁴⁴ There are still no text books of anarchism, and there never will be any, because there cannot be. When an anarchist catechism is prepared, this will be the perpetration of the utmost absurdity: because anarchism is this—⁴ every latitude for individual appreciation, providing always that the natural and biological laws are not exceeded'.

"Some people may ramble into Communism, others into academic theories, by virtue of essential anarchy. There are no laws laid down, there are no paths marked out, there are no delimitations except respect for the ⁴ symbol ' which is ⁴ the law in blank ', which is ⁴ the whole scope for the movement of each individual'.

"Anarchists have to know only one thing, namely, ⁴ that they are anarchists ', and even if they knew more than that, it would help them little.

"The definition of anything, of the Deity itself, expresses less than the thing, pure and simple, universally felt; but even with the whole definition made in twenty theological treatises the vocabulary which expresses divinity, liberty or solidarity, or, in fine, any abstraction, expresses to every ear which hears it a different concept as to its size, its form and its colour

⁴⁴ Anarchism is not based upon ideas which are strictly logical, or even according to reason; and it may be pointed out that the word ⁴ reasonable ' has an elastic significance reaching even to the irrational, but, by the minimum of laws of conduct—which it indicates—it is maintained by a series of limits

(or definitions) which would best be covered by the idea of temperament.

"I have been brought to observe this by the fact that energy, free will, activity, tenacity, the spirit of sacrifice, companionship, naturalness are considered in the appreciation of an individual as worth as much as, or more than, intelligence.

"This complex expression of will of anarchist 'super-estimation' shows us on the one hand the possibility of a humane harmonization by means of education of affection, whereby there would be peace in the world, and at the same time the desirability for the diversity of opinions amongst those who are passionately attached to the essence of anarchy, confirming what was stated at the beginning, namely, that it is not necessary to know either its articles or its mandatory principles.

"Let nobody be ashamed because he believes he knows less than others. In our organization, it is only necessary to know one thing—that we all of us have the personality which emanates from our own individual faculties, which cannot be increased by the support of any friendship whatsoever.

"Whoever speaks of anarchism can only do so with the preamble that it is a very subjective influence. There should therefore be no school of anarchism, no capitular constitution, no standardized principles for the libertarians.

"Just as it is said in medicine that there are no illnesses but only sick people, so it can be said that there is no anarchism but only anarchists; and we can reach the conclusion that socially and in practice the nihilist philosophy is Utopian. And, in fact, it is so from the exclusively rational, methodical, scientific point of view; but that it is practical and even of daily routine is shown by its existence since the very origin of humanity, and by the high value which in all societies—even those of the kind which are most scrupulous in their calculations—is placed upon the impulses, the sentiments, the suggestion, the sympathy, upon which we put our highest esteem.

"By virtue of what 'practicalism' or other 'ism' can it be said that anarchism is Utopian, if here and now we are in the majority?

"We are anarchists, and nothing more, 'to be as we are' without any wherefore.

"UNCLE ROQUE."

The creed of the anarchists is thus, in effect, "self-expression" without defined limits, a convenient doctrine which resulted during the Civil War in 1936 in the most dreadful atrocities and tens of thousands of murders in cold blood. When the Civil War began the official number of members of the C.N.T. (National Confederation of Labour), mainly controlled by anarchists, was very large. A correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* put the figure at over 2,000,000. It was probably nearer 1,000,000, and that figure included many who had to be members in order to be permitted to work. They were thus one of the largest bodies supporting the Madrid Government, to which their support was so necessary that they could practically dictate its policy, although, theoretically, they had adopted the principle that they would take no part in politics or in government.

Absence of restraint, the destruction of self-control, and resentment of discipline is the interpretation of anarchism or "libertarian communism" and it will be observed that the above article clearly aims at keeping the anarchists content with direction by Communists. "We explain the reasons for this later in these pages. This article is a typical example of the political chicanery perpetrated upon the Spanish peasants, an advocacy put forward by members of an organized group on behalf of a creed which could not lead to anything useful, but only to the shedding of the blood of the people against whom the anarchists could be let loose.

The struggle of ideas in Spain has often been violently manifested in the past. The principle of "direct action" has often guided those who fiercely advocated a doctrine and those opposed to it, whether they were the authorities in power or people over whom authority was exercised. Professor Castillejo gives an interesting outline of the tenets of one of the early secret sects which spread over the country, although it was bitterly persecuted by the Moorish Minister Al-Mansur. He states, "The philosophical doctrines, the austerity and spirituality of the founder soon gave rise to a political party, defending a sort of communism on its negative side: a Moslem should not possess anything beyond his daily food; the sexual relations ought to be free and unrestricted by religious precepts." In the eleventh century, when this party was led by Ismael, they "added three significant postulates: they considered it lawful to possess themselves of the property



THE ALHAMBRA, GRANADA



of the infidels by whatever means, including murder; regarded as an infidel any person who did not belong to the sect; and the members of this, being superior to the rest in mystic perfection, did not need to obey any rules which were good only for the ignorant masses".

As Professor Castillejo remarks, it is difficult here to disentangle Communism from Anarchism. The principal difference between this "religion", Russian Communism, and the Spanish Anarchism of to-day is that these last two appear devoid of any religious or spiritual inspiration, however perverted. Their doctrines are materialistic, and the "high priests" show more aptitude for personal gain, or for political power, for what it will bring materially, than those of this earlier mystic religion.

So it was too in the conduct of the Grand Inquisition; whether it was operating as a religious or a civil instrument, there are few who would maintain that its characteristic was toleration.

The peculiar ingredients in the Spanish character frequently produce the antitheses: an uncompromising ferocity or austerity. Many have adopted self-discipline almost as an end in itself. There are thus, scattered about the country, little communities which still live similar lives to the hermits of the Middle Ages. In his book, dealing with Malaga under Government rule after July 1936, Señor Gil Gomez Bajuelo gives a good picture of a typical community.

The famous hermitage outside Cordoba—"the little white houses perched like doves above the slopes of the sierra"—was not destroyed by the Reds in 1936, nor were the hermits slaughtered, as they were at most of the other similar places and sanctuaries, like the Sanctuary of the Virgen de la Cabeza.

There was room in the "colony" for a total of twenty. In July 1936 there were ten "hermits" and two aspirants. Each lived in a house composed of three compartments: a hard bed in a small cell, a tiny cooking cupboard, and a small room with a work-bench. As usual, these little houses were perched high up on the hills, because altitude and the nature of the position were in harmony with detachment and meditation. In the approach to them, tall sombre cypresses stood sentinel. Daily the monks rose at two in the morning and went to rest at nine at night. They spent their time in prayer, at work, at cultivating food, making their own clothes (sackcloth), and in medita-

tion. Admission was by voluntary¹ application and with a probationary period. Twice a month they met for conversation as common recreation. Each morning a night vigilant rang the chapel bell in turn along the line. If one of them did not ring in response, he was visited after Mass; for it meant either that he was sick, or that his bell would never ring again.

No traveller or needy peasant had ever been known to ask for food in vain.

This "Order" had been long established there. On a previous occasion when Marxist patrols called to sack their premises, led on by the usual stories of their fabulous hidden wealth, their lives had been spared. Nothing was found, only a hundred of the poor being provided with a meal. Most English people may find it difficult to understand these men, but it would be difficult to maintain that they are evil, much less deserving of death. But that was the fate in 1936 of nearly every similar community throughout the Red part of Spain.

Between the creed of licence and the creed of restraint, typified by the anarchism and the asceticism we have outlined above, there is in Spain every possible gradation. The one thing common to the majority is that strain of impatience and intolerance which might be directed towards either extreme.

The character of the people has always made two things necessary for good administration and order in the country—a strong government, and a strong lead for guiding the people's mobile impulses. But good government is a thing Spain has seldom enjoyed. In the face of discontent, it was generally weak, as well as vindictive, inefficient and corrupt. There was generally money to begin, if not to complete, all sorts of expensive and grandiose schemes. But there was no money to provide bread for the unemployed. The whole of the relief for the unemployed and the poor was carried out for centuries by the Church and latterly from voluntary subscriptions, when the Church had little revenue of its own. Education too was mostly carried out by the Church, for Spanish Governments spared little money towards it.

One of the most noticeable failures of the Governments elected under a democratic parliamentary system, with popular suffrage, was its neglect of the unemployed, although their numbers normally were not very great. The number increased visibly during the Republic, though it is hard to obtain reliable statistics. In the agricultural districts those in exce

of what particular regions could well afford to support used to emigrate, principally to South America. But industries came to be developed, and the "proletarian" element increased in numbers as a consequence, creating in Spain, though in a minor degree, the evils which everywhere spring from casual labour and the fluctuating demands on the labour market which seem to follow industrialization.

Three things held the nation together, the Monarchy, a national religion, and the nation's past great history and achievements. The first two were deliberately attacked by organized forces. The third had reached the stage of a memory, tinged with the bitterness of loss. Patriotism was not sustained by success, and the traditions of *Españolismo* were weakened by the fostering of regional aspirations, so clamorous for their own "rights", so impatient of the needs of others.

Into the distant valleys, where the *pueblos* were so often like isolated nests, came the forces of modern "progress"; and with them the men eager to benefit by the changes in the local outlook. It was pouring new wine into old bottles. The great spate of theory seldom brought increased resources or amenities; but it did most certainly induce discontent.

There was much knowledge without wisdom, change without remedy and for its own sake, destruction of sound local philosophy of long growth without replacing it with anything better, but usually very much the reverse. It was very like introducing gin and Christianity suddenly amongst African or Papuan natives, destroying the old religions before new ideas could be assimilated. Content is a great boon, by no means to be despised, and it is very hard to achieve. Discontent can do untold mischief, whether caused by unscrupulous and cynical exploitation of ignorance by the ambitious, or by enthusiastic mental indigestion and learning divorced from principle. The purely materialistic point of view, especially where coupled, as it often was, with an intolerant and intolerable pride of intellect, has damaged many societies in the world besides the Spanish villages. There was plenty of room for improvements and for progress. But their introduction required a wise guidance which was not the distinguishing feature of those who gained authority. There were too many who could not distinguish between what was ignorance and what was the wisdom of the centuries.

The reaction of all the different groups was as varied as

might be expected. No observant traveller can fail to notice the amazing differences between them—some too impressionable, others slow to move; some visionary, others practical. Largely these differences were regional. It was one of the joys of travelling in Spain to see the relations between the peasants and the landowners in the Castilian regions. The labourer of Castile would greet "Don Pedro", his master, as the master would greet "Don Carlos", his employé. They spoke as man to man, and sobriety and dignity was the keynote. In many other parts the impulses were violent and unruly, though the nature usually generous at heart. The character of many Spaniards is ver}' like their own sky, with strange and sudden storms, and a rapid return to the sunshine. In his contacts

the Spaniard generally judges a man by his face—and it is not a bad criterion. If he liked the look of you, there was much he would be glad and honoured to do; if not, no mule could be more stubborn. If he happened to be a bad man who heartily disliked the look of a face which betokened a serene mind, the result, where authority was relaxed, was likely to be disastrous. A highly individualistic and lovable people, gaining their living by very hard work in most parts, overcoming their local problems by locally devised means—such problems as make it difficult for the stranger to judge by the standards gained from his own home environment—the Spaniard needed, and had acquired, enduring traditions and a civilization almost entirely his own, deep-rooted in the country' itself.

AX e cannot attempt to portray the intense local colour and interest of Spain, her peoples and their customs. As long ago as 1846 an Englishman, Richard Ford, wrote an account worthy the attention of all who seek to know Spain—and so to love her. ~~hord is wrong in a number of his appreciations. Mo~~ did not spend many years in the country. But most of what he wrote so long ago is still true to-day in its essentials. Had he written in 1923, after the ravages of the Government under the parliamentary system up to the time of the military dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, or in 1936 after the four and a half years of the second Republic, more fatal even than the tragic and short-lived Republic of 1873, his comments on the chronic misgovernment of the country would have been even more trenchant than when he wrote:

"Spain, if the anecdote which her children love to tell be

true, will never be able to remove the incubus of this fertile origin of every evil. When Ferdinand III captured Seville and died, being a saint he escaped purgatory, and Santiago presented him to the Virgin who forthwith desired him to ask any favours for beloved Spain. The monarch petitioned for oil, wine and corn—conceded; for sunny skies, brave men and pretty women—allowed; for cigars, relics, garlic and bulls—by all means; for a *good Government*—‘ Nay, nay! ’ said the Virgin, ‘ that never can be granted; for were it bestowed, not an angel would remain a day longer in Heaven.’ ”¹

¹ Richard Ford, *Gatherings from Spain*, Everyman’s Library.

CHAPTER II

THE FALL OF A MONARCHY

THE history of Spain leading up to the Republic in 1931, and its sequel, the Civil War in 1936, is very largely a history of the slow growth of certain conditions and influences. There are few milestones to mark their progress. It is above all a history of the creation of an antagonism intended to become class warfare, but which ended more in a division of sympathies irrespective of class.

The many modifications in the moral and material development of the nation, and the causes of them, are better appreciated by a brief note on each of the factors than by a relation of specific events which took place on particular dates. The most important were the evils resulting from the way in which the party system of government operated; corruption in the administration; the traditional rôle played by the Army in the affairs of the nation; the unfortunate nature of the direction behind the labour movement; the social disorders which retarded progress in commerce and industry; the influence and work of the Church; and the effects of clandestine propaganda.

The respective importance of these factors varied greatly from time to time. When some event could obviously be traced to the direct influence of any one of them, its strength was often comparatively easy to gauge; where such events did not occur, it was difficult to tell how far they were operating, or in what manner.

The impression has been created in some quarters that under the King, whether before or after the proclamation of the dictatorship by Primo de Rivera at the end of ¹⁹²³ _{in} the country was governed in a tyrannical manner. These allegations are unfounded. Before the dictatorship the governments which so rapidly succeeded one another were the children and

the slaves, of Parliament. The Ministers were nominated by the King only apparently. If they were not agreeable to Parliament they were immediately thrown out. It is sufficient proof that numerous Cabinets did not last a week, and few of them survived three months. It is true that the King had power to dissolve Parliament and call for elections; but this, which in any case is the reverse of proof of tyranny, was a very limited power, because, owing to the characteristic Spanish vehemence, it was not possible to keep the country in the constant state of ferment produced by elections, and also because, in any case, the elections were seldom held fairly. Moreover, large numbers of the electorate showed a complete apathy and were lacking in a sense of political responsibility. Sometimes this was due to disgust at the nature of the governments, of whatever views; sometimes they were merely too busy earning their daily bread or with local problems to worry much about the central Government, unless it perpetrated some unusually dreadful infamy which aroused their indignation. We see the same thing to some extent in England, where householders, in districts already groaning under a tremendous burden of rates or taxes, cannot be bothered to register their votes in favour of economies, even though the rates accordingly become much more burdensome, and the same experience is repeated time after time.

The function of the King was no more than that of the moderating power required in any form of government. Until Primo de Rivera proclaimed his dictatorship, the executive power was in the hands of the Ministers; the judicial officers were nominated by, and for, the political parties; and the armed forces were mainly under civil Ministers. It is not too much to say that almost the whole machinery of the government of the country was, to an excessive degree, directly in the hands of the legislative body, the Cortes, and that in practice the parties alternating in power used their authority to try to obtain for themselves the material benefits they could thus extract. If there was a tyranny, it was by these political parties; yet they usually governed weakly, and seldom exercised their authority consistently or with wisdom.

During the nineteenth century democratic political parties throughout the world flourished by reason of a perfectly reasonable theory. Men who had specialized in questions of government grouped themselves together where they held


similar views on State problems; they studied them, drew up reports on them, and put them forward to the people in the form of an electoral programme. Where these programmes appealed to the people, their originators rose to power, and there they remained until their downfall through the failure of the hopes they had engendered, or others deprived them of control by putting forward a better or more specious programme. The ideal programme was seldom attained. When they reached power, the political groups frequently forgot their programmes, granting only a small portion of the benefits promised, as a compromise in order to placate both their friends and their enemies, and with a view to enjoying the fruits of office as long as possible. In Spain perhaps more than anywhere, they knew that their political life was short. The usual routine was to gather in all they could before their downfall, and often to placate opposing influences against the day when they would be out of power.

Their chief preoccupation was to influence or control the three principal instruments which would help them to remain in office—the political syndicates which controlled labour, the Army, and the legislative executive.

Though the methods have not varied very much in the various countries in the world, the reactions in each country have differed greatly, just as the effects of a particular kind of sickness differ according to the persons attacked.

In the United States, during the elections some two years ago, both parties published their electoral programme and a statement of their objects. From the sentiments expressed and the specific aims mentioned, it was practically impossible to tell the difference between the two. Both naturally had to seek the support of the majority, and did so by the promises best calculated to appeal.

In France everybody promises so much that the Conservative programme is often indistinguishable from that of the Left-Wing Socialist. The "Socialists" are mainly communist or wherever the money is, and the Communists are either camouflaged official extremists to encourage the "Socialists" , or something unspeakably violent. There are so many parties that there is practically no Government; and, as the result of experience, the French public has become so cynical about its elected representatives that "deputy hunting" look like becoming a national sport. Meanwhile their nation 1 - s a



COCA CASTLE, SEGOVIA

[facing page 44]



economy just falls to pieces, and the benefits granted with one hand are taken back with the other by piling up debts in their place or devaluing the currency.

In Spain the result of party politics was even more disastrous. The extraordinary thing was the patience of the electorate before the final protest was made. The political parties robbed the Nation. It was their principal object in taking office. When the plunder had been secured, it was often transferred abroad. And those who benefited very frequently went with it.

The party system has another danger in countries where the electorate and the politicians are not distinguished for a highly developed sense of justice, patriotism, or even equity. A majority party, even though its majority was the smallest possible, might exercise its power to oppress the minority parties and the classes they represent. They *might* use the opportunity of power to consolidate their position and to further their future prospects of continuation in power. In the same way almost any coalition of parties forming a working majority might similarly oppress the remainder. The majority often are even regarded as justified, or at least excused, for using, in almost any way, the power which they hold: for sympathy and support is sought for the Republican Government in the Civil War of 1936 on the ground that it was technically " legitimate"; and yet, assuming it to have been so, that could not in any sense have justified its conduct, but, on the contrary, could only have rendered it more culpable.

With the growth of labour parties as active competitors for parliamentary power, the differences between those in power and those who are out are greatly intensified, and compromise is far more difficult. The system itself renders co-operation difficult. Particularly where there is a " liberalistic " or materialistic outlook, concessions are unlikely to be granted by the party in power except where they can clearly see that otherwise there must be loss of personal benefits, or there is immediate danger of violent reaction through the hatreds engendered.

One is almost tempted to think that, in order to obtain upright democratic government, it may be necessary to establish a system where a democratic popular vote may determine principles, but the execution and application might have to

be entrusted entirely to a species of non-political permanent Civil Service, very highly paid, with stringent regulations governing its contacts and its public and private relationships, even with a death penalty for breach of duty. Dictatorships have their obvious perils, but they have one advantage—namely, that where they misgovern, the responsibility is known; but under the so-called democratic governments the responsibility can seldom be traced specifically. Democratic misdeeds are ascribed to unfortunate coalitions, or the issue is confused in some other manner. New coalitions are then formed, and the stage is set for a repetition of the same farce.

The main protection against the politicians under the Spanish Constitution was that the King had power, in a crisis, to resort to government through military governors. The Army thus came to regard itself as a sort of watch-dog and guardian of the national interests. For whenever a Spanish Government thoroughly misbehaved itself, as it usually did sooner or later, the Army used to be called in to eject it or to maintain order until the next Government was appointed. This was the reason for the *pronunciamientos* which were so frequent a feature of Spanish history; and to some extent it also explains General Franco's action in 1936. Under the Republic there was this distinction: although the tradition subsisted, the Army had no specific function as a part of the Constitution. Nevertheless, during the tragic four and a half years of the Republic, for more than half that time there was martial law, a "state of precaution" or a "state of alarm", proclaimed by the various governments themselves—that is to say, conditions were so bad that the Army had to be standing by in case it was needed to maintain order and the authority of the Cortes, or of the party in power in the Cortes.

One of the greatest sources of trouble in Spain was the faulty handling of the labour problem, and the unfortunate nature of the guidance behind the labour movement. Spain is not a highly industrialized nation, even to-day. But nearly a hundred years ago the employees of the cotton-weaving industry in Barcelona were sufficiently numerous and organized to form a "Workers' Mutual Association". Following upon a *pronunciamiento* this was dissolved. The Government maintained a prohibition on such associations. As a consequence clandestine organizations came into existence. This created a bad precedent, which developed almost into

a tradition. Even when the associations became legalized, the principle of secret activity persisted. It was largely this which permitted the extremists to obtain political control of the Government in office just before the Civil War in 1936; for the full strength of these labour organizations was not known, and they threw in their power suddenly, after a long period during which they had deliberately made a point of refraining from open intervention in politics.

Writing in 1923, Mr. George Boag, referring to the "U.G.T." (the General Labour Union), said that it was "frankly syndicalist and Marxist. Its organization is on the lines of a secret society and its potential power is probably greater than any suspected."¹ ² Mr. Boag is not a political writer, putting forward statements to support some theory in the service of a political cause. He is a technical writer describing incidentally an acknowledged fact known to him in his capacity as a railway administrator. And what Mr. Boag stated in 1923 had been true for many years, and still remained true of many powerful labour groups in 1936.

Although at that time they had no legal existence, clandestine societies were strong enough in 1855 to provoke a general revolutionary strike. From that time onwards the Spanish labour associations were revolutionary in character, and secretly organized and directed.

The first open intervention of Spanish labour in the international Socialist movement took place when the Catalans were represented in Brussels at the International Congress of 1868. Señor Fanelli, a friend of Bakunin, came to Spain and introduced the anarchist movement. Various new Workers' Associations were formed and accepted the statutes of the Workers' International Association (A.I.T.) at a Congress held in Barcelona, the agreement being ratified at the second Anarchist Congress in Valencia in 1871.

In 1872 Bakunin fell out with Marx. After Bakunin was expelled from the First International, the Spanish delegates founded, under his inspiration, the Socialist Democratic Alliance.³

In that same year the Spanish Parliament decreed extremist organizations illegal, and that the Spanish section connected

¹ George L. Boag, "The Railways of Spain", *The Railway Gazette*.

² These particulars are mainly derived from the excellent brief summary by C. Domí, *La Quiebra Fraudulenta de la República*.

with the International should be dissolved. However, as before, it continued to function secretly. At a Congress at Zaragoza, it agreed to ally itself to the new Anarchist International.

It was largely the underground work carried out through these secret societies which turned the labour organizations into a sort of vast *camorra*, and brought in the Republic of 1873. This first tragic essay in Republican government was violent and revolutionary' in nature, and the country sighed with deep relief when General Pavia brought off the *coup d'état* which put an end to it. Once more the revolutionary associations were dissolved, but the underground work went steadily on until, in 1881, when the Liberals came into power, they were again recognized officially, and a new Anarchist Congress was held in Valencia.

There were large bodies of workers who desired some sort of organized self-protection, but disagreed with the anarchist tendency. Accordingly, in Barcelona, a new body, the Workers' Association, was formed. It was fiercely combated by both the anarchists and the employers. On the proposal of Pablo Iglesias it adopted the name of the Workers' General Union (U.G.T.) in 1888, and, *according to its Statutes*, it had no fixed political, religious or economic doctrine. This organization did not flourish in Catalonia, but in 1890 it achieved a considerable increase in membership as a consequence of the dissolution, decreed by the Government, of the Iberian Anarchist Federation (F.A.I.).

The syndicalist elements collaborated with the Radical Republican Party until 1908. They then supported and formed the *Solidaridad Obrera*, and two years later they founded the C.R.T. (Regional Federation of Labour) and the C.N.T. (National Federation of Labour). In 1913 both these organizations were suspended after a series of strikes, not because the principle of collective bargaining was combated, but because of their extremist and revolutionary conduct. During this period the revolutionary syndicalist movement greatly increased in power, acting against all the political parties and the State itself. Their societies were not legal, and the basis of their whole policy was "direct action," advocated with the greatest heat and violence.

In 1916 the C.R.T., directed by Angel Pestana and Salvador Segui, was reorganized, following upon a Pacifist

Congress, and in 1918 these two labour leaders formed in Barcelona the "Sole Syndicate"—the *Sindicato Unico*, generally known as the One Big Syndicate.

It must not be thought that efforts were not made to direct the labour movement along sound lines. Mr. Boag, for example, writing in 1923, mentions one experiment: "It is not generally known that the Madrid Cáceres and Portugal Railway Company for many years past has distributed among its staff a bonus contingent on the increase of gross receipts over those of 1900. The whole staff participates, from General Manager downwards, but the amount varies in inverse ratio to the rate of pay. Fifty per cent, of the increase (if any) is allotted to the staff. The lowest paid employees receive the equivalent of forty-five days' pay, and so on with the higher paid grades to twenty days' pay at the other end of the scale, or less in proportion if the increase is insufficient, while any surplus is again divided up *pro rata*. In 1921, although the Company paid no dividend there was a fair increase over 1900 figure; a 5% . . . was sufficient to provide a bonus on the lower paid ratings equivalent to sixty-seven days' pay on the pre-war rates."

An attempt to found a Social Catholic Christian Syndicalist Movement had also been made, but it was unable to stand up against its more powerful competitors.

During the Great European War, Spain made large profits, like most other neutral nations, but the working classes did not derive much benefit from them. An interminable series of strikes followed, to which the employers replied by lock-outs. The employers gave nothing away—and it is probable that under a liberalistic regime, competition would hardly have permitted them prudently to do so. Labour solidarity was being developed in accordance with a creed of violence, in which lay little hope of improvement, but on the contrary only a decreased earning power in the industries concerned. Parliament was as incompetent as usual and did little that was constructive to guide things towards a safe solution. The politicians were too busy feathering their nests. There was a lamentable absence of civic sense in all directions in the nation itself.

It is interesting to remark the note of the Pacifist Congress. Then, as now, the violent extremists, heading for war, whether social or international, were using the terms of peace

and "Peace Organizations" as the outward cloak for their activities.

In 1919 the Workers' International Congress (A.I.T.) approved the formula of obligatory incorporation of workmen, though with free syndication. As a result, in 1920, a new body, the Free Syndicate, made its appearance to counter the revolutionary activities of the "Sole Syndicate" (the *Sindicato Unico*).

Towards the end of 1923, General Primo de Rivera declared a military dictatorship. The King was probably in favour of this move, and probably, also, privy to it. But never was a dictatorship of some sort more obviously necessary. Many reasons have been put forward, principally by people with political theories to support, as to why the dictatorship occurred at that time. But there were three, and only three, really important reasons for it. They were (1) the interference by the politicians with the conduct of the war in Morocco, both by corrupt intervention in the Army contracts and the actual conduct of the operations; (2) the dreadful state of social disorder promoted by the foreign-inspired directors of the extremist labour organizations; and (3) the threat of Catalonian Separatism, fostered as a means of helping to disintegrate the country and weaken the central authority. The men behind the anarchist activity were largely foreign or trained abroad. One can imagine the state of affairs produced where there were secret societies with a membership of many hundreds of thousands, pledged to a policy to "unchain the popular anarchy in country and town, magnifying it till it rolls like a raging avalanche, devouring and destroying"? The anarchists' programme admirably suited the Communists of Russia; it coincided with the first stage of their own programme—to destroy utterly the existing order of things in every possible direction, with a view to reorganization according to their own ideas upon the ruins. When, therefore, the Communists started to take a hand after the European War supplying large funds to encourage disorder for its own sake¹ whilst the successive Governments and Ministers continued weak and corrupt, the industries of the country began to become unworkable. Spain, fortunately, lived mainly upon her agriculture, which somehow carried her through both that difficult period and the even worse one of the second Republic.

¹ E. H. Carr, *Baltunin*, quoted by Robert Sencourt in *Spain's Ordeal*

Between 1910 and 1923, in Barcelona only, there were 1,000 attacks upon individuals, resulting in 250 dead and 450 wounded. One hundred of these attacks were on employers, over fifty were against officials, and the rest were against workmen in the course of struggles between rival labour organizations, which were becoming more and more like machines directed by rival gangsters. Between 1917 and 1922 there were about 1,500 attacks in the principal cities of Spain—over 150 in Bilbao, over 150 in Valencia, and about 125 in each of the towns of Madrid, Zaragoza and Seville. As Mr. Sencourt states, "In a few years 500 employers had been shot, poisoned or kidnapped, 160 of them in the single city of Barcelona. The murderers at last accounted for twenty-one of them in two successive nights."¹

Victor Serge²³ states that in one year rival gangs accounted for no less than 400 members of the C.N.T. It was not in one centre, but in almost every centre, that these people operated. Perhaps one of the most notable examples of the activity of the anarchists was in later stages, when they attacked in broad daylight the Bank of Gijon⁴ and removed its securities and currency. And in Malaga they produced a revolt which took on the dimensions of a local civil war.

The main difference between the conditions produced by 1923 and those produced later in October 1934 and in 1936 was that the Communist inspiration and guidance was strengthened in these later years. The anarchists knew how to organize violence with great thoroughness, but they were not good at attaining co-operation throughout the country, or turning to advantage the weaknesses of others by offering them the benefits of political alliances.

In Catalonia were large numbers of workmen imported from other regions, largely from Murcia and the south, an unruly, turbulent crowd. The Catalan himself was, and still is, mainly a smallholder, a merchant or a business man. His alliance was sought, and obtained, for resistance against the Central Government, even though it would mean his eventual destruction. However, he was disposed to be short-sighted and to look for some immediate apparent benefit rather than weigh up what the future might hold for him. Like many

¹ Robert Sencourt, *Spain's Ordeal*.

² Victor Serge, preface to Maurin's *Hæta la Secunda Revolucion*. ■

³ The leader was Durruti, who appears later in these pages.

others he probably did not appreciate the full strength of the secretly conducted anarchist and communist organizations.

Had it not been for the agitators—both in Catalonia and later in Bilbao—wise councils would have prevented those regions from embarking upon a separatist movement. Catalonia's true interests lay in unity with Spain as a whole. She could probably have achieved most of her aspirations by pacific means, and enjoyed some such regional benefits as the Basque provinces did with their *Consorcio Economico*. But her alliance with the extremist labour position alone made it difficult for any Government to give Catalonia a free hand to create an outpost of Moscow within Spain itself. The Catalans, always anxious for gain, did not seem to realize that given separatism, probably, within a very short period, they could have been utterly ruined at any time the Central Government chose to apply a heavy tariff against them.

The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera soon restored order. Personal aggressions and political strikes ceased absolutely. The mere imposition of authority was sufficient to cause Spain to be regenerated. Though the form of government was changed, there was very little alteration as regards the essentials of the Constitution—evils were suspended without new fundamental principles being introduced. That alone was sufficient to put new vigour into the country.

One of the first great works of the Dictatorship was the successful conclusion of the Moroccan War. Although at that time a young man, General Franco, as we relate later, played no small part, both in initiating the scheme which brought this about, and in its active execution.

One of the next great tasks which Primo de Rivera tried to achieve was vastly more difficult, for it was a more intangible one. This was the creation of a civic sense, to which end he created the Union Patriotica. But he was not well versed in that kind of work. He did not know how to employ the methods which Signor Mussolini, Herr Hitler, Comrade Stalin or the Communist Propaganda Bureau have all used so successfully since. Primo de Rivera was accused of violent repression of opinions in universities and other centres; but looking back, the sound sense behind most of what he did in that direction becomes ever more apparent. The country had been deliberately selected for attack by subversive forces. Which was the better—a mild measure of repression, or to

allow the agents and their allies to have their head? It is not as if he was dealing with a country naturally pacific. On the contrary, the country, always difficult, was just then being brought out of the dreadful conditions produced by such theories, deliberately directed by people whose object was to produce disorder. Is it necessary always to wait until the whole country is an inferno, as it later became, before endorsing the wisdom of such a policy? Yet even now, with all the facts laid bare, and the obvious causes and consequences, one hears serious criticisms of his conduct in that regard. Nor were the criticisms usually sincere, for most of the men who so harshly criticized him had little or nothing to say in condemnation of the far greater repressions instituted by the subsequent Republic. The people who intended to produce, and finally produced, the Revolution, were already busy finding the excuse of repression, and forcing the Government to take measures which could be so interpreted.

Once he is stirred, the Spaniard is a crusader, but he does not readily understand a crusade against an enemy so amorphous as apathy. Though Primo de Rivera failed to get the Spaniard to appreciate collective civic responsibilities, so that it became increasingly difficult to lay aside his powers and leave them in the hands of a parliamentary body, his dictatorship did much good work in other directions. It had its faults, like other governments, but it gave Spain seven years of the best Government it had enjoyed for a very long time.

One of its great works was an attempt to assist labour towards a wise development, and Primo de Rivera instituted what were known as *Comités Paritarios*, composed of representatives of employers and employees, somewhat on the lines of the English Whitley Councils. Largo Caballero, later seduced to the cause of the extremists, did great work in those years, and was a member of Primo de Rivera's Council of State. There was good material to work upon, in spite of the underground influence of the Russian anarchists and Communists; and, in particular, the great U.G.T. organization was developing upon lines which were at once a lesson and a reproach to the parliamentary⁷ politicians. The standard of living and wages were not high in Spain, but numerous branches of the U.G.T. developed almost on the lines of the old guilds. Some branches, like the railwaymen, ran their own Sick and Provident Funds, and took care of their old and infirm, orphans and

maternity cases. The companies were being guided towards extending their assistance to these funds. Much remained to be done, but, clearly, the policy was in the right direction. One of the great crimes of the extremists, when later they got control, was that they used the machinery and membership of this organization for unworthy objects whilst they destroyed most of its good, and its ideals.

In education, too, great strides were made. In this direction far more genuine progress was made under the Dictatorship than under the Republic, in spite of the tremendous boosting of its achievements which the latter was given—or gave itself—in the Left Wing Press. For under the Dictatorship the changes and improvements in education were with the object of extending education for its own sake, whilst under the Republic the object was largely to arrange fresh means of spreading political propaganda.

There has been some appalling nonsense talked about education in Spain. Every⁷ properly educated man appreciates the benefits which suitable education can bring; but it is not all who realize precisely how this should apply in a country like Spain, or how it was applied. It is a good thing that all men should be able to read and write, but the proletarian townsman who has considerable leisure and has learned to expatriate, for example, upon the teachings of Karl Marx is probably wrong in considering himself better educated than the countryman with less leisure for reading, and perhaps less inclination. The local horticulturist may not know the *Psylla mali*, but he knows at first hand the habits of an "apple-sucker"; in like manner the local fisherman may not have read the Board of Trade and Fisheries Report upon the *Crepidula fornicate*,¹ but he has learned by experience and first-hand observation what "them there fornicators" can do to a bed of oysters. Spain is so agricultural in its national life that it is easy to over-rate the importance, and to mis-judge the nature, of the great educational programmes so loudly proclaimed for propaganda purposes by the Left Wing authorities. Much of the high-sounding "progress" was advocated by men like Alvaro Albornoz, who, though not well known as a lawyer, was able to write and talk his way to the newly created lucrative post of President of the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees. Brilliant journalists and geniuses

¹ Slipper limpet.



MOUNTAINS IN' ASTURIAS

[*Facing page* 54]



writers and "thinkers", many of about twenty years of age, were prepared to settle the nation's educational—and every other problem. And in so many cases their fame rested—as it is beginning to do in England—upon the reiteration and mutual boosting of their names in the Left Wing Press, at whose service they were. In education, as in agriculture, the Dictatorship did more in practice than in theory. Different, indeed, it was when the theorists and agitators came into power afterwards. In both those spheres they destroyed more than they built.

The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera at least left a number of material benefits behind it. They built railways and roads and sponsored numerous schemes of hydro-electric and other developments. It is true that their programme was not as high-sounding or as vast as that of the Republic, but it was still too big. Their achievements also were greater, but they were building beyond the capacity of the nation to pay for it all.

It is amusing to read in reputedly well-informed British periodicals that the Republic and its politicians had bestowed the inestimable boon of electric light upon the poor country villagers. The writers probably believe this, and are unaware that the credit for the initiative in most of the great hydro-electric schemes was due to the Dictatorship, whose schemes would have absorbed something like the total estimated national wealth. They can still less be expected to know that all over Spain, before the European War of 1914, it was common for villagers to make their own electric light, and it cost them considerably less than that which they later enjoyed as a result of these magnificent projects.

The Ministers of the Dictatorship were over-optimistic in their finance. That, perhaps, was the most important reason for the fall of the Dictator; for the over-expenditure resulted in conditions which gave the agitators their opportunity to pull down first the Dictatorship itself, and secondly the Monarchy, though the links between the cause and its effects were by no means apparent at the time.

It was a strange, patriarchal sort of Dictatorship, one of the most moderate, when one considers the difficulties of governing this fierce nation. As has happened so often, it passed from the scene largely as a result of ceasing to govern. After seven years Primo de Rivera was a very tired and a very sick

man. He wished only to lay down his burden, and he made the mistake—in Spain—of asking on all sides the desires of all the various people he consulted. The weakness was at once appreciated and exploited. The military power, undermined by forces we describe later, indicated that their support was withdrawn. The Ministers of the Dictator's Government began to govern with one eye upon the popular vote. The Dictator himself even had issued a note and an invitation to the mayors of the country', requesting their applause and that of their towns and villages. Finally he even entrusted to Besteiro and Saborit, the two Socialist leaders, the task of preparing a new electoral census.

This was indeed playing down to the multitude. Elections in Spain have always been crooked and managed by political bosses known as *caciques*. All manner of abuses in procedure were customary'. But it did not help matters to prepare an even worse abuse. There were plenty of upright men of all parties who could have been called upon to collaborate and help to produce a better state of affairs. As it was, he merely played into the hands of those who were preparing the popular Revolution. In the elections of 1931 and 1936 we know that the candidates of the Conservative Parties found that whole blocks of houses mentioned in the register did not exist; in some blocks of buildings as many as thirty or more fictitious voters' names were entered, complete with invented descriptions of their professions, age, etc. Personal identification certificates, known as *cedulas*, in respect of non-existent people, based upon incomes which had never been earned, were got out, and the annual tax payments, varying between one and two pesetas on each, were made to establish their validity, so that they could be distributed in due course amongst the Left Wing agents and thus, by means of those *certain* votes, they could carry the elections in the big cities. We are informed by a reliable Spanish electioneering agent that *in Madrid alone* the number of such fictitious voters prepared in the official centres during the last two years of the Dictatorship certainly exceeded 40,000.

Such was the basis of the later voting at the famous elections which finally produced the "legitimate" Government of 1936. We are not suggesting that there had never been abuses in Spanish electoral procedure, but that never in the history of Spain was there such cynical jobbery and falsi-

fication as under and preceding the Republic.

One of the great factors which operated to pull down the Dictatorship and the Monarchy was the clandestine propaganda carried out throughout the country. Its inspirations and origins were at that time for the most part not clearly seen. Apart from the floods of books, literature, and pamphlets, largely printed outside the country and smuggled in, great and unscrupulous use was made of insidious rumour. Spain was particularly susceptible to this method of attack, for rumour is part of the national life. The more incredible the story¹, the faster it will often travel. One of the most vile—a forerunner of the "poisoned sweets" rumour referred to later—was the insinuation, based upon the known fact that the Prince of Asturias suffered from haemophilia, that every day a soldier had to be sacrificed in order to give his warm blood to keep the heir apparent alive. This story was believed with a blind faith by large numbers of the poor people of the town amongst whom it was propagated. For a whole month it was a heated subject of discussion, and when it was denied, stand-up fights frequently followed. This and many other calumnies had a great effect in swaying the fickle passions and loyalties of the "Workers", as was the intention.

This rumour was only one example of the great organized campaign of calumny poured out against the King. Charge after charge was levelled, and exploded; but that did not stop them being repeated and continuing to receive credence. There were many dishonest people prepared to continue to give currency to the calumnies, though they knew them to be false, and large numbers of people did not know of the refutations, or credit them if they knew. The same method has been developed even more greatly since then, throughout the Civil War.

Primo de Rivera finally threw in his hand. He had lost the support, even, of the Army. The Army had been well prepared in advance for the Republican coup.¹ Twenty-one of twenty-three Divisional Generals had already sworn their allegiance to the Republic; the Catalonian Left groups, playing for their own ends, had already decided at the meeting in San Sebastian in the autumn of 1930 that the King must be expelled. Theoretically, high-minded patriots were clamour-

¹ E. Mola, *Temicstad Calma Inlriga y Crisis*, p. 104, and Jean Dauray in *L'Œuvre Laline*, January 1937.

ing for a democratic constitution, to be arrived at by the free vote of the people of the country; and yet the immediate events which followed clearly demonstrated that they wished for nothing of the kind.

The Government which followed the departure of Primo de Rivera tried to prepare the ground along constitutional lines. They held, first of all, municipal elections; in Spain this is the customary preliminary to the parliamentary elections. When the results began to come through, it was found that in the large towns the vote was in favour of a Republic. But from the country as a whole there was a heavy majority in favour of the Monarchy. In spite of this, relying upon the greater cohesion of the city masses, their organization through the Labour machinery, and the co-operation, previously secured, of the majority of the Army Generals and the Commander-in-Chief of the Civil Guards, the instigators of the Republic faced the King with the certainty of civil war if he refused to abdicate.

The King left, as he stated, to prevent bloodshed. It is interesting to note that the King did not abdicate. He merely suspended the exercise of his prerogatives. After the first ghastly failure of the Republican Government of 1873, they had been glad to search Europe for a king; and certainly the Bourbon Dynasty, after its restoration, governed wisely so far as Parliament permitted. This fact will undoubtedly become more widely recognized when passions have cooled and the forces engaged in this war are widely known.

In those municipal elections the countryside—and that represents the true Spain far more than the towns—voted solidly monarchical. *The countryman, in 1931, was untouched by any revolutionary movement,* “which meant, after all, that it had no deep roots in Spain as a whole”?

The outstanding feature in the tragedy of the fall of the Monarchy was the statesmanship of Alfonso XIII. It would be hard to find a more patriotic and disinterested gesture than he made on the eve of his departure, when he issued his last public proclamation. It ran as follows:

“The elections held on Sunday have revealed to me that I no longer hold the love of my people,^{1 2 *} but my conscience tells

¹ Franz Borkenau, *The Spanish Cockpit*, p. 46.

² The results of the elections in the majority of the voting centres h-iH withheld. The whole of them are still not known. S bad been

me that this attitude will not be permanent, because I have always striven to serve Spain, with all my devotion, to the public interest, even in the most critical moments. A King may make mistakes, and without doubt I have done so on occasion, but I know that our country has always shown herself generous towards the faults of others committed without malice.

"I am King of all Spaniards and I am a Spaniard. I could find ample means to maintain my Royal Prerogatives in effective resistance to those who assail them. But I prefer to stand resolutely aside rather than provoke a conflict which might array my fellow countrymen against one another in civil and patricidal strife.

"I renounce no single one of my rights which, rather than being mine, are an accumulated legacy of history for the guardianship of which I shall one day have to render strict account.

"I shall await the true and full expression of the collective conscience, and, until the nation speaks, I deliberately suspend my exercise of the Royal power and am leaving Spain, thus acknowledging that she is the sole mistress of her destinies. Also I now believe that I am fulfilling the duty which the love of my country dictates. I pray God that all other Spaniards may feel and fulfil their duty as sincerely as I do."

We shall see shortly, by way of contrast, the standards of nobility, patriotism and disinterestedness of those who stepped in to take over the government of the country.

CHAPTER III

THE GOOD SOLDIER

FEW men who have made a page in history have so reluctantly had greatness thrust upon them as Francisco Franco. Anyone less like the popular conception of a "dictator" could hardly be conceived. Dictators, for all the virtues they may possess, are not free as a rule from some desire to pose before the public as romantic figures. It was certainly true of Napoleon. If it be a necessary ingredient that dictators should preen and romanticize themselves before their fellow countrymen, then Francisco Franco is a complete failure as a dictator, and always will want to be.

For Franco is blissfully unconscious of what people think about him. To himself, he is just an ordinary soldier doing his job. Personal ambition he has none; as reward for himself he has asked nothing. He is the *rarissima avis* in Europe to-day, the completely disinterested patriot: a man who really lives for his country, and for his country alone. This may seem incredible in a world made cynical by the forcible economic interpretation of history. "Every man has his price" is said more cynically to-day and with, unfortunately, far greater truth in this country than our grandfathers would ever have believed. Franco, too, has his price. A very high one; and a very difficult one—that the country to which he has given his life work, and for which, as he has proved over and over again in battle, he has always been ready to lay down his life, should be allowed to live its national life according to its natural development without any dictation or domination by alien forces. His desire is that Spain should shape her own destiny—a destiny which might not include him. The only reason which could have made this ordinary, quiet, unambitious citizen take on the leadership of the most important

The rebellion in the long history of Spanish insurrections was that he was *orced' bY irresistible proof, to see that the powers which sought to determine Spain's destiny were directly opposed to her national life, concerned in deliberately destroying that national life, and inspired by men of alien blood and ideas.

To grasp the Spanish war in full perspective, the salient features of Franco's personal character must be clearly appreciated. In the first place, he was in no sense a "Fascist" leader. At the outside, when the present struggle broke out, there were not more than 8,000 *Falangistas* in Spain, and even that party was not "Fascist" in the sense usually attributed to that word in the voluminous Left press of England. In the elections of February 1936 there was not one single deputy of the party in the Cortes. Such members as "the Phalanx" boasted were but a few people driven to organize resistance against a war already being waged on them by the extremists—very numerous indeed and well organized, but vastly in a minority in the country as a whole.

Franco had, over and over again, both by his words and his actions, shown that he had no interest in politics, nor did he conceive it as part of his position as an officer to have any political bias. The legal Government of the country was his employer and master. From that Government he received his orders: and his simple job was to carry them out to the best of his ability.

His reputation was acquired by the merit of his work, and by no other means. Far from seeking popularity or applause, he had always run far from it. His hallmark in the country's eyes was steadfastness and efficiency. He had no aristocratic family in the background or influence derived from supporting particular politicians or parties. Every promotion he gained was for ability in his military profession and for merit in the field. Nobody w'ould have chosen him as a national figure to be placed upon a pedestal as the Head of the State, except in a time of supreme crisis when the occasion forces the man forward.

Franco is not the popular conception of a romantic leader. Forty-five last December 4th, he looks older than his age. There are touches of grey in the hair. He is of medium height. As his staff includes many tall men, he usually looks even shorter than he really is. He is definitely inclined to em-

bonpoint. His staff are always making him promise that he will take up horse-riding every morning before breakfast, but every morning before breakfast there is always something far more important to be done.

Superficially, Franco is not a striking figure, though his most prominent feature, his forehead, is unusually intellectual. But stand in front of him, and when he looks at you a miracle happens. The eyes are the man. Under longish lashes, his dark eyes are neither hard nor stern nor truculent. They are memorable for their extreme kindness. Here, one feels, is a man incapable of doing a mean, a selfish or an underhand action. They are the eyes of a man who has taken a straight course through life, as though he had mapped out for himself a "single track" philosophy, and carried it through. There is no sign of personal vanity or personal consideration. There is *every* sign of discipline. Here, one feels, is a man who has never demanded of others what he has not first experienced himself. Self is obviously subdued: sincerity is obviously triumphant. A man of deep spiritual life, but one who has never found the soul lonely. Absorption in an ideal has destroyed the fluffy dross of personal vanities. For Franco is remote; he thinks his own thoughts; he is not afraid to keep these thoughts to himself; he is naturally aloof. Not many of his nearest associates know all that is in his mind. He does not act impulsively or rashly; and once he has worked out his plans with his meticulous care, he is completely inflexible. If genius be an infinite capacity for taking pains, Francisco Franco is a genius—a fact which he would indignantly deny.

He is a "good Catholic", but in no sense religiously fanatical; he is little interested in eating; he drinks little; he smokes hardly at all. His main attraction in life (after his country) is his devotion for his wife and daughter.

Franco has learned in the hard school of experience, and he does not lightly choose his men. His caution and good judgment have ensured that his choice is almost always good. His main fault—if it be a fault—is that once he has accepted a man, and that man has worked for him, he will stand by that man when perhaps greater efficiency could be obtained if he were superseded. As a result, men work for Franco. The hundreds of thousands of men who have served under him in war in Spain and Africa follow him and trust him because, from experience, they know that he never sacri-

fices one man unnecessarily, because he has their entire confidence, and because of his own superb courage.

He has shown this courage no less in his just and fearless administrative work in Morocco than in his military duties; and in consequence the Moors regard him as almost divine. Amongst them his name is "The Victorious", "Chief of Chiefs", "Brave-as-a-Lion". Perhaps there is no greater tribute to the character, administration and achievements of this retiring man than the veneration and loyalty of these peoples whom he helped to subdue in years of bitter warfare and who to-day ask only for the privilege of fighting for his cause.

For Franco's courage is that of the selfless man, the man who cannot be stopped from doing what he conceives to be his duty whatever the personal danger or the possible consequences in his career. Such moral and physical courage is a quality which all Spanish soldiers admire in their leaders, and it may be said without exaggeration that its example has been one of the chief factors in the present Civil War.

In describing Franco's period of tuition through fighting, we will give many examples of his great courage, but one more recent example must be detailed here. Much of Franco's fate in the field depends upon the support he receives from the two great Carlist and Falangist parties. The first leader of the Falangists, Don José Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of the Dictator, was in prison when the war broke out (he was later executed by the Reds) and Manuel Hedilla became their leader. When the unification of the Carlist and Falangist militia was ordered, Hedilla insisted on his appointment as supreme head of the joint militias. This would, in effect, have given him more power than the *Caudillo* himself. Franco decided that an Army General must be in executive authority of the joint militia, with himself as the nominal head. Hedilla, resenting this decision, sought to test his power and authority against that of General Franco.

He rang up General Headquarters at Salamanca and demanded an interview with the Generalissimo the following afternoon at two o'clock. Mr. Harold Cardozo describes what took place:

"Hedilla arrived to time with his customary escort of stalwarts in blue uniforms carrying sub-machine-guns. They waited down below while their leader went up the double

marble steps past the Moorish guards into an ante-chamber. A few minutes afterwards the escort was invited into the guard-room and their weapons were taken from them, they being told that at the Chief of State's palace none were allowed to go armed except the Guard itself and such officers as were on duty.

" Meanwhile, the great clock on the landing of the Bishop's Palace, for that was the seat of General Headquarters at Salamanca, ticked slowly on while Hedilla paced up and down impatiently in the red and gold tapestried room in which he was alone. Twice he rang the bell and an aide-de-camp appeared, only politely to beg the Falangist chief to wait in patience, as the Generalissimo was very busy. Finally, it was nearly three o'clock when Hedilla, vociferous with anger at what he looked upon as a deliberate insult, was ushered into General Franco's presence. He strode across the room faster than the officer who was accompanying him and began an angry tirade. General Franco waved him to a chair and bade him take a seat while he signed to his aide-de-camp to withdraw. Nobody knows exactly what happened during the interview, which lasted half an hour and was extremely stormy, the sound of Hedilla's voice being clearly heard in the ante-chamber. But suddenly the bell rang, and when General Franco's aides-de-camp entered they were briefly told to arrest Hedilla and hand him over to the police. Hedilla himself seems to have been so amazed at this order that he was speechless. . . . Hedilla was allowed to go to South America into exile."¹

Franco's fearless handling of the situation was completely vindicated, for to-day, as before this incident, he has no more sincere and enthusiastic followers than the whole vast body of Falangists.

As is natural, Franco's bluntness has made him many enemies as well as friends, and perhaps has partly been responsible for the "bad Press" from which the Nationalist cause has suffered. For, after there had been several regrettable incidents with a number of the international journalists, who, of all shades of politics and opinion, had swarmed into the Nationalist area, he told them that, unlike his enemies, he had no intention of paying them; all the money he could obtain was to be towards purchasing munitions and aero-

¹ Cardozo, *The March of a Nation*, pp. 308-9.

planes. He gave them complete liberty of action, and trusted they would do their work honestly from their sense of professional duty.

How has it come about that this retiring, selfless man, whom Gil Robles affirmed ■was not the man to lead a revolt,¹ who was not, in the first instance, the actual appointed leader of the revolt, should, in so short a time, have come to be the leader of the cause, in spite of the fact that he has never sought either publicity or power? The answer is to be found in his career and in a study of the patent needs for the re-establishment of Spain. How⁷ much Franco meant to the Nationalist Movement even early on is shown by the publicity story w^rhich the Government felt compelled to put out in October 1936. It may surprise many people to know^r that, officially, the Government have declared Franco dead—and never denied it. Just one small example of their consistently mendacious form of propaganda. Not only is this instance typical, but the details “ calculated to give verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative ” are important as disclosing the methods by which they “ land ” their publicity. The notice of Franco’s death appeared in *El Sol*, October 1st, 1936:

“ IT IS SAID THAT A LIEUTENANT OF THE CIVIL GUARD
HAS KILLED EX-GENERAL FRANCO IN TETUAN

TANGIER.

“ Rumours are growing which were already in circulation some days ago concerning the death of ex-General Franco in the house of a well-known Falangist doctor. It is said that ex-General Franco, by mistake, ordered castor oil to be administered to the wife of a lieutenant of the Givil Guard and that that lady as a consequence died from a miscarriage.

“ The lieutenant of the Civil Guard went and found Franco, and discharged several shots, seriously wounding him. He w^as taken to Tangier for an operation, but, in spite of the doctors, he died. It is affirmed that the body was embalmed and removed to Tetuan.

“ These rumours have not been denied, even by the Falangists themselves, who, on the contrary, s h^ow t^he m^se l^ves to be greatly distressed at the event.

And the truth behind the new’s! In the Red territory,

» Knoblaugh, *Correspondent in Spain*, p. 21.

especially in Madrid, the people were marvelling at the victorious and apparently irresistible advance of Franco's army. Franco was their "bogey man" therefore Franco must be killed off. As he could not be beaten in the field, "bump him off" in the Press. The Government, in spite of continued failure on the field of battle, have several times nearly won the war in the newspapers of the world!

The details are also of considerable interest. "Castor oil", of course, was used to show that Franco was "a Fascist", Subtle propaganda, this! Then, equally, of course, a child and a woman must be injured: that's the essential "heart stuff" which carries so well all over the world, however untrue!

"The rumours have not been denied by the Falangists." Of course they had not been denied by the Falangists: they could never have heard of any such rumours unless by some rare chance they read it all in the Madrid *El Sol*. It seems hardly necessary to add that Franco at that time, or at any time since he flew from Tetuan at the commencement of the revolt, had not been near Tangier. A perfect example of the typical methods of Government propaganda which has deceived more than half the world. We shall cite a hundred more examples of these methods in the course of this book.

But such propaganda proves the importance with which Franco was then regarded. He is even more importantly regarded now. Let us take a closer view of his career, to discover whether he is the man he is made out to be, and, even more importantly, whether he is a man who can give Spain the right background and the right heart of regeneration.

Francisco Franco—his baptismal names in full are Francisco Paulino Hermengildo Teodulo Franco Baamonde (the "Baamonde" is the result of the charming Spanish habit of adding the mother's maiden name after the father's family name)—was the second of five children. His eldest brother now acts as Secretary of State for him. His younger brother, Ramon, flew the South Atlantic for the first time in "Plus Ultra" before Lindbergh flew the North. Ramon to-day commands a hydroplane unit in the Balearics. They are the children of Nicolas Franco and Pilar Baamonde.

Franco's forebears had long been associated with the Spanish Navy. His mother's family was also of the same tradition. Their native town was equally of naval tradition

Ferrol, the great Spanish naval town which "fed the Navy with men and ships that fell as prey to the typhoons of the Far East, to the *cyclones* of the West Indies, to the British frigates, or to Nelson's guns."¹ Every tradition, every surrounding, prepared Francisco for the career for which his parents had chosen him—the Navy.

His early education, after a preparatory school, was at the Naval School preparing to pass the entrance examination to the Naval Cadet College. When, on the ground of national economy, the entrance examinations to the Naval College were suspended *sine die* and the Naval Academy was closed down, he passed instead into the Infantry Cadet College at Toledo to be trained at the Alcazar of which, twenty-nine years later, he was to be responsible for the relief after one of the most romantic sieges in history. But there can be little doubt that what was a sore disappointment to his parents was not altogether unwelcome to the boy himself. From his earliest years, in the small house with the white walls and the green shutters in the Calle de Maria, the Army had called him, and he made the change without regret.

His first military appointment was as a second lieutenant in the 8th Zamora Regiment: but his restless nature chafed at routine garrison duties. Franco was a slender youth. Resolute and eager for any duty imposed by the discipline of the college, and, at the same time, notorious for the "larks" into which he led his brother cadets.

In 1911, the military prestige of Spain had fallen to its lowest ebb through the Hispano-American War, the loss of Cuba, and the persistent inability of the Army to finish the trouble with the Riffs. No man could have entered a more discredited service; and yet within twenty years not only had Franco been a vital figure in redeeming its ancient prestige, but he had earned from so high an authority as Marshal Lyautey the opinion that he was one of the two best potential Generals in Europe.

Fighting conditions in Morocco were then extremely uninviting. Apart from the gross corruption rampant in the service, through which the soldiers were often compelled to go without food, medicines and equipment, and even their pay was stolen from them, they were faced by clever, efficient, and never tiring adversaries, who thoroughly understood the

¹ Arraras, *Franco*.

value of surprise and of good marksmanship. The worst enemy of all was, perhaps, the prevailing malaria; in the defence of the Tulusit heights 60% of all ranks were put out of action by disease. Owing to the persistent anti-Moroccan propaganda—one of the most telling slogans used was “ Not a man, not a peseta more for a war that only serves the interests of the Mining Companies ”—dissatisfaction was rife throughout the Army. Most soldiers dreaded the ill-fortune which, decided by lot, might drive them to foreign service, and most of the officers too loathed the possibility of their compulsory term of duty in Africa.

But not so one young second lieutenant. He had eagerly volunteered for African service. He landed at Melilla in February 1911, attached to the 68th African Regiment.

During fourteen years of hard fighting in Africa Franco learned fortitude in the face of adversity, the art of making the best out of meagre resources, economy, so essential in warfare, of material and, above all, of men. He soon learned the lesson that he must prove everything in detail for himself, not to be satisfied with either map information or rigid formal tactics. His natural sense of strategy was developed by his admirable opponents, the Moors. They were superlative guerilla fighters with a natural eye for country, and an ability to live and fight on a country which was foreign to Spanish soldiers. To beat them, especially at that time when their morale was at its highest and the Spanish Army was seething with discontent, the only one way was to challenge them at their own game—to know their country in as intimate detail as they did, so as to be able to use their own terrain for what Lord Passfield once ingeniously called the “ suppressed alternative ”. Thus Franco learned in practice the vital importance of the element of surprise, which he has put to such striking use in his present campaigns. *Audax, audax, semper audax* was the only possible motto for Franco’s shock troops, and one particularly suited to the Spaniards and the Legionaries he commanded. Franco knew that the bold way is often the easiest way and the cheapest way: his main trouble was to work out the right bold way, and not just the foolhardy way. Fighting with a discontented army, with no knowledge of where the next reinforcements might come from, Franco learned also the all-important lesson of caring for his men under every circumstance, partly to prevent human wastage and to build up the morale and

trust of his "other ranks", and partly from the inherent kindness and understanding in his own nature.

Franco is, in himself, a strange contradiction. He has an infinite capacity for study; never is he more happy than when studying a map; it is said of him that he can make a map stand out in all its most intimate features before his eyes, after what to another man would be a cursory glance; he is also a voracious reader, especially of technical works and books affecting subjects in which he is immediately interested. But the fundamental instinct of the man is entirely one of action. He rebels against inaction, he seems unable to live without pursuing some useful purpose. Whether at Zaragoza, or with the Legion, or with the "Regulares", in the building up of the Academy from nothing, or planning the defences of Majorca, his immediate task receives his unlimited concentration. A theoretical problem to him is an incentive, an outlet for the same controlled enthusiasm which in action impels him to undertake great personal risks almost as if they did not exist. These great qualities have marked him out as a great leader of men in every stage of his career—whether he was leading his own first regiment, in Morocco, or his cadets, or to-day when it is the best elements of the whole Spanish nation.

Franco was not long with the 68th African Regiment. General Berenguer had organized a new force of native police, known as the "Regulares", but there were grave doubts about the quality of these troops. Even their officers were always on the alert for signs of incipient mutiny among them. For this force, Second Lieutenant Franco volunteered. Within three months his own platoon had received special commendation for its resolution under fire, and all the fears for the fighting qualities of the "Regulares" in action disappeared. Franco had by hard work and good example instilled into them the essentials of good discipline.

Two years later General Berenguer again observed Franco's outstanding military temperament by the gallantry and skill he showed in seizing the heights in the hard-fought engagement of Izarduy. For this he won his first promotion for merit in the field and became a full lieutenant, at less than twenty years of age.

The campaign went on, long and arduous, and, at that time, almost entirely one of attrition. It was an admirable test of the military qualities of a young soldier. Out of the forty-

two officers, selected, like Franco, as volunteers, only seven survived after two years. Franco himself escaped casualty, and established a reputation for being invulnerable, for he had throughout been distinguished for his readiness to undertake the most dangerous tasks.

"I have seen death pass by me many times," Franco once said, "but fortunately it never recognized me."

During this time he received additional promotion to captaincy. He was then only twenty-two, and his age prevented any further immediate promotion, although he had been awarded the Cross of Maria Cristina and the National Service Medal.

In 1916 Captain Franco was very gravely wounded. At Ceuta, Franco saw that his men were being enfiladed by the Moors from a very strong natural position. Whilst he was leading his men to storm the height, he was shot down by a bullet in the abdomen. The wound was too serious for him to be moved, and his parents crossed the Straits with the fear that they would be too late to see their son. But he survived and gradually recovered.

Once again he was recommended for promotion, but this was refused on the ground of his extreme youth. It was not considered suitable to have a field officer of the age of twenty-three. Franco, however, addressed a petition to the King in the manner laid down by Regulations, and the application was granted. Thus Franco became the youngest Major in the Spanish Army—*El Comandantin*, the little Major, as he was called at Oviedo, where after his recovery he was stationed because there was no vacancy in Africa.

But before long Franco was to return to Africa for one of the most romantic and inspiring periods of his career.

On April 28th, 1920, the Tercio Extranjero, the "Foreign Legion", was established by Government decree. Colonel Millan Astray was given the task of forming the Legion. Millan Astray, known throughout Spain as *El Gran Mutilado* for the countless number of wounds he carries on his body, is one of the most romantic figures in Spanish history. He is a living monument to the struggle against the Riff. Only one arm is left and only one eye, he walks with a perpetual limp, and his face is pock-marked with bullet wounds. He is the figure of the undaunted, unconquerable soldier. To-day he is still fighting—under the command of the young man who



££ G/< V-MUTHADO,

GENERAL MILLAN / VSTRAY

[facing page 70]



helped him to found the Legion and whom he had described as the best strategist of the century.

A mixed and desperate lot, the first recruits of the Spanish Legion, foreigners whose names and pasts had been thankfully forgotten, Spaniards who preferred the obscurity of life in the Legion to prison sentences in their native land; time-expired civil guards; an ex-officer of the Prussian Guard; an Italian airman; an ex-monk even, to whom his prior had suggested the strange penitence of enlisting in the Legion—all of them men with a relish for danger, ready to flirt with death. These were the men *El Mutilado* and *El Comandantin* had to lick into shape.

At Wad Lau they had their first training camp. Here they taught them rigorous discipline, and again more discipline. Here by discipline they created one of the most remarkable corps in Europe. But they taught more than discipline. They taught them to live a creed; and they addressed them as "Caballeros"—"gentlemen". Looking at Franco's writings and speeches, one can understand how near to his heart was the drawing up, with his Colonel, of this wonderful *credo* of the Legion.

The *Credo* runs:

"The spirit of the Legionary, unique, without peer, must be blind and ferocious in combat. His duty is to shorten the distance between himself and the enemy and to charge him with the bayonet.

"His spirit of comradeship must be such that he must take a sacred oath never to abandon a wounded or dead Legionary on the field of battle, even if it entails the death of all.

"When he hears the cry, 'The Legion to Me!' he must run to the aid of the wounded man, with reason or without.

"A Legionary' must never fall out on a march. His body must be supple and strong. He must never succumb to fatigue, or pain, or hunger, or thirst, or sleep. He must accomplish all labours, dig trenches, push cannon, accompany convoys, do all that he is asked.

"The duty of the Legionary, and of the Legion, is to run in the direction where there is firing, by day, by night, always, always, with order or without.

"He must obey until death. He must always, always fight, without rest without counting the days, the months, the years. To die' in combat is the highest honour. Death

only comes once. Death comes without pain. It is not so horrible to die as it seems. The most dreadful thing is to continue to live a coward.

"The standard of the battalion is glorious because it represents the blood of its Legionaries. Every nation is brave. It therefore behoves us to show which country is the bravest. Long live Spain! Long live the Legion!"

Whoever can read this *Credo* and find no stirring in the heart of him is, indeed, a strange man.

Let us add a few words of Pembroke Stephens, who saw the Legion in action while he was serving as a War Correspondent in Spain:

"These rules were fulfilled without question. A whole section has been killed recovering the body of a dead comrade. Among the * notable deeds ' of one battalion was the death from fatigue during the long march of four Legionaries. They marched on till they dropped dead.

"Initiation into this mysticism of death is rapid. Recruits are asked their reason for desiring to enlist. 'To serve my country' is the usual reply. * Not enough,' says the O.C. 'You must say—I want to die.' "*

It is related that at one of the hospitals not far behind the front line, within range of the sound of the guns in action, a lieutenant of the Legion lay gravely wounded and delirious from fever. In the same hospital were numerous other Legionaries, many of them as grievously wounded as their officer. In his delirium he was haranguing his men, exhorting them to attack. His voice ceased. The irregular, heavy breathing seemed to indicate that the end, the stertor, was not far off. Suddenly his broken voice called hoarsely—"To me, the Legion! To me, the Legion!" Each from his bed, some crawling, some pulling themselves along from bed to bed, wasted by fevers and weak from wounds, came the Legionaries, groping their way to him, disregarding the protestations of the hospital staff of nuns and nurses who tried to stop them, saying ..." He is raving. ... He does not know what he is saying. . . ." "He is calling us," they replied. And beside him they remained, as a guard of honour, until he died.

When this story was told to General Franco, he almost broke down. After a long pause he said, "Please let me know the names of this officer and the Legionaries."²

¹ Pembroke Stevens, *Daily Telegraph*, February 16, 1937.

³ Arraras.

Who can wonder that the re-conquest of Morocco was achieved by such men under such commanders? Or that men fight and gⁿe^tJleir i*ves willingly and trustfully under a man like Franco. If ever there was a complete proof of the old British Army saying that "the C.O. is 90% of the battalion" it is here in the spirit with which Franco has always imbued his men.

The Legion under Franco were never content unless they were given the post of extreme danger in the van. But for a while they had to wait for this distinction. When it came to them it was because of one of the worst disasters which had befallen Spanish arms for centuries.

General Sylvestre had set out to defeat the Moors once and for all, acting more on his own initiative than orders from the General Headquarters. The result was a terrible defeat at Anual in which Spain lost 20,000; many of those not killed were carried off into slavery by the Riffs. Sylvestre took his own life, and the prestige of the King was so jeopardized that it may be said to have been one of the chief factors in the eventual fall of the Monarchy; for he had been a keen supporter of the continuation of the Moroccan campaign, and the propagandists invented every infamous fiction to throw the onus of its failure upon him.

The Legion had marched for twenty hours, and had lain down exhausted in the streets of Fondak, when the news came that Melilla must be defended. Sylvestre's army was in rout, no garrison was there to protect the town, and the people were in panic. When the Legionaries entered Melilla, singing as usual their rousing songs, the people rallied; but soon fugitives poured in from the front and told the full story of the rout. The Legionaries alone stood between the Moors and the opportunity for them to overrun Spanish Morocco. They held the line.

The exploits of Franco and the Legion during this time read like a romance. Almost all the outlying blockhouses were besieged and needed water, food and munitions, and every convoy meant fighting through hostile country. On one convoy only, to Casabona, Franco lost ninety of his men before he could force a way in to the defenders.

In August 1921 the campaign to recover Melilla opened, with the Legion now the accepted spearhead, and Franco leading it in the field. They were almost incessantly engaged.

On one occasion, when Franco saw that the officer of another regiment had been killed, and the line was wavering, he galloped up to them on a white horse and rallied the troops. Though he hates the romantic pose, Franco does not despise to use spectacular methods where it may be needed.

The conquest of the great fortress on the summit of Mount Uisan was one of the great epics of this period. This stronghold endangered the Spanish camp at Scgangan and its reduction was of the most urgent importance. The nature of the terrain prevented effective artillery action and made a direct assault almost impossible. Torrential rains completed the almost insuperable difficulties. Franco suggested a surprise attack, which he organized, as usual, with every precaution down to the smallest detail. His opponents in the Civil War have found only too often that Franco's great gift is to be able to visualize a way round, especially where the enemy consider themselves most invulnerable.

The column left in silence, their rifles muffled by their cloaks so that no warning should be given by glint or sound. All munitions and machine-guns had to be carried up the precipitous mountain. Franco, as usual, led personally. At sunrise the Spanish flag was on the highest point of the Beni-bu-Ifrur.

On another occasion, at Anvar, when an attack had failed and the troops had had to dig themselves in, Franco was sent for; and once again by a surprise attack he turned what might have been a serious defeat into an important victory.

A complete change had now come over the Moroccan situation. In one month the rejuvenated army had subdued the Beni-Said tribe, which previously had held out against the Spaniards for ten years. For this campaign Franco was decorated with the Military Cross, the highest distinction after the Laurel Cross.

Sylvestre's defeat at Anual was thus revenged. But such was the state of Spanish opinion at that time that little or no notice was taken of anything occurring in Morocco. And because of this lack of support at home, all the advantages gained were lost and the Moors again started to be increasingly active. Soon conditions were as bad as ever, and in June 1923 the position of the Spaniards occupying the dangerous salient of Tizzi-Assa became desperate.

How Franco became Officer-in-Charge of the Legion also

reads like a romance. Millan Astray had been compelled by wounds to relinquish his command. His successor was Rafael Vallenca. To him was delegated the task of saving the Tizzi-Assa garrison. It was a job after his own heart, although he knew there was no return. He sent for his chaplain, made his confession, and set out on his last combat. It was then necessary to appoint a new Commandant. Franco was the obvious choice, but, once again, his youth stood in the way. He was not yet thirty and had not been appointed Lieutenant-Colonel. Better counsels prevailed and he received the command.

Franco's amazing record created amongst the troops an almost legendary faith which only grew with the exploits which this demanded. For example, at Tilfaruin all seemed lost and the garrison was at its last gasp when they were told that Franco had been sent out to relieve them. "If Franco is coming," they said, "we will hold out. Long live Spain!" The task seemed difficult enough, but Franco's tactics would have dismayed any but troops who trusted him blindly. Apparently he placed them in positions of great danger and uselessness. "Within a few hours the enemy will be coming within range," he said. None could see that it was possible. But Franco's words proved true. He attacked them in the rear and drove them on to the men in Tilfaruin. Not only was the garrison saved, but the enemy suffered heavy casualties and a severe defeat.

Again, in the basin of the Lau, he brought off a surprise attack from a position that all thought was impossible. Four unsuccessful attempts had been made to relieve the garrison at Koba Darsa. Franco was sent for. "Is it possible to assist them?" he was asked. "I consider it certain," he replied, "if I am allowed to carry out my own plan entirely in my own way." "It is impossible to cross the river," he was told. "I do not need to cross the river," Franco replied. His method was based on a knowledge of his enemy's psychology. Everyone in Spain and Morocco has a siesta between one-thirty and three-thirty. Franco attacked with great rapidity and completely by surprise at three o'clock under the blazing African sun. In just over an hour Koba Darsa had been relieved. Small wonder that General Sanjurjo reported on Franco: "He is an intrepid leader, who, in critical moments, contributes with his sang-froid and example at the head of his

troops to the re-establishment of a situation, and is always the last to retire" or that General Fernandez Perez stated: "He shows an extraordinary aptitude for commanding troops. In spite of his youth he displays a marked certainty in his judgment, careful consideration in his decisions, and repose in action, added to great courage. He always examines the situation from dangerous positions in order the better to reach his decisions. They are always sound, because they are the result of personal observation. I am honoured to propose his immediate promotion."

The political position in Spain had become so precarious for the Monarchy, after the Annual disaster, that the King agreed to the appointment of Primo de Rivera as President of a Military Directorate. One of the results of this political change was that the Moroccan question was entirely re-orientated. All the dangerous forward salient posts were given up, and only the zone known as "useful Morocco"—the coastal fringe from Tctuan to Tangier and Larache, and the road from Ceuta to Tetuan—was maintained. As a result of this defensive policy the garrisons at Xauen and Gorgues, the key to Tetuan, were soon besieged. Franco was first sent to assist in the relief of Gorgues, after which he was sent as head of the relieving force to Xauen. They had to force their way at the point of the bayonet through the defiles, and eventually reached Xauen. Here they found the out-lying garrisons in a dreadful state. The rescued defenders of Naucr had to be brought in in horse-paniers, those of Buharraz in ambulances. In six weeks the position was rectified and preparations for the retreat of 10,000 men were carefully organized. Five battalions of the Legion under Franco were to be left to cover the retreat. On 15th November, 1924, the troops stole silently away.

"We must give the impression that we never intend leaving here," said Franco. For two days Legionaries stuffed uniforms full of straw to man all the posts. On the 17th the Legionaries retreated without being observed at all by the enemy. Not a shot was fired.

Immediately Franco requested the honour of taking his Legion to assist the hard-pressed troops at Zoco-el-Arbaa and to cover their retreat. They had been subject to three weeks of constant attacks. Not only did Franco's Legionaries assist the other troops to retreat in good order, but afterwards they

themselves alone fought such a rearguard action as to call forth from Señor Magaz, Vice-President of the Directory, the statement that their final retreat was "the most arduous undertaking ever carried out by a colonial army". Franco was promoted to full Colonel for bravery on the field.

The alteration in the Spanish front line gave enormous satisfaction to the Riffs. Abd-el-Krim proclaimed himself Sultan of Morocco and held sway over forty tribes. Their attacks were now directed against the French as well, for they knew that there were a number of disaffected tribes under French influence. As a result, joint action was decided upon between France and Spain.

It is doubtful who was the originator of the idea of an attack on Alhucemas Bay. Franco in 1922 had written: "Alhucemas is the focus of the rebellion. It will end the day we land there." But Primo de Rivera has always been given the credit for suggesting the idea. However, he sent for Franco and put the idea before him. "I am told," he said, "that it is impossible. It will probably be a great catastrophe." In reply Franco made what, for him, was a long speech—for he is very laconic. "With courage," he said, "it is a mathematical certainty. Spain will never forgive you if you do not settle this Moroccan question; and the key is Alhucemas."

The first essential was to find a base where an army of 20,000 could manoeuvre. Apparently there was no such place. The proposed plan was worked out to the last detail. Armoured lighters were to be towed to the beach, each carrying 300 men. Franco's troops were the shock battalion. He was given absolute control in the choice of the position for disembarkation and the choice of the positions to be attacked on landing.

The landing-planks were inadequate, but Franco led his troops ashore through the water with their rifles held over their heads. Early in the afternoon of the 8th September, 1925, the Legionaries reached the heights above the Bay and hoisted the Spanish flag. The whole operation was so rapid that the casualties were negligible. Strong defensive positions were taken up on the heights.

Here for twelve days they held on. Owing to bad weather and the state of the sea the troops were short of water and had only biscuits and sardines as rations. Then the weather changed and 15,000 men were successfully landed. Franco

himself led the attack which followed. They had to scale the height of Malmusi Alto. There was a moment when the explosion of land mines made some of the troops waver, but Franco personally led the 6th and 7th Battalions of the Legion forward, and the position was saved.

Then the difficult part of the campaign began. To open the road to Axdir the summits must be cleared, and finally the heights of the Palomes mountain scaled and held. Franco's column was given the most difficult task. The fighting was extremely severe, but the passes were won. By 2nd October Mount Amerkrem was surrounded and Abd-el-Krim's strong-hold captured. The war, which had lasted eighteen years, was virtually over.

Franco, for his part in these successes, was awarded a second Military Medal and, *at thirty-two years of age*, given the rank of General. The French honoured him also. Marshal Lyautey stated that Franco and Graziani—later to be conqueror of Abyssinia—"were the two outstanding soldiers of our time". The French Government bestowed on him the rank of Commander and Knight of the Legion of Honour and of the French Military' and Naval Merit.

Franco returned to his native land after nearly fourteen years of constant warfare. He seemed to have borne a charmed life. Not 10% of his officers had survived his campaigns. His reputation with the troops was unbounded. He had always studied their interests. He never wasted human life. Always he gave the greatest care and attention to detail before he made a move at all. His capacity for organizing surprise attacks saved tremendous wastage. But to form a just appreciation of his achievements it is necessary to realize the conditions under which he was compelled to fight. First of all, until Primo's day, there was the widespread corruption and the lack of interest at home in the Moroccan campaign. The desire to exploit the opportunities of making money out of supplies to the Army outweighed all consideration for the needs of the Army and the men. Secondly, conditions in the actual fighting area were as difficult as could be imagined. The appalling heat, the ever-present problem of water shortage, the intense ferocity of the fighting, the low morale of the troops who had no enthusiasm for their task, and the large number of officers who lost heart at the mismanagement and apathy of the Governments, the difficulties of fighting in un-



MOROCCO: IHE JALIFA AT A REVIEW



SALAMANCA: THE MOORISH BODYGUARD



familiar mountainous country and the great distances to be covered—any one of these problems might well have disheartened even the most determined of men. But Franco faced them without fear or hesitation, and did more than any other man to restore to the Army its *esprit de corps* and its honoured traditions.

He had learned to fight with but little moral or material support from his Government at home. He had learned to build up an army from completely raw material. He had built for himself a reputation for self-discipline, loyalty and courage. He had learned how to evoke those qualities in others. Had he known that the Civil War was to come, he could not have chosen, if he had designed it, a more searching preparation for the problems which he was soon to be called upon to face. Above all, he brought into being something which Spain had been sadly needing for years—a man whom the mass of the people could trust, to whom they could look up, a man of ability, courage and proved integrity in whom they could place their faith.

CHAPTER IV

THE GOOD REPUBLICAN AND THE BOGUS REPUBLIC

APRIL 14TH, 1931, was the Great Day for which so many people had been working, to which so many had been taught to look forward with blind enthusiasm: the Great Day about which so many orators had been "intoxicated by the exuberance of their own verbosity", upon which the poor and the oppressed had been taught to count for the solution of all their troubles. The second Republic was proclaimed.

What were the plans at the back of the minds of the men who had brought the Republic into being? Had they done this from genuine motives, or was there something undisclosed, some hidden direction with intentions very different from those which appeared on the surface? At that stage there were many people who already knew the real answer; but the majority of the nation most certainly did not.

General Franco had no part in the creation of the Republic. He was, however, a servant of the State, and he made his position perfectly clear by two pronouncements which were models of correctness. The first was at Zaragoza, and the second was through the pages of the *I.B.C.*

Franco was then head of the Military Academy at Zaragoza, newly instituted by himself and Gil Robles, which, while under his command, had received the highest praise from Marshal Petain when he inspected it. Before he took over his command, Franco had taken a finishing course for Colonels and Brigadier-Generals at Versailles. Later he was also to take a course of training at the German military academies. Having learnt his job in the best possible school, fighting, over fourteen years, he can fairly claim that he "finished his education" in universities as good as any.

On the declaration of the Republic he issued the following order to the Academy:

"The Republic has been proclaimed in Spain. It is the duty of all, at the present time, to co-operate with their discipline and allegiance so that peace may reign and the nation be permitted to direct itself through the natural judicial channels.

"Hitherto, at the Academy, there has always been discipline and exact fulfilment of service. To-day these qualities are even more necessary: the Army needs, serenely and with a united spirit, to sacrifice every thought of ideology to the good of the nation and the tranquillity of the fatherland."

This proclamation was such that it should have delighted the politicians of the second Republic. Nevertheless it is impossible to avoid seeing in it a latent fear that all was not quite what it seemed to be. Perhaps one might also read into it a warning, though the army could only be hostile if the latent fears were realized.

Two days later a rumour that he had been nominated High Commissioner for Spain in Morocco enabled him to make his position clear to all Spain. He wrote to the newspaper T.B.C.:

"The Government cannot have considered this appointment, nor would I consider a post which might be thought to indicate any previous complicity with the recently installed regime or regarded as a consequence of my displaying any lack of warmth or reserve in the fulfilment of my duties or the loyalty which I owed and maintained towards those who, up till yesterday, represented the nation under the monarchical regime.

"It is my firm intention to respect and serve, as hitherto, the national sovereignty. It is my desire that this sovereignty should express itself through the proper judicial channels."

Franco thus only reiterated what was, in effect, his oath as an army officer. He was the servant of the State. Whatever form of government the people deemed best for themselves—that was his master. He was a soldier. He had no politics. While there was a State authority to command he was their very willing servant. It was only after the proceedings against General Lopez Ochoa, and the complete and organized breakdown of all central executive authority, the suppression of law and order throughout the country, with mob rule deliberately encouraged and financed, that, against all his personal inclinations, he conceived it his duty to his country—not to any

particular class, section or party—to take arms against the establishment of a government inspired by alien and evil forces.

Whatever doubts General Franco may have felt, there is no doubt that he was prepared to help the Republican Government in its task, so long as that Government was genuine in its professions. But there were grave reasons for suspecting the Government's sincerity from the very outset. Well-informed people in Spain had long known that peculiar forces were at work within the country; and the manner in which the King had been forced to leave was far from reassuring. There was nothing constitutional, democratic, or legal in demanding the departure of the King by the threat of civil war, on the strength of purely municipal elections, even if those elections had returned a majority vote in favour of that course. The municipal elections were properly to be followed by ordinary elections, but the people working to bring about the fall of the Monarchy refused to wait for them. Apart from this, the result of the municipal elections over the country as a whole was heavily in favour of the Monarchy. The politicians who formed the provisional Government of the Republic were fully aware of this; but they also knew that where their propaganda had done its work was in the provincial capitals, where those who were supporting them were concentrated and organized. If the King had not left, there most certainly would have been bloodshed. There would have been civil war. It was the blackmail threat of it which caused him to leave. Yet, looking back, perhaps it would have been best if he had not left; for the civil war which would have broken out then would have been of far shorter duration than the one which commenced some five years later, when the Government, though it had control of every means of enforcing its policy and exerting its authority, and although it had obtained many new adherents by intensive propaganda and suppression of opposition by terrorism and the elimination of unfriendly or neutral periodicals, nevertheless still did not have the majority of the nation behind it. By this we do not mean that it was the Republic versus the Monarchy, but that those who supported and used the Republic as an instrument were really representing policies and ultimate objects which were repugnant to the best elements in the country.

On the 14th May, 1931, *The Times* reported a debate at

the Ateneo Club in Madrid to discuss a political programme; its eight points were as follows:

1. Creation of a Republican dictatorship.
2. Immediate punishment of all responsible for illegal acts under the dictatorships.
3. Disbanding of the Civil Guard and the Army, police, and their substitution by armed Republicans chosen from the labouring classes and Republican clubs.
4. Confiscation of property of religious orders.
5. Nationalization of land.
6. Suppression of all Press organs hostile to the Republican Government.
7. Utilization of technical schools and other buildings for the public good.
8. Postponement of the Cortes until this programme had been carried out.

Señor Azaña, exercising brilliant statesmanship, or low cunning, according to how one regards these things, opposed this motion. In doing so he expressed his agreement "upon many points" and made it clear that his real objection was that the time was "inopportune". In point of fact, it was the programme which, later, he put into effect. What was inopportune was its publication, not its contents.

He and his associates had already indicated the path to be followed. The Government decided to regard all legislation, contracts, and dispositions made by the Dictatorship in the previous seven and a half years as illegal.

This was of extreme importance. It meant that Ministers might decide that whatever they thought fit could be declared illegal—every contract, every law in force throughout the country, and everything done by virtue of those laws. Theoretically, all State salaries paid throughout this period were illegal. Every municipal contract in progress could be cancelled, and those completed could be nullified retrospectively. Whatever theoretical justification might be advanced, what actually happened was victimization and blackmail on an unheard-of scale. From then onwards the Government was able to ratify contracts only where it reached fresh agreements, which were made in exchange for political adhesions, personal benefits or similar advantages. Those who disagreed were open to persecution, and some of them were selected and

ruined to make examples to "encourage" the waverers. It was the first example in practice of "Republican justice".

Very soon there were two events, the significance of which has since become clear. In May 1931 Señor Indalecio Prieto arranged a Russian credit to Spain under a scheme which left in the country 60% of the price of Russian oil purchased by the State; and early in June there was a project put forward for a statute of autonomy for Galicia. In June also the *Daily Telegraph* reported: "A Basque statute demanding practical autonomy for a tiny mountain state. . . . They demand a separate concordat with the Vatican. . . ."

There were several other significant items of news which showed what was happening. On the 28th July, 1931, *The Times* correspondent reported on the Syndicalist Movement: "Since Casanella fled to Russia in 1921, this Syndicalism may be more truly described as Communism." Prieto, petrol, Moscow, Casanella, the Syndicalists, separatism, and Barcelona—note the links.

As for conditions in the country, already on the 20th August, 1931, the Civil Governor of Seville was forced to describe the situation there as "a state of civil war". Yet had not the people's own elected Government been in office for four months; had the "people" not obtained the kind of Government for which they were said to have been yearning?

In due course the Cortes Constituyentes was elected. Its purpose was to draw up the new Constitution for the Republic.

This Constitution, like all Communist-inspired documents, prepared an infamous programme cloaked in fair words. Nor is this surprising, for one of its principal draughtsmen, Jimenez Asua, had been trained in Russia for such work. Whatever its outward appearance, let us for one moment analyse its effects. Inspired by Russian experience, the new Republic was described as a Republic of "workers". The national flag of Spain was changed, in order to break with past associations and history. Provision was made to assist regional and provincial autonomy and separatism. Measures were introduced to collectivize, socialize and confiscate property on various grounds, including whenever a parliamentary majority thought fit. And in order to neutralize those clauses which guaranteed protection for religious worship or personal rights in any form, a clause was tacked on whereby all such rights could be suspended. And in case that were not enough, a

special Law for the Defence of the Republic was then passed, suspending the Constitution itself!

This Law^{of th⁶ ^e^ence} the Republic, which was passed before 193¹ was out, gravely menaced private liberty. Newspapers, under this law, could be suspended indefinitely. In the same way any meeting-place or club could be closed. Private citizens were liable to indefinite imprisonment on any charge the Government might advance. They could be forced to change their residences or compelled to reside in places nominated by the Government, and they were subject to deportation without cause. The Government also took the right to dismiss any civil servant at any time.

The Law having been passed, the Government made the widest and most oppressive use of every one of these powers: and to ensure success, special use was made of the powers relating to newspapers, which were suspended arbitrarily, indefinitely, and without formulation of a charge, and the editors thrown into prison.

Such an outrageous policy of the Government of the People for the People would be extremely difficult to carry out without a judiciary manned by satellites of that Government. This necessary step was therefore taken at once. Judges were dismissed and large numbers of magistrates replaced by convenient appointments. This wanton invasion and havoc of the lives of private citizens was carried through under the high-sounding claim of the needs of the Republic. With equally methodical relentlessness the Church was persecuted by law, by the Government, by unrepressed terrorism and violence on the part of the anarchists. The measures proposed against the Church, most of which were passed, were the suppression of the religious orders, the confiscation of their property, the prevention of any of the religious taking part in education of any kind, and, at the same time, prohibition of their earning a living by any form of trade or profession. "The unnecessary harshness with which the separation of Church and State was effected left some 35,000 of the rural clergy without any means of living."*

Azafia used every effort to crush the Church and all that it stood for. He even entered religious associations in the Criminal Code. And whilst Azafia was officially dealing with the legal side of the attack, the Third International set to

* E. Alison Peers, *The Spanish Tragedy*.

work with the "unofficial" propaganda. They established the revolutionary "League of Atheism" in December 1932 and financed its activities and its periodical *Sin Dios*—“The Godless”—in which, under cover of anti-clericalism and criticism of evils, which they first of all largely invented, they set out to ridicule not merely the doctrines or dogmas of the Church, but the principles which underlay them. It is not by direct quotation that the responsibilities of these politicians can usually be run to earth. They have been far too well trained. It is necessary even to ignore what most of them said. They must be judged by those with whom they were working in association, and the intention of their dispositions must be judged by the way they were applied.

It is not generally proclaimed in England that a large number, if not the majority, of the Spanish clergy were in favour of the Republic, and used their influence to help it to arrive. Probably this has been concealed or glossed by a number of commentators, because the facts might indicate that the Church was democratic, and therefore that the real trouble was a revolutionary movement, and not a movement in favour of a democratic Republic. If it is the intention to cut the throats of nearly all the clergy who could be found, it is necessary to justify it in advance, and to maintain the fiction—as it was maintained—that the Church had enormous wealth, and that the clergy' were the allies of feudalism, tyrannical monarchs and dictators, and in every' way "anti-democratic". The clergy must bitterly have regretted how they were misled, and themselves paved the way for the awful deaths that so many of them met when the true nature of the revolutionary' movement declared itself.

Clearly there was some controlling influence behind this "Government of Dwarfs", as Dr. Albiñana so aptly called them. For, while this anti-Spanish and anti-Republican legislation was proceeding, riots, political strikes, murders, burning and looting of churches, convents and monasteries were taking place all over the country.

This Parliament had not been summoned to put laws into effect. Its mandate was merely to draft the Constitution. But it arrogated to itself the dual powers, and proceeded with its work of wrecking the existing order, by decrees, and by unjust and tyrannical interpretations of decrees. Though some of those engaged in this work may have been genuinely acting

from some sort of political conviction, or, at least, with a political object, unquestionably the majority of these politicians were so acting in order to benefit themselves personally, usually in a purely financial sense. Thereby they sold themselves irretrievably to the "brains" behind the programme.

Because the Republic came in at a time when new ideas were abroad throughout the world as regards social justice and reform, many people considered at the time that the work of the Republic was merely the application of these new general ideas—a little too fiercely applied, perhaps, rather too intolerantly theoretical. It was not generally appreciated that this was not the application of Liberal ideas, but on the contrary, of most un-Liberal ones, in accordance not with a combination of general principles and theories, but one particular specific school. The measures which the Government took, leave no doubt upon this point, no matter how much they may have been cloaked by fair words and misleading expositions. The Republic was merely a means to an end.

To take but one example. The Spanish code of laws was based upon the old Roman code. It had sound basic principles, and there were rules to act as a guide, no matter what modifications were introduced. Any Decree Law passed came into force over-riding any previous legislation which was in conflict with it. Any laws or dispositions which a later decree did not modify remained integrally in force. It was thus somewhat like English Case Law, where precedent governs principle, except where overruled by a subsequent decision or statutory legislation. But these politicians of the Republic set out to destroy the whole basis of the legal code. In fact, it was their intention to alter existing order in every conceivable way as to contracts, legacy or property—in brief, change for its own sake and for reasons which we explain later more fully. The right to private property had to be attacked; laws which protected private ownership had therefore to be nullified. Whatever reforms might have been introduced or contemplated, the fact that there were injustices or anomalies in the past, either major or minor, was made the ground for sweeping aside the whole of the guarantees which the law provided. All the accepted principles of justice were undermined. So also, upon specious arguments relating to minor

problems, they sought to sweep away religion, and, in the name of education, to institute throughout the country a vast series of propaganda bureaux on behalf of their new policies. It is not a question of what words they used, but the ultimate effect of what they did. That is the test. And each time that test is applied the real objects of this "Republican" Group become clearer and clearer.

Even where a principle was apparently respected in theory it was disregarded in practice. Let us take one brief example relating to property. On 15th September, 1932, when the great propaganda of the *latifundios* was being carried on, *The Times* correspondent reported: "Many landowners will be glad to have their land expropriated in return for compensation, which was proposed mainly in the form of Bonds, but modified by arbitrary declaration of confiscation in many cases."

In Catalonia the conditions which General Primo de Rivera had brought to an end once more returned. The bare record of the outrages exceeds any "Red bogey" which the most fanatical reactionary could have invented. Raids in quite small places brought to light stores of thousands of bombs, until by January 1933 it was reported in the *Morning Post*. "Huge stocks of bombs, rifles and ammunition are being found by the police all over Spain. . . . An enormous amount of money is being spent on fostering anarchy. Many of those arrested, though to all appearances not well paid, carried note-cases full of bank notes. The conditions in Barcelona in September 1923 . . . are eclipsed by the present vast organization." In July 1933 the *Daily Herald* reported that "200,000 Fascists" were working hand in hand with anarchist gangsters.

Four months after this an effort was made to form a party—the *Falange* (*Phalanx*)—with a policy in some respects resembling Fascism. Is this surprising?

It was not economic distress which caused most of the ferment. It was a creed of hatred preached by professional agitators, and fanned by paid emissaries. In December 1933 *The Times* recorded that a rising on the 9th was boldly announced, and with such confidence that the zero day and hour were known with exactness. Funds were abundant: "It is credibly reported that 'remunerative robbery' has become

a regular source of revenue for the C.N.T., who guarantee the best provision of legal assistance . . . and intimidation of juries in the event of arrest, providing half the product of the robberies was paid into the Party funds."

There was much dissension between the gangs running the labour organizations. Some months before the above report, Layret, the lawyer rival of Companys (later the President of Catalonia), was murdered by a competing "labour organization". The murderers complained bitterly at their trial that of the 20,000 pesetas set aside for the job, they had only been given 100 pesetas (say, £3). They were also somewhat careless on occasion. When General Fernando Berenguer's assassin was arrested, he found he had shot the wrong man. He was one of three hired to do the murder. They were unknown to each other and not part of the secret organization employing them, and had drawn lots for the final choice. The loser (or was it the winner?) was supposed to murder Damaso Berenguer, but slipped up through not being acquainted with either of the two Berenguer brothers.

Perhaps the greatest crime committed under cover of the euphemisms of the Republican politicians was the ruination of the sane labour movement which is described in Chapter II. Primo de Rivera had laid a foundation and Largo Caballero had followed the lead. There had at least been the possibility of Spanish labour obtaining increased benefits from the development of the country's industries, within the limits of the industries' capacity. But under the Republic this machine was turned into an instrument for sowing class hatred. Its leaders were corrupted and bought over to the extremist school. In the name of progress the industries of the country were ruined, not by short-sighted policy, but by deliberate intent. Perhaps the greatest hope of peaceful development had lain with the U.G.T. Most of its members were ordinary, decent workmen, the same sort of men who are to-day the backbone of the *Falange*, fighting for General Franco. There are some 200,000 of them under arms as volunteers, and many more working on communications, internal order, and other work in the rearguard. Properly led, these men might have come to co-operate with the *Ceda*, most of whose supporters were working men, as a moments thought will show, for *half the people iuho voted in 1936 voted anti-Marxist*. In Spain the upper class was not numerous, and there was only

a small middle class of which large numbers, the *petite bourgeoisie*, were seduced to the Popular Front in their blindness. The party machine was used to corrupt the members of the U.G.T., to lead them away from their old ideals which, in many industries, approached those of the old Guilds of our own past history. But they were now joined up with the anarchists whose members professed to have no theory of government at all. They claimed the right of libertarian self-expression, and the abolition of all forms of government. A very curious constructive policy! At a later stage they even agreed to join the Government in order, presumably, to help its final destruction! It was because of such basic absurdities and contradictions, this vagueness and essential unsoundness, that the U.G.T. themselves came to be at the orders of the Communists, together with the other bodies, the C.N.T. and the F.A.I. The Communists were nominally few in number, but the anarchists were disposed to carry out the first stages of the Communist programme: they became allied in a destructive programme without thought of the consequences.

We are informed of one interview which a representative of a foreign firm had with a Minister of Fomento (Industry and Public Works). He pointed out that business was being ruined by deliberate injustices, both general and specific. The Minister replied to the effect that the Government did not confiscate private enterprises, because that might lead to awkward international complications. It was also quite unnecessary, for they only had to make the business unworkable, to see that it ran at a loss, and the owners would be very glad to surrender the business for nothing rather than continue to lose money. Thus official policy was imprudently disclosed. It can be imagined what the state of affairs must have been after this "system" had been perfected by four further years of intensive work. That was the explanation also of the perpetual (political) strikes and riots which commenced even before the Republican Government took up office.

We will give one remarkable example of the administration of the nation's affairs and of the current form of justice. Where a tax had been paid exceeding 150,000 pesetas, and it was found to have been paid in error, it was necessary to have the formality of a decree passed by Parliament before the money could be recovered. Accordingly, an income-tax demand could be submitted, absolutely unsupported by any

proper ground, for, say, £5,000 or £10,000. The tax-payer had to pay, but was allowed to appeal. The victim could then win his appeals through every stage of the slow and difficult procedure. He could end up with the decision of the highest Court of Appeal, ordering the money to be refunded, but the matter still rested there, unless the Minister was prepared to place the decree before Parliament. This kind of thing had been current in Spain for many years, but it had never reached such limits as it attained under the Republic; when finally the matter was pressed in the strongest possible manner, it was disclosed that the total claims, under this head alone, amounted to over 80,000,000 pesetas, and it was blandly stated that all these were liabilities incurred under past Ministers, and that the existing Minister could not reasonably be expected to find so large a sum out of his restricted resources! After all, the ordinary Minister under the Republic was only in office for a few weeks, and there were so many better things to be done than making restitution out of the money collected from current taxes. The receipts were what mattered, not the debts which should have been discharged.

The conduct of the average Spanish politician at any stage of the country's history is unedifying; but what took place in the four and a half years of Republican rule is almost beyond description. If the description were faithfully given, the story would seem so fantastic that probably it would not be believed.

There was one other curious feature, namely, that although the Government did not take steps to restore order generally, they *did* take steps of the most brutal kind conceivable to suppress occasional individual disturbances. And each time this anomaly occurred, the disciplinary measure was taken up by the Press and presented as a disgraceful repression—as indeed it frequently was. The events which provoked it—and should have provoked a far wider exercise of authority throughout the country—were given little attention. What aroused the tremendous indignation was the nature of the repression if not the fact of the exercise of authority. There was always more outcry at the punishment than at the crime; and the Government in power always gave grounds for it. Does this sound too diabolic to be true? At the time it probably seemed so; but looking back after the events of 1934 and 1936, and after seeing the proclaimed objects and methods

of the organizers, it would seem that, on the contrary, this also was certainly part of a deliberate scheme.

Strangest of all, it was while events were proceeding on these lines that the Government chose to refuse co-operation with the Army, and set about methodically destroying its efficiency—almost its very existence.¹ Thus were General Franco's fears justified, as again, at a later date, when Azaña, by a stroke of the pen, destroyed all General Franco's efforts to reconstitute the Army during the brief period when Gil Robles co-operated with the Centre Government after the Asturian rising of 1934.

In September of 1933, 40,000 members of the "Youth" sections, Communists and Socialists, demonstrated a protest in Madrid against the decree that children under sixteen should not belong to political parties. Is this an indication of organization at work? The man who could resist an affirmative conclusion must be rare.

And as regards the conditions generally, we would refer again to *The Times*, which stated that *pistoleros* were in such numbers that the work was positively competitive, and they were carrying out their slaughter for the price of 30s. (50 pesetas) a day from the official "Socialist" funds.

Meanwhile the Russians felt sufficiently strong within this "democratic republican" government for officials appointed to the various government departments to be given a new title—*Comisar*,² and the departments themselves became *Comisarias*. This was in 1931.

As will be seen later there was every justification for the report on the 14th September, 1934, that there were "sensational details of the sale of arms implicating war officials and officers". The smuggling was said to be by "Socialists". The people supplied, the Asturian miners, were mostly "anarchists". The principal person in the Government concerned—Señor Azaña—was, of course, a "democratic intellectual". What is in a name? They were all directed from a common source.

¹ The King had once more behaved in an exemplary manner and sent for publication a notice to the following effect:

"News has reached me that many officers are refusing to give the promise of fidelity to the Republic required of them. ... I have asked them to do so. If the Monarchy ever returns to Spain, it must be by the same path of the will of the people."

² Is it merely an accidental play upon words that in the standard Spanish dictionaries the word *Comisar* means to confiscate, sequestrate, attack?"?

The Government's conduct in suppressing every form of democratic liberty was utterly cynical, and it was perfectly plain that it was not the result of incompetence or confusion, but carefully considered policy. "It is truly amazing that, in Spain, a country accustomed under the Monarchy to a much greater measure of freedom," wrote three close observers, "a Republican Government should have found it possible to exercise a despotism that was entirely unknown even during the exceptional regime of General Primo de Rivera."¹ And yet, of course, the verbal promises made in the new constitution of the Republic had been even more high-sounding than in France in 1789.

It may seem a strange statement to make—that anyone could gain by purposely ruining the Army, by creating distress, by ruining industry, and by lowering the standard of living of the whole population, but all the evidence to that effect exists, and the reasons are not really far to seek. At that time few people, except those who were part of the conspiracy, could see the key to the puzzle; but once the key is supplied, the existence of the intention is established and everything becomes perfectly plain.

Well-informed people in Spain had no doubts as to how these familiar sequences of revolutionary strikes and religious riots came about. On May 10th, 1931, within a month of the establishment of the second Republic, the attack on the Church was commenced by the Jesuit Church of the Calle de la Flor in Madrid being burned. There was a sinister feature about this incident. The crowd prevented the firemen from extinguishing the flames, and the *Government took no steps to prevent the mob having its riotous way*. Moreover, the crowd flaunted the red banner of Russia rather than the yellow, red and purple of the new Republic. The Church of the Carmelite Fathers, the residence of the Jesuits, the Mercedarian Convent, the College of Maravillas, these were the next objectives. They were set on fire and destroyed. "Still the Government failed to take any effective action," says Professor Peers.²

Valencia, Alicante, Murcia, Granada, Seville, Cordoba, Cadiz and Malaga were the next towns to follow Madrid in the

¹ *The Spanish Republic*, p. 30.

² E. A. Peers, *The Spanish Tragedy*, p. 56. When similar incidents occurred later, warning was given in advance. The destructions were "symbolical" and to point the way for the final holocaust.

religious persecution. Within two months, Professor Peers states, the Government "was incapable of safeguarding the lives or property of any group of citizens whatever"? Strikes, accompanied by organized violence, took place at San Sebastian and in Asturias; over two hundred persons were killed and wounded in a Seville general strike: a general telephone strike took place all over Spain. The culmination of this period, the clue which provided the direct line on the true criminals organizing this persistent nation-breaking policy, was provided by the appalling events in the little village of Castilblanco in Estremadura.

Castilblanco was a contented little village of about nine hundred inhabitants: a successful little village when judged by Estremaduran standards. "There was no kind of distress: food was plentiful, and nearly all the villagers had their own land."²

In other words Castilblanco was in most respects a typical agricultural village content with itself and with its own life.

A general strike in the city of Badajoz had extended to Castilblanco. On New Year's Day, 1932, some of the political strikers attacked the Republican Civil Guard. Four of the guard were murdered. There is no pretence that there was any occasion for this attack or any provocation. The murderers also threatened to shoot the village telephone operator if she let through news of the slaughter.

"Not till eight hours had passed did reporters arrive at the village. They found a scene typical of a provincial prison-yard of the Cheka, the terrorist police of Soviet Russia in the early days of the Soviet Revolution."³

Professor Peers has described what they saw:

"The murdered guards had been battered with their own rifles beyond recognition. Their heads had been beaten in, their eyes gouged out, and their bodies knifed, stoned and mutilated. On one of the bodies were counted thirty-seven knife thrusts. To crown all, the very women of the village, so an eye-witness declared, had danced round the disfigured corpses."⁴

"Only political motives," continues Professor Peers, "could have been responsible."

¹ E. A. Peers, *The Spanish Tragedy*, pp. K7-0.

² E. A. Peers, *ibid.*, p. 88.

³ Godden, *Conflict in Spain*, p. 22.

⁴ Peers, *The Spanish Tragedy*, p. 88.



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^{TA7} -During the Dictatorship terrorism had been suppressed. When it returned under the Republic, it took on a new form which became gradually accentuated. Instead of occasional employers being waylaid and shot in one place at a time, the evil was more widespread, and the number of agents and co-operators in the work multiplied tremendously. The work even took on an official character. And the type of man engaged became more frequently ordinary workers enrolled from one of the village or urban cells instead of men hired or chosen by lot from members of "the Party", specially selected by headquarters and sent down to carry out the assassinations. Professional organizers were trying to build up throughout the country the revolutionary urge, as the necessary preliminary to the final assault, and they were developing the local spirit of aggression with that in view.

The "political motives" were of alien source. These terrible events were the work of trained agitators sent down to provoke them by intensive propaganda and a campaign of falsehood. The "political motives" were the same which brought about the expulsion of the Monarchy and the establishment of the Republic, as a means of furthering future plans for the destruction of Spanish civilization and the enslavement of the country¹.

That alien source was the Russian Soviet Government.

We accuse the Soviet Government and those who assisted their plans of being the premeditated instigators of every major misfortune which had occurred in Spain since 1925. All the trouble in Spain -which brought in the Republic, which existed all through the time of the Republic and finally culminated in the present Civil War was the direct result of a calculated, relentless policy by the Soviet Government of Russia.

Lenin, at the Second World Congress of the Communist International in Moscow in 1920, made his famous declaration that the "second successful Proletarian Revolution" would take place in Spain, brought about by an "armed Proletariat"? On Lenin's death Spain became a "pious legacy" to the Kremlin. It was the duty of the Communist chiefs to implement the sacred words of the great leader.

We make the further accusation that all the terrorism, the

¹ Report of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, Moscow, 1922, English edition, p. 75.

crimes, the persecution of the Church, the deliberate development of blood-lust were carried out as part of the considered policy of the Comintern, organized in every detail and carried out ruthlessly without any consideration for humanity, with the sole object of destroying the whole national fabric of Spain, with a view to establishing a Soviet Republic.

Spain was essential to the Communists in their scheme of World Revolution. If Spain became a Red Republic, the real attack on the Western Powers had begun. France to-day, even with the Spanish war lost, stands very near the brink. After France, the target is England.

Britain is essentially a *bourgeois* country, the perfect soil for the weed of Marxian Socialism, though this may sound paradoxical. We have a large middle-class nation. "The middle classes," said Lenin contemptuously, "can be left to destroy themselves." Communism is still, to many Britons, a "political theory". That is how Lenin wanted his victims to think. But Bolshevism is not just a theory. Lenin was frank; he never hid his purpose. It is there for all who will take the trouble to read in the vast amount of writings he left. "Bolshevism," he said, "is a manual of action." Constantly he said this: he repeated it over and over again. "Our theory is not a dogma, but a manual of action."¹

We say that the Soviet attack on Spain was the most dangerous attack which Europe has yet had to face from Bolshevism. We say that General Franco's revolt is the only bulwark which stood between Spain becoming immediately a Red Republic in 1936, and the menace which that would have implied to the whole of the rest of Europe.

Three of the chief republican leaders and signatories of the Pact of the Provincial Republic, Indalecio Prieto, Caballero and, perhaps in a less conspicuous manner, Azaña, were the emissaries of the Comintern.

This is no theory. Everyone in Spain, and most of those outside with a close knowledge of that country, know that this is a commonplace. Unfortunately the facts have, for some reason, been concealed from the British public.

Everyone knew in Spain that the object was the Soviet Revolution. The militia were openly drilled before the Civil War broke out. The Robles-Sotelo platform for the 1936 election was the straightforward issue of anti-Marxism. The

¹ Lenin, *Left Wing Communism*, p. 53.

GOOD REPUBLICAN AND BOGUS REPUBLIC gy

appeal of General Franco when the Nationalist revolt broke out was a direct challenge to Marxism, and limited to that issue.

Franco and his men have rendered a service to Europe, and especially to Britain, which can never adequately be repaid. They have, at least for the time, stemmed the torrent which would have overrun Europe had Spain given way.

But it is not only the menace of the Soviet Republic itself which must be faced. Far more awful are the methods employed by the Soviet to obtain their ends. These methods are so diabolical that they require to be exposed as widely as possible. So far as space permits, we will give specific illustrations of the methods by which the Soviet set out to conquer Spain. We do not ask that our personal views or beliefs should be accepted. There is enough evidence to make outlaws of every man who assisted in this work. That evidence comes largely from the lips and the writings of the emissaries of the Soviet themselves, men who were detailed to bring Spain to ruin.

In the next chapter we confirm the facts from the evidence of the Soviet's own chiefs. But before setting them out, it is important first to describe the philosophy and methods used by the Soviet to conquer the world for the Communist Revolution.

Seven years ago Mr. Winston Churchill wrote an excellent description of Soviet methods. It is as true to-day as when it was written. What has happened in Spain proves the truth of his words to the last detail. "Communism", writes Mr. Churchill, "is not only a creed. It is a plan of campaign. A Communist is not only the holder of certain opinions, he is the pledged adept of a well-thought-out means of enforcing them. The anatomy of discontent and revolution has been studied in every phase and aspect, and a veritable drill book prepared in a scientific spirit for subverting all existing institutions.¹ The method of enforcement is as much a part of the Communist faith as the doctrine itself. At first the time-honoured principles of Liberalism and Democracy are invoked to shelter the infant organism. Free speech, the right of public meeting, every form of lawful political agitation and constitutional right are paraded and asserted. Alliance is sought with every popular movement towards the Left.

¹ Cf. Maurin, "unpublished tactics and strategy." (See page 173.)

"The creation of a mild Liberal or Socialist regime in some period of convulsion is the first milestone. But no sooner has this been created than it is to be overthrown."

Could anything be more truthful of the fate of the second Spanish Republic? And yet this was written seven years ago.

"Woes and scarcity resulting from confusion must be exploited," Mr. Churchill goes on. "Collisions, if possible attended with bloodshed, are to be arranged between the agents of the new government and the working people."

Does not the lesson of Castilblanco now become all too vividly plain?

"Martyrs are to be manufactured."

After the abortive rising at Jaca in 1930 the first two conspicuous "martyrs" were successfully manufactured—Fermin Galan, the leader of the rising, and Garcia Hernandez were shot by the Government when the rebellion was suppressed. These two discontented junior officers had acted "unofficially", forestalling the intended official movement which so shortly afterwards was engineered in connection with the municipal elections. Like most of the Marxist leaders, they had hoped to use the movement as a means of achieving personal power, but they tried to do so "against the machine". The draft decrees of Galan were published, with facsimiles, by General Mola in his book *Tempestad Calma Intriga y Crisis*;¹ and it is clear that though these men were the ordinary typical leaders of atheistic Communism, they were merely ambitious theorists, not "officials" in the inner councils of the elect. In high-flown language Galan drafted bombastic decrees, signed by himself as "President", for the suppression of religion, the exaltation of the brutal characteristics in men, and for the ruthless destruction of all opposition. In spite of the history and the obvious personal motives of these two men, they rose ostensibly for the establishment of a "Soviet" Republic; and as "martyrs" were needed, so "heroes" and "martyrs" of the cause they became.

Mr. Churchill continues:

"An apologetic attitude in the rulers should be turned to profit. Pacific propaganda may be made the mark of hatreds never before manifested by man. No faith need be, indeed

> At that time General Mola was head of the General Directorate of Security (the police) and he therefore was fortunately in a position to disclose these facts.

may be, kept with non-Communists. Every act of goodwill, of tolerance, of conciliation, of mercy, of magnanimity on the part of the Government or statesmen is to be utilized for their ruin. Then when the time is ripe and the moment opportune, every form of lethal violence from mob revolt to private assassination must be used without stint or compunction."

In England the facts have been glossed. But this is no more than a brief sketch of what was actually put into effect in Red Spain in 1936.

"The citadel will be stormed under the banners of liberty and democracy: and once the apparatus of power is in the hands of the Brotherhood, all opposition, all contrary opinions must be extinguished by death. Democracy is but a tool to be used and afterwards broken: Liberty but a sentimental folly unworthy of the logician. The absolute rule of a self-appointed priesthood according to the dogmas it has learned by rote is to be imposed upon mankind without mitigation progressively for ever. All this, set out in prosy text-books, written also in blood in the history of several powerful nations, is the Communist's faith and purpose. To be forewarned should be to be forearmed."

Every word of Mr. Churchill's terrible indictment has been proved in Spain since 1925. He himself adds, "I wrote this passage nearly seven years ago, but is it not an exact account of the Communist plot which has plunged Spain into the present hideous welter against the desires of the overwhelming majority of Spaniards on both sides?"^x

Such is the "philosophy" of Communism. Its strategy and tactics can literally be described as diabolic. The Soviet-democratic revolution is brought about on a clearly devised plan. Its technique has been perfected by the Kremlin in twenty years of world-wide experience. Its tenets for the destruction of mankind are engaging in their simplicity. The first essential is, as Napoleon said of war, "Money, more money, and still more money." The first uses of that money are corruption and internal propaganda. There are always people in any country sufficiently corruptible to ensure the revolutionary foundation. That corruption may be achieved by straight cash, by assisting to power, or by flattering the intellect or the pride. At a later stage the sequel, blackmail, can be employed.

> W. S. Churchill, *Great Contemporaries*.

For the recruitment of the leaders, secret societies are formed, or utilized, and others of a special popular nature are used for the great army of assistants. It is strange how in this boasted "advanced" civilization of to-day nearly everyone is flattered in belonging to a secret society. Thus is the Communist "cell" born. When Largo Caballero, under the specious pretence of the Defence of the Republic, illegally replaced existing mayors by "comrades", he made the boast that he had created "tens of thousands of Communists' cells throughout Spain".

Outside Britain the corruption of Freemasonry has long been accomplished. The Grand Orient Lodge, the servant of the Soviet and of certain powerful Jewish groups determined on world domination (but by no means unopposed by powerful groups of their co-religionists), is the executive headquarters for disseminating revolutionary orders, with a very complete obedience to those orders by unwitting disciples all over Europe. Two of its chief centres in Europe to-day are Paris and Prague, which largely explains the political orientation of France and Czechoslovakia in the Spanish Civil War. Spain was made ready for the first stage in the Soviet Revolution, the establishment of the Republic, by the "capture" of the Army Generals by Freemasonry. The deputy Cano Lopez deposed in the Cortes that "since 1925 Masonry had grouped under the heading * Military Brotherly Union 'most of the high officials of the Army. The members included . . . Cabanellas, Sanjurjo, Goded, Mola" (there is considerable doubt if General Mola should have been included in this list. The statement is not disputed otherwise), "Lopez Ochoa, Queipo de Llano and others, all acknowledged Republicans. Of twenty-three Divisional Generals, twenty-one were Freemasons and a similar proportion of the Brigadiers. They had all taken the oath of the Spanish Grand Orient: 'I swear obedience without limitation to the head of the Council of Thirty-three. . . I swear not to recognize any mortal as above him.' Both in 1929, for the abolition of the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, and in 1931, for the abolition of the Monarchy, the Masons gave their orders and the Generals obeyed."¹

Seven of the eleven signatories of the "Provisional Republican Government" were members of the Spanish lodges.

¹ Jean Dauray, *L'Encre Latine*, January 1937.

Because the Russian Soviet Government is neither democratic nor liberal, in any sense of those two misused words, they have enormous advantages over ordinary governments. In a democratic country, whether under a monarchy or any other usual form of government, the incidence of taxation is fully appreciated by the citizens, and the purpose and use of the main bulk of the expenditure of the money obtained through taxation can be ascertained, and to some extent even controlled by the electorate. The Government cannot levy enormous sums, for which it makes no attempt to account to taxpayers entirely ignorant of the State's revenue, and then proceed to use the money, in undisclosed volume, for the subversion of foreign states. But in Russia the autocratic Government, without visible direct taxes and by means of the appropriation of the output of collectivized State industries, is able to put aside and utilize, unnoticed, enormous sums. The limit is only reached when the standard of living of the suppressed "masses" reaches such a depth as to create discontent too strong to be held down. To take an imaginary and by no means inapt example. If the State ran the whole of British industry, paying the producers only the equivalent of the wage received by Russian labour, there would be an enormous surplus available, no matter how badly industry was run. Russia is in the position where the standard of living for the vast majority has been and still is extremely low, but, at the same time, she possesses enormous natural resources, and, in prodigal profusion, some of the fundamental needs of humanity to-day—gold, timber, wheat and oil.

Oil has played no small part in financing Russian propaganda in Spain. Before his elevation to the position of Minister of Finance, Indalecio Prieto had promised in his speeches that, when in power, he would wind up the petrol monopoly, the inference being that with a free oil market the "liberty" of the private purchaser would be improved. On obtaining power Prieto proved himself a good Communist. He did not wind up the petrol contract. He handed it over to his Russian masters. Russian Oil Products obtained the monopoly.^{mo}

Details of this contract began to be known early in May 1931, and *The Times*, in recording these facts, reported Prieto as saying, "Our land contains individualists and anarchists,

but no Communists ", thus following the accepted Soviet doctrine that when some particularly important move against the people is undertaken, it must be done under cover and in the name of liberty and democracy. Later *The Times* reported that Prieto had invited M. Léon Blum and Vincent-Auriol to Madrid to " advise on economic subjects "¹ and announced that the Republic had begun *pourparlers* with the Soviet about economic relations. He then hastened to add, " There is no danger of Communism in Spain, nor is it true that Russia is desirous of experimenting with her system in our territory."

But that oil monopoly went a great way to assist in the " manufacture " of Communists in Spain, even if Prieto's statement were taken at its face value, and not, as it was, an example of the " inversion " upon which all Russian propaganda is based. (It is not too much to say that Russian propaganda has this much of truth about it. It tells the truth . . . for those who can read it. For it always tells the opposite of what the truth really is.) The oil " monopoly " conveys the right of handling and selling about 70% of the whole of the oil used in Spain, and as one of the terms of the bargain, 60% of the money obtained from this monopoly was left in Spain for propaganda purposes. Is there any need to wonder why there was a constant supply of money in an impoverished country for riots, insurrections, *pistoleros* and the wholesale corruption of officials in every walk of life—the politicians, the Press, and those connected with the management of the arsenals? One vivid example may suffice. In quelling the Asturian revolt in 1934 (for which Caballero went to prison, Prieto escaped in a bull crate and Azaña saved himself by his oratory in the Cortes), the Government forces rounded up nearly 90,000 rifles, 33,000 pistols and revolvers, and some half-million rounds of ammunition,¹ ² and that at a time when Franco had discovered the Government arsenals practically denuded of all weapons. Rather a large deposit of arms for the deluded workmen to be able to finance for themselves, especially when it has always been the boast of the C.N.T., the group most implicated in the Asturian revolt, that they had no central funds, not even for strike purposes. They

¹ Could cynicism go further? The two men who have done more to ruin France than any others in living memory.

² Knoblaugh, *Correspondent in Spain*, p. G.

had no need to spend their own money. It was provided for them by the Internationals.

With the basis of the "economic interpretation" of revolution vs. all established, the next step is the degradation of humanity in the country chosen for victimization in the name of the Soviet-democratic Revolution. Humanity has to be degraded to its lowest common denominator. In the Psalms it was written of the Creator: "He maketh man a little lower than the angels." Of the present great revolutionary destroyers it can be said, with equal truth, "They make men a great deal lower than the beasts." The main axiom to be remembered is that, in making a democratic-Soviet Revolution, anything sufficiently debased can always be turned to the "good of the cause". The basis for the instruments is bestiality.

These are harsh words, but they are the truth. From the methods employed in Russia since the Revolution until to-day, through Hungary- (shades of Szamuelsky), through Mexico, through Spain since 1930, gaining in strength through France and in the signs through Britain to-day, the use of these same relentless, sadistic tactics can be seen. Terrorism, as Lenin pointed out again and again, is the Soviet's "one foundation". By terrorism are the "comrades" controlled, by terrorism are new "comrades" made, and by terrorism are all opponents "liquidated".

"How can we accomplish a revolution without shooting?" asked Lenin on one occasion.¹ "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat is unthinkable without terror," Lenin said on another occasion.² "The masses must know that they are entering on an armed, sanguinary, and desperate struggle. . . . The ruthless extermination of the enemy will be their task."³ Lenin knew the power of "plugging" a doctrine. And the culmination of his philosophy is that it now has legal significance in Russia and even "respectability" abroad. The Communist Legal Code, he raid, was to "base terrorism firmly on fundamental principles".⁴

Blood, torture, mutilation, rape, burning—these are the

¹ Trotsky, *Lenin*, p. 159.

² Speech to Communist International, Moscow, July 30, 1920.

³ Lenin, *Proletary* No. 2, pp. 32-6; *Lectures to Young Workers*, p. 50.

⁴ Lenin, *The Bolshevik*, October 31, 1930-

"impregnable rocks" on which the Soviet-democratic Republic is founded. Even straightforward murder is not enough. Torture, the more revolting the better, is the means whereby man is to find his new birth. Mankind is to find new spiritual rectitude through the scientific development of the blood-lust. Once dominated thus by the diabolical, the Gadarene swine are then ready, rounded up, for their final precipitate rush into the Dead Sea.

As Mr. Churchill has so ably pointed out, their plan is carried out in the name of "Democracy" and "Liberty". Not to say "Freedom". For Lenin learnt many of his lessons from studying the French Revolution—an event which may be regarded as a mere pallid "test" compared with the Soviet World Revolution of to-day's dream. Voltaire has taught the Communists many elementary aspects of revolutionary philosophy. "One must lie like the devil," said Voltaire in a letter to Theriot; "not timidly, not for a time only, but boldly and always." Add to this the general principle laid down by Collot D'Herbois that "everything is permissible for the triumph of the revolution" and Vicomte Léon de Pon^{ins}'s considered statement, and the whole "intellectual" philosophy of Sovietism is revealed.

Vicomte de Pon^{ins} writes: "The secret power directing the attack (of the French Revolution) knew that certain ideas, lofty and beautiful in appearance, could prove a terrible weapon of destruction. It had, moreover, at its service the real genius of the formula. Provided that the telling phrase, full of high-sounding words and fine promises, is spoken to the masses, that is the principal thing. *The opposite of what has been stated can be done afterwards'*, that is of no importance. Such are three words of Masonic origin, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity."¹

The importance is to seize power. The method, provided it is ruthless enough, is unimportant. The end justifies the means.

With the Gadarene herd thus prepared, a people systematically degraded and goaded, by lies and by misery deliberately provoked, murder a habit, sexual morality a thing of the past, truth a mere matter for cynicism, and family life destroyed, the "comrades" are ready for the great assault. The primary objectives are the rallying-points of the nation.

¹ de Pon^{ins}, *The Secret Powers Behind Revolution*, p. 32.

In Rock n*tions⁴! These are the Monarchy, or the Republic, and the Churches. The object is to break down all discipline and authority. Twigs are easily broken one by one.

There are many to do the work for them, and for a variety of motives, not excluding notoriety. When Ortega y Gasset launched the slogan *Delenda est Monarchia*, he probably did not know he was weakening the first objective of the Soviet shock troops. From there, or simultaneously if possible, destroy organized religion. Calumny and the libertarian "ideology" are the chief weapons. These finished, the third step is easy. The main position is turned. National feeling is next on the list for "liquidation". To assist this, federalism or regionalism are fostered—for is not the apparent basis a local patriotism? Especially in a country like "the Spains", where local autonomy has a geographical basis and where each man is a true citizen of his environ. Once the State is disintegrated, the final assault is made simple. Only that ancient conception, the family, has to be destroyed, unless that too has gone in the convincing campaign against morality. The people then are theirs. Lost, terrorized, terrified, without a shepherd, turning to the ignoble creatures who have woven this mesh, they are ready for the final culmination of the "democratic" revolution—their complete subjection to the will of the small clique who have managed

"... to wade through slaughter to a throne
And shut the gates of mercy on mankind."

"This self-appointed priesthood," as Mr. Churchill says with such fine irony.

The piteous cynicism of the whole thing! The proletariat is to give all, their lives, their liberty, their hopes, to bind themselves more securely at the wheels of a chariot driven by a conqueror more ruthless, more diabolical than any in ancient Asiatic history. That is what Spain has been facing for years. To that she would have succumbed had not Franco and his fellow Generals taken their lives in their hands, and fought. Their only asset was hope. "We have all the money, the men, the instruments and all the arms", said Prieto. Are these men mad? One can only suppose that every crusader who has fought for something dearer than life itself has had

the same question asked about him. But to men of such calibre, "There are worse things waiting for men than death"—and not the least of these is the Soviet-democratic Revolution.

Spain, from her very nature, was the easiest victim in the world for these highly trained, cynical professional revolutionists. Her centuries of bad government, the natural tendency towards anarchy, especially Bakunin anarchy, the low standard of life, the natural tendency towards *juntas* and secret societies, these, and that strange quality in the Spaniard which may produce the sublimest courage or the most brutal cruelty according to how it is directed, all contrived to make the Iberian peninsula, quite apart from its strategic geographical position, the most obvious terrain for a frontal attack upon Europe. The Spaniard has always been a violent partisan, intolerant of his opponents, a master of invective and vituperation, hot-tempered and quick to resent and avenge insult. It was in such fruitful soil that the organized agitators cunningly spread their creed of class hatred, carefully and patiently over a period of years, turning to advantage the prevalent illiteracy and ignorance wherever possible, exploiting and creating grievances, and, of course, promising Utopia; and in a great part of the country they succeeded in raising a fanatical hatred—chiefly in the cities and lowlands, and the less European elements of the south and east—which expressed itself in a dreadful series of atrocities, far worse than Russia ever knew. For the Spanish character is capable of the greatest extremes, either for good or evil. It is the country of the Inquisition, of victims and martyrs, of fanatics and aesthetes. Individuals will disregard every ordinary material consideration and willingly give their lives for the cause they espouse. It was this same fierce quality which produced the epics of Sagunto in the days of Flannibal and again of Napoleon, and the defence of Numantia in the days of Rome.

Driven desperately into a corner, lightly as he holds life, the Spaniard will fight with the same reckless bravery as the bull he so dearly loves to watch. Perhaps it is because he recognizes in that last desperate struggle in the *corrida* some similar quality to his own that his admiration for the bull reaches such heights. Nothing can justify the unforgivable wrong which the Soviet has done to this lovable people, and the ruin it brought to their lovely country. The story is



THE VAL D'ARAN: PYRENEES FRONT

Facing page 106



an epic of evil such as has never been known before, and which surely -will never be allowed to happen again if the eyes of the world can only be opened in time.

It started as far back as 1869 when, following a visit of Lafargue, the son-in-law of Karl Marx, " the * International Workers of the Madrid Section 'issued a Marxist manifesto. Terrorism became rampant in Andalusia, through the secret society known as the ' Black Hand ', which numbered 50,000 members in 150 federations." (They would be called " cells " to-day.) " An ' epidemic ' of bombs broke out in Barcelona in 1893 and 1896. From 1890 to 1902, strikes, accompanied by violence, broke out in practically every part of Spain, the revolutionary features of which, writes Madariaga, ' were practically always due to anarchist action or inspiration '."¹

The secret international organization of anarchists which had this highly developed membership in Spain, was the one which played so large a part in bringing about the Russian Revolution of 1917. This body may be called the father of the Comintern, and one of the present links between Spain and Russia.

The World Congress of the Communist International supplies useful evidence of the foundations of the plot against Spain after the Comintern had been created. At the Second World Congress, at which Lenin prophesied that Spain would be the " second successful proletarian revolution ", the attitude of the leaders of world Communism to their parliamentary allies was defined in the memorable phrase, " The Communist Party enters parliamentary institutions not for the purpose of organization work, but in order to blow up the whole *bourgeois* machinery and the parliament itself from within."² Here is the true origin of the Trojan Horse so cunningly insinuated by Georges Dimitrov, Secretary-General to the Communist International, for effective propaganda purposes throughout the world.

At the Fourth Congress in 1922, Señor Acebedo announced that the Spanish representative on the executive of the Communist International had signed an agreement to carryout³ in Spain the newly devised tactics of the United Front . In view of the fact that the ' United Front ' policy has now swept

> Godden, *Conflict in Spain*, p. 5-
» *The Communist International*, No. XIII, 2407.

France, has invaded England and has plunged Spain into civil war, it is of interest to recall that the slogan of the United Front was first formulated by the Executive of the Communist International in 1921. ‘ All our strategy⁷ has been nothing but the practical application of the United Front to the concrete situation of each country⁷. ’ . . . The United Front was really the first international campaign which the Communist International attempted on a large scale.”¹ The authorship of the “ United Front ” policy is fully authenticated. Dimitrov, speaking at the Seventh World Congress, said, “ Only the Communist Party is, at bottom, the initiator, the organizer and the driving force of the ‘ United Front ’. But things moved slowly at first in Spain. The Dictatorship put an end to the disorders provoked in Catalonia and elsewhere, and held its own till 1931. It was not till then that the parliamentary machinery existed to make possible this manoeuvre of the Internationals to introduce the “ second successful proletarian revolution ”.

Señor Acebedo also stated at this Congress that “ the Spanish Party will always be faithful to the Communist International and will observe international discipline ”.^a And at the final sitting, Comrade Humbert-Droz declared that the moment in Spain was “ propitious for propaganda and party activity ”, and suggested that the Communist Party of Spain should “ work in the Spanish anarcho-syndicalist organizations on the lines of pure [szc] Communism ”. Here is the origin of the future C.N.T. riots, atrocities and strikes, and the explanation of the remarks by writers like Mr. Louis Fischer and Mr. Geoffrey Brereton,^{1 2 3} that the “ Communists ” were few in numbers.

At that time, as E. M. Godden so cogently points out, fifteen years ago, the official Communist Party of Spain was, as the Communist Party of England is to-day, “ a small minority movement, a ‘ spearhead ’ of only some 5,000 members ”.

Spain was also represented at the Second World Congress of the “ Red International of Labour Unions ” or the Profintern. One of the “ philosophic bases ” of this significant body was frank enough. “ We are for the arming of the working

¹ Godden, *Conflict in Spain*, p. 10, quoting *Report of Fourth Congress of Communist International*.

² *Report of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International*, p. 76.

• In the *Nineteenth Century*, January 1938.

class."¹ The Spanish members of the R.I.L.U. were also instructed to oppose "free unions" which were being set up in some parts of Spain.^{6 H}

How were these machinations succeeding? Their effect is well illustrated by an English working-man, Mr. F. B. Deakin, who claimed that he had lived so long amongst the Spanish people that I feel it is my right and, indeed, my duty to speak frankly". Mr. Deakin states that, in 1923, "a cloud of Communistic revolution is hanging over the life of the Spanish nation. Communists are working openly for the establishment of the Soviet Republic throughout Spain. Many Spanish workmen . . . accept Lenin as the new Messiah and . . . accept his propaganda without hesitation or looking backwards, and hasten to form illegal associations to consolidate and spread his influence. They gave themselves up to the wildest excesses of speech and action, as though the country were already at their feet."²

Primo de Rivera's Government drove these subversive activities underground, but he did not put an end to them. In the report of the Communist International, 1924-8, it was stated that the work of the Spanish Communist Party had greatly improved, in spite of what they condemned as " rabid persecution ". Certainly the Spanish Party had been active. Like they are doing in England to-day, they had established a publishing house in Madrid for the issue of " the fundamental and necessary Marxian and Leninist literature and thus bring greater clarity and class-consciousness to the ranks of the Spanish workers ".³ Many of their readers were illiterate, of course—the class most suited for " educating " on Marxist lines.

But that was by no means all. In 1927 a textile strike in Catalonia had been successfully carried out as an early experiment. By 1928 they were strong enough to call general strikes in Barcelona and among the Asturian miners. In 1930 there were general strikes all over Spain. In June, in Malaga, Granada, Bilbao; in September, in Galicia and Asturias; in November, in Madrid and Barcelona with student strikes and a short military rebellion, while the close of the year was

¹ A. Losovsky, General Secretary of the Profitem, *The World Trade Union Movement*, pp. 101 and in

² F. B. Deakin, *Spain To-day*, 1923-4. PP- 63, f03, 173.

³ Godden, *Conflict in Spain*, p. 15.

celebrated by strikes in Coruña, Santander, Bilbao, Tolosa, Pamplona and Logroño.¹

Small wonder that, at the Eleventh Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, immediately before the establishment of the Republic, the worthies present congratulated themselves that "the *prerequisites* of a revolutionary' crisis are *being created* at a rapid rate in Spain ".¹² There were more congratulations at the next Plenum. "In Spain, in particular, we have been able to observe such revolutionary' strike struggles, going on interruptedly over a period of many months, as the Spanish proletariat has never experienced before. What is happening in these struggles is, above all, the further development of the Spanish Revolution."³

This activity was not of Spanish origin, nor due to Spanish problems. Spain had problems capable of far different solution; but those who controlled this huge machine were creating problems and preventing other means of settlement than their own, which rejected reform and demanded violence as an essential part of their system. General Mola, as head of the police, reports that in 1932 there were over 200 trained revolutionary Soviet organizers known to the police in Spain.

Can there be any wonder then that we repeat our former accusation that the major disasters which have occurred in Spain since 1925 are the direct result of deliberate relentless machinations of the Russian Soviet Government with the sole intention of establishing the "second successful proletarian revolution" in the country that Lenin had decreed? The above facts alone should be more than sufficient to prove the truth of that deliberate accusation. But there is yet far more proof to come: proof from the words of one of their chosen and most successful organizers.

But before passing to this evidence, we would emphasize once again that Spain is by no means the only country where Russia is operating. Captain Francis McCullagh had a provocative thought as he looked around him on the latest battle-ground of the Soviets:

"Some day British soldiers may be watching London . . .

¹ Peers, *The Spanish Tragedy*, pp. 13-16.

² English edition of the *Eleventh Plenum*, p. u. (Our italics.)

³ English edition of the *Twelfth Plenum*, p. 37.

from deserted palaces on the Surrey hills, when it is in the grip of a Sydney Street gang, ten thousand times larger than the gang Mr. Winston Churchill contemplated, armed with annihilating weapons of defence unknown to us now."¹

¹ McCullagh, *In Franco's Spain*, p. 177.

CHAPTER V

THE RUSSIAN VIRUS

THE Monarchy had been destroyed to give way to the Republic. It was now time for the dissolution of the Republic and the establishment of the Soviet. We have shown how the careful minuting of the Communist International, its Executive Committee and the Red International Union has left the historian little option in apportioning the blame for the conception and execution of the Spanish tragedy. It was due to the Soviet Russian Government. So, with the period between 1932 and the general revolt in July 1936, we do not ask that our opinions or views should be assumed or accepted: the evidence comes from others, and above all from the frank, self-condemnatory statement of the Soviet's own trained revolutionary organizer, Joaquin Maurin.

Maurin, like so many of the Soviet agents, was caught young. At the mature age of seventeen years this "intellectual thinker" had already set out to teach the Spanish people the Soviet solution of the world's economic troubles—the doctrine of hate and violence. "In 1914 he was already condemned to twenty years' imprisonment. He was not of legal age for the 'penalty says Victor Serge.¹

Victor Serge first met Maurin in Moscow in 1921 where he was one of the delegation of the C.N.T. to the Third Congress of the Communist International. With Maurin was Andres Nin, of whom *The Times* wrote, in the characteristically cautious manner of their extremely able and well-informed correspondent in Barcelona:

"One of the outstanding leaders of the Communist Movement here is Andres Nin, a Catalan, who was in Moscow as one of Trotsky's chief lieutenants, when Trotsky was in great power there, and who has been his confidential agent here,

¹ Victor Serge, preface to Joauuin Maurin's book, *Hacia la Secuenda Revolution*, published Barcelona, 1935; republished edition, Rieder, Paris, 1937.

preparing the groundwork for the possible triumph of Communism. In a recent statement to your correspondent Nin gave a clue to the working of the minds of all those bent upon bringing about a social revolution. He said: 'We began first with an educational campaign, and now we are engaged in organizing Workers' Soviets in anticipation of the crucial moment when the ^{A\}workers must be the first to arrive on the scene and seize power. . . . We undertook to group the masses round the symbols of Democracy, such symbols as they could understand, *to give the masses illusions* [the italics are ours]. . . . We organized political *juntas*, which in Spain have a traditional significance, and which at the right moment could be converted into Soviets.'^x

In the same dispatch *The Times* correspondent states that "subversive propaganda was running rife and apparently gaining strength, and encouraging elements of disorder to resort to violence". In a previous dispatch (June 2nd, 1932) the same careful and observant correspondent had written:

"Evidence continues to accumulate that the Spanish Republic is being made the victim of a vast conspiracy against law and order ... in the background there is reason to believe the existence of clandestine and powerful forces."

The huge party founded by Maurin and Nin, the Workers' Party of Marxist Unions, known as the P.O.U.M., has been practically exterminated *for its moderation* (!) by the Stalinite Communists controlling the Spanish Red Government, and Andres Nin has been executed by the private Cheka of the Prieto Government. Maurin was fortunate enough to have been previously taken prisoner by General Franco.

There is a pathetic note in Victor Serge's account of the life of this professional agitator. As one of the founders of the Communist Party in Spain, Maurin was arrested, but was acquitted in October 1927. "He then went to Paris," writes Victor Serge, "and was married. The three years he spent in Paris were the only peaceful ones in his life."

The truth of this can easily be seen. From October 1921 to February 1922 (he had then reached the mature age of twenty-four) Maurin was secretary to the C.N.T. "Fie pursued his task as pioneer of Communism in libertarian Cata-
Ionia, often attacked by the anarcho-syndicalists. . . . Maurin founded *Batalla*, a weekly journal. Pursued by the police . . .

i *The Times*, January nth, 1933.

and wounded . . . he left for Moscow after assisting at an enlarged Executive of the Communist International (1923). . . . There I saw him again. I was just back from Vienna. . . .

"Just then . . . we were feeling the profoundest disquiet over the bureaucratic evils appearing in the Soviet. . . . But no sentiment was so strong in Maurin as his attachment to the International. Moreover his sense of realities led him to concentrate all his forces upon his own native soil in Spain, and more precisely in Catalonia. . . . Thus Maurin's break with the Communist International was only after years of discussion and struggles. The directors of the Executive, recognizing the force that was in him, put up with him, because they could not succeed in ruining his influence, nor corrupt him, nor break him.

"He returned to Barcelona . . . was arrested, escaped. . . . He was rearrested in January 1925. . . . He tried to escape . . . was wounded, and finally imprisoned in the Citadel of Montjuich.

"Prison itself, however, was no guarantee against assassinations. Evelio Boal, of the C.N.T., and three other comrades some time previously had been set at liberty one evening, only to be slaughtered by *pistoleros*.

"After the fall of Primo de Rivera in 1930 the approach of a revolution was felt. Joaquin Maurin returned to Spain, was arrested at the frontier, and finally released on the eve of the Republican Jaca plot (1930).

"On the very eve of a revolution, *the Communist International was more anxious to have an influential party in Spain than to get rid of him* [our italics].

"His presence in the Communist International, already domesticated by Stalinism, was an anomaly in 1930. *All the heads created by the International at the beginning of the Russian Revolution had fallen.* Base intrigues were woven around Maurin; insinuations were made that he belonged to the police.

"With a realistic and clear mind he knew how to conquer the masses for Communism, and it was the time of sectarianism of the extreme Left, imposed externally by Stalinism as the complement of his interior policy of forced agricultural collectivization. It was necessary (for Stalin) to justify this kind of war upon the peasants, the dispossession and deportation in mass of millions of land workers, by an intransigent ideology.

... * The ^Ctcs of ' class against class ' had to range the Communist Party against all the other political formations, in an absolute isolation which would often make them the plaything of worse reactions. *The official theory of the Communist International considers the Socialists as social-fascists, even more dangerous than real fascists.* . . .

" Accused of ' straying from the path, he broke with the Communist International; and the Catalan-Balearic Federation of the Communist Parties, which stood by him, was to become, with the support of the Communists of Asturias, Madrid and Valencia, the kernel of a new party, the Workers and Peasants Block. . . .

" The Catalan Communist Party (with Jordi Arquer) soon merged with the Workers and Peasants Block. At the end of 1935, by a second merging, the F.C.I., this time united to the Spanish Communist Left (Juan Andrade and Andres Nin), gave birth to the workers' party of Marxist unification, the P.O.U.M.

" The year 1934 gave signs of being a year of dangers. The Governments of the Left, the Radicals and Socialists, had not kept any of their promises . . . change had not brought about great reforms; but it had deported the anarchists." (By this is meant a few of the anarchists' leaders, not the tens of thousands of adherents.) " The downcast masses appeared to be in retreat. . . . The historic merit of Joaquin Maurin is that he was amongst the foremost of those who were to give to the workers the Workers' Alliance, the means of smashing for the first time the backbone of Fascism."

Here for the first time is introduced that provocative word Fascism. Nowadays, so skilfully has Soviet propaganda been disseminated throughout the world, an impression has been speciously created as if Communism, this latest St. George, was saving the universe from the ancient dragon of Fascism. But Maurin does not deceive himself in that way. It is probable that he deceived himself in few ways, for he had a keen analytical mind. Maurin's definition of Fascism is unquestionably correct: " It has been stated that Fascism is a preventive contra-revolution. It would be more just to say that Fascism is the counter-revolutionary consequence of a revolution which has failed to achieve success". Furthermore he points out that because in Spain in 1933 the revolution had been checked, " the fundamental premises for the birth and develop-

ment of Fascism might be said to exist".

Thus Maurin makes the true and important admission that Fascism did not exist in Spain before the Civil War. Thus he gives the lie to the constantly reiterated defence of Communism that it is preventing the spread of Fascism over the world. Fascism is merely the inevitable corollary of Communism wherever Communism has not made its way. (*Vide* Lord Baldwin, page 129.)

"After these October days in Barcelona, Maurin slipped from the hands of the police and proceeded with illegal action. His book *Towards the Second Revolution* he wrote in clandestine retreat while re-groupment of his party was proceeding.

"The elections of 1936 returned him as a deputy to the Cortes. There he denounced the unqualifiable weaknesses of the Popular Front. . . . 'Parliament,' he said, 'no longer represents the aspirations of the people. . . .'

"The voice of Maurin announced, in words which now appear prophetic, 'a pre-Fascist condition exists in this country . . . we may soon find ourselves faced with a *coup de force*'.

"The Stalinite Communist Party, destitute of ideologists but provided with numerous well-appointed functionaries—whereas the P.O.U.M. lived only on the sacrifices of its militants—seized one after another upon Maurin's slogans, though they framed them to suit their own wishes. 'One single Marxist party, one single central syndicate,' said Maurin. On the day after the 19th July, 1936, the Communist Party amalgamated the vaguely Socialist nuclei, who up till then had fought with each other mercilessly, giving them the *inexhaustible resources* and the *occult direction* of the *Communist International*, thus forming the Catalonian Unified Socialist Party—The P.S.U.C.—which only called itself Socialist through the necessity for camouflage.

"Now that he is dead¹ all the Press of the Left does him full justice, except, of course, the official Communists, who cannot pardon him for having been one of the first in Spain to defend the Russian Revolution, to foment revolutionary Marxism, to denounce the bureaucratic degeneration of the Russian Soviets and its dangers for the International Move-

¹ Maurin was reported to have been killed in action on the Ilucsa front but in point of fact, he is now a prisoner by the Nationalists.

went . . . These men of mud and intrigue insulted him living and insult him now he is dead

"Unfortunately the Civil War broke out in Spain at the exact moment when Stalin's regime completed its evolution in Russia and the bureaucracy, dropping the mask, revealed itself brutally for what it was—a caste of new exploiters determined to maintain themselves in power against the people. Joaquin Maurin was killed in Spain, whilst at the same time in Moscow, in a cellar, the Six fell with a bullet through the neck. Caught between two fires at the two extremes of Europe, the militants of the first Congresses of the Communist International are at the same time going down to their graves.

"Joaquin Maurin implanted revolutionary Marxism in Catalonia. . . . He was one of those who inspired the Workers' Alliance of 1934; he leaves us this book, the only one which fully sets out the problem of the Spanish Revolution."

Maurin's views on revolution in general are worthy of the closest attention.

"In the great historical commotions which have changed the face of the world," he writes, "there have generally been two revolutions. The first poses the question, the second solves it. . . . Spain is now in the preparatory phase of the second definitive revolution. October was the forerunner . . . the failure of the first revolution is favourable to the second revolution directed by the proletariat."

This was written in 1935. The October rising of the previous year in the Asturias had been quelled. But "the Robles Government was much too narrow-minded to see that the events in Asturias had given its opponents a tradition combining the pride of an army in its previous feats of military glory and the pride of a church in its religious martyrs";^x and the Government threw into prison 30,000 of their opponents.

The second revolution was first set for May 1936; then for 29th July, 1936; but while the Soviet remained undecided, events drove the Generals to immediate action. Maurin, speaking in 1935, says:

^M The seizure of power by the proletariat is much nearer to-day in Spain than in France, in England or in the United States. The proletariat must forge its weapons of the struggle and know how to use them conveniently.

¹ Borkenau, *The Spanish Cockpit*, p. 5®*

And Ramon Sender, the protégé of Sir Peter Chalmers Mitchell, confirms:

"The working-class organizations all through Spain were trained by constant mobilization. We regarded the possibility of a military insurrection . . . with confident hope of victory."¹

Maurin was equally confident. "Spain is to-day the country where the proletariat has the best chance of seizing power by revolution." And he gives his reasons—separatism, blindness of the *bourgeois* elements and the progress of agitation among the peasants. He is, in fact, sufficiently optimistic about the future to become lyrical: "The Spanish proletariat in accomplishing its national revolution, will be making a formidable step forward towards the world revolution. We must become a great liberator . . . liberator of women, liberator of youth. . . ."

As is usual in Communist deceptive planning, Maurin's programme includes many features which even the mildest of Socialists would agree to, together with others, and the sinister principle of the "arming of the workers". "The rifle, cannon and grenade of the workers will guarantee liberty and Socialism," he writes. This insistence of the arming of the workers is based on the rejection of the principle of gradual reform. It is the acceptance of the doctrine, constantly reiterated by Maurin in common with many other revolutionaries, "Before building, it is necessary to destroy."

The worst possible solution, Maurin points out, would be one which contributed towards the maintenance of "reformist illusions" for any considerable length of time. "This evolution of reformist Socialism took place very slowly (in Germany), and permitted Hitlerian Fascism to organize itself and triumph.

" Besteiro² aspired to a general demobilization of Socialism according to the councils of the *bourgeois*, who desired peace, order and tranquillity."

"Peace, order and tranquillity", in the view of Señor Maurin and the others who were working for Russia in Spain, is the antithesis of Soviet Communism.

"Now, from experience," Maurin goes on, "the worker

¹ R. Sender, *The War in Spain*.

³ Besteiro was the most moderate of the Socialist leaders. His less moderate colleagues in the labour movement were Prieto and Caballero.

^m_{dS}, 7h>^o Anrnw the Social^{1st} Party have reached the con-
thnt '• P 1935) that it is only by violent revolution
that definitive emancipation can be obtained. That is the
essential rectification within the Socialist Party."

Maurin marks 1917 as an important date in the "education of the proletariat." "In that year", he writes, "the proletariat began to understand that it might be able to bring about a revolution by itself. The *bourgeois* were afraid of it. It knows that a triumphant revolution would have a proletarian character, and the *foundation of property; of religion, and of the family would be crushed by it.*"

Could honesty go further than that?

And then Maurin tells exactly how it is done. "In 1900 the proletariat of Spain seized power, but Socialist reforms prevented them as well as the terrorist and reformist anarcho-syndicalism. *The proletariat was not in possession of a revolutionary doctrine.*"

In other words there were few serious grievances and little discontent. The grievances must therefore be invented. "The proletariat was going to undergo its most important experience. Revolution would cease to be a mere word. It would become converted into a fact, a tooth and nail struggle. Victories and defeats, bloody convulsions, monstrous crimes, and sublime heroism."

That is it. "Monstrous crimes"—to degrade the ordinary victim : to uplift the international "priesthood". "Sublime heroism"—that is the "slogan" to make their dupes fight better at the barricades.

Maurin is quite frank about the means to be employed to bring about the desired result. He shows the true object of the extraordinary campaign for separate regional states, and for Federalism and Separatism, so academically discussed in the Cortes and the Press, often by those who did not appreciate the forces at work. There were movements to support the Catalonian Separatists, a Basque Republic, Galician autonomy; in defence, there were suggestions of Castilian groupings; there were independent movements for Andalusia and Valencia. Spain was to be made like the Heptarchy in England in the days of the Saxons. Maurin explains how and why this is to be brought about:

"The Republic had to be the exact antithesis of the Monarchy. Was the Monarchy centrist? Then the Republic

must be federal. . . . The federal structure would have an important and salutary sequel: it would dislocate the old state . . . it would be more revolutionary than the proclamation of the Republic. . . . The regions, the communes, would be shaken up from their lethargy and transformed into bastions and unshakable ramparts of democratic revolution."

The object was not to favour regional aspirations for their own sake. Had there been autonomy, they would have urged centralism or regrouping. The *essential* was a *radical change*—anything to cause disturbance and disintegrate the existing order. The Separatist movements themselves, without the tremendous impulse given them from these ulterior motives, would never have taken their eventual course, nor attained the strength they finally gained. And if proof is required, one may point to the fact when the war for order and unity at last broke out, it was *the Basques* who made the chief contribution to the Nationalist cause. The wonderful autonomous Basque state, on behalf of which England and the world were urged to intervene, was very much a minority of the Basque people. It is true that that is precisely the opposite picture to what was represented in the British Press. But that is merely one of the many propaganda stunts which our Press was induced to foist on the British public; and it had such tremendous financial and other backing that unless one had a first-hand knowledge of the country it would have been almost impossible for an ordinary reader to credit the real facts.

The inevitable result, the object of these disruptive measures, is clearly proclaimed. Maurin says:

"In Spain, as in Russia, there will be civil war. It is inevitable *and necessary*—but it will be brief, because the proletariat of the capitalist countries will prevent interference, and will bring to bear the threat of a world war."

In these circumstances it is not difficult to imagine the views of the Spanish Nationalists when they read of munition contracts, "with a commission for the Cabinet Minister",¹ *already signed* before the "Non-intervention" policy was put forward to England; and on the Press, when thousands of "volunteers" are crowding the passes of the Pyrenees, procured by the greatest campaign of misrepresentation in history, with British and French agents and Internationals collecting

¹ *Daily Telegraph*, 5th February, 1938.

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 ^n:Ho^ConA?1SS10n jea<? dme a bo^y is tricked into the Red
 ^n f T^j an Caij y<. date the equivalent of over £17,000 was
 collected by French "labour" organizations at approximately
 10s. per head—we wonder if the French working men had the
 benefit of this money, or was it the organizers? One can im-
 agine also the contempt and bitter anger of the Spaniard when
 he hears the cynical suggestions attributed to some of our
 Foreign Office ad\visers as to "the necessity for a weakened
 Spain".

Then Señor Maurin provides the complete confirmation of all that we stated in our last chapter. Of April 14th, 1935, he w'rites:

"The Spanish Workers' Movement is to-day passing through one of the most dramatic and decisive moments of its existence. *It is assisting at the crumbling of the zwhole of an economic, political and social system.* . . . First we were present at the check of the constitutional Monarchy, and then at that of the military dictatorship. Now to the check of the democratic republic.

"In less than four years the democratic republic has become completely discredited. There remains one last effort—the seizure of political and economic power by the working class to put an end to the atrophied democratic revolution, and to undertake the Socialist revolution."

Could confirmation go further? The "one last effort", of course, was the "second revolution", which was to take place after the murder of Calvo Sotelo in July 1936. But Maurin has even more to add to the abundant proof he has already produced.

"Not only did democracy no longer serve as protection for capitalism, a bulwark against the workers' invasion, but, on the contrary, it assisted the breaking of the bounds. *Democracy is a breach through which the enemy can pass. Forward then against Democracy. Democracy and Bourgeoisie are to-day, for us, antagonistic terms.*"

Our case rests.

But Maurin, who, at first hand, knew Moscow and its occult powers better than most foreigners, gives us further information about the machinations and policy of the Stalinite regime. His frank observations should be of the greatest importance in both our home and in our foreign policy. "Russia, who, from 1917 to 1924, had discounted the revolu-

tionary victory in other countries, was losing confidence in the European proletariat after the failure of the workers' revolution in Hungary, Austria, Germany and Bulgaria. The Communist International, and the world revolutionary centre, became changed into an instrument at the service of the Soviet State."

The World Revolution—but directed from Russia and by those who control that country from the background.

"Stalin was not without logic. He argued: Our proletarian country will precipitate the deposition of capitalism, and prepare the final triumph of the working class throughout the universe."

As to his method: "After the triumph of the Republic, Moscow sent to Spain revolutionaries of international celebrity in order to direct our Communists." Here is the confirmation of General Mola's two hundred Soviet agents in Spain in 1932.

Then, we regret to say, Maurin indulges in some vulgar abuse about his erstwhile friends; but it is when such people fall out that others are enlightened as to their activities.

"First (Moscow sent) Borodin, then Bela Kun. Yet these were the men who had contributed to the failure of the revolutions in China and Hungary.

" . . . Moscow would tolerate a revolution in Germany, France (*nota bene*) or Spain, so long as she had the guarantee that it should be in accordance with the orders she had issued, and with the men she considered *persona grata*. But, although it is internationalist, the Workers' Movement repudiates the gregarious *colonial* spirit which Moscow tries to infuse. . . ■ Moscow wanted in every country, including Spain, strong sections of the Communist International to monopolize the direction of the Workers' Movement. . . . According to Moscow's ideas in 1934, it was necessary above all to destroy social democracy if one was to conquer Fascism."

Maurin then quotes Enghels against the Stalinite conception of world domination.


As Enghels said, "It is not in the interests of the movement that the worker of any single nation whatsoever should march at the head of the world movement."

Victor Serge's evidence confirms that of his friend. Serge writes:

"The evolution of Soviet Communism was completed in

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 parties which it subsidized. . . .*

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"After July 1936 the Socialist Party (the P.S.U.) affiliated to the Third International. . . . And then comes the great blow to our poor misguided Communists. . . . And the object of Stalinism is to establish a new power of a Fa^cscist nature . . . to encircle France, the probable ally of Russia, in the war that is being prepared."

Maurin supplies the complement of this lucid exposition of what has been taking place in Europe, and the meaning behind so many strange happenings in foreign, and home, politics.

"The traditional policy of England is to ruin its adversaries, so as then to pose as the protector and to render impossible the renaissance of the conquered vassal. Spain is primarily a victim of England, and, next in order, of France. When Spain hesitates, England and France attack her strongly. If she inclines tow'ards England, France increases the persecution. So long as France and England are capitalist, they will not have to be the natural ally of Spain. *The logical line would be the curve through Portugal, Germany, Italy and Russia.* A 'bloc' of this nature would neutralize France and England."

There is not the slightest doubt that Maurin knew, and was here expressing, the real Communist political aspirations.

We make no apology for having quoted Maurin *in extenso*. We shall quote him again in later chapters. For Maurin is, without doubt, a very remarkable man, gifted with a first-rate intellect, and a high degree of intellectual honesty according to his distorted lights.

In further confirmation of all that he alleges as to the aims and the ethical basis of International Communism, we now⁷ give the considered opinion of another equally remarkable man, gifted, also, with a first-rate intellect, a passion for his life's work, and a high degree of intellectual honesty.

It is most regrettable, and curious, that the encyclical *Divini Redemptoris* of Pope Pius XI is not better known in Britain. Whether or not one is a member of the Church of which the Pope is the head, it is impossible not to recognize that for profound wisdom, for deep, human and political understanding, this encyclical, issued in March 1937, is one

of the most remarkable documents of our day. Its main argument is readily stated:

"The struggle between good and evil remains in the world as the sad legacy of the original fall of Man. ... It is on this account that one convulsion after another has marked the passage of the centuries, down to the revolution of our own days. . . . Entire peoples are in danger of falling back into barbarism. . . . This danger is Bolshevik and atheistic Communism which aims at upsetting the social order, and is undermining the very foundations of Christian civilization."

The Pope then points out that as early as 1846 Pope Pius IX condemned the "infamous doctrine of so-called Communism". "The peril, despite our warnings, only grows greater from day to day because of the pressure exerted by clever agitators.

"The Communism of to-day poses as the saviour of the poor . . . and impregnates all its doctrine and activity with a deceptive mysticism, which communicates a ceaseless and contagious enthusiasm to the multitudes entrapped by delusive promises. . . . This pseudo-ideal is even advanced as the reason for certain economic progress where its true causes are quite different, such as the intensification of industrialism in countries formerly without it, the exploitation of immense natural resources by inhuman methods, and the use of the most brutal pressure on the workers to perform very heavy labour at a low wage.

"The doctrine of modern Communism is based on the principles of dialectical and historical materialism advocated by Marx, of which the theorists of Bolshevism claim to possess the only genuine interpretation. According to this doctrine there is only one reality—matter—the blind forces of which evolve into plant, animal and man; there is neither survival of the soul after death, nor any hope of a future life. Insisting on this aspect of their materialism, the Communists . . . sharpen the antagonisms between the various classes of society . . . with its consequent violent hate and destruction which takes on the aspect of a crusade for the progress of humanity; and all obstacles to their violent and systematic efforts must be annihilated as hostile to the human race.

"Communism strips man of his liberty . . . and removes all the moral restraints that check the eruption of blind impulse.

" Reusing to human duties any sacred character, the doctrine logically makes marriage and the family a purely artificial and civil institution. ... It is particularly characterized by the rejection of any link that binds women to the family and the home ... and the right of education is denied to parents, for it is conceived as the exclusive prerogative of the community.

" The community would have no other authority than that derived from the economic system; only one mission, the production of material things by collective labour ... in a word, a new era and a new civilization, the result of blind evolutionary forces culminating in a ' society without God '.

" It is a system full of errors and delusions. ... It subverts the social order because it destroys its foundations; because it ignores the true origin, nature and purpose of the State; because it denies the rights, dignity and liberty of human personality. By pretending to desire only the betterment of the condition of the working classes, by urging the removal of the very⁷ real abuses chargeable to the ' liberalistic ' economic order, and demanding a more equitable distribution of this world's goods—objectives obviously and undoubtedly legitimate—the Communist, taking advantage of the present world-wide economic crisis, draws within his influence even those who reject, on principle, materialism and terrorism. And as every error contains an element of truth, the partial truths to which we have referred are astutely presented according to the needs of time and place, to conceal, when convenient, the repulsive crudity and inhumanity of Communist principles and tactics. ... It is able to deceive people of no ordinary worth; and these in turn often become apostles of the movement and spread its errors, particularly amongst young people who are easily misled. . . . Taking advantage of the confusion which enters the field of studies when the very idea of God is absent, it penetrates into the universities, where the principles of their doctrines are supported with pseudo-scientific arguments.

" The way had been prepared by the religious and moral destitution in which the wage-earners had been left by ' liberal ' economics. Even on Sundays and holy-days, labour-shifts were given no time to attend to their essential religious duties; no one thought of building churches within convenient distance of factories. . . .

" There is another explanation for the rapid diffusion of communistic ideas—a propaganda so truly diabolical that the world has perhaps never witnessed its like before. It is directed from one common centre; it is shrewdly adapted to the varying conditions of diverse people; it has at its disposal great financial resources, innumerable organizations, international congresses, and countless trained workers; it makes use of newspapers and pamphlets, of cinema, theatre and wireless, and schools, and even universities. Little by little it penetrates into all classes of the people.

"Another powerful factor is the suppression and silence on the part of a large section of the non-Catholic Press of the world. We say ' suppression ', because it is impossible otherwise to explain how a Press, usually so eager to exploit even the little daily incidents of life, has been able to remain silent for so long about the horrors perpetrated in Russia, in Mexico, and even in a great part of Spain; and that it should have so little to say concerning a world organization as vast as Russian Communism. The silence is due in part to short-sighted political policy and is favoured by various occult forces which for a long time have been working for the overthrow of the Christian social order.

" The sorry effects of this propaganda are before our eyes. . . . Communism has striven, as its champions openly boast, to destroy Christian civilization and the Christian religion by banishing every remembrance of them from the hearts of men, especially of the young; priests (of Russia and Mexico) were shot and done to death in inhuman fashion; laymen suspected of defending their religion were persecuted and thrown into prison. . . . In Spain, as far as possible every church and monastery was destroyed, every vestige of the Christian religion eradicated. The theory has not confined itself to the indiscriminate slaughter of bishops and thousands of priests and religious of both sexes; it searches out above all those who have been devoting their lives to the working classes and the poor. The majority of its victims have been laymen of all conditions and classes . . . with a hatred and a savage barbarity one would not have believed possible in our age. No man of good sense, nor statesman conscious of his responsibility, can fail to shudder at the thought that what is happening to-day in Spain may be repeated to-morrow in other civilized countries. For man, some restraint is necessary, as an indivi-

dual or in society. But tear the idea of God from the hearts of man, and they are urged by their passions to the most atrocious barbarity.

" . . . The enslavement of man despoiled of his rights, the horrible abuse of public power in the service of a collectivistic terrorism are contrary¹ to all that corresponds with natural ethics. . . . Neither man nor civil society can be exempted from their correlative obligations.

" . . . As a remedy for evil, the most important is the precept of charity. . . . *Thou shalt not kill; thou shalt not steal . . . and thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.*

" . . . In the beginning, Communism showed itself for what it was in all its perversity, but very soon it realized that it was thus alienating the people. It has therefore changed its tactics, and strives to entice the multitudes by trickery, hiding its real business behind ideas that in themselves are good and attractive. Thus, aware of the universal desire for peace, the leaders of Communism pretend to be the most zealous promoters and propagandists in the movement for world amity.

" Yet at the same time they stir up a class warfare which causes rivers of blood to flow. . . . Under various names which do not suggest Communism, they establish organizations and periodicals with the sole purpose of carrying their ideas into quarters otherwise inaccessible.

" . . . Elsewhere they carry their hypocrisy so far as to encourage the belief that Communism, in countries where Christian faith and general culture are more strongly entrenched, will assume another and much milder form. . . .

" Communism is intrinsically wrong, and no one who would save Christian civilization may give it assistance in any undertaking whatsoever."

As a statement of the Spanish Nationalist point of view, no document could be more clear and comprehensive. And in this exposition of the greatest evil in the world to-day there is hardly a sentence that does not confirm the statements and views we have quoted from the Communist Maurin.

Let us turn now to another, and very different, source of information. Dolores Ibarruri, better known as " La Pasionaria ", was one of those who achieved prominence by her part in the Asturian revolt of 1934. Her career has been remarkable. "As early as 1916,¹ when the party organization was

¹ *Pasionaria*, price ad. The Communist Party of Great Britain.

preparing the general strike, the party entrusted Dolores with the most important task—that of providing arms for the workers. In 1920 she was one of the founders of the Communist Party." In 1931 she was arrested, but "the campaign which developed around her arrest assumed such threatening proportions that the tribunal was forced to reject the demands of the public prosecutors". In the famous general election of February 1936, needless to say, she was returned as a deputy to the Cortes. "Her first words in Parliament were: 'As the representative of a revolutionary party—my fists clenched in fury—I demand the imprisonment of Gil Robles....'"

The reason she clamoured for Robles' impeachment was that he was one of those few who had the courage to mention in the Cortes the infamies of the Government and the collusion of the Popular Front politicians. He it was who informed the world that since the Government of the Left had taken power, within four months of "popular government", 160 churches *had been totally destroyed* and 251 partially destroyed, 43 Right newspapers had been burned, 69 Right Centres destroyed and 28 churches sacked. These figures, a matter of parliamentary record, have never been denied.

When Calvo Sotelo interpellated the Government on a similar point, it was she, too, who committed the indiscretion of anticipating the intentions of the Third Internationals when she screamed at him across the floor of the House, "That is the last speech you'll ever make." Two days later "a squad of Assault Guards kidnapped Calvo Sotelo. . . . His body, covered with knife and bullet wounds, was found in the East Cemetery of Madrid at dawn."¹

Dolores does not conceal who are her masters or in what country her heart lies: "The Spanish women . . . say 'we want to be like the Russian women . . . with free meals. ■ • We will talk together and our thoughts will soar like little blue birds on tireless wings to rest ... in the country where, on the sunny steppes, the revolutionary forces flared up in October 1917, destroying everything which prevented the well-being of the people.'

"Please convey to the Soviet people the gratitude of the Spanish people [sъc] for the brotherly help which, from the very first hours of our struggle . . ."

Was it, then, the Russians or the wicked totalitarian

¹ Knoblaugh, *Correspondent in Spain*, pp. 22-3.

powers who first intervened in Spain? Or do the Communists repudiate their own spokesmen? ". . . has supported and inspired us enormously. The Soviet Union has proved once again that it is a great beacon revealing the path of the future to humanity, pointing out the way to solidarity among the peoples in their struggles for liberty. . . . Her voice—a voice of the tribune of the Spanish people—is joined with those of millions of the Soviet Union, who endorsed the sentences passed on the Trotskyist agents of Fascism.

"All honour to the Commissars. . . . We have an army . . . but our army has a soul. . . . The Commissars of the Popular Front have inspired the battalions. . . . The political Commissars are heroic and self-sacrificing. . . . Forward! Build up the strength of our people's army to hasten its victory over Fascism!"

And as to who controls Communist Spain, we may accept Señora Ibarruri's proud claim: "Since July 18th I have, of course, carried out the orders of the Communist Party to which I belong, at the front and behind the lines."

We end the presentation of our case with one more quotation, from a speech by another representative of the people in another Parliament. There was no Fascism of any kind in Spain before the Civil War, and nothing approaching it except a diminutive party which, as time proved, was more than justified; and that party, the *Falange*, only came into existence in 1934, after Communism had been forcing its satanic methods on the Iberian peninsula for a number of years and forcing peaceful men to seek to protect themselves. That other representative of the people was Mr. Baldwin, speaking in the House of Commons, and his words convey the absolute truth of the position. Mr. Baldwin said:

"There has come into the world the modern development of Communism. The peculiar feature of it is that its devotees are as fanatical in fighting for a creed and dogma as any man who ever fought in any of the religious wars at any time in the world's history. It brooks no opposition; it will kill rather than brook opposition. It is a religion that has in it some of the worst features of the old religious wars. . . .

"Communism has bred something besides itself. It has bred Fascism. You have now on either side large bodies of men who are prepared to fight and to die for an abstract creed. That is a new feature since the War, and to my mind far the

most dangerous thing in this world to-day. I do not think there was any Fascism in Italy before Communism began. The same thing is true of Germany. Force begat force as it always has done."¹

Here,, we submit, is the whole case, and the reason for the revolt of the Spanish Generals in July 1936. It was no desire for a military dictatorship to harness the nation to the old form of corrupt government. It was a straight fight—life or death; for Spanish freedom against Russian domination; and, if you will, for *Cristo Rey*—for Christ against anti-Christ.

¹ *The Times*, October 30th, 1936.

CHAPTER VI

SECRET SOCIETIES

IF "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church", there should be such a renaissance of religion in Spain as to resound throughout the universe. Then would the efforts of Soviet atheism have defeated themselves indeed! For this, in reality, is no ordinary civil war. It has so happened that the Church attacked was the Roman Catholic Church; but it might have been the Protestant Church of England—and it may be tomorrow, just as it was the Orthodox Church in Russia yesterday. When the tumult and the shouting is ended, we have little doubt that Franco's struggle against the forces of atheism will be considered the most important event for Europe and for the civilized world since the World War, and perhaps even of greater importance. Had Spain fallen to the atheistic forces of the World Revolution, one of the main ramparts of Christianity would have gone. Afterwards—who would have stayed it? Certainly not France. As we show later, she has become bound on the wheel of the proselytizing atheism of continental Freemasonry. For it is our case that there is a world-spread campaign against humanity, which is positively satanic in its nature. As we see it, Nationalist Spain is fighting the cause of the whole Christian world, not for the comfortable re-establishment of the Catholic Church, not for the great possessions of a small group of Grandees, not for military or political power or domination, but for the freedom of man's immortal soul—his right to believe in God if he wishes to, and to worship God in any way which most attracts him. If Spain fails to win conclusively, the struggle, assuredly, will soon be transferred to this country. We should know our enemy. We *must* know our enemy, if we are effectively to deal with him. Even with conclusive victory by Nationalist Spain, the same enemy will attack us, not in the open field, but with an intensification of his present methods of "peaceful penetration", unless we take steps to conquer him. We have

undertaken a colossal programme of armaments against potential enemies in the field; we should be equally prepared against the "enemy in our midst".

We have used the epithet "satanic" in relation to the activities of the Soviet and its hidden allies for the establishment of the Communist World Revolution, for which they chose Spain as their first objective. We do not regard that epithet as an hyperbole. The most repellent feature of all their activities is the use of institutions and organizations designed for, and still operating, in the minds of ordinary people, disinterestedly for the common good of humanity. It is a long list, these institutions and organizations subverted for the World Revolution; and, as will be observed, the common factor is "international"—the "open sesame" whereby they can obtain entry into every country. We will mention only a few as being of the greatest importance. The League of Nations is one—"To-day there is a Tower of Babel at the service of Stalin, and one of its principal centres is Geneva, that hotbed of intrigue."¹ Furthermore, the Grand Orient of France decreed the Herriot Government of 1924 to make the League of Nations "an international tool for Freemasonry".^{1 2} The Youth and Peace Societies afford other examples of the organizations used: not only the present Pope, in his encyclical of March 1937, but also Maurin, Serge and other authorities as the poles apart, have denounced, or proclaimed, this truth. The Pope specifically refers to the way the Soviets use the Peace Societies: the Communist writers say so in warning about the war Russia is now preparing. But one of the greatest subversions of all is the use of Freemasonry as machinery for the cause of revolution—although the Soviet, and especially Lenin, may well claim that they learnt most of their revolutionary strategy' and technicpie from the Lodge of the Grand Orient.

We wish to make it quite plain that the references to Masonry in this chapter, where we may have inadvertently omitted to say so, relate exclusively to continental Masonry. There is a wholesome difference between British and continental Masonry', and more particularly between British Lodges and the Grand Orient Lodges of the Continent. The real British Masonry', as it proclaims, is a philanthropic organiza-

¹ Trotsky, Stalin.

² A. G. Michel, *La Dictature de la Franc-Ma^onnerie sur en France*.

nion which has forbidden its members to associate in any way with Grand Orient Lodges; but the Grand Orient, we state beyond any contradiction, was founded with the specific object of promulgating revolutionary propaganda. Another essential difference—if any other really need be mentioned—between the British Lodges and those of the Grand Orient is that all mention of the Great Architect of the Universe is eliminated from the ritual of many of the Grand Orient Lodges. Probably no one will more cordially welcome our remarks on the immoral continental variety of Masonry than the English Lodges; for the activities of the former are such that they might bring even English Masonry into disrepute if the distinction were not emphasized.

The Grand Orient, ever since it was founded in 1773, has functioned for the reason for which it was founded, for proselytizing purposes, among non-Masons, for the causes of atheism and revolution. This is no hidden secret. Members of its Lodges are continually boasting of it. The *Daily Telegraph* of 23rd May, 1933, stated that Freemasonry, under the Grand Orient, had, since before the French Revolution, been political and largely anarchistic and subversive. We go further. We shall produce proof here that Freemasonry was not only the actuating force preparatory to, during, and after the French Revolution, but every violent revolution which has happened in France since; it was also one of the most powerful actuating forces of the World War of 1914-18; and now this same force is actively working for the establishment of the Soviet world revolution. It is more than probable that the Soviet is only just another means in the hands of the high Grand Orient Lodge. Their well-laid plans in Spain miscarried for a reason which seems to us to be symbolic of the whole struggle in Spain.

As ever, their initial plans were most carefully laid: the ground was well prepared and tilled for the crop they desired. There is a mass of evidence not only of their plans, but also of their objective. To start with, let us consider this testimony from *El Dia Graft co* of October 15th, 1936, edited and administered by "The Workers Constituted Under Co-operative Regime", in Barcelona:

"Thanks to the foresight of the Freemasons, a great part of the posts in command of the Civil Guards and the Assault Guards were in the hands of real Republicans before the

insurrection of 18th July" (the Generals' revolt).

" It was the Masons who saw that the greater part of our Navy placed itself on the side of the people's party, disarming the rebellious chiefs. The aviators were Masons, who, with heroic impetuosity, placed themselves at the head of our Air Force. The majority of the officers of the Assault Guards, shot by the rebels in the towns they occupied, were also Masons.

" Look at the statistics of the dead at the front in the posts of command, or even in the ranks as simple soldiers; you will see that all, for the most part, were Masons, as are also those in command of our columns. Similarly, Masons are the majority of those who, in the Press, on the speakers' platforms, before the microphone, maintain the sacred fire of the cause. Those, too, who are fighting abroad to rectify the disastrous neutrality applied in one direction [sic], and those who are countering espionage and international action of Fascism [sic] working against our country'. ... It is the Masons who have done most in this enterprise of liberation of the Spanish people."¹

General Mola, when Minister of Government, under which was the Police, had evidence additional to that which we have already quoted from him:

" An absolute avalanche of public officials rushed to the Lodges to request entry', as they thought that they could thus be free of the persecution which, in the name of an absurd revolutionism, had been practised by the majority of those in the Government. A large number of Generals and heads of the Army also went to swell the ranks of the Grand Orient and the Grand Lodge of Spain, with a view of evidencing their Republicanism, and to have the certainty of not having their careers ruined.

" The state of mind of the youth of the country, fed with the post-war literature *from Russia* [italics ours] was very interesting. The paradox was that in *bourgeois* families of monarchical tradition the sons were fighting, not in the Republican but in the Socialist camp, especially in the Communist. The libraries of all the young students were full of books about liberating creeds, books the Press censorship could not get at."

¹ Requoted from *Franc-Ma\$onnerie Rouffe* by Albert Vigneau (past Master of the Grand Lodge of France) and Vivienne Orland.

How different is this picture of Spain in 1932 from young England to-day? And that literature was not only "intellectual", it was pornographic as well.

Referring to the attempted Republican revolt in Jaca in 1930, General Mola quotes a report from Paris of 28th January, 1931. This is of the gravest importance, since it shows the "lines of communication" which have operated throughout the present Civil War.

"Through the French Masons, the revolutionaries have got into touch with Russian Communism, and they are also in communication with the delegation of the Soviets in Vienna."¹

What Mola thus wrote was ordinary, everyday talk in Spain in 1932, just as similar facts were open secrets to any person in any degree well informed on Spanish affairs in 1936. How can one account for the continued conspiracy of silence maintained by the British Press, so that these facts must appear to most British readers as startlingly new?

And Mola then exposes the methods. The Masons knew the infallible way, perhaps the only way, to organize successful revolutions. Monsieur G. Martin, himself a Mason, in his book on the French Revolution says:

"... In case of trouble, the mob, which will have backed the political demands of the reform party by force, is certain to be supported financially by the Masonic Lodges."²

The financial arrangements of the continental Masons for the establishment of the Republic in Spain were adequate, in conjunction with the internal arrangements made in Spain itself. It is merely one example of what sums are available for corruption and subsequent revolution. Mola writes:

"One million and a half pesetas were placed in the bank for those Generals who backed the Republican cause and to help them abroad in case the movement failed. Two and a half millions were also deposited for the purchase of arms."

After four years of "liquidating" the Republic, with the people trained, corrupted, and the blood-lust well lit up, all ~~Trgc~~ ready for the "second revolution"; but, by the grace of God, the Grand Orient plans miscarried. How they miscarried is symbolic of the whole struggle. We have shown

¹ Mola, *Tempestad Calma Intriga y Crisis*, p. 104.

² G. Martin, *La Franc-Maçonnerie Française et la Préparation de la Révolution*, Paris, 1925.

how nearly all the Generals—there were two exceptions, one of which was Francisco Franco—had joined the Grand Orient Lodge to ensure continuity of employment. We have told how they had kept their oath, when first the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, and secondly the Monarchy were destroyed, to “ recognize no mortal above the head of the Council of Thirty-three It. was on this point of recognizing someone more than “ mortal ” which made the Grand Orient plans miscarry. They were beaten in the fundamental struggle between the rights of God and the rights of man, “ who will become man-god, directed by a state-god ”.

“ But the directors of the Spanish Masons were not slow in wishing to turn the young Republic into a regime of atheism and proletarian dictatorship. To do so it was necessary to destroy the Church and to weaken the Army. The Generals, though disturbed by a policy of this nature, nevertheless allowed matters to drift (except Sanjurjo, who rose in revolt) until the day when the arrest of General Lopez Ochoa¹ opened their eyes. . . .

“ The Freemason Generals then met and agreed that Masonic solidarity had been broken by the Government, that an appeal to arms was licit. They decided to refer this matter of the appeal to arms to General Franco. Franco was a soldier above everything, concerned only for the greatness of Spain, and with an undisturbed prestige amongst the Spanish peoples, and, above all, with the army in Morocco. . . .

“ There was no time to lose unless Spain was to know the atrocities of Russia and Mexico. It was no question of Monarchy nor of the Republic. It was necessary to save the country from the clutches of the unspeakable evil foreign dictatorship: and it was for the Army, the guardian of the honour and the liberty of the country . . . to undertake the direction of the movement of liberation. It was not only the armed forces, it was the nation in arms in defence of its rights. Around the Army the people who wished to be free ranged themselves, with the sole exception of the traitors, Communists, anarchists and other anti-national forces.

¹ General Lopez Ochoa was the General who suppressed the Asturian revolt in 1934. In August 1936 he was taken from hospital by some twenty Asturians, marched to the Carabanchel Bridge, Madrid, and riddled with some forty bullets. His head was then cut off, and eventually carried triumphantly on a pole into the city, accompanied by a mob of exulting Reds, a large proportion of whom were women, who threw stones at it. (Adelardo Fernandez Arias, *Madrid ba jo el Terror*. Also other witnesses.)

"The old Radical Lerroux, the old Republican Unamuno, nulled to the insurrection. On the other hand, the Central Council of the Soviet League of Atheists addressed to Cabalero, the chief of the Government, a telegram to assure him of its recognition of the struggle he was fighting against religion, and its confidence that he would know how to accomplish the mission entrusted to him to fight, by every means, and with the greatest energy, the Church and the Catholic Faith. . . ."

"When the Generals ranged themselves round Franco, they were no longer Freemasons: they had renounced the sect, and their action was purely Nationalist."¹

That is the reason why Franco, the least rebellious of men, and the other Generals had no option but to rise in revolt in July 1936. They had no great armed organization behind them. They had no coherent party. They had no vast accumulation of money. They had only their faith . . . and the truth of their cause. To call this a war for Fascism, for the Roman Catholic Church, or for the powers of reaction is inaccurate, and often deliberately so to confuse the issue.

The great importance of the corruption of the Army has long been recognized by the continental revolutionary Masons as a cardinal point. The most important Masonic commentator on the French Revolution, G. Martin, leaves no doubt on this point. He writes:

"Freemasonry would have had, perhaps, much more difficulty in securing the triumph of its doctrines in practice if it had not had, during the last years of the century, the support of a great portion of the Army. Historians who have reported this fact seem to have grasped imperfectly the root cause, which was the spread of Lodges in military circles. . . ."

"The old system of government collapsed partly because the French Army and its lower cadres did not attempt to come to its aid. Here again Masonic propaganda had consequences which surpassed the expectations of its military promoters.

"... By the help given to the beginning of the Revolution, military' Masonry was an essential element in the triumph of the new ideas. It may even be supposed that without it the great work would have been seriously compromised."²

¹ Jean Dauray in *L'Œuvre Latine*, January 1937-

² G. Martin, *La Franc-Maçonnerie Française et la Préparation de la Révolution*.

"The great work" in Spain was "seriously compromised" by the wicked Generals breaking their plighted word to the Grand Orient: because when it came to an ultimate "show down", their country and their religion meant more to them than position, employment or money. Had Spain gone, we repeat, France was bound to have followed directly after. Then half the *bloc* was established for the European War which Maurin and Serge state categorically is being prepared by Russia. And which Russia to-day proclaims, under the guise of a war on Capitalism and, the chief capitalist country, England.¹

There is later confirmation of this preparation for European War. On January 25th this year (1938) there was a meeting of the Political Secretariat of the Comintern, at which representatives of the Profintern and the Foreign branches of the G.P.U. (the secret police) were present. All the most deadly of the arch-organizers were there: Iejov, head of the secret section of the Comintern; Dimitrov of the Reichstag fire infamy, head of the League of the Godless and the Free Thinkers' League, now General Secretary of the Communist International; Schick, Manuilsky and Lozovsky of the Profintern; Popescu, Weintrauben, Gourovitch, Liemann, Turrini, Adami, and Valdez who represents the Society of Foreign Affairs in the political bureau of the Comintern. (It is well to be acquainted with their names. They may be ruling this country one of these days.) The subject of the meeting was the development of revolutionary work in Spain and North Africa. Dimitrov waxed indignant at the lack of missionary vigour among the special military envoys sent by the Soviet to corrupt Spain. Their action, he said, had not had sufficient stimulus and revolutionary *élan* on the general European masses. The results had not justified the heavy risks taken. Then he went on:

"The principal struggle, which is to bring about an armed conflict between two groups of capitalistic states, has not been reached.

"A decision already adopted by the official diplomacy is important.

"The Soviet Military Commandant in Spain should pass

¹ The radio broadcaster from Moscow, describing on March 13th, 1938, in English, the recent trials in Moscow, made the same point. But it is perhaps unnecessary to stress the proclaimed policy of the Internationals,



CHURCH OF SAN FRANCISCO, BURNT BY THE REDS
(BUJALANCE, CORDOBA)

[*Facing* page 138]



under the control of the Comintern emissaries like the ambassadors who know how to impregnate him with the necessary revolutionary feeling."¹

This, we submit, is just a typical meeting of our self-appointed shadow Cabinet. Doubtless Dimitrov has to do a lot of forcing and a lot of "liquidation" to keep up the relentless pressure which, is essential for the conquest of Europe. Spain has proved a stubborn customer. Had she not been so backward in her industrial development the Soviet-democratic Revolution would have happened long ago. We can only feel grateful for this inherent Spanish resistance to the essential basis of Marxian revolution: and, in precisely the same way, in this struggle, Spain has proved quite surprisingly "tough" and unwilling to lie down. Perhaps there is a profound truth underlying Count Keyserling's prophecy—which made him so unpopular with his own government in Germany—that the future of civilization is with Spain. Whatever the record of Spain's long tragedy of misgovernment may be, if Spain holds the keys of the future, one thing is certain—any civilization Spain stands for will be a Christian civilization. And it was this fundamental touchstone of Christianity which determined the revolt of the Generals.

We have made definite accusations against continental Freemasonry, such accusations of infamy and deceit as to require the most absolute proof.

Those proofs are only too ready to the hand. It is not suggested that every Mason in a continental Lodge is a proselytizing atheist and revolutionary. Grand Orient Freemasonry is far subtler than that. It has a double and simultaneous organization. There is the visible administrative organization, given to philanthropy and good fellowship. But there is also the hidden organization, the existence of which is largely unknown to the vast majority of the brethren themselves until the orders of the "hidden powers" have to be carried out. The controllers of continental Freemasonry do not, directly, carry through revolution. They direct the ultimate policy, lay the plans, prepare public opinion in advance, and supply the necessary money for the uprising. It is seldom, until after the high degrees have obtained the success of what they have planned, that the full extent of their

> *Gringo ire*, February 11th, 1938.

programme is apparent to the world. There have been very few members of those Lodges brave enough to tell all that they know. It is usually only when a Government has, by good fortune, captured important Masonic documents that there is any indication where the next blow will be struck. The last great important capture was in 1919 when the Hungarian Government seized the Masonic archives on the fall of Bela Kun, the Jewish leader of the Bolshevik revolution in Hungary. (Bela Kun has been more than once the special Russian " plenipotentiary " in Spain before and during the present struggle.) From the information the Hungarian Government then obtained, they at once closed all Lodges and forbade Masonry throughout Hungary.

Lenin, we have already pointed out, was greatly influenced by the methods and planning of the French Revolution. This may be taken as the classic example of Freemasonic planning. Lord Acton points out that " the appalling thing in the French Revolution is not the tumult but the design "? The authors of that design are now abundantly clear. They have often boasted of their influence. Thus the President of the Grand Orient in 1923 gave the following toast:

" To the French Republic, daughter of French Masonry. To the universal Republic of to-morrow, daughter of universal Masonry."¹

But the Masons' part in the Revolution had been acclaimed in the Chamber of Deputies as early as 1904. The Marquis de Rosanbo, after some searching questions whereby he had deliberately brought up the question in the Chamber, said:

" We are then in complete agreement on the point that Freemasonry was the only author of the Revolution, and the applause which I receive from the Left, and to which I am little accustomed, proves, gentlemen, that you acknowledge with me that it was Masonry which made the French Revolution."

To which M. Jumel replied:

" We do more than acknowledge it, we proclaim it."³

It is impossible here to detail all the evidence of how the Orient Masons determined, prepared, organized and financed

¹ Lord Acton, *Lectures on the French Revolution*, p. 97.

² *Convent du Grand Orient*, 1923, p. 4°3*.

³ Henri Delassus. Passage quoted in *Conjuration anti-chretienhe*.

the Revolution of 1789, as well as the Reign of Terror. It is sufficient to point out that it was in the temples of the continental Masons that the encyclopaedists¹ evolved the "slogan", "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity", which was to be the high-sounding phrase to lead the people to a new subjection.² But how closely the revolution in Spain has followed that of France, and how little fundamentals have changed since the eighteenth century, can be—and must be—overwhelmingly shown by the words of the Mason Marmontel:

"Money above all, and the hope of pillage are all powerful among the people. . . . Mirabeau jokingly maintains that with a thousand *louis* one can make a very good occasion for sedition.

"To overawe the *bourgeoisie*, we shall have, if necessary, that class which is resolved, and which sees nothing to lose and everything to gain by change. There are powerful motives to stir up revolt: scarcity, hunger, money, *alarming and terrifying rumours*, and the madness of terror and fury which will strike into people's minds.

"The *bourgeoisie* produces only elegant speakers: all these orators of the tribune are nothing in comparison with our Demosthenes hired at an *ecu* apiece, who, in the wine-shops, in public places, in the gardens and on the quays, proclaim havoc, fires, villages sacked and running with blood, plots to besiege and starve out Paris.

"The social movement requires this. What could one do with all these people by muzzling them with the principles of goodness and justice? *Good people are feeble and timid: only the worthless are determined.* It is an advantage for the people in a revolution to have no morality. How could they resist men to whom all means are good? . . . All that is necessary for the revolution, all that is useful to it, is just. That is the great principle."³

Is not this the basis of the Soviet revolutionary propaganda to-day?

As with the French Revolution of 1789, so with those of 1830, 1848, 1871. The first step of the revolution had been completed. The French Monarchy was ended. The attack

* Voltaire Diderot, Condorcet, d'Alembert, etc., were all Masons.

» Bonnet 'Orator of the Convent du Grand Orient de France, 1904.

1 Quoted by Mgr. Jouin in *Le Peuple judeo-maçonnique*.

on the Church began. That war has been waging ever since. Triumph for the Masons before the war: the tide slowly returning afterwards, and yet, once again, receding now, if more slowly in its movement. So enormous has the hidden influence of the revolutionary Masons in France become of late years that in 1926 a well-known Masonic writer stated :

“ The advent of the Republic permitted Freemasonry to act outwardly and to take such a place in the State that its adversaries could say that France was not a Republic but a Freemasonic State.”¹

The most important triumph of political Freemasonry of late years was in 1924 when M. Herriot obtained power. Never before had Masonry obtained so complete a political mastery over the State, although as early as 1893 *Le Matin* had stated quite openly that all important laws such as education, the military law and the law compelling seminarists to do military service “ went from the Rue Cadet (the headquarters of the Grand Orient) to the Palais Bourbon: and came back inviolate and definitive ”.

M. A. G. Michel has set out, in singularly clear and telling fashion, what the Masons demanded of the Herriot Government and how their slaves carried out the orders given them. It is interesting to note that it usually takes about one year and a half to get Masonic decrees passed through a French Parliament.¹²³

1. In January 1923 the Lodges decreed the suppression of the embassy to the Vatican.

Parliament carried out this order, October 24th, 1924.

2. In 1923 the Lodges demand the triumph of the idea of laicity. (This is the first essential of the continental Masonic atheistic basis for the State.)

Herriot made his first ministerial declaration on this point, June 17th, 1924.

3. January 31st, 1923. The Lodges demand a full and complete amnesty for condemned persons and traitors. Several were mentioned by name, *including Marty, now notorious as the organizer of the International Brigades fighting for the Government in Spain.*

Voted by the Chamber, July 15th, 1924.

¹ Albert Lantoine, *Hiram cotiromid d'apines*, Paris, 1926.

4. Most important of all. In October 1922 the Lodges decreed for relations to be opened with the Soviet. (*Bulletin officiel de la Grande Loge de France*, October 1922, p. 286.)

This was realized on October 28th, 1924.¹

Even as long ago as 1929, M. Gustave Hervé had pointed out in his paper, *La Victoire*, that "the collectivist party of Léon Blum, the second branch of Freemasonry ... is not only an anti-religious party, but a party of class war and of social revolution".

How convenient for the unholy alliance of Soviet and the continental Masons that Léon Blum should be in power when the second revolution was designed to be carried out! How convenient for the Red Government that Léon Blum was Prime Minister of France to supply munitions and men, to keep the Pyrenees open, and insist on the pernicious doctrine of "non-intervention" (i.e. to be applied against the Nationalists). We shall show later the financial aspects of non-intervention from the point of view of France . . . and some Cabinet Ministers. We make the direct accusation that the link between the Spanish and French Governments during the present struggle has been through Masonry: through such Grand Orient Lodges as Plus Ultra, La Marseillaise, L'Internationale. These Lodges organized the supply of arms to the Red Government, and carried through the contracts for the supply of those arms. It was the same Lodges which organized the Communist fêtes in support of the Red Government of Spain, which were held at the seat of the Grand Lodge of France, Rue Puteaux, Paris. We have said that not the least part of the saving of Europe that Franco and his Crusaders are doing, is to prevent France from rushing over the precipice of Communism. There is unfortunately only too much evidence of the clandestine power which the Soviet has over the great C.G.T. of France, the very centre of the whole French Trade Union Movement.

But Spain is only one of the last of the attempted victims. Masonry had the obligation, and the impetus of its success, to continue its revolutionary work throughout Europe after 1789. It was, "in duty bound",^a to continue its work. Its

¹ A. G. Michel, *La Dictature de la Franc-maçonnerie sur la France*. (Editions SpC, ^{s.1}) H. Delassus, *Le Conjuration anti-chrétienne*, Vol. I, p. 146.

primary success in the Iberian peninsula naturally made it conceive Spain to be another easy victim. For it was the continental Masons who boasted that they destroyed the Monarchy in Portugal.

"In Portugal," wrote Raphael Rens, "free-thinking, the Republic and Freemasonry go hand in hand, but of the three, it is Masonry which directs."¹

In December 1907, Magalhaes Lima, the head of Portuguese Masonry, came to Paris to lecture to the Lodges on "Portugal, the overthrow of the Monarchy and the need of a republican form of government."

A few weeks later King Carlos and his eldest son were assassinated. King Manoel mounted the throne, but as he was considered inoffensive, his banishment was considered sufficient.¹²³

The continental Freemasons boasted of this success. The Mason Furnemont, grand orator of the Grand Orient of Belgium, said (February 12th, 1911):

"Do you recall the deep feeling of pride which we all felt at the brief announcement of the Portuguese revolution?

"In a few hours the throne was brought down, the people triumphed and the Republic was proclaimed. For those who were not initiated, it was a flash of lightning in a clear sky. But we, my brothers, we understood; we knew the marvellous organization of our Portuguese brothers, their ceaseless zeal, their uninterrupted work. We possessed the secret of that glorious event."³

We could multiply examples of this nature all over Europe. The Bolshevik revolution in Hungary was dictated by this revolutionary Freemasonry, and the men who carried it out, including Szamuelly, perhaps the most callous murderer of them all, and Bela Kun, were Masons. The Bavarian Soviet under Eisner were all Freemasons. The story is monotonous in its repetition. Only one further example of the ramifications of this hidden power we feel compelled to bring forward. It is perhaps one of the most sinister in the long catalogue of evil.

"On 15th September, 1912, the *Revue Internationale des*

¹ Raphael Rens in the *Banhutte*, January 25th, 1909.

² Leon de Pon^ins, *The Secret Towers Behind Revolution*.

³ *Bulletin du Grand Orient de Belgique* 5910, 1910, p. 92.

Sociétés Secrètes, edited by Monseigneur Touin, published the following lines:

"Perhaps light will be shed one day on these words of a high Swiss Freemason on the subject of the heir to the throne of Austria: He is a remarkable man. It is a pity that he is condemned. He will die on the steps of the throne."¹

"On 28th June, 1914, the Archduke, heir to the crown of Austrian Monarchy, and his wife succumbed to the bullets of Serbian Freemasons."²

As all the world knows, that deliberate murder at Serajevo was the signal of the World War.

"On 12th October one of the assassins, Cabrinovic, unconcernedly said to the judges of the military court, 'In Freemasonry it is allowed to kill.'"

The Pharos shorthand report of the trial of the four most active participants in that murder is one of the most profoundly disquieting papers of our time. One passage alone will suffice to show the whole story. The President of the Court was questioning Cabrinovic, who threw the first bomb at the Archduke's car:

THE PRESIDENT: "Tell me something more about the motives. Did you know before deciding to attempt the assassination that Tankovic and Ciganovic were Freemasons?" Had the fact that you and they were Freemasons an influence on your resolve?"

CABRINOVIC: "Yes."

THE PRESIDENT: "Did you receive from them the mission to carry out the assassination?"

CABRINOVIC: "I received from no one the mission to carry out the assassination. Freemasonry had to do with it because it strengthened me in my intention."³ In Freemasonry it is permitted to kill. Ciganovic told me that the Freemasons had condemned the Archduke Franz Ferdinand to death more than a year before."

"In the tempest of the war," writes Vicomte Léon de Pongins, "this trial passed unnoticed. The silence of the Press

¹ *Revue Internationale des Sociétés Secrètes*, September 15th, 1912, pp. 787-8.

² Leon de Pon^ins, *The Secret Powers Behind Revolution*, pp. 775-8.

³ Tankovic and Ciganovic were higher Masons than Cabrinovic. Ciganovic had told Cabrinovic, who was under twenty years of age, that the Freemasons could not find men to carry out the Archduke's murder.

* We cannot rid ourselves of the possibility here of occult suggestion. All the murderers were between the ages of eighteen and twenty and very susceptible to influences of all kinds.

was perhaps not entirely due to chance. It was in the interests of many people that there should be silence, and there are means to obtain it."

Add the further evidence of Count Czernin:

"The Archduke knew quite well that the risk of an attempt on his life was imminent. A year before the War he informed me that the Freemasons had resolved his death."¹

And why should there be this desire to create wars, disruption and the downfall of dynasties and systems of government?

Towards the end of the World War, Sir M. Findlay sent to Lord Balfour a quotation from the Netherlands Minister in Russia. It ran thus: "I consider that the immediate suppression of Bolshevism is the greatest issue now before the world, not even excluding the war which is raging, and unless, as above stated, Bolshevism is nipped in the bud immediately, it is bound to spread in one form or another over Europe and the whole world, as it is organized and worked by Jews who have no nationality, and whose one object is to destroy for its own ends the existing order of things. *The only manner in which this danger could be averted would be collective action on the part of all powers.*"² (Our italics.)

Possibly this thought is present in the minds of our wiser statesmen. Sometimes it appears to be so; at others that probability recedes.

In analysing the "hidden hand" behind these world revolutionary movements, we have been relentlessly forced, in the same way as so many other inquirers, from the Netherlands Minister onwards, to the consideration of the grave importance of the Jews in all such campaigns. Let us, at once, make our position clear as to how we regard this question.

Anyone familiar with the early Nationalist broadcasts from Portugal and with their daily press, will have noticed a strong strain of anti-semitic bitterness. To the uninitiated this feature must seem very strange in what is thought to be a purely Spanish civil war; but, once more, the whole crux is that it is *not* in its essence anything of the kind. Here, therefore, it is necessary for us to deal with a thorny subject, which

¹ Czernin, *Im Welt-Krieg*.

² *Russia No. 1*. A collection of reports on Bolshevism in Russia presented to Parliament by command of His Majesty, April 1919.

we would have avoided at any cost were it not that we cannot do so without concealing some of the fundamental factors of the struggle and hiding the explanation of so many of its obvious features.

Just as the Spaniard has a certain streak of hard relentless-ness which may produce the saint or the assassin, and the quality of every race may be turned to good or bad account, so the Jewish race is capable of producing the highest and the low'est, though the racial characteristics which are the origins of these potentialities are very sharply differentiated from many of the others. Like money, the treasures of natural gifts can be a force for good or evil. The Jewish race is intelligent, patient, ambitious for position, powder and wealth, capable of the greatest kindnesses or a callous hard-heartedness. It has produced the greatest dramatists and authors or the most sub-versive and pornographic writers; many great painters, or vendors and originators of pornographic postcards and obscenities; eminent politicians or demagogic agitators; great organizers or wreckers of businesses; creators of industry or authors of huge stock exchange swindles; writers of great imaginative books or journalists of the type so frequently found connected with the Barcelona Press bureaux; the Founder of Christianity, the greatest of all moral codes, and His Apostles, or the adepts of the Grand Orient and the founders and agents of the Internationals. And it is the great tragedy that the race is often judged as a whole, by the short-sighted, from those unworthy of its great history and achieve-ments, who drag it into disrepute and create undeserved prejudices.

This great race is scattered throughout the world; many of its industrious and intelligent people have found a home and peace in countries of their adoption, but others, restless and bitter, have espoused internationalism as a creed, and work for it as a cause and with a mutual loyalty which is at once an example and a reproach to most other races. Quick of intelligence, adept at languages, this latter class has abused the hospitality of countries that have welcomed it, and in large numbers has worked for the disintegration of their govern-ments and institutions. Is it partly that they resent these creations of another race as something to which they feel foreign? Perhaps. Yet it need not be so; for so many others do not seek that destruction, but develop the means of mutual

adaptation, find many firm friends, and contribute to the improvement and development of the countries of adoption.

Thus we have the two extreme wings, and, as with other races, a large neutral central mass, indifferent to the principles of the New Testament rather than unprincipled, and agreeable to the pursuit of gain without regard to those principles. The composite result of the faults and virtues, the good work and the bad, is conspicuous for its frequent and very outstanding success. Envy at the success of many in the meritorious and welcome fields has been added to resentment at the misdeeds and undesirable activities of others; and from this has resulted the persecutions of the Jewish race at the hands of so many nations since its early history was first recorded in the Old Testament. Anti-semitism is like Fascism; it is not autochthonous like a plant; it is a reaction which occurs only when another evil first manifests itself: on the other hand it is bad because it is violent, unreasoning and cannot make distinction. For the sins of its unscrupulous members, woe has been brought down on the heads of the innocent, and pogroms and slaughter of the inoffensive have resulted.

One of the great tragedies of this race is that by reason of their great capabilities, where they are misguided or degraded they are the more easily converted from the highest usefulness to the lowest level of destructiveness—not merely passively potential for harm, but actively and unscrupulously malignant. And if this is correct, imagine what must happen if an organization so controlled, with international roots and mutual solidarity, can obtain virtual control over such enormous sums as a nation's budget, or over its whole resources, as, for example, in Russia. The resources are even greater than that brief supposition implies. Nor is their work rendered more difficult by the fact that in England already the outlook is increasingly secular; the spade-work has already to some extent been done; dishonesty evokes daily less and less repulsion—the more frequent attitude is how to devise a means of being dishonest safely.

One last observation, which also is in the nature of a warning. Though many of these Jews of the International Bolshevik group are forced to operate in the open or have unwillingly been brought into the limelight, the majority operate behind firms of Gentile appearance or through Gentiles on whom they have some lever, or for whom they make it

worth while, financially or in one or more of the many ways¹ open to them.

And incidentally they themselves, the oxen that tread out the corn, are not muzzled.

On February 21st, 1936, Lord Londonderry wrote Herr von Ribbentrop a letter which confirms us in our views. Referring to conversations with the Fiihrer, Herr von Ribben-trop and General Goering, he said: "They forget here (in England) that we have not been invaded for many centuries, that we have not experienced the devastation of a revolution. . . . In relation to the Jews . . . we do not like persecution, but in addition to this there is the material feeling that you are taking on a tremendous force which is capable of having repercussions all over the world. . . .

" It is possible to trace their participation in most of those international disturbances which have created so much havoc in different countries, but on the other hand one can find many Jews strongly ranged on the other side who have done their best with the wealth at their disposal and also by their influence to counteract those malevolent and mischievous activities of fellow Jews."¹

The position, as we see it, is perhaps best summed up in the words of Hilaire Belloc, who has been a close student of this same question. The Spanish Revolution had the same inspiration as the Russian Revolution; and the latter he describes as " the Russian Revolution, led by a small international clique, largely Jewish . . . and energized almost wholly by its Jewish members ", these being actuated, as he points out, by intense motive for revenge against the old regime, no doubt with cosmopolitan experience, and possessing instruments of secret action.²

There is a considerable school of thought which would add that there is also a large body of Jews aiming at some form of Judaic control of the world, but not Bolshevik—merely for their personal power and wealth. We do not subscribe to this belief, and most certainly not in the sense that it might be regarded as a conscious and deliberate organiza-

¹ Lord Londonderry, *Ourselves and Germany*, re-quoted from the *Evening Standard* of April 23rd, 1938.

² Hilaire Belloc in *The Crisis of Our Civilization*, p. 186. Juan Tusquets, in *Origines de la Revolución Espanola* (p. 43)» Barcelona, February '932» states that according to the detailed lists given in 1920 By the association " Unidad de Rusia " (121 East Seventh Street, New York), of the total of 271 Russians directing the Soviet, 232 were Jews, and most of them Masons.

tion, whether in alliance with their apparent opponents of the same race or at war with them.

We must, therefore, draw the distinction between Red Jews and White Jews, just as there are Red Christians and White Christians; and again, within the category of Red Jews—and it is a large one—we have those who are active promoters and those who are merely subsidiary participants, either from "ideology" or for gain, as again is the case with the Red Gentiles. But above all, we distinguish between the atheistic and genuinely theistic Sefer Jews.

This lengthy explanation is found necessary because, in the exposition of the Spanish war, there are many harsh things to be said or implied against a section of the Jewish race which is bringing odium on their fellows: and without the distinction so clearly and justly to be made, we might very wrongly be accused of anti-semitism; and that false accusation might even be made a ground for attacking our conclusions, and even our facts.

It is Jewish thought which most conspicuously developed the joint stock company system. Revolutionary republicanism is the application of the joint stock conception to government. The Communist "cell" and the affiliations and groupings of the unions and internationals is the application of the joint stock conception to politics. The use of continental Masonic Lodges is the application of the joint stock principle to revolution. By the application of the joint stock principle the true owners of a concern may remain hidden. It is the easiest method whereby the directors of any of the above applications of the joint stock principle can hide their identity from the world. The question of who are the leading figures behind this attempt at a "joint stock" domination of the world, and how they obtain their ends, is beyond the scope of this book. But it is one of the most important *libres à jaire* yet to be written. It will have to be written by a man of the highest courage, who will count his life as nothing compared with enlightening the world as to what the atheist "self-appointed priesthood" would ordain.

It is an interesting fact that amongst the Spanish Nationalists it is often remarked that they feel they are fighting some sinister, intangible force which they cannot properly define. It is not the least humiliation of the Spanish Reds and their Government that the people in Franco's Spain pray for



SALAMANCA: A BATTALION AT MASS

[Facing page] T30



them—and, God knows, they need it. Strange mediaeval touch in this super-civilized world! A people in arms that pray for their enemies, yet sworn to liberate their country from the evil that seeks to destroy it. With an entirely new significance and knowledge they utter the prayer familiar to all the millions of Catholics throughout the world for so many centuries:

"Holy Michael the Archangel, defend us in the day of battle. . . . Do thou, Prince of the heavenly host, by the power of God, thrust down into hell Satan, and all wicked spirits who wander through the world for the ruin of souls."

If Franco were to fail—what then? Is he not fighting our fight? Or at least making our future fight an easier task? For if he failed, the light of Christianity would indeed grow very dim both in Europe and throughout the world.

CHAPTER VII

THE TRAINING SCHOOL

THE main problem before the directors of the Soviet world revolution was: how soon would Spain be ready for the second and decisive phase? Time was important for the Comintern in its plans for world revolution, in spite of Lenin's warning that the tactics of "tacking, waiting and retreating" must often be employed. Though they had planned on a very ample base and had spent enormous sums of money, the measure of success achieved had not fulfilled their hopes. The reaction against Communism in Germany was causing them much anxiety and victory elsewhere was urgently needed. Spain was the ideal place. With success in Spain France would fall. More important still, perhaps, Spanish America would quickly follow on the United Iberian Soviets: and with Spanish America brought in, a great part of the wealth of the world would be in their hands. Throughout the world were countries where the "red pollen" had been scattered, and the work might be wasted unless a great success were scored.

Spain had lingered many years. In 1932 not even the United Front, commanded by *ukase* ten years previously, had been achieved. But things were progressing.

"The Communists in Spain seem indistinguishable from anarchists. Their aim is the overthrow of any Government, just because it is a Government, and their methods are disruption and havoc," reports the careful correspondent of *The Times*. But they were not yet ready for the final assault. The years of 1932 and 1933 were the training years, preparatory to the great year of execution, 1934. During the training years the "education" of the people went on steadily. "Test" revolts, sudden insurrections in town and village, political general strikes, assassinations, the continuous persecution of the religious together with church burnings, the usual proved routine, was followed. At the risk of boring the reader with

repetition of the story we must record at least a part of these significant events. We have attempted no historic sequence and seek only to give a general picture of how the attack was planned and delivered.

The first obstacle which had to be attacked was the Church and for the reasons set out in Chapter V. In preparation for this, as they had done in the case of the Monarchy, they paved the way with a campaign of calumny, and an appeal to indiscipline. Then Azaná decreed that the Jesuits should be expelled from Spain. His argument was that he was compelled to enforce strong measures against the religious orders because they were teaching orders, who "taught everything contrary to the principles which are the foundation of the modern state." The Jesuits would be the first to admit that charge if the "modern state" which Azaná sought to found, under the guise of freedom and democracy, was the atheist state of Ferrer, the Soviets and the Grand Orient. His further argument was even more curious. "It is necessary to respect the principle of freedom of conscience, but also to protect the Republic. These two necessities being incompatible, the State must come first." But the "crime" of the Jesuits really lay in this, that they were a highly efficient, educated and religious body of men, and active and effective opponents of the dechristianization of the country.

There was also another reason—a minor reason, but part of the machinery. Madariaga said, "The Republic, obsessed by its anticlericalism, has light-heartedly closed down the only type of school which, for all its imperfections, bore some slight resemblance to a secondary school, the Jesuit College, and it has created more and more caricatures." Even the Minister of Economy, Nicolau D'Olwer, a Catalan, said, "I have voted for a bad measure. The Government put intolerance and prejudice before desire for educational and social progress." But the Minister of Education saw few disadvantages in closing so many schools. He estimated 7,000 new elementary schools would be required. All the 17,000 secondary pupils would be absorbed in four months. But as *The Times* (May 1933) pointed out, it was not clear how 7,000 teachers were to be prepared in six months. But was this problem considered—or did it matter? On the erection of new schools the opportunity for a "drawback" presents itself; but there is little to sweeten a politician's life in the training of new teachers, though even

such small commission as their small salaries permitted was frequently extorted, during the years of the Republic, as the price of success in the "competitive" examinations for their posts.

The Jesuits were accordingly expelled. Alcalá Zamora, the President of the Republic, though against the measure, dutifully signed the decree. In the same year, *The Times* correspondent demonstrated how "modern" schools were used to train the young idea for the desired Soviet revolution. He gives a rough translation of a "hymn" sung at the beginning and the end of class by Barcelona school children:

"Sling the bomb . . . place well the mine, grasp firm the
pistol
Pass on the word for revolution . . . Help for the
anarchists
Stand to arms till death: with petrol and dynamite
destroy the Government."¹

We must not underestimate the Soviet's ability in education. Mr. Francis McCullagh reports:

"I was asked to translate for two (of the fifty or sixty young Russian aviators) who had had a forced landing outside Madrid. . . . The Soviet has certainly succeeded in producing a completely pagan type of combatant, atheistical, communist, merciless and efficient."²

To complete this short outline of the use of education in revolution we quote a letter from Francisco Ferrer, who suffered "judicial murder", and has been held up as one of the great educationalists of Spain. Ferrer wrote this to a friend:

"In order not to scare people and give the Government a pretext for closing down my establishments, I call them modern schools and not schools for anarchists. For the aim of my propaganda is, I frankly admit it, to form in my schools convinced anarchists. My wish is to bring about the revolution. For the time being one must, however, be content to implant the idea of a violent upheaval in the minds of the young. They must learn that against the police and the clergy there is only one means of action—bombs and poison."

¹ Very similar hymns were broadcast in English from Moscow for the instruction of English Communists during 1937 and 1938.

³ McCullagh, *In Franco's Spain*, p. 213.

And this is his epitaph: "The Council of the Order of the Grand Orient de Paris sent to all the Masonic powers of the World a manifesto protesting against the execution of Ferrer. It claims him as one of its adherents:

"Ferrer was one of us. He felt that in Masonic work the highest ideal was expressed which man could hope to realize. He abhomed our principles to the end. What they wished to strike at in him was the Masonic ideal."¹

There was certainly more to be said for the Jesuit schools than for schools under such direction as that. Certainly there was every reason for a Government which was actively promoting the revolution, under the orders of the Comintern and the Grand Orient, to be rid of them as soon as possible.

So that the long tale of church burning and religious persecution may not prove too burdensome, we will merely give one more quotation. It is from the Spanish correspondent of the *Morning Post*:

"Bela Kun, former Red Dictator of Hungary, and Casanellas are acting for Russia in Spain . . . and working to accomplish the destruction of all that is held sacred by civilization. . . . Nearly two hundred churches have been burnt or destroyed in Spain during the last eighteen months." (The dispatch is dated 21st December, 1932, so the period covered is, roughly, that of the life of the Republic up to that date.) "The religious are compelled to disguise themselves to avoid persecution in the streets."

Liberty! Equality! and Fraternity!

That same formula was equally applied to the Republican method of dealing with the agrarian question.

The agrarian question in any country is extremely difficult, and often almost insoluble. In Spain this is especially true. The magic wand of "nationalization" is insufficient: where agrarian difficulties arise, the land generally wins. It propounds endless puzzles. It is a problem which cannot be solved by a facile application of "economic laws" or by the cunning of accountants.

No agrarian problem in the world is more complex than that of Spain. "The Spains" differ in so many ways. There are the prodigally rich districts, there are the large desert regions where even the utmost toil cannot scratch a living from

¹ de Pon\$ins, *The Secret Powers Behind Revolution*, p. 63, quoting Mgr. Del ass us.

the soil. As we have stated, in many parts, even in the most fertile, the soil does not allow of rotational crops. There are the astonishing differences and changes of climate in the various parts of the Peninsula.

The chief problem of the land in Spain was one of *minifundia*, not *latifundia*. Mr. Louis Fischer (with a hammer and sickle on his passport) appears to have been misinformed upon the matter, and he is now in consequence misinforming Mr. Attlee and numerous English readers of his widely distributed pamphlets.

The area chosen by the Republican *politicos* to support their propaganda to inflame the peasants against landlords and obtain political support was naturally Estremadura, where there were some large estates of little value agriculturally. And the result was as disastrous as was to be expected. To the small land-workers, proprietors of a pair of oxen (called *yunteros*), they gave a part of the estate to cultivate, and for those with even less means they purchased a pair of oxen and agricultural instruments. The sowing was commenced, ruining the pasturage and the woodlands; and the failure was such that in the following year the *yunteros* sold their oxen, and purchased, with a quarter of what they had cost, some miserable donkeys, with which they were doing the ploughing in 1935. The Marqués of Albaida took some very interesting photographs showing perfectly the employment of this primitive means of cultivation; for this he was given a democratic fine of 5,000 pesetas, imposed by the local Governor. What occurred in Estremadura is perhaps one of the best illustrations of the real position as regards *latifundios*.

In New Castile, in one area where the land had largely been leased to municipal syndicates of the local villages, in 1935 there were some nine hundred family groups holding leases as farmers. At the commencement of 1936 the Government appropriated the estate because it belonged to a grandee of Spain. They expelled the old farmers and put in instead, as owners, various well-known Marxists to a number not exceeding eighty, and thereby dispossessed and ruined some eight hundred and twenty families. When this estate was captured by the Nationalists, the owner found that of the land he used to cultivate scarcely two hundred hectareas had been sown. It may, therefore, be said that almost the whole of this coveted estate had been abandoned as waste land by its new proprietors.

And again, as regards this area, that case is a typical one.

As regards some of the Andalusian *cortijos* which were distributed by the Republic to popular syndicates some, like "La Espera" in the Province of Cadiz, were totally abandoned, and others, like that of "Las Quemadas", at the gates of Cordoba, and many others which ceased to be worked, were turned into waste land where the syndicate gave written permits for cattle to graze at the rate of one peseta per head per annum.

The case of "La Espera" is a good example, because the unscrupulous political agitators had chosen it, as *one of the better lands*, to prove their arguments by chicanery, pouring in State funds as subsidy for the purpose. Fortunately we are able to give evidence independent of our own. *The Times* Madrid correspondent—one of the most tolerant and gentle of shrewd critics, with a very long and intimate knowledge of the country¹, where he has had his home for so many years—reported, on 12th February, 1934, as follows:

"The first community of peasants² was formed¹ at Espera . . . on land² with teams, ploughs and seed supplied by the institute. The peasants were familiar with both the land and the crops, being the tenants of the evicted landlords. Officials flocked to the sowing. Pictures of the emancipated 'serfs' riding gaily caparisoned mules filled the newspapers. Oratory flowed: 'No longer shall slaves of the soil toil for a lord to take the golden grain; it will now ripen to enrich humble homes.' In these circumstances it is unfortunate that the community has so far proved unprofitable and has cost money to the State."

On the day when they distributed the very few large Spanish estates which were still held under one hand—all of which were the poorer ones—they created two very grave problems. The first was due to the unemployment produced through wages no longer being paid on such estates. The second was that, as they produced regular crops only at great capital cost in manure, agricultural machinery and other needs, the Spanish agricultural production suffered a heavy blow which crippled a principal source of the national wealth. In the first two years of the Republic over 750,000 acres went out of cultivation.

¹ By the Instituto de Reforma Agraria, created November 1938.

² Free, of course.

Almost the whole of the Spanish soil which is really fertile—the “Spanish Earth” exploited by a much advertised propaganda film—is, for the most part, excessively subdivided. As this distribution in reality has been carried out during the last hundred years, it follows that, continuing on the same lines, in a few more years the distribution of the few remaining estates already appropriated for the purpose would have been completed, and, though impoverishing the country, there would not have remained even the argument of size. If the Marxist authorities had desired in this problem the good of the people, they would have employed and advocated means very different from those put forward by the revolutionaries. But that was the inversion of their aim. They brought about the *discontent* of the peasantry for the disruption of Spain. Individually their plan was to climb to the heights of power, where they might benefit from the ruin of the many. The plan of those they served—the “self-appointed priesthood”—was to gain control of the whole wealth which Spain had built up through the centuries. And the poor Spanish people, lacking in education, and only too well endowed with a hasty temperament and good faith, were lead astray by the doctrine of hatred and the lure of illusory promises, sacrificed, with Spain itself, for “ideologies” which they neither know nor share.

It may be advanced in opposition to this argument that the Institute of Agrarian Reform was established with an annual grant of £1,250,000 and that the “Communities of Peasants” were being encouraged. We would reply that these, like “La Espera”, were merely to incite the peasants to look to the Communists for “freedom” and benefits. And, incidentally, though subsidies in Spain, before the Republic—and not in Spain only—had a nasty way of sticking to Government officials’ fingers, after the Republic it was notoriously worse.

Dr. Franz Borkenau, who can in no way be regarded as reactionary or insensitive to progressive ideas, and who is “advanced left” in his politico-social views, clearly observed how easy it was to impose on the peasants. Speaking of his visit to Red Spain in August 1936, he says:

“The gap between ideals and reality is grotesque in Spain, and people are completely satisfied with their own good intentions without bothering to put them into effect. In the village committees the anarchists seemed usually to take the lead, and

among their achievements they prided themselves upon the abolition of private commerce in the harvests. All crops were now sold direct to the trade unions, I learnt, and I was inclined to admire this extraordinary¹ feat of organization. My curiosity, in one case, went so far as to ask for an interview with the man who was charged with the commercial handling of the main crop, which in this instance was wheat. And then came disappointment. There was no such man: thus there was visible dismay on the faces of the committee members when I asked to see the man who did not exist. After a few minutes they decided to admit that the crops were handled exactly as before, by private merchants. In fact, the problem of the handling of export crops, such as Valencia oranges, is far beyond the capacity of small villages. But if the ideals of *communismo libertario* could not be put into practice, at least it was nice to talk about them.”¹

The history¹ of the disorders which marked these years of undeclared civil war is dreary¹ in its reputation; for it was the period in which the master minds were training “the masses” for the final great day of the Revolution. At the risk of boring the reader we must give in some detail the monotonous sequence, for it is only by a full appreciation of what occurred that it is possible to appreciate also the ample justification for “revolt” against the Government—a revolt which was merely a refusal to be exterminated or enslaved.

The year 1931 ended with a curiously ineffective disclosure of the “hidden hand” A poor but widely attempted “test” mobilization was carried out in Catalonia when a Communist State was proclaimed, with sympathetic outbursts in Bilbao, Lerida, Seville and elsewhere. Even the “Government of Dwarfs” had no difficulty in putting it down.

Directly after the new year an equally abortive attempt to found the Communist State in North Catalonia met with a similar fate. But 1932 was to be a year of valuable training, and great progress was able to be reported by the zealous revolutionaries to the waiting Comintern. Indeed, so certain were they of quick success that as early as February *Le Journal* reported that Stalin had promised 500,000 dollars to assist the social revolution in Spain. He appears to have largely implemented that promise, for it was reported on 21st Mai^{ch} that he had sent 200,000 dollars “on account and” to encourage

1 Borkenau, *The Spanish Cockpit*, pp. 119-20.

the "training school"? The financial reports of the Communist International for 1931 show that in that year £240,000 had been sent to Spain.²

That was presumably good money. It was taken that there was also plenty of "home-made" Russian peseta notes for distribution. This standard method of the Soviets is known from our own experience here in Britain. In one year the Home Office Report stated that £27,900 was paid to the Communist Party of Great Britain of which at least £10,300 was in forged £3 Bank of England notes made in Moscow. It was further admitted in a House of Commons debate in 1928 that *M. Shannin, attache' to the Soviet Embassy in London*, brought over £27,000 in English notes for the use of the Communist Party in Great Britain.²

We have asked already how it was that this impoverished country, with its leading revolutionary organization bitterly complaining that it had had no central funds, could afford the constant stream of armaments which flooded every part of the country¹ except the military arsenals. Here, then, is the answer. Let us disturb the chronological order for a moment to emphasize this point. On January 25th, 1933, the *Morning Post* correspondent in Spain sent forward this dispatch:

"Huge stocks of rifles, bombs and ammunition are being found by the police all over Spain. An enormous amount of money is being spent in fostering anarchy. Many of those arrested, though to all appearances not well paid, carry note-cases full of bank notes; some have 3,000 pesetas, others 1,000. The conditions in Barcelona in September 1923, when Primo de Rivera saved Spain from anarchy, are eclipsed by the present vast organization. In reference to the Twelfth Plenary Assembly of the Comintern, the Soviet organ *Pravda* says, 'The combats for which the Comintern must prepare will be graver than hitherto and in certain countries decisive, Spain being one of those countries.'"

The suitable occasion which Stalin used to implement his promise of 200,000 dollars was the Communist Congress at Seville. (Casanellas considered it safe to return to Spain for this congress, but the Government arrested him.) That congress decreed one of the Soviet's more subtle methods of disruption. In the name of "Liberty and Freedom" the

¹ Peers, *The Spanish Tragedy*, Chapter III.

² Godden, *Conflict in Spain*, p. 31.

independence of Spanish Morocco was urged. As we have already indicated, one of the most useful methods of disruption for the destruction of central authority is the development of the separatist or federal theory. This congress also ^as used to familiarize the Spanish comrades with regular wireless lectures in Spanish from Moscow on Soviet aims and policy', just as in the course of the Civil War they were broadcast from special cars in Valencia¹ and all over Red Spain.

July saw the staging of another typical village "test". Like Castilblanco before, and Casas Viejas just afterwards, Villa de don Fadrique had little quarrel with the world, or with the Government; but it was the scene of a fight between the Civil Guards and Communists. The political strikers, "stirred by the village doctor and the judge,² both fervent Communists . . . attacked the Civil Guard PROTECTING THE REAPERS ".³

Though 1932 was a quiet year in comparison with what was to come after, *The Times* was compelled to report, in words very similar to those of the *Morning Post* correspondent in the following year:

"The state of unrest was never so serious since the critical days just preceding the Dictatorship, after a long period of terrorism. Acts of violence are continuous in all parts of the country'. Every day the newspaper contain a long list. The Communists are in most cases the root of the trouble."

Within a week of this being printed in London, violent rioting had started in Lerena (Badajoz) and throughout three provinces of Estremadura, to be closely followed by strikes and sabotage in Asturias, bloodshed in Mula (Murcia) and more riots in the small town of Queseda (Jaen). It will be noted how widely the Soviet agents had organized. The professional revolutionaries perfected their organization all over the country, partly to keep the masses "mobilized" by giving them plenty of "tests", and partly to "test" for themselves the state of public opinion for the advent of the "second revolution".

On the last day of the year the police seized 1,600 bombs and a large number of firearms in Barcelona. "From papers seized, these troubles", reported the *Morning Post* corres-

¹ Knoblaugh, *Correspondent in Spain*, p. 167.

³ We have already pointed out Largo Caballero's boast that municipalities could be quickly organized into Communist cells.

» *The Times*, nth July, 1932.

pondent, "were due to anarchists. . . . There can be no doubt that both their inspiration and their banking account came from Moscow."

In respect of 1931 and 1932 the professional revolutionaries could report considerable progress to their headquarters in Moscow. But this success was slight compared with the tremendous advance which they made in 1933. Such advance, indeed, as to warrant the belief that 1934 would be the Great Red Year. The Executive Committee of the Communist International congratulated itself upon the development of its plans in Spain.

The year, from the very start, opened auspiciously for the Comintern. By January' 10th Barcelona was in the throes again. " Attacks on police and military in forty different places in the city. Bloodshed in Lerida and intense fighting in a village in Valencia. Strikes in Seville and Jaen. Twenty-one killed and one hundred injured in north-eastern Spain."¹

" Outside Madrid a patrol of Civil Guards challenged, ' Who goes there? ' The reply was ' Lenin ', followed by a discharge of bullets."²

Directly after came the terrible case of Casas Viejas.

"Early one morning in January' 1933 a Communistic regime was suddenly set up, in alliance with persons operating under the black and red flag of the anarchists, in the village of Casas Viejas in Cadiz Province. The fight with the Civil Guard went on all day: and the Republican force finally bombed the house of the leader, soaked it with petrol and set it on fire: the leader, his daughter and six other persons perished.² The village surrendered next day, after a considerable death-roll."³

The Assault Guards were said to have been given the order *à la barriga*—to shoot at their stomachs. Never was any disciplinary measure carried out in a manner more calculated to increase, rather than decrease, the discontent of the revolutionaries. And all this was under a Popular Democratic Government. The careful *Times* representative would certainly have reported it if there had been any local cause or provocation to account for these outbursts. The explanation

¹ *The Times*.

² Mr. Knoblaugh, Professor Peers and the three authors of *The Spanish Republic* suggest that the Civil Guard were officially told to " shoot and kill " and take no prisoners.

³ Godden, *Conflict in Spain*, p. 32.

is to be found only in the frank account of Sir Peter Chalmers Mitchell's young protégé, Ramon Sender, who proclaimed, as we have already recorded :

"The working-class organizations all through Spain were trained by constant mobilization."

On 1st March the National Labour Confederation opened a campaign of agitation at Barcelona. "The Confederation has 1,200,000 members ready for anything," said one speaker. "The working class" was being trained "by constant mobilization".

The authors of *The Spanish Republic* have mentioned incidents upon what they truthfully state was "a normal day under the Republic":

iyth April, 1933. "Forty-six packets of dynamite, thirty-two loaded bombs, one revolver and a large quantity of ammunition, as well as spare parts for the manufacture of infernal machines, are discovered at a house near Tarragona (Catalonia). As a result of an uproar during a Socialist meeting at Zorita (Salamanca), the President of the Workmen's Federation fires several shots at his political opponents, and, without encountering official interference, continues to shoot his revolver through the streets of the town. Shots are fired at a meeting in the province of Lugo, and a member of the public, who had interrupted an orator and drawn a knife, falls dead with a bullet through his heart. In the province of Avila, Socialist agitators about to attend a meeting are stoned by the womenfolk and forced to retire. Shots are fired near Ferrol, and a corporal of the Civil Guard is seriously wounded: his colleagues remove fourteen knives and three pistols from the scene of the fray. Disturbances occur in several towns near San Sebastian: shots are fired, and a girl is slightly wounded. Two bombs explode at Oviedo. The Communists attempt to cut the water supply from the town of Baena (Cordoba). During a fight at Arabayona (Salamanca) shots are fired and three employers and five workmen are wounded: it is feared that three of the casualties will prove fatal. Shots are fired in Seville, where a bakers' strike is in progress: a workman is killed and an Army Sergeant is seriously wounded. A bomb explodes at Villaciervos, near Soria. At Puebla, near Salamanca, shots are fired, and a workman is wounded. The Madrid Railwaymen's Syndicate, incensed because one of their colleagues had been admonished by an official of the Northern

Spanish Railway, issue posters inciting all workers to rise against this 'Monarchist and Jesuitical company': it is later ascertained that the colleague in question, who was guilty of several offences, had been asked not to repeat them, and warned that if he did not mend his ways it would be necessary to take action against him. Five owners of a large colliery at Cordoba are imprisoned by the Civil Governor, to whom they dared address a request that measures be adopted for the resumption of work in their foundry, which was in the hands of extremists. At Zaragoza, several workmen are attacked for having consented to work in a factory: shots are fired, and one of the workmen is wounded. The Syndicalist Assembly meets at Barcelona and decides to call a builders' strike: shots are fired at a policeman who arrested one of their comrades, and a passer-by is wounded. The headquarters of the Barcelona Boy Scouts are attacked by a group of sociologists who disagree with the ideals of the organization. Catalans of the extreme Left protest against religious ceremonies."¹

"Nothing more of special interest occurred *on that day*, which on the whole may be considered uneventful."

We wonder if we too will hear something like this on a "normal uneventful day":

"Serious riots at Cockermouth and Camborne. Railway blown up at Carlisle. Village rioting at St. Anthony-in-Roseland. Agricultural workers attack police at Paddock Wood. Bombs found at Manchester, Ashford, Derby and Norwich. Sabotage at Sheffield and Coventry, Rugby, Crewe and Newcastle. Attempted Soviet republics proclaimed at Leeds and in Whitechapel."

This is not mere jesting. It has begun even in this country. There was even a Federalist Movement in Wales whose members were incited to burn aerodromes. Have not cells been started in our forces and arms factories? Need we give the example known to almost everyone? And are the reports daily in the papers of France—at our very door—very different in 1937 and 1938 from those in the Spanish Press two years before?

An unimportant event in April 1933 was significant. Again we quote *The Times*:

"During the Moscow trial of Britons accused of sabotage, British-owned premises at Jerez, the wine country, were pla-

¹ Anonymous, *The Spanish Republic*, pp. 114-16.

carded with 'Long Live Russia. Down with Imperialistic England. . . Long live Gibraltar free and Spain.'

"These placards", *The Times* points out, "are of little consequence in themselves except as yet another indication of the directing hand behind the Spanish Communist agitation."¹

On 28th July, 1933, the recognition of the Soviet Government by the Spanish Republic was officially announced.

And, *The Times* added, a big oil deal with the Soviet was predicted, partly in return for the services of the Spanish Government.

One further date deserves special mention. On 31st October, José Antonio Primo de Rivera formed the Falangist Party.

No such party existed before; nor afterwards, until after the Civil War had commenced, had it any considerable support. But its formation is yet another confirmation of the Communist origin of the terror, and of Lord Baldwin's and Joaquin Maurin's words that Communism precedes and is the origin of Fascism.

On 14th November an attack was made on José Primo de Rivera at a meeting. The shots meant for him killed two of his audience. His assassin also injured three people who pursued him, and the police made no attempt to stop him from escaping.

It was an important year too for Joaquin Maurin. He testifies:

"Parallel with the change in tactics by the Socialist Party, and in connection with it, a vast movement for unity of action of the working class developed under the name of the Workers' Alliance.

"The Workers' Alliance was born at Barcelona in the spring of 1933. . . Organically it was very simple. Every section of the parties and workers' syndicates of a locality formed a *bloc*. A committee was formed with the representatives of each organization to centralize direction of all the movements . . . and thus it did not destroy any existing organizations.

"What the Soviet was to the Russian Revolution, the Workers' Alliance was to the Spanish Revolution.

¹ The indications constantly recur, and in all countries. On 20th February following a general strike was also organized in Spain "to protest against the recent bloodshed in Austria".

"It was not a simple addition of force, but a veritable geometrical progression. ... In starting a series of great struggles at the end of which it knows it will find victory. The myth of success is created. Optimism is born."¹

But at the end of the year a general election was held, and, to the utter surprise and discomforture of the Left, the pendulum swung far away from them. The country was sick of terrorism. It wanted orderly government. The results of the election left the balance of power with the Centre (Radicals and Catalan Lliga). Lerroux, a Radical, came into power, for his party held the central position with enough deputies to put into power either Right or Left Wing with his support. However, the C.N.T. had refrained from any active part in the election: undoubtedly it was in accordance with policy dictated by the undisclosed directors of their organizations. Whether it was to lull the *bourgeoisie* into a false sense of security or not, we cannot say for certain. At all events that was what occurred.

For two years the Government of Spain was comparatively sane, whatever its faults, and terrorism was not connived at. It has been accused of undue repression during this period, especially after Gil Robles joined it. It certainly did not take the measures most suited to meet the difficulties confronting it; but the plain fact is that without measures which were bound to appear repressive, it was quite impossible to govern the country at all, owing to the intense activities of those whose object was to render the country ungovernable by normal means. The wisest course would have been to act with the greatest possible severity against the ring-leaders, whether their responsibility had been direct or indirect. This, however, they failed to do; and the Revolutionaries intensified their subversive propaganda throughout the country. Perhaps a minor reason for urgency in 1934 was that the Lerroux Government gave notice to cancel the Soviet's Oil Monopoly Contract as from the end of that year.

It seems unnecessary to add that, even before the results of the elections were known, there was a big strike in Barcelona, revolts almost everywhere, attacks on the Civil Guards, on churches, and on the Barcelona express train, when nineteen were killed. A state of alarm was proclaimed. Only the loyalty of the police and the Army saved the position.

¹ Nfaurin, *Ilacia la Secunda Revolution.*

What Spain needed then, what Spain needs, is steady, firm government. There is little interest in "democracy" in Spain. A central trusted head with autocratic powers exercised for the country's good is the best government for the Spanish people. But since the beginning of 1931 "in four years the young Republic has 'devoured' fourteen Cabinets and produced seventy Ministers"? It must be remembered that every ex-Minister received a pension of £300 a year for life, even if he had only held office for one day. That was how "democracy" worked under universal suffrage in Spain.

Before we deal with the rising we must comment on the attitude of the Comintern after the defeat of the Left at the polls. They were apparently surprisingly unconcerned with the result. The official organ of the Communist International reported in April, "The Communist Party in Spain occupies a fighting position which is unfolding."¹ ² The progress of the United Front, under the intensive efforts of Joaquin Maurin and Andres Nin, was such that Moscow declared that the "question of organizing a direct struggle for power" was now urgently raised for Spain.³ Meantime the training for "mobilization" went on. In the first six months of 1934 the statistics of political or social crimes were 102 deaths, 140 wounded, 150 bomb explosions, and the confiscation by the police of 500 bombs and large quantities of explosives and small arms.³

Maurin tells the story of these months in more enthusiastic tones than those of our own bald narrative:

"In March the workers of Madrid . . . received their baptism of fire. Catalonia responded. The Workers' Alliance of Catalonia declared a general strike on 13th March. . . . It was the salute of the working masses of Catalonia with their fists raised, to those of Madrid. . . . A proletariat of all Spain awoke.

"On the 22nd April the Youth and Popular Action—Fascists in thought rather than in practice, decided upon their first meeting at the Escorial. . . . The nascent Fascism . . . with a candle in one hand and a dagger in the other.

"The parade at the Escorial provoked as a reply the general strike of the workers of Madrid.

¹ *Evening Standard*, 6th November, 1934.

^a *Communist International*, English edition, April 1934, p. 202.
> Godden, *Conflict in Spain*, p. 33.

"Madrid was paralysed. . . . During *these manoeuvres* the masses became conscious of their real force. General strikes spread throughout Spain. . . . An irresistible hurricane. . . . A general strike at Valencia *decreed* by the Workers' Alliance. General strike at Zaragoza for thirty-six hours. General strikes. Partial strikes. Strikes which ceased and suddenly started again . . . the tempest was approaching.

"During 1934 the Workers' Movement showed unexampled impetuosity which was expressed by *strike activity of a political character*." (It will be noted these were not of economic origin.) "The proletariat more and more became conscious of its unlimited force.

"The official Communists had no liberty of movement: they depended on Moscow. . . . But during the summer of 1934 there was an important alteration in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. . . . The Communist Party, instead of a bitter enemy of the Workers' Alliance, in twenty-four hours became its most enthusiastic partisan.

"Just preceding the October events . . . the Minister of the Interior, in spite of all his boasting, saw with justifiable surprise, general strikes and subversive movements occur throughout the whole country. . . .

"The C.N.T. in Asturias ratified its adhesion to the Workers' Alliance. In Madrid the Socialists and Communists together organized a meeting of 100,000 people in the stadium. . . . Events were hurrying onwards. The *bourgeoisie* trembled in fear. . . . Terror caused the orderly elements to tremble ■when the news of the arming of the workers¹ spread through the country. . . . A state of siege was proclaimed . . . everything ready to resist. . . . A Cabinet crisis followed.

"On Friday, 4th October, silently the mobilization of the revolutionary forces proceeded everywhere. On the afternoon of that day the workers rapidly occupied the strategic points, drew up their troops in order of battle, and with the clenched fist saluted the dawn of the new day.

"A victorious insurrection in Catalonia could not appear in the eyes of the popular masses of the Peninsula as a Separatist Movement, but as a liberating insurrection with which the workers and the peasants of the towns and villages would sympathize. . . . It would extend beyond Catalonia and open a new phase of our revolution."


¹

That is, before the rising.



SCENE ON THE LEON FRONT

[Facing page 168]



"On 6th October, 1934, the Left made, by force, its bid for power. A revolutionary general strike was declared."¹ Insurrections were to take place all over the country. The three most important districts were to be Madrid, Catalonia and Asturias.

What happened in Madrid and Barcelona can be shortly described. Madrid is not mainly an industrial city. Communism is not deeply rooted in the heart of its people. There were sporadic disorders but no organized rising. Sniping went on for days and there was one occasion when it appeared that something more was to be expected; but the Army got matters under control there, as they did more quickly in Barcelona, although the insurrection at the latter city was far more formidable and serious. "Luis Companys attempted to set up an independent republic within the federal government."¹ Within forty-eight hours the movement was crushed. Once again the Communist-inspired rebels considered themselves let down by the C.N.T., who refused to support them.

Franco himself took charge of the operations against the Catalan rebels. He directed the attacks; he even directed the fire of the cruisers in the harbour. He was also in charge of the quelling of the very serious Asturian revolt, though he did not go there himself. General Lopez Ochoa was in charge of the troops on the spot there.

How formidable was the Asturian revolt can be seen from the fact that, by 7th October, "It was calculated that the rebels numbered about 60,000, fully armed and provided with tanks, machine-guns, armoured cars and large quantities of dynamite."² Oviedo was almost completely destroyed. "Within a few days the Cathedral, the University, the Asturian Bank and the High School were burnt. Bridges were destroyed and roads were blocked in the surrounding country. Seven hundred and thirty buildings were destroyed or damaged by fire. The murder of a total of twenty-seven priests and of Dominican novices, the shooting of the Christian brothers, the horrible mutilation of the body of a priest at Sama de Langreo (affirmed by the eye-witness, Señor Martinez, a Deputy for the Asturias) and the burning alive of a priest in the park of San Francisco were acts that foreshadowed the slaughter, torture and mutilation of priests throughout the villages and cities of

¹ Knoblaugh, *Correspondent in Spain*, p. 5.

³ Peers, *The Spanish Tragedy*, Chapter IV.

Spain held by the so-called ‘democratic’ Popular Front forces in 1936.”¹

One priest’s body was hung naked on the railings of a public street with a notice attached to it, “Pig’s meat for sale.”

“The official figures later showed that 1,335 were killed, of whom 1,051 were civilians; the wounded numbered 2,951, rather more than two-thirds of whom were civilians.”² The Government took possession of nearly 90,000 rifles, 33,000 pistols and revolvers, and some half-million rounds of ammunition. It took a fortnight to restore order in Oviedo, and for weeks after there was fighting in the hills. Nearly 30,000 members of Left parties were thrown into prison (to remain there for the best part of eighteen months), including Largo Caballero.

This was by far the most concerted and ambitious attempt by the Soviets to achieve power by direct action. Everyone in Spain was aware of its inspiration.³

Maurin has some interesting things to say in regard to the Asturian rebellion:

“The Asturian Commune did not last so long as that of Paris, but they were sister as to their intensity.” This brief phrase, in the mouth of one of its organizers, vividly describes its horrors.

“In Madrid the movement has great defensive qualities, but for the offensive, it lacks the numerous factory proletariat—the proletariat properly so-called.” This was one of the difficulties of the Internationals—to make a proletarian revolution where there was no proletariat. “... But in the valleys of Mieres and Langreo in Asturias are the true roots of the Spanish proletariat. Since twenty-five years ago, when the miners’ syndicate was founded, the workers of this region have been to the school of Socialism. Houses of the People, co-operatives, ‘Ateneos’, choral societies, workers’ newspapers, syndical and political organizations—the Asturian workers had known how to create all that patiently.

¹ Godden, *Conflict in Spain*, p. 36.

² Peers, *The Spanish Tragedy*, Chapter IV.

³ Mrs. Helen Nicholson records in *Death in the Morning*, p. 85, how Isabel, her Spanish cook, came to her after the Civil War of 1936 had started, and said:

“Tell me, Senora, where is this Russia that people talk so much about? Is it a province in the north of Spain?”

“No, Isabel, it is a country far away.”

“Well, but I know the Russian Revolution was the uprising in the Asturias two years ago.”

"For years there had been bitter discord, Anarchists and Syndicalists against Socialists. . . . There was then a scission in the Socialist ranks and a struggle between the Socialists and the Communists. The civil war between the Communists and Socialists was implacable from 1922 to 1934.

"In the spring of 1934 the Workers' Alliance brought about combined action. And José María Martínez brought about the alliance; he said, 'It has been stated that two authoritarian U.G.T.s and two libertarian C.N.T.s do not make four liberty; but I consider two U.G.T. revolutions and two C.N.T. revolutions make four revolutions. *As to what becomes of that revolution, the proletariat will determine that in the street.*' They had decided to fight all that out afterwards.¹

"The first days of October passed in expectation and mobilization. Obliged, like the whole of the Spanish proletariat, to accept a premature battle [sic], the Asturians were going to fight without casting glances behind them. . . . On the 4th October they had reached red-hot temperature. The fight was inevitable, it could not be put off. . . . The cry 'Up!' resounded throughout the province. . . . The conflagration was to embrace the whole province and the leaping flames were to illuminate the Peninsula. 'Foolishly rash', as Marx said of the Parisian workers of 1871, they 'were ready to try to assault the heavens'.

"On the 5th Mieres was already in the hands of the revolutionaries. . . . The Red army was rapidly formed with headquarters in the House of the People. They formed into groups of thirty with absolute obedience to their chiefs, who were responsible to the revolutionary committee. . . . Arms were not yet numerous: dynamite was to play the principal rôle." This statement is not true; but Maurin had to give reasons for the failuiue.

"Drunk with enthusiasm, the population of Mieres greeted the victors. . . . The barracks of the Civil Guards and the Assault Guards fell one after another into the hands of the revolutionaries, in some places without great effort, and at others after bitter fighting.

"It was now necessary to take Oviedo. . . . The battle on the St. Lazare Road was bitter . . . and ended in favour of the rebels. . . . The dynamite factory at Mongayia and the

¹ Our italics.

cannon factory- at Trubia were taken. ... It was a civil war. . . . The factory- of La Vega was captured. There was one other which the rebels were to take—the Bank of Spain. As Enghels said, ‘ The Bank in the hands of the Commune (in France) would have been worth 10,000 hostages.’ The Asturian revolutionary committee remembered this important Marxist lesson. The safes of the Bank of Spain were blown open with dynamite, and all the safes in the other branches of the mining zone. As Marx said in *Capital*, ‘ Violence is of the economic category-.’ Money is merely a sign of power. . . .

“ Behind a barricade at Gijon the Red militia carried on the struggle ‘ They shall not pass! ’ The red flag flew in the wind. The Socialist Republic was in course of being born.

“ However, reinforcements of troops arrived. It is said there were under eight hundred in all the province at the commencement, thanks to Seiior Azaña’s policy. The Catalonia insurrection had failed and elsewhere there had been inadequate support. As Martinez said to them, ‘ They have left us alone, abandoned.’

“ The militia fought nobly and the women also. ... A young girl was in command of one of the last barricades. As Marx said, the women of Paris joyfully gave their lives at the barricades or on the execution grounds. What does that prove? That the demon of the Commune had turned them into Megaeras and Hecates.

“ Lenin has often indicated the classic conditions necessary for the triumph of the revolution: ‘ For revolution to break out ... it is necessary- that the exploiters (i.e. non-proletarians) should be unable to continue to live and to govern as before. . . . Revolution is impossible without a general national crisis between the exploited and the exploiters. Therefore it is necessary- that the majority of the workers should be made to understand the necessity for the revolution. . . . The insurrection must break out at the peak of the ascendant revolution. But *the situation of the popular masses and of the petits bourgeois was not desperate.*¹ The Socialist Party hesitated and still conserved recollections of its past reformism. . . . The insurrection had not been decided directly, voluntarily by the proletariat.

“ The Government has made use of the radio and the

¹ This admission alone refutes the world propaganda attributing the conduct of the revolutionaries in this civil war to desperation and distress.

bourgeois press." (The Reds certainly remedied matters in this respect, and on a very wide scale, in 1936, 1937 and even 1938.) "... In Spain the insurrection could start in different centres, just as a volcanic eruption breaks out through several craters at a time. . . . The peasantry . . . (who did not take part on this occasion) . . . in our country constituted a great revolutionary' reserve. . . . In Spain the *petite bourgeoisie* is not yet Fascist. . . . In Spain a considerable part of the forces of the Government, those in Catalonia, passed over to the side of the revolution." (This was not quite the case; they foolishly tried to synchronize a separatist movement, which was very' different.) " Those of Asturias were submerged in a few moments, and the remainder was bound to be cautious because the Army might change sides rapidly."

M aurin then quotes from the official Government report:

" In Asturias 30,000 armed miners, faced by 722 men spread out over the whole province, prepared a violent attack. They had modern arms in abundance. There was also a grave danger which might have arisen, namely a rebellion in the territory of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco, for, for some months before the revolutionary' explosion, an intense propaganda was carried out amongst the Musulman nationalists by means of articles published in *The Socialist* and by individual propaganda amongst the Nationalist leaders of Morocco."

" The Catalonian proletariat has not acquired leadership in Catalonian politics because an effort has not been made until recently' to give the Catalan workers a *Marxist education*.

" The failure of Madrid to rise gave the Government, at the most important point, a liberty' of movement. . . . To take Madrid means to seize power . . . and for this it is necessary for the workers' revolution to be a national enterprise in the broad sense of the word, that is to say not merely the workers, but also the peasants and a part of the *petite bourgeoisie*.

" Insurrection must be co-ordinated; simple spontaneity, with absence of central combination, spells defeat. In the art of insurrection it is necessary to have tactics and a strategy to disconcert the enemy, *unpublished tactics and strategy* against which the State may not be prepared. . . . Though ' arms must not be taken up ' is a conclusion which satisfies our politicians of the little *bourgeoisie*, of course, and certainly several of the Socialist leaders of the second revolution. . . .

"The proletariat of Vienna, Linz and Styria has not been conquered like the German proletariat.¹ It remains alive and working in a subterranean manner on the preparation of new combats which will lead it to victory. ... In Spain the proletariat knew how to profit from the German and Austrian experience and accepted the battle (in 1934!) upon the ascendant, in spite of rather unfavourable conditions. . . . But defeat is a good school. ... In October the first revolution came to an end, and the second one commenced."

Maurin, who has written much that is the essential truth, never spoke more revealingly or with greater truth. The Asturian rebellion gave the "Cause" all that it needed, the tradition of a fighting army and a vast number of "martyrs", both alive and dead. The "slogan" swept through Spain that the imprisoned comrades must be rescued. For the first time the C.N.T. was as deeply involved as any of the other factions. Common cause had at last been established. The United Front came into being. The Soviet Republic was within measurable distance of being achieved. *Hacia la Secunda Revolution!* Forward towards the second attempt. Next time—next time, they thought, it was bound to be successful.

¹ The *Daily Telegraph's* Vienna correspondent reports on the 17th March, 1938, the closing by Hitler of the Masonic Lodges in Austria.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CAULDRON BOILS OVER

THE unsuccessful rising in 1934, promoted by the international agitators, had one good result: it brought home to some at least of the population and of the politicians the nature and strength of the forces at work in the country. Amongst those best qualified to judge was General Franco himself, for he had been in command of the forces which put down the rebellion in Madrid, Catalonia and Asturias; and afterwards he was engaged in rebuilding the Army in Gil Robles' time, when he was to find fresh overwhelming evidence of how the Army and arsenals had been honeycombed with Communist cells. It was a mere chance, and a fortunate one for Spain, that Franco was called upon to deal with the outbreak. He had no official position at the Ministry of War. At that time he was a virtual exile in the Balearic Islands, and it was as a man on leave, in civilian clothes, that he entered the doors of the Ministry of War on the 6th October, 1934.

Diego Hidalgo, the Minister, had sent for him at a time when Franco may well have doubted if his career was not practically at an end, for Azaná had closed down the Academy and expressed his strong disapproval of Franco's valedictory speech to the cadets. Throughout 1931 General Franco was left without a command. In 1932 he had been appointed to the La Coruña Brigade. But the Azaná group still feared him for his stern sense of patriotism and his influence with the Army. They thought it wise to get him out of the country, and so, in 1933, he was sent to virtual exile as Military Commandant in the Balearic Islands. Azaná fully appreciated that this man, with his complete disinterestedness, his patriotism and his regard for the dignity of his profession, was the most dangerous opponent to the Government's plans for ^{unr¹er} mining the Army and building up the "Private Army of Assault Guards. Franco was, moreover, one of the two

Generals who had not joined the Grand Orient. It was inconvenient that a man of such prestige and influence should remain too near the centre of affairs.

Meantime the replacement of soldiers of proved merit by those chosen for their political complaisance would facilitate the undermining of the Army, until it should be incapable of effective opposition when the Great Red Day arrived.

Whilst he was thus stationed in Majorca, Franco devoted his untiring energy to the military problems of the islands. The artillery at Mahon was quite ineffective and, in fact, the Balearics were in an utterly defenceless condition. He therefore spent his time in drawing up a comprehensive scheme of defence, which was later adopted by Gil Robles when he became Minister of War. It had its effect, too, in the present conflict; for when Franco heard that Catalan Communists had landed at Majorca to seize the island, he merely instructed the General in command of the small Nationalist force there to carry out the plan of defence which he had filed at headquarters. The defence had few casualties and the invaders were contained without difficulty from the strategic points long before chosen. The expedition finally withdrew after suffering tremendous losses. It was a great blow to Barcelona, for serious opposition had not been expected.

Señor Diego Hidalgo, the Minister of War, who held Franco in the highest esteem, had no hesitation in sending for him. In a time of crisis, the Minister said, he must use the best men he could, whether they were actually in power in the Ministry at that time or not. Franco knew Oviedo intimately, he had been attached to the Brigade garrisoned there, and he was in any case the man most likely to deal with the crisis with the necessary skill and decision.

The time was far more critical than might appear from the rapidity with which the movement was crushed. Oviedo and Gijon had scarcely 1,600 men as garrison. Opposed to them were at least 20,000 men, well equipped with the most modern accoutrements of war and previously organized. It was in no sense a spontaneous casual rising. The revolutionaries had already taken possession of a dozen villages, and could cut the railway and road to Leon with the greatest ease. By no other way could reinforcements be rapidly brought up, if, indeed, it were possible to find reinforcements. For the previous Government had deliberately reduced the Army

strength, and there were too few men at the other centres also.

Franco's chief difficulty was treachery from within. Efforts to countermand his orders and nullify his plans were soon apparent. The O.C. at the aviation base at Leon did not even trouble to answer his calls. General Batet, left by the Government with only a handful of troops in Barcelona, was vague and undecided. Every point of attack had to be treated as a separate problem. There was only one way in which order could be re-established. The Army in Africa must be brought over. The Government not only agreed to this, but found a new confidence because of Franco's firm handling of the situation. Colonel Yagüe arrived from Africa by autogyro in the centre of Gijon in time to save that town, but too late to organize the defence of Oviedo. But with only two battalions of the Legion and a *tabor* of native infantry he liberated Oviedo within two days of the arrival of these troops in Spain. At the same time General Lopez Ochoa, with five hundred men, had gone to the relief of Lugo. Franco controlled the operations even in its details, from his office in Madrid, from reports by telegram, radio and telephone. General Lopez Ochoa, for example, would have been destroyed in the ravines of Pehaflor beyond Grado, where an ambush had been laid for his diminutive column, had not Franco warned him from Madrid. The General changed his route accordingly, and safely made a detour through Aviles.

It seemed too much to say at that time, but it is amply clear to-day, that in 1931, as again in 1936, the Azaña Government had purposely reduced the forces of security to prepare their massacre; for its rôle in the general scheme was to "sell the pass" to the extremists. Franco's resolute handling of the complicated position and the heroic behaviour of the handful of troops in Asturias alone brought the position under control and prevented the spread of the terror and the formation of similar Soviets in other parts of Spain.

There was a great outcry in the Press about the brutality with which the insurrection was put down in Asturias. Actually, the fault of the Government was that they took far too weak a line. *Not one* of those who had organized the movement was executed. After the operations were over, only two people were executed, and those sentences were for particularly terrible crimes. The politicians, however, took the

foolish line of imprisoning no less than 30,000 people. The result can be imagined. All the friends and relatives of this large number were stirred up without difficulty to agitate for the release of the "martyrs", and material was thus afforded to the agents of the Third International to work up an overwhelming agitation. Probably the elections of 1936 might have had a different result, and the disorders which followed them might never have occurred, if the Government had dealt justly with those who were really responsible.

General Franco was in no way responsible for this foolish line of action by the Government, whose policy was probably dictated by the Radical Party, which held the balance of power in Parliament. His own methods in the course of the Civil War have been precisely those which should have been adopted by the Government in 1934. All those proved guilty of crimes which would merit the death penalty under civilian law are condemned to death, although in many cases even these are reprieved. Those who are responsible for *inciting* massacres are usually treated in the same way. As regards the rest, Mr. Douglas Jerrold relates an incident which illustrates what usually occurs:

" ' How many Reds have you here? ' I asked the military Governor of a big town recently captured. He shrugged his shoulders. ' About 15,000 possibly,' he said. I was surprised and asked where they were. ' In the streets, I imagine,' he answered with a smile. ' Do you place any restrictions on them? ' Of course not, I was told, for the excellent reason that no one knew who was * Red ' and who wasn't. ' If you did know? ' I asked, and again was told, quite accurately, as I found out by asking the British Consul, that nothing would be done: the feeling against them was so overwhelming that no action was called for."¹

This, we know, is not the impression current in England; and the reason is that the propaganda sections of the Internationals have created an impression of a terrorist regime with their usual thoroughness, partly to fan the flames of hatred and partly to induce people to tolerate their own oppressive Government. In those provinces which have to-day been liberated, there is a far less rigid control of personal liberties than, for example, is suffered by those in Catalonia under the

¹ Jerrold, *Spain: Impressions and Reflections. The Nineteenth Century and After*. April 1937.

"legitimate" Government; the treatment by the Nationalists of those who have been in arms against them is far less oppressive than that accorded by the Government to those who are supposed to be its own supporters. General Franco's chief object with the Reds is to try and give back to them a sane outlook, not based upon the creed of hatred, but upon the principles of Christianity, and to try and give them back a sense of patriotism. The point of view was well illustrated by General Franco's remarks to some captured soldiers of the International Brigade whom he released and sent back to their homes:

"Go back to your homes. . . . Love your country. . . . Work for its improvement . . . and do not be misled by false ideals." Only one British paper reproduced this portion of his address. Amongst a certain group which has a large say in the moulding of our opinions, it is not the fashion to encourage patriotism in England.

Perhaps the most barefaced and inaccurate propaganda in all the astonishing campaign of mendacity which the Reds have carried on in every country has been that which speciously insinuated: "there have been atrocities on both sides—it has been the same on both sides." This suggestion is untrue. Its origin is the necessity to counteract the effect upon public opinion of the wholesale and deliberate massacres practised in Red territory. They cannot be denied; and therefore the only possible policy has been to suggest that they were no worse than occurred in Nationalist territory. Once that

- false impression could be created, it would even be possible, with willing Press assistance, to put over the impression that the Red atrocities were due to the provocation by the Nationalists. General Franco had few organized followers; and if the Nationalists had been responsible for one tenth of what is attributed to them, they would have had no security for their communications, and General Franco would have had no backing in the country, upon which he relied for the recruitment of the hundreds of thousands who are to-day enthusiastic soldiers in the front line. The lie can be nailed by anyone who visits the country for himself.

Franco has no need to invent stories of the deliberate and systematic atrocities of the Reds; nor is it necessary to look far for proof of the Russian domination which inspired and organized them. The Comintern does not hide its deeds; it

glories in them in order to encourage its supporters in other parts of the world that they too may pursue the same work when their time comes. In the official organ of the Comintern, the Communist International dated 5th December, 1934, the following frank statement of the Spanish position after the Asturian rising was printed: "In Catalonia, the Communists did not play a decisive rôle; this explains why there was an absence of any form of leadership . . . and why Catalonia did not fulfil the part that might have been expected." But Asturias was different. "From first to last, our party there was in the leadership of the armed rising." And, as Maurin said, it was "sister to the French Revolution in its intensity". It was also sister to the Russian. The official paper goes on: "In the course of events, the Communists attained absolute preponderance, not only in the workers' revolutionary committees, but also in the regional committee . . . which was absolutely in the hands of Communists. . . . As a result of stubborn activity, the Communists were able to secure powerful positions in the ranks of the working class and to organize cells in the factories. . . . Soviets were established in each town, in each village and in each peasant district. Decrees and orders were issued in the name of the 'Workers' and Peasants' Government'. Private property in the means of production and land was, of course, abolished.


"*The Soviets organized the supply of arms and provisions. . . . A Red army was created and fought against the Government troops holding Oviedo, the capital of Asturias, until 18th October, 1934.*"

The Comintern, thus, did not see in the Asturian defeat anything but another excellent "test" for the "mobilization" of the masses.

"If none the less the Spanish proletariat fought for power under the banner of the Soviets in a number of the most important districts in Spain (especially in the industrial north), this implies the *tremendous historic victory of the idea of the Soviets, the victory of the Comintern and the Communist Party of Spain. . . .*"

Their future plans they proclaimed with equal directness:

"Decisive battles are near in Spain. The task facing our party is to prevent the consolidation of the power of the victors for a single hour, by an uninterrupted partisan struggle in all its forms." Surely no further proof of our contentions is



MORELLA, THE KEY TO THE MAES I RAZGO



IN NAVARRE

[facing page 180]



needed. It is not possible to do more than repeatedly quote from their own mouths.⁷

It may seem surprising that the Comintern should deem it wise to be so outspoken concerning their plans. But, as Mr. Lancelot Lawson has pointed out, "The Bolsheviks despise the intelligence, and ridicule the ethics, of the bourgeoisie."⁸

What force was there within Spain to stem this torrent let loose by the Soviets? The only possible force was an efficient army, where the traditions of discipline and patriotism still existed. Apart from the Civil Guards, it was only in the Army that a sense of duty remained in any organized body. With a few honourable and outstanding exceptions the politicians were more cynical and ready to sell their country or their principles than ever before in the history of Spain—and that is indeed a strong indictment. Fortunately the Left lost the general election of 1933, and in that period General Franco and Señor Gil Robles were able to do that little which finally saved the country. If Franco and Robles had not had that brief period of authority in which they could point out the dangers and inspire the minds of the decent citizens, the year 1934 would have been the Great Red Year. And though they were not in power long—a few months only—and their work was undone, so far as human ingenuity could undo it, during the six months preceding July 1936, it was their example which resulted in the successful rally against the Red tyranny possessed of almost every advantage and means of suppression.

The task which Franco undertook was tremendous. The Army was in an appalling condition. Not only the ranks were impregnated with Communism, but time-serving or actively Communist officers had been appointed. In every branch of the Army there were Communist cells, and particularly in the air force and artillery, which the Government had specially selected for corruption as being the two most important sections. Given this, it was only necessary⁷ to shorten the period of service for conscripts, to render the service unpopular, to neglect to call up classes, and to reduce garrisons. The Communists had also filtered into those parts of the services where technical knowledge was essential.

In equipment the Army had been shamefully starved and the whole organization corrupted. Franco found that in the

» Lawson, *Contemporary Russia*, No. 2, January 1938.

arsenals there was not enough ammunition for twenty-four hours' fighting under modern war conditions. And yet it was an open secret in Spain that the ammunition which the Asturian miners used against the Government had largely been filched from Government arsenals with the connivance of a high official in the ordnance service. The troops in Campo Manes, when the Asturian revolution broke out, had not even first-aid equipment.

The first step in tackling the formidable problem of re-building the Army was to re-establish the standards, the morale and the prestige of the officers. A Superior War Council was formed. It created Tribunals of Honour. Officers guilty of dishonourable acts were dismissed the service by these tribunals, and officers guilty of serious delinquencies were expelled or punished.

The list of offences alone gives some idea of the condition to which the Army had sunk. Officers were even guilty of stealing the pay of their men. Commissions on equipment, or the stealing of supplies or their re-sale to friends was common. One of General Franco's chief objects in forming these special military tribunals was to remedy the evil without bringing the whole Army into disrepute. For the majority were good men utterly ashamed of what was occurring, and the method adopted to purge the evil had the effect of raising still more the standards of morality and conduct among this majority. Most of the officers who joined the Government's forces after civil war broke out had been found guilty by the tribunals, including General Miaja, at one time Generalissimo (under Russian supervision) of the Red forces. Other officers now prominent in the Red army who had been retired or sanctioned were Mangada, Villalba, Sarabia, Camacho and Riquelme.¹

Conditions in the ranks were even worse. As much as a quarter of the whole Army were active militant Communists. In every barracks the organization of the Communist cells was highly developed. But Franco learnt much of the Soviets' activities in Spain through having to clean up the Army, and the information he received from the special information bureau which he set up was of great assistance when he was eventually forced into action against the Soviet revolution.

Soldiers were, of course, at once absolutely forbidden to

¹ Arraras, *Franco*.

have any connection with Communism, and a similar provision was enforced by Franco for workers in the arsenals and aeroplane factories. They were put under military control, and affiliation with revolutionary organizations was forbidden.

At the same time the men's own position was safeguarded. The whole code of military justice was reorganized. Garrisons were redistributed. The military academy was once again opened. A special branch of munition engineers was created, for the Army had to be entirely re-equipped. Guns were as antiquated as were the aeroplanes; the few bombers the country appeared to possess were not later than 1918, and the bombs were only five kilos.

Just before the end of the year 1935 contracts for new aeroplanes, bombers and fighters, new artillery and anti-aircraft guns had been placed. Steel helmets had been issued to the troops. The gas problem had been studied and protective and manufacturing arrangements put into force. The whole management of the arsenals was altered. Personnel was increased. At Toledo production was planned to reach 800,000 cartridges a day. By the middle of December the re-armament programme was completed and approved, with an extraordinary budget of 1,100,000,000 pesetas, almost all of which was to be spent in Spain.

Unfortunately, long before the work could be completed, there was a degrading financial scandal which involved Señor Lerroux's relatives, and members of his Radical Party. This, following upon other scandals connected with that party, inevitably brought down his Government. It is probable that a trap was laid for their cupidity; if so, it was almost sure to be successful. The President felt compelled to call a general election, and the brief period of less than two years, during which the co-operation of the Right Wing parties had begun to bring a measure of order and peaceful conditions in the country, was brought to a close. Not that the Soviets and Internationals had been idle during that period; order had been maintained in face of the gravest difficulties. For example, *The Times* recorded on 29th July, 1934, the report of the Secretary of the Madrid Socialists that "300,000 Madrid workers were waiting to fight, backed by 2,000,000 men in the country and provincial towns".

The Socialist author, Dr. Edward Conze, has shown how the "masses" were developing in the "training school".

"The greeting of the clenched fist has become the common property of all militant workers. It is the best introduction to any working-class quarter. Half an hour after the train had crossed the frontier from France I was greeted with the clenched fist. All over Spain it was the same—the clenched fist was the usual greeting."¹

A companion picture from another writer sympathetic to the Left, but written later, just before the Civil War started, also shows how thoroughly Russia prepared for the Great Red Day.

"We passed the Escorial half an hour before reaching Madrid, just as a civic reception was being given to 121 Left Wing fighters who had come back to Spain after a long stay in the Soviet Union. They had gone to the U.S.S.R. after the October rising in Spain in 1934, and now they were back, entertained to a State reception in the largest palace of the Kings of Spain."²

Señora Clara Campoamor has also given a vivid description of conditions in Madrid prior to the Civil War. Señora Campoamor, having sat as a Republican Member of the Cortes in 1931 and 1933, and having several times represented Republican Spain at Geneva, can hardly be accused of having acute "Fascist" sympathies. She writes:

"From the middle of May to the outbreak of the Civil War, Madrid lived in chaos. The workers took their meals in the hotels, restaurants and cafés, refused to pay their bills, and threatened the owners. . . . Workers' wives gave their orders in the food shops, without paying for them, as they were accompanied by a gallant with a revolver. In open daylight, in the outlying parts and even in the centre of the city, small shops were looted and the goods removed under the threat of revolvers."

This was the time, too, when the infamous rumour of the poisoned sweets was spread abroad throughout the country to provoke anti-clerical persecution. The rumour was spread that children were deliberately being given poisoned sweets by priests and nuns, especially those of the teaching orders, in order to kill them. In the "collective madness" aroused by this infamous story many innocent victims were attacked and some ruthlessly massacred.

¹ Conze, *Spain To-day*, p. no.
² Mairin Mitchell, *Storm Over Spain*, p. 12.

But most vivid and convincing of all, and, at the same time, most convincing of how certain was Russia of her eventual success, is the account given by M. Yvon Delbos, Foreign Minister of France, of his own personal experiences in Russia. He visited the revolutionary museum at Moscow and he records:

" Lastly a special room has been devoted to the future Communist revolution in Spain. Copies of newspapers are shown, such as *La Bandera Roja* and *La Palabra*, portraits of Spanish Bolsheviks, and scenes of strikes and risings. It seems that the Soviets reckon upon achieving *this first success of contagion* among our friends on the other side of the Pyrenees."¹

Nor did the Russians neglect their standard practice of demoralizing the youth of the country with pornographic literature. Professor Peers has written: " There was a notable increase of ebullience, especially in streets and public places, among the young of both sexes ... in the later and darker days of the Republic this degenerated into the most shameless and disgraceful licence. . . . There was certainly a great deal more display of immorality, principally in the shape of pornographic literature, which was prominently featured in kiosks and bookshops and, with Marxist literature, was sold outside the very entrances of the churches."²

Jerome Tharaud tells the same story of Barcelona. " The kiosks, immense, numerous and magnificent, are always there under the trees. . . . I looked in vain for a French newspaper. I could only find pamphlets of a more or less pornographic nature. I had already observed a swarm of such stuff at Budapest and at Munich at the time of the Bolshevik revolution."³

Mr. Edward Knoblaugh illustrates this in the following episode:

" Occasionally delegations of Protestant clergymen came to Loyalist Spain to investigate stories they had read of anti-clerical activities. These delegations were warmly received. Great pains were taken to show them that they had been grievously misled. Special guides were selected to show the distinguished visitors round. Needless to say, the clergymen saw only what they were intended to see. After a day or two

¹ Delbos, *L'Experience Rouge*.

² Peers, *The Spanish Tragedy*, pp. 97-8.

»Tharaud, *Crucile Espagne*,

they generally were hustled off to the frontier suitably impressed."

But he recounts the sad adventure which happened to one such "conducted tour".

"The visiting delegation had been shown here and there, when their guide inadvertently led them to a bookstall. They paused to admire some rare old volumes. The guide saw his mistake too late. They had seen one of the things he was instructed never to let visitors see. There, prominently displayed, were profusely illustrated copies of *La Traca* and *Bicharracos Clericales*, widely distributed anti-clerical publications, their covers portraying priestly orgies with semi-naked nuns.

"The delegation left in a huff."¹

When we come to touch upon conditions in the Red zone during the course of the Civil War, we shall be able to show how all this was the thin edge of the wedge: the sequel was inevitable and intended—wholesale free sexual relationship and the Russian variety of "civil" "matrimony", and the simplest "divorce", and naturally, venereal disease and abortions. An exaggeration? The facts themselves make it clear that the "text-book" decreed the inversion of the ten commandments, and the victims corrupted and lost beyond all turning back. And as it was decreed, so in fact it came about.

Nor were the Internationals less active with the more "intellectual" and educated of their intended victims. "Ateneos" became widespread all over the country. We have shown how Maurin extols the Asturian miners for so "patiently creating" "Ateneos", choral societies, Houses of the People, co-operatives, and a host of other associations that we in England would naturally regard as organizations for the health, pleasure and social betterment of the poor. Here they were formed and used by the astute Russians to promote their malevolent ends. It was in one of these "Houses of the People" in Madrid that the biggest deposit of arms, a fine private arsenal, was discovered by the police just before the Civil War began. La Pasionaria carried on the good work in "poor miners' clubs" and choral societies. Señor Ruiz Villaplana's evidence may also be accepted in this matter:

"But the Popular organization was on the march (in

¹ Knoblaugh, *Correspondent in Spain*, p. 176.

Burgos)... In the popular Ateneo, lectures were given by renowned intellectuals... The new spirit spread through the pioxmce, and Left political centres were founded; schools arose and libraries, and even in the Ateneo a choral society was organized.'

This is almost the same wording as "Pasionaria's"—and we know her confessed objects—and very similar to the professions of the members of the Cultura Popular, describing the "progress" amongst the Asturian miners and the peasants. And in speaking of José Tomas (said to have been shot by the Nationalists), who organized the Orpheon at the Burgos Ateneo, Señor Ruiz then makes the unlikely, but compromising, statement that "he (Tomas) did not know *the political and syndical nature of the centre*".

Choral societies are no doubt excellent; but it would appear that the principal object was to teach the "workers" to sing the Internationale; and the libraries were to disseminate the great doctrine of hatred—and pornographic literature. There were lots of other books as well; but somehow it seemed impossible for them to be circulated alone. A mere cursory examination of the great educational work of the Republican intellectuals is sufficient completely to "debunk" it: it was the usual evil use by the Reds of institutions that should have been beneficial.

All these developments were carried through in the name of "Spanish Democracy" . . . "this myth which was the creation of the Third International as a part of the * Trojan Horse' policy recommended in 1935 by Dimitrov at the Seventh World Congress. It is based on the belief that many who could not be induced to fight for Socialism or Communism will join a united force against Fascism"? Many helped in good faith, not seeing the ultimate goal, and rapid progress was made, even in spite of the considered opinion of Señor Oliveira, himself a Socialist, of "the almost utter impossibility of acclimatizing Western democracy on Spanish soil".² The agitators were sent out to the towns and into the quietest parts of the country—even the distant Canaries were overrun with them—and stirred up hatred whilst they promised Utopia. They professed to know the solution and answer for everything—the railways, the shipping problems, iron, steel, coal, agricul-

¹ R. J. Dingle, *Second Thoughts on Spanish Democracy*, p. 6.
² Oliveira, *The Drama of Spain*, p. 10.

ture, hydraulic and electrical development, banking, State control of exports, economics—a list that is endless. They are amazing fellows. Maurin knew it all, for example. At the mature age of seventeen he was editing a newspaper, *La Lucha*, to guide the nation. Give them a list of difficulties, real or imaginary, possible or impossible of solution, put a pen in their hands, and you can have an immediate answer. And you will find that the answer will illustrate the necessity for a proletarian revolution, and help to inflame the ignorant. Experts know, of course, that these base scribblers are mostly intensely ignorant. They are merely a form of the Hyde Park ranter—with a fine flow of oratory, but little knowledge, and no good faith. Any expert on the subjects they so glibly discuss could inform you of the patent errors in the facile solutions they put forward. We have them here in England too—generally described as “well-known Thinkers”. And the worst of them are those who write well and have sold their talents to “the Cause of the Party Lenin understood when he enjoined the formation of this army of writers. As he frankly said in his book *Against the Current*:

“The masses cannot be won without a highly developed, carefully carried out, and well-organized system of flattery, lying chicanery¹ and political jugglery.”

1936, Spain's fateful year, opened in turmoil. On the first day of the year the President, Alcalá Zamora, made up his vacillating mind to suspend the meetings of the Cortes for one month; five days later he dissolved the Cortes and appointed 16th February for the general election. Although the Centre-Right Ministry went out under the stigma of a financial scandal, everyone knew this concerned only the Radicals, and Gil Robles had great hopes of success. He made his electoral appeal on the straightforward ground of anti-Marxism. Calvo Sotelo, speaking at Barcelona, had implored patriotic Spaniards to bestir themselves, lest after the approaching general election “there would wave over Spain the red flag, the symbol of the destruction of Spain's past, her ideals and her honour”.¹ As the elections drew near, *The Times* correspondent in Madrid reported “there seems to be much intrigue and trickery afoot”: and added the significant observation that “for the first time in Spain Bolshevik propaganda is being openly conducted. A manifesto signed by ‘Friends of

¹ *The Times*, 20th January, 1936.

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M dw T nran'cfbnl]ard Knoblaugh tells of an interview he had with Largo Caballero in prison some while before the election took place. Largo Caballero said:

" We will win at least 265 seats. The whole existing order will be overthrown -Azaha will play Kerensky to my Lenin. Within fixe }ears the Republic will be so organized that it will be easy for my party to use it as a stepping-stone to our objective. A union of Ibeian Soviet Republics—that is our aim. The Iberian Peninsula will again be one country.² Portugal will come in, peaceably we hope, but by force if necessary. You see behind bars the future master of Spain! Lenin declared Spain would be the second Soviet Republic in Europe. Lenin's prophecy will come true. I shall be the second Lenin who shall make it come true."

In the most completely dishonest election which even Spain has had, with corruption and intimidation, forgery and barefaced alteration of results, Caballero's prophecy of the number of " Popular Front " seats was finally made accurate. They took 265 seats in the Cortes out of the total of 473. The methods pursued to achieve that end were fantastic. Two descriptions will give a slight idea of the tactics to which the Communists resorted:

" Left extremists ... in many districts resorted to violence at the polls to insure against a Rightist victory. There were disorders in a number of areas. Voters were terrorized and many glass ' urns ', as they are called in Spain, were broken and their contents burned."³

The President of the Republic, Alcala Zamora (immediately to be deposed as a result of the election), has made these observations on this election:

"The Popular Front was hoisted into power on 16th February, thanks to an electoral system as absurd as it is unfair, which gives an extraordinary advantage to a relative majority, though absolutely it may be a minority. Thus, in a certain constituency the Popular Front, with 30,000 votes less than the opposition, was, nevertheless, able to win ten

* *The Times*, 14th February, 1936. quoted by Gtlden, *Conflict in Spain*, p. 48.

² Knoblaugh, *Correspondent in Spain*, p. 17. Dr. Conze confirmed this plan in *Spain To-day*, p. 155, where he says, "A victory for the workers' militia would lead to an overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship.

³Ibid., pp. 15-16.

seats out of thirteen, though in no part of the constituency did the number of its votes exceed those of its major adversary by more than 2%. Paradoxical cases of this kind were fairly common.

"At first the Popular Front was believed to have been beaten. But, five hours after the arrival of the first results, it was found that the anarchist masses, which are so numerous and hitherto had abstained from the polls, had voted in a solid block. They were anxious to show their power and to claim the price for their aid—the peace and perhaps, alas, the very existence of the country.

"In spite of the syndicalist reinforcements, the Popular Front obtained only a few, very few, more than 200 seats out of a total of 473. Thus it became the largest minority group, but did not secure a majority in Parliament. It managed, however, to obtain this majority by hurrying through two stages of procedure in defiance of all legality and with utter disregard for scruple.

"As to the first stage, as early as 17th February, and even from the late afternoon of the 16th, the Popular Front, without awaiting the final scrutiny or the proclamations of the results of the voting, which were to be given out on 20th February by the provincial commissions appointed for the purpose, launched its attack by starting disorder in the streets and using violence in demand of power. ... At the instigation of irresponsible agitators, the mob seized the balloting papers, with the result that false returns were sent in from many places.

"As to the second stage: the majority thus secured was easily rendered crushing. Reinforced by such strange allies as the Basque reactionaries, the Popular Front elected the Committee entrusted with the task of verifying the elections in each constituency, a task the Committee carried out in an arbitrary manner. In certain provinces where the opposition had been victorious, all the mandates were annulled and candidates who were friendly to the Popular Front, although they were beaten, were proclaimed Deputies. Several members of minority groups were expelled from the Cortes. The end aimed at was twofold—to convert the Chamber into a packed Parliament by crushing all opposition, and to ensure the obedience of the more moderate group of the Popular Front. As soon as the support of that group was no longer required,

it became the mere puppet in the hands of the extremists."¹

We have quoted at great length because this election is of the gravest importance, and because we have wished to avoid setting out these events in our own words. For the Government which thus won this election is the Government which we are told is the rightful Government of Spain, the *de jure* Government which "rebel" Generals attacked for their own ends. Before showing the actual results of this election we would bring forward two additional accounts. The first is from an American correspondent who was present at the time:

"The 'Segunda Vuelta', or second-run elections, were a mere formality. Fresh violence marked centres where voting was close. In several places where Rightists had won, signally Granada and Salamanca, the elections were nullified."²

"Worse was to come. When the Cortes sat, the commission for the verification of mandates got to work. It had been carefully 'packed' for the occasion,³ and it gave Right seats away to Socialists and Communists with glaring partiality, so that when the Cortes was finally constituted the Popular Front found itself the unabashed possessor of 295 seats, while the Right and Centre, for all that they had polled 500,000 more votes, had merely 177 seats."⁴

The actual figures of the voting were:

For the Centre and Right Parties	4,500,000*
For the Popular Front	4,356,000
Right-Centre Majority over Left.	554,000

One of the anomalies common to all forms of democratic government based upon universal suffrage is, that the Parliament elected can form a Government to carry out a policy which has nothing to do with the mandates given to the delegates. Where, for example, there is a Centre Party which holds the balance of power it can fuse with the Left and the extreme Left, and in order to keep in power it can pursue a strong Left policy; or it can ally itself with the parties of the Right and pursue a strong Right policy. Usually it has to do one or the other; and there are heavy bids to obtain its co-operation. In Spanish politics, and in those of some other

¹ Zamora, *Journal de Genève*, 17th January, 1937*

² Knoblaugh, *Correspondent in Spain*, p. 16.

• The Chairman was Indalecio Prieto, the Stalin of Spain.

4 Cnrdo7o *The March of a Nation*, p. 1.

*The Rights were the biggest party. The separated figures show: Right, 4,570,000 votes; Left, 4,356,000 votes; Centre, 340,000 votes.

countries, the means employed to obtain that co-operation often may best be left to the imagination. Sometimes the system results, as in France, in innumerable parties, all crawling downwards in their attempts to obtain votes by promises to the majority of the electorate; and once the deputies are in power a Government eventually results, which is merely a combination of weaknesses and compromises. In fact one might say that it is not a Government at all, for it lacks the necessary cohesion and continuity of policy.

In Spain the public were doubly defrauded by this system, for not only had the "Government" under Portela Valladares posed as the upholders of law and order, whereby they robbed the Right of large numbers of votes, but subsequently, when the elections were over, they threw their weight upon the side of disorder; and even if they had wished to turn back, the cynical disregard of every principle of right and justice which the "Verification Committees" displayed made it quite impossible to remedy the position.

The new Government came into office and soon took further steps to strengthen its position. Alcalá Zamora, who had been a weak President, nevertheless was a man with a number of scruples. He must be replaced. They, therefore, adopted the extraordinary course of accusing him of having acted illegally and unconstitutionally in dissolving the previous parliament. The President had the right to dissolve two ordinary parliaments; but the "constituent Cortes" which first sat was not an ordinary parliament; it was solely to draw up the constitution. The Government maintained that it was, for this purpose, an ordinary parliament, and that therefore he had dissolved three parliaments. The ironic jest in this move, which was intended merely to hoist Azaña into the Presidency, will be appreciated from the fact that, if their contention was correct, the parliament then sitting was an illegal body, and the Government, composed of themselves, was not a legally or constitutionally appointed one.

Another of the troubles with "democratic" governments is that the vote of the populace is unstable. As a result of misconceptions, clever electioneering manoeuvres, or even under the urge of genuine grievances, the swing of the pendulum may cause unnecessarily abrupt changes. Side issues may bring into power people bent upon radical and undesirable changes. And the wrong type of man so often arrives,

perhaps even more often than under other systems. In democratic systems under universal franchise, the problem has therefore been to obtain a moderating influence, which may slow down the rhythm, criticize and smooth the edges of hasty or vindictive legislation. In some cases this is attempted by having a second chamber, of greater or less efficiency; in Spain the principle of the "moderating power" was vested in the President of the Republic. But Alcalá Zamora, the President, though he had been one of the first Republicans, was insufficiently uncompromising and bitter in his outlook to suit the revolutionaries. Under a futile pretext they therefore appointed Azaña, the least moderate of men, as the moderating power.

The Government having thus declared itself and the existing parliament to be illegal, proceeded to get to work.

"From the moment that the Popular Front Government took office it was visible to anybody acquainted with Spain and Spanish history that civil war could not be far away. The revolutionary parties in Spain can never control the unruly and criminal elements which form the main part of its marching Left Wing, and it was certain that Spain was about to face another period of murders, burnings and public disorders in general."¹

As regards what occurred in Spain between February and July 1936, we can only state that it was infinitely worse than anything which had occurred since the Republic came in in 1931. The reader who had patience to wade through the awful tale, unfolded in a previous chapter, of the first two years of the Republic, will thus realize that it completely defies description. The record of the brief life of the Republic previous to these February elections was correctly summarized in the Madrid paper *La Nation* as follows:

"Two Parliaments and three dissolutions.
One revolution with over 2,500 killed, 7 revolts, 9,000 strikes (about 165 a month).
Five prorogations of the budget, 2,000,000,000 pesetas increase in charges.
1,000 municipalities suspended.
114 newspapers forbidden.
² 2 years of 'States of Exception' (equivalent, roughly, to our proclamation of martial law)."

i Cardozo, *The March of a Nation*.

In agriculture, too, things went from bad to worse. From the time of these elections in February 1936, the whole of Spain was in a state of indescribable chaos. The war, which had been smouldering for years, this Russian attack upon the life and liberty of the country, now leapt into flames. What is occurring in France to-day reflects some of the methods employed, rather more clumsily, in Spain yesterday.¹ Strikes were not economic, they were political. Demands such as 100% increase in wages, even in concerns running at a loss, were common. Any pretext was used for calling strikes and inciting the strikers to violence. The more this continued, the greater grew distress throughout the country'; and this was undoubtedly the object—namely, the deliberate *creation* of distress, in order to create the necessary "revolutionary urge" and provoke the mad rush of the herd which should finally sweep across the country.

Franco and the Generals did not start this war. The declaration of war was originally made by the Comintern and Lenin when they decided that Spain was to be the next Soviet Republic. It was waged, in a steady crescendo, in accordance with a methodical plan of the Soviet for the "colonization" of Spain; and the climax was near in 1936. This conception of making the World Empire of the Internationals by methods which are the degradation of humanity must have succeeded, if the Generals had not called upon the nation to fight for the salvation of its life and honour. They had been driven to fight in the last ditch. For the Soviets were making their greatest effort. Victory' for the Soviet "would bring Bolshevism to western and south-western Europe; to the shores opposite to northern Africa, and to the gateway between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Its effect would be consider-

¹ Mr. Andrd Tardieu's paper, *Gringoire*, is always pointing out who arc M. Blum's associates in French politics and journalism. We quote two of them in these pages. On the 25th March, 1938, *Gringovre* says:

"M. Leo Finkelstein, dit Léon Blum, fut . . . chargé de former un ministère bien fran^ais. S'il n'avait Icoutl que son coeur, notre Finkelstein cGt appell aux affaires ses collaborateurs prdfdrds, autrement dit ses parcils, et nous cussions eu sans retard un magnifique cabinet d'affront populaire, ou les noms de MM. Rosenfeld, Moch, Zyromski, Hermann, Weil-Reynal, Goldschild, Cohen-Adria, Serge Moati, Nicolicli, Sch lesser, Liebermann, Julius Deutsch, Wiirmscr, Tasca, Imri GyomaT, Hirsch, Hausser, Ranter, Schiff, Schermann ct Kuntzelmann allaien faire resplendir, par delA les monts et les mers, le g6nic de notre race, les traditions de notre histoire et les vertus de nos aicux. Aprés cc sanhddrin blumocratique sans doute aurions-nous Mndfici d'un ministère de sidis, lequel n'eQt fait que *prdpacré un cabinet de formats."

In the following number the name Finkelstein was admitted as inaccurate. M. Henri Béraud apologized, and stated it should have been Karfunkelstein

able in South America, whither much pollen had already flown: of this possibility the Bolshevik leaders were well aware.¹ The implanting of Bolshevism on Spanish soil would have a significance far more ominous than the visible consequences. It would show that Bolshevism is an ideological infection which transcends space and assails peoples regardless of location."²

The outrages throughout the country from February onwards were too numerous and widespread to record. A brief summary³ of the position after six weeks of the Government dominated by Azaña, Caballero and Prieto presents a vivid picture:

Assaults and Robberies:

At political headquarters	58
At public and private establishments and dwellings	105
At churches	36

Fires:

At political headquarters	12
Public and private establishments and dwellings	60
Churches	106

Disturbances:

General strikes	11
Risings and revolts	169
Persons killed	76
Wounded	346

This was the record read to the Cortes by Señor Gil Robles.

The leaders were making no secret of their aims. Caballero, speaking at Zaragoza, said, "Spain must be destroyed in order to remake it ours. On the day of vengeance we will leave not a stone upon a stone."³

A woman leader, Marguerita Nelken, announced the same programme: ** We demand a revolution. But even the Russian one will not serve us. We need flames that will be seen throughout the planet, and waves of blood that will redden the seas."³

¹ Lancelot Lawson, *Contemporary Russia*, January 1937.

» Quoted by J. Arraras in *Franco*.

³ Ibid.

Caballero declared: "Before the elections we must ask for what we want. Afterwards we shall take it by whatever means." And on the 22nd January, whilst still in doubt as to the result of the election, he said, "If one day things should change, the Right must not expect mere }' from the workers. We shall not again spare the lives of our enemies." Azaña expressed his view of the result of the election as follows: "Spain has ceased to be Catholic."

The Madrid correspondent of *The Times* once again vividly shows how the tide was rising. Writing in February, he reported of Barcelona:

"A * Vigilance Committee ' warned a number of high officials on 20th February to relinquish their posts. The *Committee was obeyed.*"

In the following month he wrote the ominous words:

"The Dictatorship of the proletariat is now the open aim of all the Reds."

"Spanish Socialism ", he wrote a little later, "has been drifting towards Communism. It is among the *less illiterate younger generation* that Marx and Lenin have gained most of their disciples. These young people believe that the conquest of power is the immediate requirement of Spanish Socialism, violence the ultimate means of getting it, and a Dictatorship of the proletariat the only way to retain it. The subversive doctrine is preached untiringly." In March he reported that Deputies in the Cortes, with clenched fists in Communist salute, sang the Soviet anthem, *L'Internationale*, in the House itself.

All those imprisoned as a result of the Asturian rebellion were, of course, released—for this was a revolutionary government. Each man came out after eighteen months in prison feeling that he was a "martyr" for his cause, anxious to drive on the revolution. Even before the Ministry took office, the extremists—described as "public demand"—took matters into their own hands. They did not wait for the promised Amnesty Bill, but marched on the prisons, where the authorities prudently opened the gates, and the greater part of 30,000 instructed "district, union and Communist cell ringleaders ", including "a number of qualified desperadoes ", were released to make Spain '*' safe for democracy ". Later the "Comrades " still behind the bars were brought out to help in the good work: "In that first urgent need for militant manpower to

offset the traditional apathy of the peace-loving masses, 40,000 common prisoners had been released on their promise to carry arms.¹ We record some of their exploits later.

The cauldron was seething. The boiling-point came with the murder of Calvo Sotelo.

Calvo Sotelo's "crime," for which he was murdered by the Government, was that he again drew attention in the Cortes to the appalling state into which Spain had fallen after five months under this "Government". He stated that in that time there had been:

- 113 general strikes
- 218 partial strikes
- 284 buildings burned
- 171 churches, 6g clubs and 10 newspaper offices
completely burned down
- 3,300 assassinations

"You will be held personally responsible for the emotion which your speech will cause," Casares Quiroga, the Premier, told him, at the same time as Dolores Ibarruri, the "Pasionaria", shouted across the floor of the Cortes, "That man has made his last speech."

"She was right. On 13th July a police car, number 17, arrived at Señor Calvo Sotelo's house with fifteen Assault Guards under Captain Moreno. They were admitted to the house and went to Señor Sotelo's room to invite him to go with them to police headquarters. . . . Unresisting, the monarchist leader followed the police. Later Casares Quiroga professed ignorance of the whole affair; but the body of Calvo Sotelo was found with a bullet through his head in the eastern cemetery."¹

"He had been shot through the breast and in the right eye," Professor Peers confirms from *El Sol*.

"Calvo Sotelo anticipated his assassination. Eight days before it occurred he told Gil Robles of a suspicious change in his escort, and that the Chief of the Government had again threatened him. In reply he had said, 'Señor Casares Quiroga, you can take my life from me, but more you cannot do.'

"The authors of the crime went unpunished. There were mass arrests, and all *Right Wing centres* were closed throughout Spain. Thousands of people in Madrid went into hiding,

¹ Cardozo, *The March of a Nation*, pp. 6-7.

while the spy organizations hunted them down. The militia, thirsting for blood, patrolled the streets, pistols in hand."¹

The same night the police visited the houses of Señor Gil Robles, Señor Goicoechea and other prominent opponents of the Popular Front; but warning had been conveyed to them and they escaped Calvo Sotelo's fate.

Two days after Señor Calvo Sotelo's assassination, General Mola had a visit from his younger brother, Captain Mola of the Barcelona garrison. He loved his brother as a son. Captain Mola came to warn the General that the Government were fully aware of dangers pending and were fully prepared to crush any attempted rising. It would be better to postpone any thought of an insurrection against the Government. He considered it his duty to warn his brother.

"Thank you," said the General. "Return at once to Barcelona. Every man must do his duty and behave in whatever way his conscience and honour for the good of Spain dictate to him."


"At your orders, my General . . ." replied Captain Mola. And he returned to Barcelona, fully aware of the certain death which awaited him when he would be called upon to attempt the impossible task of upholding the movement for the salvation of Spain in the very centre of the Red organization.²

In Spain there were many men like Captain Mola ready to give their lives for the honour and salvation of their country. But the ordinary man did not know and could not credit the baseness of the Government betrayal to the Communists.

On the day of the February election the mob, before the results were known, had celebrated the victory in the streets, demonstrating in their now familiar way. Franco rang up General Pozas, Commandant of the Civil Guard, and warned him. But General Pozas could not see that anything was amiss or that Franco's urgent suggestions for the protection of the State were necessary. Franco was not satisfied with this put-off. He rang the Minister of War, General Molero, and suggested that a Council of Ministers should be called to declare a State of War to prevent excesses by the mob. The following day this meeting was held. *The necessary orders had already been drawn up by Franco himself.* They were passed by the

¹ Arraras, *Franco*.

³ Pérez Madrigal, *Augurios Eslallido y Episodios de la Guerra Civil*.



THE PICOS DE EUROPA: ADVANCING ON GIJON

[facing page 198]



Cabinet. But Portela, then Acting Premier, said that he was too old for the responsibility of putting the Cabinet's decision into practice.

" You have brought the country' to this pass. It is your duty now to save it," replied Franco.

" Why not the Army? " asked Portela.

" The Army has no longer the moral unity to undertake such a task," Franco told him.

The Premier decided to sleep on the Cabinet's decision, and, after consulting with General Pozas, the Inspector-General of the Civil Guard, and with Martinez Barrio, he decided that the problem of keeping public order could be safely left to the Civil Guard. They refused the Army's assistance for maintaining order, because they did not wish to maintain it.

Franco was sent to the Canary' Islands as Commandant. It was a repetition of his previous " exile" once again his presence might be inconvenient in the capital. But before he left Spain he saw Generals Mola and Varela and arranged means for communicating with them should the final stage of emergency arise.

In his absence, the " packing " of posts of the Army and the Civil Guard continued. On 23rd June, 1931, a fortnight before Sotelo was murdered, Franco wrote to the Minister of War:

" The last measures passed in relation to the Army compel me to give you my impressions of their effect and the danger to discipline in the Army. . . . The reappointment of officers sentenced in Catalonia . . . the incidents at Alcalá de Henares . . . have created a very bad impression in the Army. Officers with brilliant records have been removed from their posts and replaced by those regarded by 90% of their comrades as far inferior in merit. *It is false that those who represent the Army are disloyal to the Republic.* In 1917 the Military Defence Juntas were born of the lack of justice by the authorities largely through favouritism and arbitrary appointments. The same position seems likely to occur again. There are evidences of their fresh existence, but *I consider it would be easy to avoid the civil strife, if considered, and just measures are taken.*

. . . Though miles away from the Peninsula, the news reaches me that this state of affairs which exists here exists also perhaps even to a greater extent in the garrisons of the Peninsula. As

a student of discipline ... I can assure you that the spirit of justice in the Military Corps is such that any violent, unjustifiable measures will produce a reaction. ... I believe it to be my duty to bring to your notice what I consider a grave condition as regards military discipline, as you will be able easily to verify if you make personal inquiries from those Generals and Heads of Corps who, *unassociated with political conditions*, are in contact with the feelings and thoughts of their subordinates.”¹

No notice was taken of this clear warning. Calvo Sotelo was murdered. The crisis had come. On 17th July a code message was conveyed to the Generals who were sworn to raise the standard for the salvation of Spain—Mola, Goded, Fanjul, Sanjurjo, Saliquet, some of the officers of the Fleet and Queipo de Llano.

Franco flew from the Canaries to Tetuan.

On the 21st July, 1936, General Franco issued a proclamation to the Spanish people. Its terms were brief and of the greatest importance, for in it he declared, “ It is the duty of every man to enter this definite struggle between Russia and Spain.”²

It was only because this statement was perfectly true, and was recognized as a fact in Spain, that it was the sole reason given by the General for the action they were taking. If it had been false, or if it had not been common knowledge, it could not have been made the ground of the appeal, nor would the movement have received support from the Spanish people.

The sense of this declaration is amplified by the words written in January 1937 by Alejandro Lerroux, the Premier in the 1933 Government:

“ I should like to make it plain that we are not in the presence of a military rising. The Army has not broken with discipline. It seeks to restore a discipline broken by anti-patriotic traitors and criminal anarchists. It has not risen against the law, but for the law; so that law and authority should rule, not against the people, but for the safety of the people. It is by no means a question of a military *pronunciamiento*, but of a National Rising as legitimate and holy as the War of Independence in 1808. It is even more sacred, for it is

¹ Arraras, *Franco*. The italics are ours.

³ We do not recollect having seen this, or Mola’s declaration to the same effect issued about the same date, given any publicity in England.

not a question only of political independence, but of social and economic organization, of the protection of home, property, culture, conscience and very life: in a word, of a whole civilization as handed down in history.”¹

Or in the words of Professor Unamuno: “ It is a struggle of Christianity against barbarism.”

Never was rebellion more justified. The ultimatum was given to the Government that it must govern; the Government refused; and these men were ready to stake their lives, and abide by the result of their appeal to the nation to rise up in defence of its every ideal, its right to religious toleration, the rights and liberties of its citizens, and of everything which the Spaniard traditionally held sacred.

¹ Lerroux in *L' Illustration*, 30th January, 1937.

CHAPTER IX

THE GREAT ADVENTURE

IT all started in the casual way in which great historical events so often begin. Morocco was seething with discontent. Everyone felt that something was bound to happen. There was an increasing anarchy produced by the Government. Rumours of the projected Communist revolution and stories of an Army rising had been in circulation for months. The local Red militia were daily being drilled in public up to midnight, with the acquiescence of the General put in command by the Government.

The Army manoeuvres had just been completed on the Yellow Plain. In the great officers' marquee Colonel Yagiee and his friends had discussed together the question of revolting against the Government for its savage attacks on personal liberties and its open connivance at the development of the Red plans. The Government knew of it. They made little secret of their sentiments. For insults against the military were being encouraged and multiplied. The Government had ordered the Tercio, the most popular branch of the Army, to leave Melilla. Huge posters appeared: "Legionaries' heads at 15 pesetas a time." There was an air of foreboding, an ominous tension.

Major Tella Cantos, one of the bravest and most admired men in the Legion (he was the Commander of the First Legion), an officer who had the blind devotion of all his men, was deprived of his command, and compelled to leave Spanish Morocco. Just previously an attempt had been made on his life in Melilla. From his exile in French Morocco he kept in close touch with his friends across the border.

Major Tella Cantos returned secretly and met some friends in a house in Melilla. But the Military Governor, General Romerales, had been informed of the meeting. He sent some Assault Guards and police, with an order of arrest, to surround

the house. But one of Tella's friends managed to escape before the arrests were made. Some twenty Legionaries rushed to the scene and disarmed the Assault Guards and police. Then, to quote Major Tella:

"There we were—already rebels. We proceeded to the Military Commandancia. We took it forthwith. Immediately the Tahuima Bandera came down. The rising of the forces of Morocco had commenced."

The Legionaries then proceeded through the town. The militia fled before them. Many of them, in their panic, threw themselves over the parapet of the bridge.

Casares Quiroga, Minister of War, feeling anxious, rang up General Romerales from Madrid. The reply was:

"Colonel Solans speaking. I am holding Romerales prisoner."

On orders from Madrid, General Gomez Morato, the Government's Military Chief of the Forces in Morocco, flew to Melilla to investigate; and he, too, was made prisoner by Colonel Solans.

The rebels reported to Ceuta what they had done, and on the next day the Ceuta garrison joined the movement. But the same day the Government moved. To-day the Government and its friends complain about the iniquity of air-raids, for they no longer enjoy air supremacy, but, when the war started, having nearly all the machines, they bombed civilians indiscriminately and deliberately in all parts of the country. On the 18th July one of their planes flew over the mainland and bombed the Moorish quarter of Tetuan, damaging two mosques, killing fifteen natives and wounding many others. The Moorish resentment was fierce; it seemed as if there might even be a serious riot, the prelude to a rising throughout Morocco. But the Grand Vizier, Sidi Hamed Gaumia, an aged man of seventy-six in feeble health, dashed through the streets on horseback explaining the position to the inhabitants. And the raid, at this psychological moment, instead of defeating the rebellion, only assured the Army of its African base and communications, and stimulated later recruiting; for the natives had already been infuriated by deliberate mis-government under the Marxist-inspired decrees, and the conduct of the officials of the Government.

The Nationalist Movement had started. The fate of a hundred centres in the Peninsula hung upon just such a

chance. Where the coin spun luckily, and men of decision and courage were able to seize that critical moment which so often brings success even against overwhelming odds, the movement began. Where fate did not smile, it was death. That the movement which the Generals led ever succeeded in starting at all is little short of a miracle. It was a fantastic adventure. Over and over again during those first few days it hovered on the brink of disaster. For it was founded on faith and little more—faith in Spain—the belief that Spain would drive out the accomplices and dupes of the alien forces which were terrorizing and degrading the country.

Keen partisans of the Government claim that the Army had in fact ver}' complete plans, and that it was a democracy taken by surprise. The admirers of the Nationalists claim that, on the contrary, there was a plan for Red revolution to seize the country for the Internationals. Both these claims are correct to this extent—both had plans. But there was no element of surprise so far as the Government was concerned. The Government was bent on protecting the revolution. There was a state of war already in the country, though it was undeclared. The Generals decided to appeal to the nation, and drew up plans upon which they were prepared to act, *although the Government was fully aware of these plans and there were very few troops in the Peninsula.* The details of the measures taken by the Government are given in these pages. It was, therefore, a handful of men who risked everything, with a fierce Spanish patriotism and a belief in the ancient spirit of the nation. On the other side was “the Government” with every precaution taken, every essential munition and armament secured. Every man who declared for the Nationalists deliberately took his life in his hands and went out to stake it in a gamble against all the odds.

Simultaneously two disasters occurred which might well have extinguished all hope for the Nationalists—the failure of the Navy to support the Nationalist Movement, and the death of General Sanjurjo in an aeroplane accident on his way from Portugal to take over the leadership of the rising. It was then only that Franco came into full prominence; and even so, it was General Cabanellas who, months later, was made the head of the National Defence Board in Burgos.

No book of fiction is more extraordinary or romantic than the way in which the Nationalist Movement actually came

into being and grew in Spain between 18th July, 1936, and the end of the month. Few countries but Spain produce such men as were needed for it. If ever there was a tale of desperate men using desperate means to save their country, caring nothing for their own fate, it is this story of the rising.

In Spain none knew what had happened in the next village or town, much less in other provinces. Only the radio could tell the news. There was Queipo de Llano wirelessing from Seville to all who could hear, calling the Spaniards, in the name of Spain, to join the Nationalist Movement. But the Government was using the same weapon, and they held the two best and most widely used radio stations in the country. They announced that the rising in Morocco had been put down, and that all was quiet in the country; the rising had failed utterly at birth. This had profound effects. In many places where people were on the verge of rising or had taken the first steps to support them actively, this news brought confusion, indecision; nor is it difficult to understand the attitude of those hundreds of thousands of persons who then hesitated and "went to ground". The average man in the street may have agreed in his heart, but to go against the Government meant death. For the posts of authority and control had been packed by "the Party".

Apparently the Government held all the cards. Azaña had denuded the Army. He had built up his private army of Guards. The Red militia had been drilled in the open for months. Arms were issued to Red partisans by the Government. And the municipalities, in most cases, had completed their metamorphosis into Communist cells which controlled the supplies, the water, the transport and every essential in the important centres. A brief consideration of how the position must have appeared to the ordinary citizen will explain why most of them, and particularly those with family or other responsibilities, had little alternative but to lie low.

For this was not a Government surprised by an Army rising. The scheme which the Generals had agreed to try, if it could not be avoided, was known to the Government. They had appealed to the Government not to force the revolution. They offered their services for the maintenance of order. But "the Government" had decided. It was only in Africa that there was an army in being. The Generals were but a few individuals in Spain. They had no large bodies of troops there.

Calvo Sotelo's death showed that the date of the revolution was imminent. It was known in any case that the last stage of the Communist revolution was set for late July or early August. (At the end of this chapter we append documents which show the details of the preparation for that revolution.) The stroke must come before that happened. And then the hazard of the attempted arrest of Major Tella decided the date of 17th July for Spanish history.

For what support could the Generals hope? Navarre they could count upon confidently. Aragon? Castile? It depended on the conscious decision of *each mart* and whether he dare face the supporters of the Government—trained, prepared and already armed in their thousands, controlling the arms in the depots, and aided by a special police force that was really an army.

There was no help to be found in the Army outside Africa. In principle there was conscription in Spain. The principle of liability to serve an obligatory term of service was laid down for all citizens. Theoretically one year had to be served with the colours, and seventeen years on the reserve. After that a man was free of military obligations. But under Azaña's scheme for wrecking the Army, part of the annual contingent called up was advised for training for a maximum of only four weeks, and in practice they did not serve with the colours at all. Furthermore, it was possible for the remainder of the year's *cuota* at the end of six months to evade further service by payment of the Military Tax. In 1932, 15,485 paid this tax out of a possible total of 80,000. In addition, persons showing special capacities were able to obtain a reduction of four months and freedom after eight months. Finally, the number of soldiers available for mobilization was again reduced by contingents being called up for training on two dates, February¹ and November. As the French General, Duval, said, "If, in 1936, the Generals had represented only themselves within the country, their power of resistance would have been of short duration."¹

The depleted Peninsular Army consisted, nominally, of eight divisions of infantry, one cavalry division and two mixed mountain brigades. In theory, the strength of the Army was about 145,000 men. In fact the following official figures were more appropriate:

¹ Duval, *Les Lemons de la Guerre d'Espagne*.

10,698 officers,¹ 1,627 Stationed in Morocco.
7,981 warrant officers, 1,600 in Morocco.
8,725 native soldiers, all in Morocco.
4,657 men in auxiliary services.
Other ranks—25,000 soldiers, re-enlistments or volunteers, in Morocco.
About 40,000 in the Peninsula, Balearics and Canaries.

Azaña had reduced the Army to its barest skeleton. The units were hardly big enough to carry on, and could not be instructed. A battalion was less than two hundred men, a company less than fifty. The number of officers was excessive for the requirements,¹ and they had far too much leisure. They were constantly moved and transferred, with the object of preventing them from settling down with the inhabitants of the garrison towns or with their own men. Everything that could be thought of was done to reduce the Army to inefficiency and impotence. The short period of service meant there could be little *esprit de corps* amongst the troops who had but recently left their towns and villages, and changed little from civilians. As a result, when the movement arose, the troops often sided with the party which, at the moment, appeared to be winning in their district. The Government had also taken the precaution of sending as many men as possible on leave before the news of an Army rising was brought to them. It will be seen that to anticipate hope of a successful campaign, if that hope rested on the Peninsular Army, would have been insanity indeed.

The Army in Africa was different. It was efficient, well disciplined and, in some cases, such as the Tercio and the Moorish troops, as good a force as could be found. The men and officers knew and respected each other. But it would be impossible to remove that Army *in toto* to the Peninsula. General Franco could not count upon removing more than half the effectives—a force of about 17,000 men.

It may be as well at this point to comment on the question of the native troops. The inhabitants of Spanish Morocco are regarded just as much as citizens of Spain as any other “nationals”. The vast majority of Spaniards have Moorish

¹ The number of officers seems disproportionate to the other ranks. This is not really so much so as might appear. The officers were the *cadre* of the Army; they were professional soldiers, and their numbers were based on what the requirements of the Army would be if all classes were called up.

blood in their veins. The Marques' Merry del Vai, for example, at a dinner of the Wiseman Society in London, referred with pride to his Moorish ancestors.

The chief reason why the matter has become prominent has been the Red propaganda service and its willing assistants, who have presented the matter in a false light and with a clever appeal to prejudice, and supported it with a flood of unscrupulously invented atrocity stories. The high standard of behaviour of the Moors in Spain during this war has, in actual fact, been one of its most striking features. It has been the product of a strict discipline, and obedience to a corps of officers who have set an example, and have themselves maintained a standard which is rare in our century. We do not know of any reputable British correspondent, who has followed these forces in their campaigns, who does not bear out this tribute. And we would add the opinion of General Duval:

"It has been said that the native troops represented an element of savage barbarity. But we know in France from our own experience that the Moroccan soldier, when he is led by European officers, behaves irreproachably. In their regiments there was ver}' strict discipline, which was certainly in contrast to the anarcho-syndicalists of Barcelona."

We British did not feel any qualms at using native troops in our late war. The French to-day seem chiefly concerned with their "strategic African communications" to the natives with whom they policed the Ruhr. Yet neither we nor the French can point to racial affinities such as those between the Moor and the Spaniard under whom he serves as an ordinary part of the National Army.

As regards the forces immediately available or at the orders of "the Government", the Marxist leaders claim that 200,000 shock troops were ready in Madrid, and 1,000,000 were ready in the country. These numbers are important, as they were *organized* supporters who, from their preliminary training, could, at worst, be used for the intimidation of the rearguard, even where they were not good fighting material. Apart from this huge body of supporters, the police were under the orders of the Government; in numbers the police easily outnumbered the whole African Army. The police forces consisted of the Security Corps, the Civil Guards, the Assault Guards and the Carbineers.

The Security Corps, armed with pistols and sabres, had charge of order inside the towns. They had 450 officers and 17,000 men.

The Civil Guards were a very fine body of men. They were all old soldiers of three years' active experience. Most of them were married. Their theoretical complement was !>O94 officers and 33>^o3¹ other ranks. The Government felt they could count on over 50% of them, as they had put their own men in charge. They were loyal servants, seldom interested in politics, and ready to carry out orders given by their superiors. But they had had to try and keep order in the countryside at a time when the Government was conniving at disorder; and the Communists had been trained to hate them. The Government could, therefore, place less reliance upon their support, for they hated the Government's conduct. The Civil Guards, with the support which they should have received from the authorities, were quite adequate to maintain order. But this was not the Government's aim, though they desired a private force upon which they could implicitly rely; and Azaña therefore had founded the Assault Guards, after the manner of the Special Russian police. They were chosen for their known political views, and were made a privileged body. They were well armed and had machine-guns and lorries. They numbered officially about 18,000. After the elections of 1936 there were large additional numbers, and their full strength is not known. It has been stated that they were double their official strength. It is not possible to verify the figure, but they were certainly much over strength. When the Civil War broke out, in many cases the Assault Guards, in districts where the Reds failed to keep control, went over to the Nationalists; but they were not a large proportion of the whole.

The Carbineers, numbering several thousand, were distributed along the French frontier, the coast, the harbours and in Morocco.

As for the rank and file, after the war broke out the Government ~~and~~ ^{had} to increase to an even more overwhelming strength the numbers they already had available in their organized labour groups. They intensified—if that were possible—their promises of Utopian legislation and benefits; they connived at loot, which brought them numerous recruits; and they offered pay equivalent to *eight times the amount*

allowed to regular army soldiers, or to those in Franco's ranks. To deserters they offered not only this, but a bonus and leave, and a special extra bonus for arms or equipment brought with them. All these offers were broadcast from the chief radio stations in Spain and from loud-speakers in the trenches.

This economic fraud was, of course, of the kind not popularly understood. The Red peseta in due course depreciated as a consequence, for to pay these large sums involved the printing of currency⁷ notes. But even so, this depreciation was not immediate, and enlistment meant pay which, alone, was much more than was to be had in civil life, quite *apart from* the certainty of clothing and plenty of the best food available.

Incidentally, the Nationalists have not descended to these methods of debasing the currency in the interests of recruitment; and that their troops have preserved such amazing loyalty in spite of the inducements offered them by the Government is itself an indication of the true position in Spain.

The Government's chief weakness was in the quality of their officers and warrant officers. Amongst their officers were those they had promoted for political reasons since 1931, and practically all those who, for one reason or another, had been dismissed the regular service by the Army Juntas of Honour. The consequent weakness was not remedied even by the foreigners who poured in to help, for, as Mr. H. E. Kaminski, a zealous supporter of the Reds, has pointed out, "The officers were mostly *political chiefs*" and "to a great extent *the instructors were foreign revolutionaries who had had experience of the World War and who came in growing numbers to fight against Fascism [sic] and for the World Revolution.*"¹

Politicians, in command, are too much concerned with what is happening in the rear, whilst professional revolutionaries and adventurers who are carrying out orders and fighting for loot, or for Internationalism, have no personal interest in the country, for which they are, for the moment, fighting. After all, if things go badly, they can go and make a home for themselves, and a hell for the inhabitants, in some other country. Ramon Sender alleges that the Red army had many officers; but though the Government had put some of their own men in since 1931, there were few good men of experience in the Spanish Army who were likely to serve willingly.

¹ Kaminski, *Ceux de Barcelone.*

The essential difference was *the cause*; for this was a fight of "Aiya Espana" against "Viva Rusia", or of "Viva Cristo Rey against Long live the World Soviet", "International Marxism", the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" or "the "World Revolution". And this is not our wording. These are their own chosen slogans.

As regards war material, it has been claimed that the war material remained in the hands of the Regular Army and therefore with the insurgents. *Nothing is more false than this statement*. Apart from the fact that the Army was practically equally divided between the Government and the Nationalists, from February to June the regiments had been slowly deprived of their arms, which had been concentrated at the mobilization centres. *These centres had been instituted in 1931, and their control placed directly under the Minister of War.*

"At the end of July the Government had many more arms than the Nationalists in the Peninsula. ... As an example, the eight hundred men of the Badajoz Garrison, who remained loyal to the Government, had their official quota of machine-guns. . . . The stores at the mobilization centres were emptied for the benefit of the ' popular ' organizations wherever the Government found itself able to do so."¹

On July 19th, the Governments in Madrid and Barcelona decided to "arm the masses", that is to say, those of them who were their declared supporters. This arming of the masses was "not an improvised measure. . . . There was certainly a previous understanding between the Government, the leaders of the political parties, and the workers' groups. This was the crowning achievement of the Third International."² At the same time, to increase the confusion, the Government decreed the dissolution of all regiments which took part in the insurrection. Their decrees also applied to those who were in Government "loyal" territory, i.e. the Cavalry, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Divisions. For even under Government-appointed officers the ordinary conscript of the rank and file could not be trusted, after a few months of life in the Army, to countenance the "liquidation" and terror to which the Government was a willing party. The 7th Division at Valladolid and the 8th in Galicia were wholly with the Nationalists.

The Galician Division was to suffer considerable losses at

¹ Duval, *Les Lemons de la Guerre d'Espagne*.

² Ibid.

Gijon, and part of it was besieged in Oviedo with General Aranda by the Asturian miners. Although the Nationalists had at their disposal most of the 1st (Seville), 5th (Zaragoza) and 6th (Burgos) Divisions, these were very disorganized. The Government had gone far to disorganize them before the revolt, and thereafter provoked desertions. And most of the troops had already been sent on leave. The "regiments" in quarters consisted *almost entirely of officers and N.C.O.s*, with very limited arms and equipment.

Such was the general position when the standard of revolt was raised in Africa. In the harbour of Melilla some marines from the Navy came ashore and fraternized with the soldiers. Then the transport of troops to the mainland was arranged, and Legionaries and Regulars were embarked on S.S. *Vicente Puchol*. But that night strange events occurred on board the warships. One of them, *Sanchez Barcaiztegui*, intimated that any transport leaving the harbour would be fired on and sunk. The Navy¹ had failed to respond to the call. Even to those in Morocco it seemed that the whole cause was lost at the very outset.

In Spain, all that was known was that an Army rising had taken place in Morocco; nobody knew to what extent. We will not try to keep to a chronological sequence, or to tell all the amazing stories of truth that was wilder than fiction. Let us start with what Mr. Theo Rogers has called the "most fantastic coup of all time", the astonishing tale of how General Queipo de Llano took Seville—a town of over 200,000 inhabitants—and saved Spain from the Red revolution in the south. Probably it determined the whole success of the rising.¹ "In Seville", says Mr. Cardozo, "General Queipo de Llano lived hours of history such as are given to few men."

"I had always said that there was nothing to be done in Seville," the General himself has confessed, "where we could not count on the least support; but I had been told off to raise the garrison of Andalusia and, though well aware of the difficulty of the task, I was prepared to see it through or perish in the attempt." This latter is no idle boast. In those words the General has expressed the state of mind in which all the leaders of the Nationalist rising started off on that dangerous adventure. Queipo de Llano was alone, except for his *aide*,

¹ General Queipo de Llano was Inspector General of the Carabiniers at the time.

Lopez-Guerrero,¹ and a Staff Captain, Escribano. His first object was to gain command of the garrison of Seville. He went to see the General in command, who was an old friend. Queipo de Llano asked him where he stood. General Villa Abrille said, "I shall always be on the side of the Government." Then, in the presence of several of the General's staff, Queipo de Llano replied:

"Then I shall have to shoot you or lock you up. As an old friend I don't want to shoot you," and he pushed him into his room. The whole group followed us into his room," Queipo de Llano has related. "When I again bade him to reconsider his attitude and he refused, I told him to regard himself as my prisoner." Then the miracle occurred. First the other General present surrendered to this determined man, and then the whole staff. "I tore down the telephone wires and was about to lock the door, when I found there was no key! Thereupon I had a corporal of the Guard come with two men and ordered them to shoot if anyone should attempt to escape. And those young soldiers, who a moment before would have obeyed General Villa Abrille's orders, became his gaolers, ready to do as I told them."—"They earned their country's gratitude," adds Queipo de Llano dryly.

He then went to the barracks to address the Granada Regiment and enlist them on to the Nationalist side. Once again he met with opposition from the whole of the officers. He put them all under arrest. And they obeyed. He marched them up to headquarters, entirely by himself, where he had them shut up with his other captures. Only one officer, Major Perez, joined him, and went back with him to command the regiment. Then he received his first shock. When the regiment turned out on parade only a hundred and thirty men were present—and the whole regiment was on parade. This was the entire force he had with which to take Seville, one of the most notorious and prepared Red centres in the country. And he did it. Once again his superb bluff carried the day. He sent a company out to proclaim martial law. But then came the news that three armoured cars were out firing with machine-guns in the streets. He heard sounds of cannon in the town. The position was rapidly getting more and more

» It was Lopez-Guerrero who insisted on the General, much against his own desire talkin' over the radio. By doing so Queipo de Llano did incalculable good for the Nationalist cause, and became one of the most famous broadcasters of the day, for whose talk most capitals of Europe used to wait nightly.

serious. But he had staunch, if unknown, allies. A riding master, Captain Fuentes, captured the first armoured car on his own. The corporal in charge of the patrol collared the second. A third car was captured shortly after. The cars were then used against their late owners. The force was getting equipment. It had more immediately. Captain Corretcher had been told off to seize the artillery park with sixty men of his engineers. In the park were some 25,000 rifles, 7,000 carbines and a great deal of ammunition. "Fortunately", the General reports, "it was Saturday afternoon and the munition workers were away, otherwise we should never have succeeded. The Reds soon realized the importance of this arsenal, as was shown by their heavy and repeated attacks, all of which were beaten off by Captain Corretcher's brave men." Next the artillery battery was seized by similar resolute tactics. At once the guns were turned on to capture the telephone exchange. When the cavalry' Colonel proved obdurate about joining the Nationalists, Queipo de Llano calmly ordered the second-in-command to put his Colonel under arrest, and he *did*.

All this time firing was going on throughout the town. The little army was then increased by fifteen Falangists. There were also sixty-five Sevillian Falangists in prison, but they could not be rescued until one o'clock the next morning when the firing had temporarily died down. Meanwhile the battery had done its work and captured the telephone exchange. It was then ordered to fire at Government House, where the Civil Governor, the Chief of Police, and some two hundred men of the police were ready for defence with machine-guns posted on the roof and in windows.

"* Who is it? " I asked, as my telephone rang.

"* I am the Civil Governor. We are prepared to surrender on conditions."

" I could have hugged him." [This is again the General's own account.] " But his accent betrayed the terror he was in. I said curtly, ' No conditions.' "

Under an escort of a corporal and three men, " which I managed to beat up from somewhere ", came a " motley crowd of members of the Civil Government, Provincial Council and Town Council: in addition, two hundred police were under arrest—on parole—with their rifles and machine-guns in the patio of the building.

" From time to time ", the General writes understandably,

"I rubbed my eyes to make quite sure I wasn't dreaming."

There were four hundred police who had not only handed out arms to the mob, but who had led in the Church assaults. Their leader refused to listen to Queipo de Llano or to the Civil Governor; but when the Chief of Police ordered the men to surrender, they obeyed. Queipo at once called up officers of the police force who had been dismissed by the Popular Front—and the police force was his. Similar tactics to those used on the cavalry brought in the Air Force. And last of all the radio station two miles away was captured.

"Half an hour later", Queipo de Llano relates, "I was telling the Sevillians how the authorities had surrendered and the garrisons risen throughout Spain. As for the latter, I was convinced that they had. Not for a moment could I believe that so many officers of all ranks had shown so much apathy, indecision and even cowardice."

But whatever his reason, that radio message stimulated the Nationalist cause as nothing else could have done; for it ran completely counter to the information from the Government stations. But Queipo de Llano knew better than anyone else that if reinforcements did not come, the bluff would be called.

He "sat all night with the telephone to his ear. . . . The news was bad. It could not have been worse. Red ships flying the Madrid flag were patrolling the Straits of Gibraltar. From Cadiz and other places came telephone messages reporting Communist armed concentrations. From the suburbs of Seville came frantic appeals for help as the Civil Guard were being attacked and overpowered by the Red militia. . . . He shifted his tiny garrison from place to place to make it look more effective. At some points machine-guns were being manned by crews consisting of staff officers, with a Lieutenant-Colonel actually seated at the piece and a Major handing his ammunition."¹

The dawn brought help. One of Franco's transport planes arrived with a sergeant, a corporal and eight men of the Legion, and Captain Melendez.

"*There was* little need to give orders to such a man. He mounted the machine-gun he had brought with him into a large lorry. He was told the situation and the suburbs in which the Reds were winning. "Give me a map. I will deal with them," he said.

¹ Cardozo, *The March of a Nation*, p. 12.

"Five minutes later the lorry was roaring through the streets at fifty miles an hour heading straight for the Red assembly place. Shouts rang out, 'The Legion has arrived', and the Legionaries shouted also. Within a breath of time all Seville, in southern way, was ringing with the news, and already prudent men who had brought out their rifles to join with the victorious Reds were creeping home to hide them while they slipped off their Red armlets."¹

Within two hours peace reigned once again in Seville. Within twenty-four hours the contents of the Red arsenals had been placed in Nationalist hands. And Seville went delirious with joy.

But for Franco, in Tetuan, the news was consistently bad. Red radio stations announced complete Government victories in Madrid, Vizcaya, Santander, the Levante and Catalonia. Queipo de Llano was anxiously calling for men to attempt to hold the south. Franco *had* to get his men across to Spain, and yet the task seemed impossible. It is said by those who were with him in this critical period, when to most men it must have seemed that all hope was lost, he was never more cool, more completely master of himself.

The Red fleet took up its station in the international waters of Tangier. Franco massed his troops on the frontier and sent a firm note to the Commission of the International Zone denouncing the breach of international agreement. On 23rd July the Red war vessels had to leave harbour. They returned, however, and on 6th August Franco again remonstrated almost to the point of an ultimatum. But still the problem of getting the men across was unsolved. Aeroplanes were carrying troops across, and even batteries, which were landed at Seville and Jerez. One company of the 5th Battalion even made a hazardous crossing in two fishing-boats. It was nearly three weeks since the rising was proclaimed—something desperate had to be done. He determined to risk direct transport by sea. On 5th August, five transports, with 3,000 men and three batteries and ammunition, left Ceuta. How they succeeded in getting across is told later in this chapter in the account of the Navy. It was the Nelson or the Napoleonic touch in Franco which made him refuse to listen to the advice of all his technical experts. His courage was rewarded. From the lessons learnt from that first successful convoy, regular

¹ Cardozo, *The March of a Nation*, pp. 13-14.



GENERAL QUEIPO DE LLANO
THE AUDACIOUS SAVIOUR OF SEVILLE



GENERAL MOSCARDÓ
THE DEFENDER OF THE ALCAZAR, TOLEDO



convoys were organized. The African Army was at last available, and Franco free to cross to Spain to commence the conquest of Estremadura.

In the north, the Nationalists had a bitter disappointment. The moderate Bilbao Basques had played for Separatism, but the Reds—of all kinds—won. Their “federalism” was a Communist trap. They had made a bargain with the devil, and lived to rue it. But no one expected that the neighbouring province of Guipuzcoa would also be held for the Government. But it was: for the officer in charge vacillated, and found, too late, that all the extremists were armed. He and his armed followers were but a few score, and were soon isolated and destroyed. After this loss of the Loyola Barracks at San Sebastian, and the heroic defenders of the Simancas Barracks had died in flames in Gijon, only the town of Oviedo, the “martyred city” of the Asturian revolt of 1934, held out on the north coast and for three months underwent one of the most incredible sieges of the war.

On the 17th July, 1937, General Aranda was informed from Ceuta about the National Movement. He had known nothing of any plans for an “Army rising”.

Imperturbable, whilst the people busily went about their business in the High Street, Aranda arranged the transfer to the barracks of the whole of the armament of the Vega factory, the concentration in Oviedo of all the Civil Guards of his command, the billeting of the troops, and permanent conference for the study of the campaign. Conquest was not possible—only defence.

The Governor telephoned him furiously. “They are demanding here that I should issue the arms to the people.” Aranda replied, “I cannot hand them over unless the Ministry of War obliges me to.”

On the following day the Asturian dynamiters abandoned the mines to enter the city. Aranda went to the office of the Governor, where he found Gonzalez Peña, Amador Fernandez, Manso and others.

Gonzalez Peña arrogantly opened the discussion: “You already know the Army in Africa has risen. Prieto has told us that you will hand over to us the armament in the barracks for distribution to the people.” “Indalecio”, said Aranda, “is a deputy. I will obey the order when I receive it from the Ministry of War.”

Whilst Aranda argued to gain time, three columns of Red miners set out to march upon Madrid.

Meanwhile Aranda carried out the strategic occupation of Mount Narranco with trusted troops. Two pieces of artillery were stationed before the Governor's office. A herald proclaimed the State of War.

Aranda had declared his choice. "He reckoned up his diminutive army and the meagre means at his disposal, but he had a surplus of spirit, driving force, valour and love of Spain. Victory was sure in either of the two equally glorious forms—victorious resistance or heroic death. Every contingency had been weighed up."¹

Success crowned his first efforts. Oviedo had risen. But the principal thing needed was to keep out from the gates of the city the hordes of dynamiters who came against it in untold numbers, in an effort to renew the days of the Red tyranny, which in 1934 had made Oviedo the "martyred city".

They would not leave a stone upon a stone; the churches profaned, the banks sacked, the civil population persecuted, and all who had leapt to the defence of Spain would be shot in mass. They proclaimed it in their newspapers, describing with sadistic gloating the exquisite torment which they were reserving for Aranda himself. Meanwhile Aranda coolly considered the defence of the city. He had no more than 4,000 men of all ranks with 12 cannon, made up as follows: Civil Guards, 600 men; Assault Guards, 200 men; regular army, 1,200; volunteers organized by Fernandez Ladredo, 2,000.

"Aranda's task was to make the fullest possible use of every man and every cartridge. He could not afford to waste blood upon gallant enterprises. And so these men had to repress their enthusiastic desires for conquest, and shut themselves in behind the walls of Oviedo, waiting in protracted agony for the arrival of their liberators.

"Spain found herself in Oviedo as in Seville, by the determined resistance of a faithful minority. A large part of the population had been poisoned with Marxist propaganda, spread far and wide in Asturias from time immemorial."

Aranda, therefore, did not rely upon the mass of the population of Oviedo. It is true that they did not make a hostile move. Sudden cowardice took the place of their one-

¹ This account is a précis from the well-informed account by a correspondent of a local newspaper.

time audacity; but they did not place themselves unconditionally upon the side of the defenders. Aranda had to fight not only against the enemy outside, using rifles, machine-guns and cannons, but also against the enemy inside, using the formidable weapon of passive resistance, which became a *spiritless cowardice at the most difficult moments*. One of the informed chroniclers has calculated at 80% this mass which mutely opposed the epic of Oviedo.

The problem of food was serious to the point of disaster. A population of over 70,000 normally living a prosperous and comfortable life, was not ready for the privations of a siege. The supplies available in the city could not meet the normal necessities of two months of struggle.

And so it was. Supplies within soon ran short. Meat immediately became unobtainable. The classic *fabada* (the local bean stew) was soon a thing of the past. The grocers offered for sale the produce of Castile, the chick peas and corn, which with rice and onion were, for a long time, the only diet of the besieged population. A month after the siege had started, the feeding of the population had become a desperate problem. There were absolutely no potatoes, milk or wine. It was difficult to cook the chick peas and rice because all the population had to live in the refuge of the cellars.

There was still one other problem—water. The reservoirs were in the hands of the Reds. This indispensable element was, therefore, withheld from the very commencement. Aranda, however, found a solution, which, though precarious, saved Oviedo from catastrophe. He made a careful examination of the city and its immediate surroundings, and some abandoned wells were found, which enabled a ration of water to be given out, allowing three litres a day to each family.

Then came the problem of lighting. The central heating system which was dependent upon the gas factory had to be abandoned for practical reasons, and Oviedo was without light. There was scarcely enough current to give a sickly light in the official centres. The population remained in the deepest obscurity. The silence of the deserted streets was awesome when the cannons were silent and the chattering of the machine-guns was not to be heard. Oviedo seemed a city of

^{dea}
'^Theron-combatant population, if it left its houses, did so

never to return or only for short periods. They had removed their most essential chattels to the refuges which were converted into habitations owing to the fury of the pitiless bombardments.

More than a thousand persons had taken refuge in the vaults of the Banco Herrero. There was hardly a single "cement" building which was not packed with a frightened crowd that preferred to suffer there the terrible inconveniences resulting from the lack of light, water, adequate food and sufficient air, rather than constant peril in their own houses.

It was impossible to prevent these spontaneous movements of instinctive self-preservation; for the events which took place in Oviedo during this heroic siege were enough to crush the most courageous. More than six hundred died, victims of the bombardments, and were buried in the cemeteries of the city. In one cellar an aviation bomb caused more than fifty victims.¹

Shortly before the liberation, the Red air force constantly bombarded the centre of the town, and destroyed innumerable buildings. Whole streets and squares looked like building sites prepared for changing the level of the ground. The cathedral, miraculously saved from the Red fury of October 1934, continues to stand. It has been damaged in innumerable places, for it was the favourite target of the Red aeroplanes. The beautiful Gothic tower has almost retained its marvellous crest intact.

Aranda, day by day, overcame all his difficulties. When he had at his disposal his 4,000 men, he established his first defensive lines reaching as far as San Esteban de las Cruces, San Pedro de los Arcos, and Pando, then stretching to the slopes of Mount Narranco.

Time wrought more damage in the ranks of Aranda's men than enemy ammunition. The 4,000 men were suffering casualties, munitions were running short, and in front of the ruins of the city defended inch by inch, the military skill of Aranda was arranging for retirement in so well thought out a manner that the Reds were slow to perceive it, and advanced timidly, as though there were some trap.

At the most desperate moments Aranda could not count upon more than 600 completely fit men capable of continu-

¹ There were no appeals to Lord Mayors, Parliaments and the world by humanitarians, intellectuals and Deans in connection with Oviedo. Or Tcruel. Or any other Nationalist town bombed or destroyed. Such appeals were nearly all from and by Reds, Internationals and their associates.

ing to resist the immense avalanche of the 30,000 Asturians.

After abandoning a part of the city itself, Aranda planned a new line of resistance, commencing at the Pelayo barracks through the arms factory, Santo Domingo, Matadero Street, Campo Manes, the old cemetery, and the stations of the North and Santander Railways.

These were the times when only the spirit maintained the weak flesh. It seemed impossible to resist any longer. In spite of every precaution, illness spread, threatening to become epidemic; in the cellars the last provisions were nearly exhausted; munitions were insufficient for another day and a half, and the howling hordes, inside and without, pressed on the defenders.

But relief did come—just in time. On 18th October a Galician column of volunteers, mostly serving without pay and providing their own arms and equipment, arrived to the relief of the city.

The tragedy of Valencia is well told in the words of José Cirre Jimenez, a private in the 5th Regiment of the Light Artillery.

On the 17th July nothing happened. It was a day of rumours. Nobody was certain what had happened in the rest of Spain or Morocco. The F.A.I.¹ (the Iberian Anarchist Federation) were invading the streets of Valencia, threatening terror to anti-Marxists' organizations and citizens. Anyone wearing the Army uniform was insulted, and there were loud *vivas* for "democracy".

The uneasiness increased on the 18th. General Queipo de Llano, speaking from Seville, called upon the people of Spain to rise in revolt. But Madrid announced that the revolution in Africa had been crushed and all the leaders arrested. The various stations poured out conflicting news, but the Government held the principal radio stations.

The radio at Barcelona on the 19th indicated that only a handful of men were trying to do the impossible in that strongly organized Red stronghold. Valencia hesitated—and was lost.

Robbery and sacking of houses and registrations by patrols began, and thousands of people regarded as opposed to the Popular Front Government were arrested.

1 When Yves Dautun was in Valencia, the head of the F.A.I. there was Ilya Ehrenbourg, the Russian writer on Toledo I

"On the 20th Captain Ulibarri, one of the Red officers attached to the Government, stung by the news he had heard on the Seville radio, went out on to a balcony of the Deputation and promised that, if given some men and live days to do it in, he would not leave a 'Fascist' alive. In reply came the cry of the day in the streets, '*Viva Rusia!*' And soon the flames of the burning buildings lit up the mob with their clenched fists raised above their heads.

"Shortly afterwards a statement by the conservative ex-Minister, Señor Lucia, was forged. It was announced that he had given his whole-hearted support to the Government. This caused added hesitation. Nobody, of course, knew that the Communists had called at the headquarters of Señor Lucia's party, and finding no one there, had vented their spleen by murdering the unfortunate doorkeeper."

The Madrid Government sent down Martinez Barrio, the President of the Cortes, to General Martinez Monge. Martinez Barrio also visited Murcia, Cartagena and Albacete with similar objects. Some sort of a bargain was sealed. The General promised the Government the aid of the garrison of the city. Immediately officers accused as suspected of Right Wing sympathies were displaced, and new people put in charge of the companies, batteries and squadrons.

"Although the Army had not done anything, it was impossible for anyone in a military uniform safely to go into the streets. Insults were the order of the day against nuns and inoffensive women, who were set upon in the streets by a crowd of ruffians. The Army was powerless to defend them.

"Then what was bound to happen occurred—public protest by many of the officers and soldiers. They knew they would be going to almost certain death, for they had no organization to undertake a revolt, but in the early days of August these few men rose in the infantry quarters—the regiments of Guadalajara and Otumba, and also the No. 8 Cavalry.

"Undoubtedly they hoped for a public reaction; but this had become impossible owing to the terrorist measures which had been instituted. . . . The majority of the orderly elements were prey to the greatest panic.

"There was an attempt by the Otumba regiment to free those who had been thrown into prison, but this was not possible, for the guns of my regiment—the 5th Light—were

trained upon the doors of the Otumba barracks, where the regiment of that name had risen. With secret rage I saw great contingents of guards and militia, with the assistance of the artillerymen, prepare the assault upon the barracks in the event of their refusing to surrender. The soldiers of the Otumba regiment, unaware that the Guadalajara regiment and No. 8 Cavalry had also risen, laid down their arms, thoroughly disheartened. The same occurred with the Guadalajara regiment.

"Not so, however, the Cavalry. The heroic soldiers and officers of the Victoria Eugenia barracks put up a resistance that was an espousal of death. . . . They fortified the weakest parts of their buildings with sandbags, and so distributed their forces that the intended assault by the Civil Guards, militia, *Carabineros* and Assault Guards failed at the gates of the barracks. The struggle started very early in the morning, and then it was that Valencia knew there were men ready to fight for the honour and life of the town. . . . The rifle-fire was intense. The revolutionaries set up machine-guns and brought guns into position to bombard the building. But the heroes continued their resistance, and the militia, the pick of the young Valencia libertarian youths, were killed in these attacks.

"Inside the building there were many killed and wounded also. In the evening one of the soldiers treacherously tried to open the gates to admit the Marxists. He was shot in the act by another soldier. The job of watching the door was then entrusted to a sergeant, through whose carelessness the militia gained admission. . . . The officers and men tried in vain to close the door, but too many had managed to get through. All they achieved was a heroic fight in the courtyard, and the officers and men fell, one after another, to the cry of 'Arise, Spain!'

"The few officers who survived the fights were shot with machine-guns together with the best known of the men.

"The Madrid Government decreed the dissolution of the regiment that had risen. The soldiers demanded their discharge by meetings in the streets. The Red authorities, faced with this problem, then offered them ten pesetas a day pay if they joined the Marxist militia, or, failing that, said they must remain in the Army.

"In the Assault Guards, Civil Guards and police, nothing very exceptional happened, because those *in charge* had made

common cause with the Popular Front from the commencement. Nearly all the Civil Guards of the province had been brought into the city, with the natural result that the villages were at the mercy of the bands of Marxists. . . . The news of their atrocities soon reached Valencia; there had already been bloodshed in Sueca, Las Palmeras and Alcira. . . .”

Soon anarchist militia arrived from Catalonia and started attacks on the churches. . . .

“ Owners of businesses were made the porters and door-keepers. Many of them were not assassinated because their signatures were required for the purchase of materials from abroad.¹ For the collection of the rice and oranges they forced the families of assassinated proprietors of property to pay the expense of the transport, collection and warehousing, and handed over to the Red Committees the right of sale and of receipt of the proceeds.

“ This was the position in Valencia in the early days of August.”

The case of Avila is interesting, for to some extent it is a history in miniature of what must have happened in so many parts of the country, though not always with the same final result. Avila was typical of many decent, hard-working, agricultural communities. The members were a good honest type of Spaniard with faults and virtues like the rest of mankind. There were a lot of convents and churches in Avila—too many in the view of many people; but certainly they did no harm. It has long been the practice of many Spanish women, particularly unmarried ones and widows, to retire from the world to a convent and pass their time in religious and philosophical meditation, or, as was more usual, to join the Orders in which they could devote the rest of their lives to charity and good works. If some of them had small private means, they often placed them at the disposal of these Orders, and the benefit went to the poor and the sick; for no man could say that the standard of life of a Spanish *monja* or *religiosa* was lavish—it was governed by the strictest regulations in accordance with their vows of poverty, chastity and obedience. If there were rare exceptions, they did not mar these objects and ideals, or confute the rule, of the overwhelming majority.

Their “ incomes ”, as compared with those of the ordinary

¹ Note the official Communist instructions on this point at the end of this chapter.

retired English man or woman, were negligible; but the benefit they were to the community was greater beyond all comparison.

Was there discontent in the province? Sometimes. It depended more on the crop and agricultural market than anything; for when was there ever a farmer who did not grumble?

With the Red Government installed in Madrid, the Communists became busy here as elsewhere. But the feeling of the province was against them, and the appointment of a Red Civil Governor would have done more harm than good. They appointed a rather wavering, weak type, of somewhat "pink" views.

When the insurrection broke out many people took refuge in Avila, and many stories of what was taking place in the surrounding countryside were told.

"They chased my wife and children like rabbits and shot them through the back; they shot my two brothers . . . they were going to shoot me," said a schoolmaster from Navalperal.

"I had a narrow escape," said a man from Burgohondo. "I shut myself in my house and I collared two of the Leftists and their wives from the People's House. The Reds came to get me, but I held out for two days with my hostages. They even sent a column and then tried to burn the house down. I opened the windows of the balcony and brought out my four hostages, and on my knees I begged them to spare my life. They left then. I owe my life to those hostages. . . ."

"They were going to shoot me too," said an inhabitant from Arenas de San Pedro. "However, they were content to rob me of my pocket-book, money and watch. . . . Finally they ordered me to conduct them to the Palace of Prince Louis de Bourbon. . . . I told them to wait and that I would send the people out to them. I would answer for them with my life. Let them leave a guard at the door. They fell for it. I entered and escaped through the gardens at the back. . . . The others who had surrendered on condition their lives would be saved were all shot, of course. . . . My son was

^{amo} ⁿ th ^{m.}

In the town there were no troops, only a few officer cadets and candidates attending the preparatory college—not a lot ^a ^f the Madrid Government and its Red militia. The ^c ^{oil} Muro arrived by car in Avila with an armed ^{Socialist} escort of two of the militia. They presented orders ^{from}

General Mangada to the Chief of the Command. The Governor sent for the head of the Civil Guard Command, Lieutenant-Colonel Almoguera. He put on his spectacles. "But can you guarantee that this document from my General is genuine?" he asked. "I think I ought to verify it by telephone. This order is nothing less than to hand over all the arms I have here to the Popular Front mob. Why?" He telephoned. "You mean this? Well, I should like to have the order confirmed in writing. . . . Yes, yes, I will hand over the arms, but not all of them." He rang off.

"There is no need for me to distribute all the arms. As you see, there is perfect order in the streets, and the men's job is only to maintain order. In Avila it seems to me that my Civil Guards need nobody to co-operate." "So you disobey the order of the Government?" said Muro.

Almoguera played for time. . . .

The local attorney of the law courts intervened. "And if forces of the Army march against Avila, what would you do with your Guards?" "Why, join the Army. I should never think of fighting against my colleagues," he replied.

Almoguera bade them good day. In the confusion of the moment they left him alone. He issued rapid orders, requisitioned all rifles, shot-guns and munitions, drew up a declaration of a State of War, and seized the town. With his few officers and forty rank and file of his Guards, he took possession of Avila for the Nationalist cause. The civil population enthusiastically joined him. The three men from Madrid might have overawed the Civil Governor had the Communists been armed; and their group of some five hundred men or so would have dominated Avila like Cuenca was dominated. Instead, some fifty men dominated it for the Nationalists, and it passed to their side in accordance with the true sentiments and traditions of that province. But it was a mere spin of the coin, as it was in many other places.

In Valladolid, on the night of the 17th July, 1936, news of the rising in Africa became known, and the civilian elements, organized by an intense effort, went out into the streets in groups, wearing blue shirts under their jackets and armed with pistols.¹ The Socialist militia, who on the previous nights had been keeping watch over the barracks and streets,

* This and several of the later accounts are précis or extracts from *£1 Movimictilo National*, by Señores Liebana and Orizana.

were sealing passers-by. But when they found themselves faced by men who would defend themselves, they quickly disappeared from the streets. The nervousness grew. The organizers of these civil forces ordered all of them to go back and wait in their homes. At the same time, some 1,200 Falangists and others had concentrated at Monte Totozas. At a nearby country estate General Saliquet was also waiting for the right moment to direct the movement.

On Saturday, the 18th, the uneasiness increased, and the last arrests of Right Wing elements were carried out.

In the evening, the Madrid radio gave out the false news that the rising in Morocco had failed.

Then the Police and Assault Guards received orders to go to their quarters to prepare to march towards Madrid. The cars and buses received orders to take in petrol and report at the Tenerias Square to transport the Guards.

The inhabitants were alarmed at the lack of protection left in the town, the more so when there were rumours that the Guards were to go without arms, and that it was the intention to give their weapons to the Socialists who were watching in groups. It was also rumoured that outside the city the Marxists intended to assassinate the Guards with the intention of returning to the city disguised.

The hundred and sixty Assault Guards in alarm refused to leave without knowing where they were going and whether they were to fight against the Army. The Police Guards left their barracks; and noticing that the doors were barricaded by a carpenter on their exit, they went over to the Assault Guards, in spite of protests. Both bodies of Guards then refused to march until the Major in charge of the Assault Guards came down and persuaded them to enter the lorries.

News was taken to Lieutenants Cuadra and Fernandez Sanz, who a few days before had been removed from their posts on the ground that they were not attached to the Governor; and these two young officers went to the barracks with the intention of leaving with their Guards, if the Guards left; but in no case to abandon them. At this stage a Captain of Artillery happened to pass, and advised them not to obey the order to depart. His advice was reinforced by a corporal who also happened to be passing.

The Guards replied with enthusiastic cheers for the Army, and mounting the lorries, drove to the centre of the town

shouting, "*Viva España!*" The Marxists who had been standing by, waiting for them to leave, fled in panic.

The Guards drove round the city to the same patriotic cries, and then returned to their barracks. Some Falangists then marched down one of the chief streets, mad with joy at the turn of events. They had practically no arms. They were suddenly fired upon by a well-armed body of Marxists, and they ran back to the barracks of San Quentin to try and get arms. A number of men of the infantry regiment came out to protect them.

At 7.30 two Socialist Deputies who had come to place themselves at the head of a train full of miners from Oviedo were arrested. At eight o'clock Lieutenant Cuadra took possession of the radio without resistance—in fact with the enthusiastic greeting of the Civil Guard in charge of it. That night, Radio Valladolid sent out the cry, "Let no one take heed of the anti-Spanish Government of Casares Quiroga. We will crush Marxism. *Arriba España!*" This produced indescribable enthusiasm, and people came out on their balconies to applaud those who were marching through the streets to organize themselves for the struggle.

The Post Office departments were occupied shortly after.

Meanwhile, the Marxists burnt the Church of Carmen and tried to burn the Church of San Esteban. When they were pursued they took refuge, to the number of four hundred, in the Casa del Pueblo, and took some women and children with them.

General Saliquet arrived at 10 p.m. Saliquet demanded that General Molero should hand over control. The Adjutant of the latter, Rioboo, then fired on General Saliquet's group, killing one and wounding another. The fire was returned, and General Molero and several of his friends were wounded as they tried to get away.

At 11 p.m. troops came out into the streets, and were warmly acclaimed by the populace.

The Civil Governor, Señor Lavin, surrendered, and a few days after, his secretary, Señor Landrove.

From the Town Hall firing had been going on all night; this was captured by the troops of the Farnesio squadron; but there were only a few men found in it.

They then moved on to the House of the People. Two gun shots were fired to try and bring about a surrender. Six

or seven Marxists came out and gave themselves up. One of them was sent back to offer to spare the lives of those inside. After five minutes firing broke out again. Then they came out and surrendered in groups of fifty or sixty. They were lined up with their arms above their heads, face to the wall. Many of them were cursing their fate, saying they had been abandoned by their leaders, and cursing Largo Caballero. Others begged for their lives; but they were told they need not worry, they were not in the hands of assassins.

The women and children were set at liberty. The number of Marxists arrested was 478. The only leader found amongst them was Señor Garrote.

Throughout Sunday the sniping was incessant, but this was brought to an end during the course of Monday.

Valladolid was thus orderly again, and there they organized the heroic feat which saved Castile and Spain at the Alto de Leon Pass. Many of the best men in the Nationalist Movement were lost, but the pass through the sierras was captured and held.

The capital of Leon was indeed fortunate, for again it had turned on a toss of the coin whether this other key-point would be held for peace and order, or be plunged in the blood bath that awaited so many other centres. For a period of some hours the town was in the hands of the Marxist hordes. Although the incidents there were not of real gravity, there was a tension in which any spark might have ignited the powder magazine.

On the 18th they heard about the National rising and there were disturbances in the streets. Early on Sunday morning (18th), a copy of the Oviedo Marxist newspaper *Avance* arrived with the disquieting news that a train full of miners had left in the direction of Madrid to save the Republic at the summons of the Madrid Government. The same morning the train arrived; also a number of lorries full of miners. They numbered 1,500 or 2,000 men. A desperate lot they looked. Only about 400 were armed, mainly with weapons hidden after the October revolution of 1934. The rest only had pistols. Each man had only ten cartridges, but they had lorries full of dynamite. They were under a Lieutenant of the Assault Guards and there were other Guards with them.

They invaded the town of Leon in a provocative and insulting manner. In the bars and cafés they ordered what they

wanted, saying, "Let the Government pay for it." They robbed principally the fruit stores, and carried off the fruit to their lorries. They also broke open the gunsmiths' shops of Leon and took any arms they could find. They then decided to capture the infantry barracks.

Accompanied by the local Marxists, who rapidly came out into the streets to join them, they surrounded the barracks and occupied houses in the neighbourhood as bases for the attack. Other groups took possession of the central Bar and the Santo Domingo and San Marcelo Squares.

Then General Gomez Caminero¹ appeared, and his Adjutant parleyed with one of the Red leaders. They discussed the difficulties of the miners' train reaching Madrid, as Valladolid and Palencia had already joined the movement. However, half the miners set off in the train towards Valladolid. Meanwhile, the 26th Infantry regiment was in the barracks under Colonel Vicente Lafuente. There were about two hundred men, all of them thoroughly patriotic and under officers such as Major Arredonda, Captain Navas and Captain Segovia, who had left his sick-bed to come and help. Most of them were on their summer leave. They began to fortify the position and place machine-guns in position for defence.

At 3 p.m. General Gomez Caminero was seen in conversation with Brigadier-General Bosch. What was said is not known, but at about five in the evening General Gomez Caminero and the Brigadier came to the barracks and the General requested that arms should be issued to the people. The Colonel objected, but the Brigadier agreed, and three hundred rifles were handed over to the Marxists, although they gave them the oldest and most dilapidated ones. The officers, meanwhile, were consumed with rage.

After this, most of the miners left, protected by the Civil Government and the House of the People, who were masters of the capital.

On Monday, the 20th, the House of the People declared a general strike and the life of the city came to a complete standstill. The Reds and a few miners who were left prepared to attack the barracks of the Civil Guards, but they were repelled. At midday the train which had left for Valladolid returned

¹ This General was the military Governor of Malaga in 1931. During the disturbances, he requested from the Bishop a list of *all* churches and convents "in order to try and defend them". The only one which escaped was a small church inadvertently omitted from the list!

£u". of J' C' UnC' r'd K'. The Column had been decimated by the
artillery fire which they had encountered at Benavente. The
train and dem' oXd On t0", ards ASturiaS thC Reds be<< an to become

At 2 p.m. the Marxists occupied the San Marcos monument, a strategic position from which they kept up rifle-fire and threw dynamite sticks.

At that same hour Colonel Lafuente formed up his officers and troops in the courtyard of the El Cid barracks and delivered a patriotic speech. To the cry of *Viva Espana!* a Burgos regiment prepared to defend the city. They soon took the principal buildings, including the Casa del Pueblo, meeting with little resistance except at the Civil Governor's headquarters. Local Marxists there eventually surrendered. The Popular Front Civil Governor had long before fled early in the morning.

A bayonet charge was needed to take the San Marcos building occupied by five hundred Marxists. Many escaped at the back of the building. Sixty prisoners were taken. The assault was made by Civil Guards, Assault Guards, one section of the military' troops, and some Falangists.

The Civil Guards of the Doncayo barracks were under an officer favourable to the Government. He was arrested and the Guards then left to take up positions on the heights and terraces under orders of the Nationalists. The Air Force at the Leon base joined the movement in dramatic circumstances related later.

At six in the evening the Nationalists seized the local radio station and issued an appeal to all men. It was rapidly responded to, and many peasants and countrymen came and enlisted at the infantry barracks.

Lieutenant Gonzalez of the Assault Guards had been imprisoned some days before because of his sympathies with the Falangists. The Guards, in face of this, were undecided and maintained a waiting attitude during the Sunday (the 19th). On Monday morning the Lieutenant was set at liberty. He got the Guards together and harangued them, saying that he thought they should come out into the streets with the Army, and that they should do so to the cry of *Viva Espana!* The Guards carried him shoulder high to the barracks.

In Cadiz, late on the 17th July, General Varela was arrested on orders from Madrid. On the 18th the Military Governor,

THE SPANISH ARENA

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after communicating with General Queipo de Llano, released him, and he took charge. The Marxist leaders in the Casa del Pueblo called on "the proletariat" from Radio Cadiz, exhorting them to rise up and embark on every kind of excess. But only about 1,000 responded, out of the 5,000 adherents they counted on.

Leaving a guard on the Casa del Pueblo, where grenades were manufactured, they sent out groups to various parts of the city. The streets were deserted from 4 p.m., and shots were heard in various parts. Late that night an order was given to cut off the light and water, the *object being to destroy part of the city by fire during the night*. The order was not obeyed, however, and the military sent detachments, which fired on and dispersed the incendiaries, and they were able to get the fires under control. Many of the buildings were destroyed, in spite of the efforts of the Fire Brigade, who worked frantically, disobeying the orders to remain inactive sent them by the Marxists from the Town Hall. Sniping and firing went on all night. On the morning of Sunday the 19th the *Churruca* rounded San Felipe point and anchored in the bay with some troops from Morocco, and the resistance was soon overcome.

The troops originally in the city only numbered six hundred, and but for the arrival of reinforcements, this key point and base for further disembarkations might well have been lost.

After the *Churruca* had landed the troops and again put to sea, the crew mutinied, killed its officers and joined the Popular Front Government. But Cadiz had been saved, at least for the moment. Slender, indeed, were the threads on which the fate of Spain hung in these first few days.

Even now it is difficult to tell exactly what happened in Zaragoza up to the morning of the 19th July, when the Army rose in reply. On the 17th they learnt of the rising in Morocco; but already before that the town was living through the revolution. People only guessed at the facts, owing to the false news sent out by the Government. Early in the afternoon the Left centres were very animated. Their supporters were attending for orders and to receive arms. After 7 p.m. groups of youths in red shirts went through the streets singing the *Internationale*, and vigilance over the barracks was redoubled by the Marxists.

On the 18th, in the morning, came the news that the rising had spread to the Peninsula. Until then the only activity had been by the extremists, who seemed, to dominate everything, but in the afternoon, at the headquarters of the Captain-General, broadsheets were put up, and in a few hours they were covered with the signatures of thousands of the citizens of Zaragoza, and large numbers of youths began to present themselves at the barracks with the cry *Viva Espana!*

Then an aeroplane arrived with General Nunéz del Prado from the Government, to replace General Cabanellas and to try and repress the desire of the garrison to join the Nationalist Movement. The military put him under arrest.

At 1 a.m. on the 19th the C.N.T. and U.G.T. Committees ordered their members to report for orders. The Security and Assault Guards in front of the Civil Governor's offices, where some machine-guns had been installed, silently watched the crowd without apparent emotion. There was a strange, significant silence. The only word heard amongst the crowd of the syndicalists was "Arms". At 2.30 a.m. some Assault Guards appeared and detained the first groups of Marxists and began to search them. Some, seeing this, fled. It meant that the troops had risen. At daybreak a State of War was proclaimed, the signal for rebellion against the Popular Front Government. They had then just heard that the *Requetés* under Mola had risen in Navarre; in Castile also the movement had triumphed, and Oueipo was winning in Andalusia.

The Red leaders fled to Madrid, Barcelona and Valencia. The demonstrations dissolved, and Zaragoza went back peacefully to its ordinary routine.

Simultaneously with Zaragoza, the garrisons of Huesca, Calatayud and Teruel declared themselves for the movement.

In Teruel, Major Aguada declared the State of War, supported by his whole garrison—which consisted of five soldiers; and the civil population, the police and Guards rallied to "the Army". There were practically no incidents. On orders from Madrid, the authorities at Valencia organized a column of Marxists accompanied by three hundred Guards from Cuenca, Valencia and Castellon; but the Communists behaved in so barbarous a manner that the Guards turned on them, put them to flight and entered Teruel to a rousing reception from the inhabitants.

Jaca, too, followed the lead of Zaragoza. About midnight

of the 18th there was much excitement in the town. Many people were in the street and arms were being distributed. Then came an order from General Cabanellas at Zaragoza to declare a State of War. The Jaca garrison responded enthusiastically. On the morning of the 19th July, the few there were left of the garrison under Major Vega came out and proclaimed the State of War. Earlier on there had been shots fired which had been answered by the *Guardias*. Suddenly from an ambuscade at the entrance to the city there was a rattle of rifle-fire from armed Marxists behind cover. Seven of the military were killed and forty wounded.

The troops entered the city to cries of *Viva España!* All the town from then on was held for Nationalist Spain. There was rifle, machine and pistol-fire throughout the day, but the town responded, and formed a company of volunteers who at once began instruction. Recruiting was continued and requests sent to Zaragoza for arms.

On the 19th they had to attend to anarchist risings at Cincovillas, Albalate, Epila, Alarcon, and a number of other places. In the words of the local chronicler, "And in those villages they now enjoyed social peace, and a well-being which the Army has handed back to them after seven years of anarchy and disorder."

On the 23rd troops of the regiment visited the villages of Hecho, Anso, Arangués del Puerto and Urduñies, where they were greeted with enthusiasm. The mountaineers flocked in to serve with the colours.

On the 28th motorized units reconnoitred the valleys of Roncal, Anso and Hecho, together with some civilians from the Rioja, Navarre and Jaca, under professional officers. Some Falangists arrived from Logroño and some *Requetés* from Pamplona. Most of those who did not sympathize with the movement fled across the frontier or into the Red zone. In September 1936 over a hundred of the peasants of the Tena valley came and volunteered for instruction for the defence of the valley in case of necessity. It is largely the inhabitants of this valley who have held the line there since—hardy mountaineers from the districts of Panticosa and Salient.

Huelva was the last important Andalusian town to be incorporated in the movement, and it had to be conquered violently by force of arms.

The following excerpts are from a Portuguese newspaper:

"I arrived here a day after the bloodshed had ceased. To obtain an objective and exact account of the facts I had to interrogate many people. . . . Although I am indignant at such cruelty, I wish to honour my profession, as always, by impartiality.

"On the night of the 18th-19th July, there were some two hundred Assault Guards in Huelva, and about as many Civil Guards under Colonel Ortiz.

"The excitement amongst the Communists was extraordinary. The ordinary forces became reduced to twenty Civil Guards and twenty Assault Guards, because the others set off for Seville in view of the proclamation of General Queipo de Llano. The Guards who remained found it was dangerous to go outside into the streets. A shipowner, Miguel Orcanes Lopez, was seized by the crowd. Finding himself surrounded, he tried to escape certain death by dashing into an inn. There he was shot. It was the first symptom of * liberty *. The fierce crowd began to insult the forces. A pair of Civil Guards on horseback appeared, and almost miraculously order was restored. But soon the Guards were ordered to retire, and the Governor and the Mayor distributed arms to the Communists. An hour later they were in charge of the city under a councillor nicknamed 'Evil Mind' and the terror commenced. Colonel Ortiz joined the crowd. In the Civil Governor's office a list of houses was drawn up for assault. The sacking of them was horrible. The pretext was always the same: to see if there were arms or suspicious papers. The assaulters were ready to take the solution of a chess problem for a revolutionary document in code.

"Then came the burning and robbery of the churches and of the newspaper *Odiel*, where, however, they left two machines for the printing of a Libertarian newspaper. Then the slaughter of priests continued. Then all the men of the Right, or Falangists, were made prisoners. . . . Man-hunting was the order of the day."

In face of this, the Civil and Assault Guards, who were making for Seville in company with two hundred armed Communists, halted before reaching the suburb of Triana. On the way the Communists had been committing every kind of excess and villainy. Then, in response to Major Aro Lumbreras, the Guards turned round and fiercely engaged the Communists who were with them, leaving forty of them dead.

Immediately the Guards joined the forces which rapidly left Seville to dominate the Red revolution in Huelva. They met with great resistance near the town, but finally entered in triumph and captured the Civil Governor's headquarters, where a group of the Popular Front elements had fortified themselves. The population received the military with tremendous enthusiasm, for they had saved Huelva from the nightmare it was experiencing.

In Cordoba, Señor Cascajo, the Military Commandant, was ordered by General Queipo de Llano to declare a State of War. The Civil Governor, however, ordered the Republican flag to be hoisted. The *Defender of Cordoba* gives the following record of events (abbreviated):

"At about 6 p.m. (Saturday, 18th July, 1936) a battery took up a position in front of the Civil Governor's headquarters, and posted up a *bando*. The doors were shut and barred. The military occupied strategic points. Then a parley was arranged, and the Civil Governor was given a period in which to surrender. The Assault and Civil Guards were divided. The period for surrender was extended. At the conclusion of the extension, fire was opened, lasting for five minutes. A further half-hour's grace was granted. Then three shots were fired by the artillery at the building. Rifle-fire was intense for about half an hour. The surrender took place at 9.30 a.m. The Guards then placed themselves under the orders of the Army, and went out to maintain order in the city, assisted by many workmen of the militia who had been armed with muskets."

In the province itself, the Marxists were strong. So on the next day, the 21st, men set out from Cordoba to various towns. On the 21st they took Castro del Rio and Villafranca. On the 22nd, Villarrubia. On the 23rd, Almodovar del Rio. Thus the Cordoba front took shape.

In Granada, the Civil Governor had been distributing arms, and on the 19th, the city was in the hands of the extremists. On the 20th, the disorder was increasing and shots were fired. There were many arrests and many houses were broken into. Then the troops came out of the barracks to proclaim a State of War, and were greeted with the greatest enthusiasm. The Civil and Assault Guards and the Carabiniers warmly supported them. The only real resistance was in the Albaicin quarter, which was soon overcome.

The distant Canaries had also joined the movement and without many incidents. The following letter to *The Times* of 5th August, 1936, dated 24th July, 1936, signed "A Tenerifeño", gives a brief record of events in one centre.

"On Saturday, 18th July, the Islanders woke up to find a State of War declared and the military authorities had taken over the local Government. The *Guardias Civiles* and soldiers occupied the strategic points in Santa Cruz. The Civil Governor, the Alcalde, the leaders of the Popular Front and the more prominent Communists were arrested.

"In the afternoon, a small group of the recently formed Assault Guards fired on some soldiers and young volunteers and killed a boy. One of the Assault Guards was killed, and one or two of both sides wounded. There was no other fighting or bloodshed, and in the inland towns the same thing occurred on a smaller scale.

"At Puerto Orotava, a favourite watering-place for foreigners, a dozen soldiers and Civil Guards dispersed groups when they were formed, but there was no bloodshed there or in the other centres. The general attitude was summed up by a leading spirit in the Trades Union Movement in its early days—'We thirst for peace and justice.'

"These islands, where formerly crimes of violence were extremely rare, have lately been under a reign of fear. Murders of all classes of people have been frequent, and hold-ups and burglaries also. All have gone unpunished. The *Guardias Civiles* have not been allowed to act. No one who was not a Communist has felt safe. . . . Business was made impossible. Things have not been so bad as in Spain, where younger members of the Derecha (Right Wing) were driven to reprisals, but they have been bad enough. . . . Russian agents have been perambulating the Islands for some time.. . .

"Franco is said to be an enlightened and kindly man, as well as a very able soldier; and the general hope is that he will bring in an era of good government, of personal security and of justice, free from reprisals, which have been a curse of recent Governments."

The typical story of an individual adventure is told by Captain Francis McCullagh, concerning "Franco's Englishman"/ Don John (Peel) de Talavera.

Don John had had fighting experience in the Civil war

» McCullagh, *In Franco's Spain*, pp. 304-12.

in Portugal, the country of his parents' adoption. When the Civil War broke out in Spain, John, with six Portuguese who had been his companions in the Army, smuggled themselves across the Portuguese frontier to assist Franco. They found themselves somewhere between Villanueva del Fresno and Alconchel, in the province of Badajoz. At that time, he had no idea in whose hands these towns were. Colonel Yagiee had passed beside them in his desperate adventure to take Badajoz, but too often he had had to leave small towns in Red hands, so urgent was his primary mission.

Constantly hungry, John and his companions went gingerly north. At last they came to a walled city. What was it? And was it Red? While he debated these points, a cavalcade of fifteen men came riding out of the town. They did not look respectable. They seemed to have been in a fight and one wore a red ribbon in his buttonhole. "Shouting out a Spanish word of command, to which the six responded (by previous arrangement) with a roar that might have come from sixty, John stepped out into the road and covered the fifteen with his automatic. In obedience to his order, their hands immediately went up."

The man with the red ribbon was the local mayor. John and his men disarmed their opponents, collecting fifteen pistols, twelve knives and one sub-machine-gun. But what to do with the prisoners? Should he take them back to the town, or did that mean certain death? He decided to see what would happen there. The obvious dislike of the fifteen to return showed him he had done right, and conviction came when, as he approached, he saw the Franco flag fluttering in the breeze. He was greeted with enthusiasm, and whilst enduring it he heard a dull thud behind him. "Some hasty patriot had bumped off the Red mayor. . . . John did not ask for an explanation, but copious explanations were given him: this mayor was a Marxist and an anti-clerical.¹ He had shot all the priests in that town and incited his Bolshevik followers to wreck the church, and to chase the cloistered Franciscan nuns into the street, after stripping them naked. He had had the local chairman of the Accion Catolica soaked in petrol and burnt alive."

Don John's gallant adventure at Alconchel is typical of

¹ This is an example of Largo Caballero's conversion of the municipalities into Communist cells.

many another during this period. The story well illustrates the reason why Marxist leaders were liable to be shot when captured.

The tippet half of Estremadura, the province of Cáceres, was extremely important in view of the strong Marxist element in Badajoz. The total garrison in Cáceres, the capital of that province, was only some three hundred men. Thousands of citizens were listed for prison by the Red "authorities". Some of the Assault Guards had left for Madrid over night.

The proclamation of the State of War was made, and about a hundred soldiers went out into the streets. Within five minutes the whole of the revolutionary machinery which had been prepared on instructions from Madrid collapsed. The Civil and Assault Guards and *Carabineros* welcomed the proclamation, and the Civil Governor and the other centres surrendered without a shot being fired.

The Reds were furious, and a column of the militia was equipped to recover the town for the Government. And this gave rise to the battle of Villamesias. At this stage the number of men engaged in battles were small, and this was one of the biggest battles, and one of the most bloody defeats which the Government suffered. The moral effect also was tremendous, and Cáceres has seldom had anything to fear since that date.

Two thousand of the militia left Ciudad Real with the usual flamboyant titles, "the Invincibles", "the Squadron of Frightfulness". Some of this body tried to take Miajadas, but a scratch force of a hundred and eighty men, Civil Guards and local citizens, broke up their attack.

Another part of the column, with some fifteen lorries, accompanied by Press reporters, made for Cáceres through the Santa Cruz Pass, near Villamesias. Here they were met by one company of the 21st regiment, some Guards and Falangists. They found that a car had been placed across the road, and when the column pulled up to investigate there was a dreadful massacre. Over three hundred bodies remained on the scene, and few escaped unwounded. On the side of the Nationalists there was not a single casualty, and the whole thing was over in about ten minutes. Such was the battle of Villamesias, a small affair, but one which was of real military importance, and of the greatest moral effect.

The first and greatest accession of support for the Nationalists came from the Carlists of Navarre. It may seem strange,

an anachronism, that this party which apparently had as its cause the restoration of a king from the line of Don Carlos, who had disputed the throne with the Bourbons in 1837, should exist at all. But the Navarrese—a magnificent race of hardy mountaineers and agriculturalists—had a well-defined creed of religion, faith and tradition which marked them almost as a people apart, Catholics almost all, and conservative in the sense that they continued to be industrious, honest and religious, and averse to the “progress”—or change for the worse—that was sweeping over other parts of the country. Their loyalty to the lost cause was largely due to their seeking a rallying point when they disagreed with the tendencies elsewhere.

There was a second Carlist war in 1875; and when the movement, as such, was practically dead, the religious persecution by the Republican laws of 1931 once more gave a cohesion to the movement which spelt revolt against the alien theories and disorder whether the movement would end by restoring a descendant of Don Carlos or not.

On the first day of the movement the tocsin sounded, and, almost to a man, Navarre rose. Señor Fal Conde, their leader, told Harold Cardozo:

“During the first forty-eight hours of the movement we placed 20,000 young men, fully armed and equipped, at the disposal of General Mola, and we are raising other forces as fast as we can get arms for them.

“We Carlists, who stand for the old traditions,” he went on, “have made great but willing sacrifices. We have abandoned for the time being our idea of the restoration of an absolute Monarchy, but on the strict understanding that this movement is not to favour one or other of the different political parties, but is to establish authoritative government.”

We will also quote the words in which Señor Fal Conde explained to Mr. Cardozo the origins of the Nationalist Movement. For in England people do not fully appreciate facts which were patent to every well-informed Spaniard as to the forces at work in his country. “Moscow”, he said, “tried to instil Marxism and Communism in Spain so that the disease might spread to all other countries. We are going to drive it out of Spain. That is why we need an authoritative Government. When we destroy the common Front Government, we

will first save Spain and then all Europe from the deadly contagion of Bolshevism."¹

We have tried to give a broad picture of the events in the area where the Nationalist cause triumphed in the first days of the rising. The history of the Nationalist Navy is full of the same inspiration.

On July 18th, 1936, the strangest order ever sent out to its Fleet from a Government in power was issued by the Spanish Popular Front Government. It would be unbelievable if it were not true. *Orders were issued by the Ministry at Madrid calling on the crews to murder their officers and seize the vessels.* Not orders to certain selected petty officers and chosen men to take over the Fleet and maintain discipline so as to combat any raid the African Army might be able to make, but orders for an *organized outbreak of anarchy in the Fleet.* Communism was most rife among the wireless operators, the artificers and the petty officers. Most of the "lower deck" had genuine feelings of loyalty to their superior officers. There was considerable difficulty in making them carry out the Government order of massacre. Only the fact that they were Government orders resulted in their finally being carried out. Massacres started on most of the vessels and spread to the dockyard at Cartagena and El Ferrol and other naval ports. Only one-third of all the naval officers escaped with their lives.

The professional Russian agitators possibly guessed right in issuing these orders. There was a good understanding between the upper and lower deck in the Spanish Navy. Communism was not very prevalent among the able seamen; it was chiefly among the technical crews. Perhaps its object was to raise the necessary blood-lust—the basis of the "democratic" revolution, and ensure that there could be no turning back.

Once started, the foul job was thoroughly done. On the battleship *Jaime I*, the crew murdered their officers by fixing weights to their feet and throwing them into the sea. The subsequent record of this vessel is worthy of this commencement. Consistently she evaded engaging any Nationalist ship except the *Dato* when that small vessel attacked her. She attempted to bombard Algeciras, but most of the shells failed to explode because the crew did not know how to set the fuses.

1 Cardozo, *The March of a Nation*, p. 32.

At every port at which she touched, her crew left a record of bloodshed. In Malaga, Valencia and Almeria her name is a byword for incredible cruelty. The crew would take harmless people on board, carry them far out to sea, and fling them overboard. At Almeria they held the town to ransom. At Valencia they commandeered the best hotel and left the vessel unguarded at night. Her end was well in keeping with her ignoble record. Through the gross incompetence of her crew she blew up in Almeria harbour.

On the cruisers *Libertad* and *Cervantes* the officers were murdered and thrown overboard as they steamed from the Galician bases to the Straits; on the destroyer *Churruca* the officers were able first to help to bring over some troops from Morocco. On the destroyer *Barcaiztegui* the officers, having been arrested, were handed over to a tribunal at Malaga. They were shot. At Cartagena, where the officers of the other destroyers, submarines, and of *Valdes*¹ and *Lepanto* were imprisoned, they were taken out in batches and killed. The officers of *Valdes* had surrendered on the condition that their lives would be spared.

At Mahon, naval officers, as well as some army officers and civilians, about a hundred in all, were machine-gunned by the sailors.

But two small ships remained loyal, the destroyer *Velasco* at Ferrol and the gunboat *Dato* at Ceuta. They may be said to be the origin of the very efficient Nationalist Navy to-day.

At El Ferrol, Captain Francisco Moreno was stationed. For two days he led a few officers, some marines and volunteers in a desperate fight for Ferrol Dockyard. This was the chief naval harbour in the north. For not only were the battleship *España* and the cruiser *Almirante Cervera* lying there, but two new cruisers, *Canarias* and *Baleares*, lay on the stocks waiting completion.

El Ferrol itself changed hands half a dozen times. Sometimes the Red militia held it; sometimes it was recaptured by the Nationalists. In the dockyard the most appalling chaos reigned. Ships fought ships at a range of not more than a hundred yards. "The fore-turret of one ship might have a Red crew, and the rear turret might be controlled by the Nationalists. Crews might mutiny and capture a ship from

¹ Vide also Arthur Bryant, *The Communist Atrocities in Spain*, Second Report, pp. 21-3.




VICE-ADMIRAL
DOX MANUEL DE VIERXA

VICE-ADMIRAL
FRANCISCO MOREXO FERNANDEZ



ADMIRAL DON JUAN CERVERA, CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF



the Reds, and half an hour later the officers . . . might rally a scratch fighting party of stokers and recapture it."¹ On *Almirante Cervera* the Nationalists held control of two turrets and the foreward decks, the Reds the rest. *España*, entirely Red, was shelling her from the other side of the harbour.

"Four sallies were made by the Nationalists to reach the dock sluices to Boat *Cervera* sufficiently high in the water for her guns to be brought into action. Three times all the men were swept down by machine-gun fire from a Red position in the arsenal on shore, but the fourth time two young officers and two quartermasters succeeded." The mutiny on the *Cervera* was quelled, her guns were turned on *España*, and after a short fight the Red crew on the *España* surrendered.

After two hard days' fighting El Ferrol was won: the Nationalist Navy was born. They subdued the mutiny on *Almirante Cervera* and released the imprisoned officers, of whom, by some strange chance, only two had been killed. They did the same on *España*, which had lost more officers. Within two days *España*, manned by a volunteer crew, was bombarding Santander.

El Ferrol dockyard was taken over, and work restarted at once. Every effort was made to push forward the completion of *Canarias* and *Baleares*. A year had been the estimate to finish their construction, but within one month the *Canarias* was fitted for sendee, and three months later *Baleares* took the sea as well. Another base was formed at Cadiz. Here lay the gunboats *Canovas* and *Lauria*. Soon they were joined by the gallant little *Dato*, which had run from Ceuta, and two monitors, *Alcazar* and *Larache*.

Opposed to this diminutive fleet was the Government fleet, fifteen times greater in number, tonnage and equipment. Their strength was one battleship, three cruisers, ten destroyers, one torpedo boat, one gunboat and eight submarines.²

Such are the effects of mutiny in a navy that the Nationalists finally succeeded in " bottling up " their opponents, in spite of the unequal tonnage. Many competent British naval authorities have remarked on the high efficiency of the small Nationalist Fleet, brought into being by Admiral Francisco

* Cardozo, *The March of a Nation*, p. 16.

¹ *Daily Telegraph*, September 29th, 1936. Other authorities state fifteen destroyers and ten submarines. We have taken the lower figure.

Moreno and Vice-Admiral Juan Cervera. The first naval engagement which it fought was on August 5th, 1936. A part of the African Army had to be transported that day from Larache. Two mail steamers, *Ciudad de Alicante* and *Ciudad de Cadiz*, the steamer *Arango* and the tug *Benot* carried them. Their sole protection was the gallant gunboat *Dato* and a monitor of little fighting value, *Uad-Kert*. *Benot* soon lagged so far behind that she had to return to Larache.

At five in the afternoon the enemy was sighted. *Alcala Galiano*, one of the most modern destroyers of the Red fleet, appeared to head off the convoy. What *Dato* had to face in the appearance of this vessel alone, quite apart from any supporting craft, can be seen by a comparison of the two boats. *Alcala* had an average speed of twenty-six knots against *Dato*'s thirteen; *Alcala* mounted five five-inch guns capable of firing a broadside at over 16,000 yards; *Dato* had only four four-inch guns ranging up to only 8,000 yards. *Alcala* had six torpedo-tubes; *Dato* had none.

Alcala opened the battle. The shooting, directed at the transports, was wild at first, but soon the range was found. *Dato* then dashed out on a very gallant adventure. To save the convoy, her commander left the line and attacked *Alcala* in the hope of drawing her fire. The manoeuvre succeeded. *Alcala* turned and concentrated on *Dato*, which was apparently doomed, in spite of superior gunnery. Soon, however, some seaplanes came to the help of the little gunboat, and the *Alcala* broke off the fight and fled.

Not long after this episode the destroyer *Velasco* and two armed tugs, *Galicia* and *Ciricia*, patrolling off Santander, ran up against the Red submarine D.6. *Velasco* was several miles distant when the tugs found I.6. But they did not wait for her assistance. They wirelessed her the news and attacked at once. Fourteen men were knocked out before *Velasco* arrived. Two direct hits from the destroyer and D.6 surrendered. *Velasco* saved thirty-nine out of the forty-one members of the crew and took them to El Ferrol.

Meanwhile *Almirante Cervera* and the newly commissioned *Canarias* were holding the northern seas and established a stranglehold on the Biscay ports. The command of the southern seas, however, had become of grave importance. Quietly the two vessels set out for the Straits, which were carefully patrolled by the Red fleet. Under cover of night *Cervera*

slipped into the Straits while *Canarias* kept guard outside. And it was *Canarias* which found the "fun". She sighted a destroyer, *Almirante Ferrandiz*, and opened fire at long range, hoping to seize her opponent intact. But the destroyer put on all speed, and aided by a smoke-screen, rushed for safety. *Canarias* was then compelled to shoot to sink. In three minutes the battle was over. In flames, the destroyer started to sink, its oil-bunkers exploding as it went down. *Canarias* and the French steamer *Koutoubia*, between them, saved fifty out of the hundred and sixty-five crew.

Cervera surprised another destroyer, *Gravina*. Once again the smaller boat sought refuge in speed. *Cervera* registered three direct hits. But *Gravina* managed, a lame duck, to reach Casablanca Harbour, later to be towed to Cartagena dockyard, though she has not since been to sea. The Red fleet had learnt its lesson. It retired to Cartagena and has seldom made its appearance outside that harbour.

As in the Army and Navy, so in the Air Force the seizure of that moment when courage determines the issue helped the Nationalists to gain the few aerodromes and planes with which they started the war. Leon is a typical and dramatic case in point. The troops, led by certain N.C.O.s, declared for the Red Government and imprisoned Major Rubio, the officer commanding, and the other officers and three men. All Sunday was spent discussing what they should do with their prisoners. Ultimately they decided to shoot them on the following morning.

They brought them out and put them against a wall for execution. But Major Rubio stepped out of the line. "You cannot shoot these men," he said. "The blame is entirely mine, if it is a fault to love my country! I gave them orders. As good soldiers they had to obey. If you must, shoot me. I am ready. But spare them."

His words and the courage he displayed had such an effect on the soldiers that they threw down their arms and came over to their officers, crying, "*Viva Espana!*"

Thus Leon aerodrome was won for the Nationalist cause.

At the time of the rising the Spanish Air Force consisted of about 300 machines of all kinds. Of these 230 fell into Red hands. At one time the Nationalists only held 40. Most of the airmen who might have supported the Nationalist rising were killed out of hand at Red aerodromes. These were

mostly pilots, so that the Red air force started with a great preponderance of machines but few men trained for air fighting. These few were soon killed off, and, since that time, the Red air force has been almost entirely dependent on foreign pilots.

On the other side, General Kindelan had to build up an entirely new force. The principal bases had fallen into Red hands: Madrid, with the military aerodromes of Getafe and Cuatro Vientos, and the excellent civil aerodromes at Barajas, Barcelona and Los Alcazares, by Cartagena. The naval station close to this latter aerodrome, San Javier, declared for the Nationalists, but was soon taken by the Red air force. The Nationalists only held the smaller stations at Granada, Logrono, Leon and Morocco. They also soon captured the Tablada aerodrome at Seville.

Of Nieuport chasers the Reds nominally had thirty-odd against the Nationalists' three, but the adverse balance was reduced as a number of the pilots flew their machines over to join the Nationalists. (In one case two of them, thinking that Valencia had declared for the Nationalists, flew there and were made prisoners.) In scouting planes the Government held an overwhelming superiority. In one station alone, at Getafe, they had more scouts than the whole total held by the Nationalists in Spain and Morocco. In light single-seaters the Reds had almost a complete monopoly. They had fifty de Havilland D.H.gs, Douglasses, Fokkers, Dragons and a Ford. Although many of these were commercial planes, they used them as bombers. They had three Hawker Fury Chasers and six Gipsy Major single-seaters, also twenty-seven Vickers Amphibians against none on the Nationalist side.

Most of the hydroplanes were also at the disposal of the Red Government. They had thirty-six Savoia scouts compared with five; five Dornier Wais against three at Cadiz. They had also ten Macchi-18 instructional machines and six old Martinside chasers. They had also an autogyro at Cuatro Vientos.

There were no modern anti-aircraft guns, and there was an even division of the few old models in Spain. The Red Government had one group of 1918 Skoda 8 mm. guns at Madrid, the Nationalists a similar equipment at Zaragoza.

The Government soon had foreign pilots, to whom they offered high pay, and in the early stages they had a great

superiority of machines in the air. But the Spanish Army pilots with the Nationalists more than made up for this difference by their high quality when it came to aerial combat. The Government's superiority in numbers was evidenced chiefly by unrestricted bombing of towns behind the lines, of which we give a few details in our later pages.

Very early machines were being acquired by both sides, for Spain does not produce internal combustion engines, and they had therefore to come from abroad. The Government received machines at first from all parts, and especially from France, followed soon after by machines from Russia. The Nationalists turned to Italy first, and then to Germany. The "grouping" was the same as in Spain—the Communists against those who had refused to bow to the Communist yoke. And as the fast military machines required men trained to use them, the pilots were mostly foreign on both sides. The Nationalists, however, had fewer foreign pilots than the Reds, for they had more trained flying officers, and they trained many more. Speaking broadly, it may be said that very large numbers of the pilots on the Nationalist side were German and Italian, for the obvious reasons mentioned above, but not by any means so many as our Press so consistently suggested. In proof of this statement are the following figures:

Spanish Nationalist airmen killed before the end of 1936	29
Spanish Nationalist airmen killed in the first half of 1937	25
Spanish Nationalist airmen killed in the second half of 1937	-34
 Total to 31st December, 1937	 88

Their names and the dates of their deaths are given in *Spain*, issue No. 17 (January 25th, 1938).

Foreign observers express the highest praise for the Spanish pilots, who have very greatly distinguished themselves by their bravery and that essential to good aerial fighting, the rapid "personal coefficient of reaction". One of their aces, Señor Haya, was recently killed; he had a record second only to Señor Garcia Morato's as regards the number of enemy planes accounted for by an individual airman, irrespective of nationality.

We have left the consideration of what happened in the great Catalan capital of Barcelona until now, as it affords the most typical example of a city dominated by Soviet influence, and because it demonstrates the intimate connection between deliberate murder and Soviet propaganda. In the last week of July the cautious *Times* correspondent reports:

"The anti-fascist revolution in Barcelona has become a reign of terror . . . with the searching of houses by 'purification' squads, the seizure of individuals or whole families, and their subsequent assassination in lonely spots and the murder of priests and nuns."¹ "On the morning of 27th July five Dominican nuns were found to have been shot in a suburb of Barcelona: they had been lured out on a promise of safety: their bodies were found in the undergrowth of the roadside. 'Purification' squads visited the house of Señor Salvans three times seeking for 'Fascists'; as none were found, on the third visit the family of eight were taken away and shot dead. Sixteen lay nursing brothers were taken from the largest hospital in Barcelona and murdered. On the Rabassala road, every morning during the last week in July, were found the bodies of a dozen or more persons who had disappeared from their homes or had been taken from them by search committees. The slaughter of the living was accompanied by the derision of the dead. During that last week in July an English eye-witness saw the bodies of nuns exhumed from their graveyards and propped up against the outside wall of the convent with offensive labels: then men and women danced round them. Again, an Englishwoman saw a church burnt by the Reds, who killed a priest, cut off his arms and legs, and hung the corpse from a statue of the Virgin. Another English witness records how a priest was hanged in Barcelona, and before he was dead he was stabbed through the body and a crucifix was put through him."³

Two months after the Civil War broke out, General Dimitrov, whose proud titles are Secretary of the Third Communist International, Supreme Chief of the World League of the Godless, which includes (1) the League of Militant Atheists (note the word "militant") and (2) the World League of Free Thinkers, said:

"We are reproached with destroying the churches and

¹ *The Times*, 1st August, 1936.

³ Godden, *Conflict in Spain*, p. 72.

convents of Spain. What does the destruction of a few convents and churche matter world? - S WhCn We are Out to ^ate a n°w e

Mr. Theo Rogers, the famous American newspaper man, who was for six months in Barcelona *during this period*, gives a vivid account of the start of the rising in Barcelona, where he 'watched one of the principal struggles under the balcony of the house in which he was staying. He tells how the Communists asked the soldiers why they were fighting against them, and how, after some argument, the soldiers went over to the Red side. Then, as allies, the soldiers and the Communists beat to death a young officer who had been in charge of the soldiers.

The last resistance was at the Hotel Colon, where a few Nationalists still held out. Big guns were brought up, and the hotel shelled from fifty feet. "After half a dozen shots . . . the defenders gave in. They were led off to prison as prisoners of war.

"But not for long. . . . The defenders of the Hotel Colon faced a firing-squad not long after or were murdered.

"And thus ended the battle of Barcelona with complete defeat of the poorly organized Army forces. The same tale was told throughout Catalonia and with much the same savagery.

"A war which, as I write, was to drag on into its ninth month, touched Catalonia for twenty-four hours. Since then there has been no warfare in that state, save for the savage and relentless persecution of those suspected of any leanings towards the Right. The death roll in this region *where there has been no war zone since 19th July, 1936, ^as probably reached as high a figure as a list of all soldiers killed on the Spanish battlefields.*"²

The total figure of executions and assassinations in Barcelona, up to about the end of 1937» officially agreed by the French, American and British Governments, is 50,000 on a "conservative estimate". Valencia can only boast 30,000 victims.

We cannot leave the story of Barcelona without reference to a very great Spaniard. General Goded, who first declared Majorca for the Nationalist cause, then flew to ^{of all} ^{1*}

¹ Perc van Rooy, quoted by the *Catholic Herald*, 1st February, 1938.

³ Rogers, *Spain: A Tragic Journey*, p. 38,

Barcelona to raise the Nationalist flag there, well knowing that the result must almost certainly be death. Like Captain Mola, at the dictates of his conscience he attempted the impossible for the good of Spain.

At his trial he was completely impassive. His only speech in reply to the oratory of the tribunal was:

"I know you are going to shoot me. Why not get it over and stop all this nonsense?"


To pass to another part of the country. Of Santander, the famous French author, Marcel Dutrey, reports:

"Of the 11,000 people assassinated in this province,¹ 3,000 were assassinated at Cabo Mayor. Here was the terrace of the lighthouse, where the victims were made to dance and sing with the encouragement, 'Make us laugh and your life will be spared.' They were eventually pushed over the side, with their feet tied to a stone. Disorder and dirt were everywhere: and in the grounds round the lighthouse were signs of what had taken place—empty pocket-books, clothing, garments soaked in blood, women's clothing, etc., etc. . . . The lighthouse keeper had gone mad."

M. Dutrey adds that prisoners "were allowed to write to their relatives, on condition only that they asked for money. It never reached them, of course, but at least it prolonged their lives. On 27th December, four hand-grenades were thrown into the prison in Corridor No. 1, six hand-grenades in No. 3. Nine were killed and eleven wounded. The warders then announced that reprisals had finished for the day."

"At Castro Urdiales", M. Dutrey also records, "the Military Commandant was an ex-municipal policeman who had been dismissed for robbery. The Chief of Police was, by profession, a seller of obscene photographs. The Public Accuser was the son of a woman of the streets, known as 'Son-of-his-mother'. The revolutionary tribunal was presided over by a miner assisted by two 'assessors', sadists who themselves carried out the sentences they pronounced. Their victims were numerous. Vicente Mura, whose stomach they opened; Julio Yanko, martyred in the market-place; Varez, the racing motorist, who, because he refused to denounce his friends, was dismembered by hand-grenades by a certain Penă, son of the local prosecutor. . . ."

¹ The figure is now known to be nearer 15,000. (Cf. General Grove's article in the *Observer*, 24th October, 1937.)



CABO MAYOR, SANTANDER

THE CAPE OF DEATH. THE REDS FLUNG 3,000 VICTIMS FROM HERE INTO THE SEA

facing age 250



In the south-west of Spain, when the Nationalist troops occupied villages in the areas where the Reds had held sway they found the same almost unvaried tale of diabolical brutality. Mr. Arthur Bryant describes one of the crimes which led him to accede to the request that he should write the preface to a fully evidenced and authenticated list of atrocities which was officially prepared. "No university lecturer or anonymous B.B.C. commentator", he writes, "has told the just and compassionate people of England about the women of San Martin de Valdeiglesias.

"Each of them was condemned to be violated and to satiate every vile passion of twenty-five ruffians each. With some of the unfortunate women the fact that their mothers were present or their fathers already imprisoned and under sentence of death was not sufficient to dissuade the Red militiamen from carrying out the sentence. The horror of the hours suffered by these victims has had terrible effects on their minds, and they relate how they again and again implored their executioners a thousand times to kill them rather than submit to such dreadful dishonour. The appalling cruelty of such atrocities can be realized by the fact that many of these unfortunate women were married, and when they were conducted between militiamen before this pitiless tribunal they were carrying children in their arms, and these were witnesses of this culmination of horror in the dishonour of their mothers."¹

Azuaga (province of Badajoz) was one of the typical cases. Between 18th July and 24th September, the Communists committed a hundred and five murders "and sacked the homes of every law-abiding man in the place. Their crimes began with the murder of Don Placido Duran Alejandre, whom they wounded seriously with a revolver shot. At the end of ten days, during which time they forbade him to receive medical treatment, the man died after terrible sufferings."

"At nightfall the prisoners were taken out one by one and subjected to blows with clubs, pieces of iron and of other metal and the like. A witness narrates the manner in which one of the victims, who had received a terrible head wound, was 'cured' by the Reds: with jeers they applied dung to the injury. Needless to say the wound became badly infected."

Twenty-five prisoners faced firing-squads in the cemetery,

¹ *The Communist Atrocities in Spain, Second and Third Reports*, p. vi.

but as their murderers were poor shots very often they were left wounded. "In consequence there have been instances of individuals being buried alive. . . . Another victim was forcibly castrated before he was shot."¹

There is no suggestion, of course, that any of these victims were guilty of insurrection, justified or otherwise. Their crime was that they were ordinary decent citizens. If we give also the case of Burguillos del Cerro (province of Badajoz), it is merely to give the details in a specific case of what was a common type of occurrence. When they heard that the Nationalists' army was approaching, the Red mob took to flight, taking with them thirty-two prisoners, "whose bodies were later discovered at a place called 'El Ponton' From the examination of the bodies made by the doctors . . . it was evident that these poor victims suffered physical agony at their hands before they were finally shot or, as happened in some cases, stoned to death. Three or four of them bore unmistakable signs of having been burned alive, while other bodies were in a mutilated condition as a result of numerous hatchet and knife blows which had been inflicted on them. Nearly all their heads had been battered in, and their legs and arms were broken."²

At Granja de Torrehermosa, quite a small place in the province of Badajoz, seventy-six people were murdered, and forty-two from the neighbouring village of Fuenteovejuna. Amongst the appalling cases recorded, one of the worst was of two ladies, Dña Piedad and Dña Ventura de Llera. They were accused of having a wireless set and listening to Seville. Both of their husbands had already been killed. "During their imprisonment they were obliged in the daytime to sweep their dirty cells, amid the insults and jeers of their jailers, and during the night they were taken out to the prison courtyard and ordered to march up and down so as to prevent them from sleeping. In order to increase their anguish they were repeatedly told they would be shot. On 24th September, the day the Communist leaders fled the village, they were released and allowed to go home. They had scarcely been a few minutes in Dña Piedad's home when two or three Communists broke in and tried to take them back to prison, but in the end they were satisfied with stealing their jewels.

¹ 77ie Communist Atrocities in Spain, pp. 12-13.
² Ibid., p. 17.

" little ter n with Pistol la Thpafi Ot?er Com munist la Gala^the ladii' aci, ^T¹ he met Was Don Sebastian de had just suffered the a ui ?*? W*S.eighty years old and who by Communes. Th^C SI of SCeing . his three sons murdered nLnl nnH^S• Communists pointed at him with his pistol and said, 'ou are a Fascist.' I am a very old man,' said Don Sebastian And without another word the Red criminal shot him dead. ... A few minutes later the same Communist returnee with another and . . . began shooting in all directions. The ladies, who with other relatives were hiding in a cellar, cried out begging them not to shoot, as with them were children whose father had already been shot by the Reds. The Communists answered their cries for pity, telling the two ladies to come out of the cellar, which they did, while begging them to spare their lives. The assassins pretended to listen to their entreaties and turned to go. But they had scarcely crossed the threshold when one came back, went down to the cellar, lined them all up against the wall and shot them down. . . . The following persons were murdered thus with Doña Piedad and Doña Ventura: their sister, Doña Felisa, an invalid forty-three years old, and her daughter, two faithful servants, Encarna, a little girl, daughter of one of the servants, Mary' de la Gala (six years old), and another daughter of Doña Felisa was seriously wounded."

It is pointed out in the preface to these books that the wide geographical distribution, and the simultaneousness of these happenings, *is alone conclusive evidence of their organized nature.*

Apart from the specimen reports of events in Iviza, Cartagena, Toledo, Avila, Caceres and Malaga, the seventy-one places where the 3,462 people were assassinated in the most unspeakable manner were all small villages in the provinces of Badajoz, Huelva and Seville, and a small part of Cordoba.

Of what happened a little farther to the north—for the above official lists covered only a comparatively small part of Spain—the story is the same. The Rev. T. Toni has giyen a very conscientious account of what was found in the Diocese of Avila in his book *Iconoclasts and Martyrs*. The reports cover from San Pedro de Arenas to the regions by Oropesa, the Tietar Valley, Casaviejo, and Burgohondo.

The mere list of the villages which were the scenes of the appalling tragedies covers approximately two and a half pages.

It is not possible to read this authentic record—the towns may be visited and verification obtained by anyone who cares to do so—without a feeling of nausea and violent indignation. Perhaps the best example of “ government for the people and by the people ” is what is reported of Cebreros.

The occupations of the victims at Cebreros at the hands of the F.A.I. patrols on the 5th October, 1936, were as follows: milk roundsman, commercial clerk, goat herd, parish priest, two quarrymen, bar-tender, engineer student, workman on the roads, workman, carpenter, baker, commercial clerk, clerk, workman, tobacco-store tender, barber, blacksmith, workman, property owner, tinsmith, baker, merchant, workman, workman, quarryman, workman, bootmaker, goat herd, merchant, student, innkeeper, innkeeper, workman, workman, shepherd, two butchers, five workmen, music master. A very representative list, this classic example of Communist “ democracy ”,

Can one wonder at the vehemence of General Queipo de Llano, whose troops daily came upon such scenes, when he calls them “ Canada! Canada Marxista! ! ”?

The cases we have mentioned were mostly in villages or small towns. The most terrible example of the revolution was Madrid. It is difficult to obtain exact figures of the number of victims in the capital city.¹ Up to mid-November 1936 the morgues boasted of 35,000 victims.² It may be assumed that for every body taken to a morgue, two were left to rot outside. We know that the “ officials ”, from prudence (!) or boredom, ceased to keep a record of victims over 45,000, giving a number instead of an exact description for a while, and then giving up any account at ad. We also know that pains were taken in many cases to hide the identity of the victims, as they did in Valencia, either by mutilating the faces of the victims, or by shooting them away. It is, in our view, a fair and conservative assumption that at least 20% of the total population of Madrid have been ruthlessly destroyed because their political views did not coincide with those of the Madrid “ representatives ” of the existing Government. And needless to say this holocaust was carried out in the name of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.

In Madrid the Spanish flag was little displayed, but there

¹ The French, American and British Government official returns slate 60,000 victims in the Madrid area on a “ conservative estimate ”,

² This figure, apart from other corroboration, was published in the Madrid papers and *Solidaridad Obrera*, as a warning—or encouragement.

were many anniversaries
 Children became young Communists, uniformed and disciplined. They and their elders were trained in military exercises by someone.

Viva el Soviet.

"In short, in this chaotic Government, there was some group with a unity of purpose. Discovery among militant Communists and anarchists of documents and plans showed later that a carefully schemed plot was being matured for an outbreak which would upset even the central Government of Madrid and establish a Soviet dictatorship."¹

The terrible feature of this Madrid reign of terror was the "design" which actuated it. It may well be taken in the Soviet future professional revolutionary training schools as a perfect model—a text-book of practical improvements on the previous theoretical instructions. Doubtless in the centres, usually designated by the same name "Marx House", where, in unsuspecting countries, plans are being perfected for "the Revolution", the experience gained in Madrid is not wasted.

Mr. Theo Rogers indicates the agents:

"... In August. Following the flood of materials (Russian), including troops and officers, there came to Madrid Nir. Moses Rosenberg, Moscow's Ambassador, and to Barcelona Antoneff Avseenko, ex-officer of the Czar, whose brilliant career is in sharp contrast with the consular office he holds—unless he has been charged with some more important mission. And, of course, he is; for to-day (May 1937) Avseenko is in charge of the Catalan Red Army and Rosenberg was, until January, the *Czar of Madrid*."²

The last stages of the "design" were entered upon as soon as the Popular Front seized power in February 1936. Popular tribunals were set up to inquire into the "victimization" of those workers who had been dismissed from their employment for incompetence, theft, sabotage or political propaganda. Workmen were compelled to be taken back, and wages paid for the whole of the time since they had been dismissed. Those wages did not find their way into the workmen's pockets. The money went to swell the coffers of the Communists' and syndicalists' organizations, so that the *money could be used against those who had been made to pay, through propaganda and the purchase of arms*. This was

1 Theo Rogers, *Spain: A Tragic Journey*.

* Ibid., p. 191.

"good Communism"—Lenin always recommended that the *bourgeois* should pay for its own destruction—but it also had another importance in *assisting to break up* "capitalism", as many firms were ruined by the millions of pesetas in which they were mulcted. They were being systematically ruined, in any case; but this method secured their funds for "the Party" before the bankruptcy.

With the rising came the second move inspired by the Comintern's representatives—the arming of the people. The result has been well confessed to Theo Rogers by a Government official: "*Henios armado la furia y se ha echado a la calle*"—We armed fury and it has erupted in the streets. From that moment, no central government existed, or was meant to exist. The city was in the hands of the Red mob and the Chekas¹ got to work. The cinema was used to inflame the minds of the "comrades". Control was only exercised to fan the flames of hatred. Mr. Moses Rosenberg carried out his work very thoroughly.

"It was not only the anarchists . . . but the 'governmentals' without distinction who must assume the responsibility for the violence," says Clara Campoamor, "and it was the Government who facilitated the arms to the mob for the purpose, without ensuring that they were for use at the front."² The result was clearly to be foreseen. "The Government were powerless to stop it," indulgently writes an authority who was nearly a victim himself during this time.³ "It tried to keep it in hand and only made it worse because, by appointing Government representatives on the CHEKAS, it authorized and took a direct part in the murders of thousands of innocent people."

"The procedure of the militia and of these Popular Tribunals or Chekas was as follows: At the beginning, parties of militia belonging to one of the political or syndicalist organizations went about the streets and entered houses at any hour of the day or night. If anyone dared not to admit them they used their rifle butts or hatchets to break in, and then showed no mercy to the inmates. They went in search, and search they did, thoroughly. If they found the slightest thing which they considered incriminating or which in their view

¹ Note the use of this sinister Russian word, which was openly used in all parts—Asturias, Santander, Madrid, Catalonia, etc.

² Clara Catnpoamor, *La Revolution Espagnole vue par tine Republicaine*.

³ Luiz de Fonteriz, *Red Terror in Madrid*, pp. 10-11.

indicated the house-owners' sympathies with the Right, they arrested all the men there, and very often the women and children too*. Sometimes the reason for an arrest was the finding of old Right newspapers, a rosary or a crucifix, portraits of some politician, religious pictures—in fact any pretext for detaining the inmates and being then able to steal everything in the house.

"It would be safe to say that no one in the whole of Madrid has escaped a search of some kind, either by the unattached militia or by those controlled by the Government itself.

"This thorough combing of the inhabitants was made possible through the efforts of the workers' organizations, which in the last five years have been compelling a register of all the residents of Madrid, divided into districts, quarters, blocks and houses, floor by floor. *This terrible work has been greatly assisted by the union of concierges or house janitors.*

"Everything that has happened in Madrid shows that the police and the militia eventually became one and the same thing, and that the Government first of all and the Council of Defence later had no authority of any kind, or, what is worse, condoned the atrocities committed by the others."¹

There were, it may be said, the Popular Tribunals, the courts of justice, where trials took place.

"Those who were not shot outright were taken to one of the countless prisons² run by the militia, established in all the sequestered buildings, especially in palaces, offices, churches, monasteries and convents. There, after several days' detention . . . they were subjected to an interrogation—which was generally a farce—and the Tribunal decided at once whether the unfortunate individual was to be released or killed. However, even if one had the good fortune to be acquitted, that did not mean safety, for the released prisoner was liable to be killed by the militiamen at the door if they did not agree with the sentence. They just seized the victim and, in their own words, 'took him for a ride'.³

"These courts are not bound by any rules at all. They lay down the law in their verdicts. What they say is a crime becomes a crime, and deserves the punishment they inflict. The degree of guilt is whatever they choose to make it. Their

* de Fonteriz, *ibid., passim.*

³ We deal later with the subject of the "private prisons".

³ *Pasco*, or *pascito*.

sole object is to satisfy the masses who want blood to flow all the time, justly or unjustly."

General statements are bald without the colour of the particular examples of which we will therefore give a few.

Two anarchists confessed to a doctor and Mr. Knoblaugh how they suspected two coal carriers of being priests, and found their suspicions true.

"The two *canalla*, admitting they were *curas*, then got down on their knees and began to pray us to spare their lives. But we took them to the side of the road and handed them shovels.

"‘We dig no graves for *caciques*,’ I told them. ‘Get busy.’

"They were so nervous they couldn’t dig very fast in the hard ground, so after they had gone down a couple of feet and we got tired watching them, we gave them the *paseito*. But, of course, we had a little fun with them first."

"This ‘fun’, it seemed, had consisted in emasculating the priests and then, after shooting them down, forcing the severed organs into the dying victims’ mouths."¹

Señor de Fonteriz relates another incident. The militia wanted information as to where a certain Army officer was hidden. They arrested his wife, and other women in whose house she was living. Eight female prisoners in all. They were taken for investigation to a large private house. The maidservants were left in a room to themselves. It is one of these maids who records what happened.

"At midnight the ladies went one by one to a sitting-room close by, to be questioned. The maid did not know exactly what had happened to them, but she heard terrible screams from the sitting-room, and she also gathered, from words overheard, that the ladies were being tortured by having long pins driven through their breasts because they refused to say where the husband was hiding."²

Then came the period of the Casa de Campo, where the daily total of *fiambres*³ averaged two hundred' to start with and afterwards fell to half that number.

"One young executioner, a lad whom I had known for years, told me about the killing of a priest who had been

¹ Knoblaugh, *Correspondent in Spain*, p. 87.

² de Fonteriz, *Red Terror in Madrid*, pp. 19-20.

³ Literal translation, "cold meat".

⁴ Mr. Knoblaugh relates how once at the morgue "the scrawny old morgue-keeper with her toothless grin said, *Business is poor, boys, only eighty to-day.' "

suspected of the awful crime of conducting clandestine Mass.

"They took him out with groups of others to be killed on successive nights," the youth told me. "We would place him last. When it came to his turn we would put him back in the car and take him to the *Bellas Artes* again.¹ Each night he thought he was to die, but a quick death was too good for him. That *finite* died seven deaths before we finally shot him."²

This was, no doubt, one of the lads trained by the Spanish Revolutionary Youth Association who used to parade the streets to the strains of the "hymn":

"We are the sons of the Revolution,
We are the sons of Liberty,
With us comes the dawning
Of the new) humanity..."

(The italics are ours.)

With their usual characteristic thoroughness the Red apologists and propagandists have ascribed the looting terror and wholesale murdering to "uncontrollables"—an easy formula which, at first sight, would seem a safe line of defence. But, apart from the many other known proofs of the organization, it must be pointed out that the lives of foreigners were rigidly respected. The few exceptions only prove the rule, for they were foreigners who had learned too much and might arouse the world's conscience, like the young Secretary of the Belgian Embassy, Baron de Borchgrave, whom they therefore assassinated. Scrupulous respect for foreign property, whether in houses or even in the looted banks, was also similarly laid down in order not to alienate foreign opinion at this stage of the revolution. But that alone is proof of the complicity of the authorities in the organized excesses, over which control thus could be, and was, exercised when they so desired. The "uncontrollables" were the Government itself engaged, in a policy of "liquidation" of "enemies of the proletariat", i.e. of the Third International.

The objects and methods of this classic Reign of Terror were as simple and direct as the Soviet plans always are. Firstly, there was the raising of the blood-lust. Secondly, the extermination of those who might be suspected of mental

i. *The Bellas Artes*, the Building of Fine Arts, was the principal Government supernumerary prison.

² Knoblaugh, *Correspondent in Spain*, p. 74*

opposition " to Communism. Thirdly, the breaking down of (the old) *central authority* and the destruction of capitalism and the ownership of private property.

To assist the programme, public opinion was crushed—and it was made.

It was squashed in this way. "The day following the assassination of Calvo Sotelo, 112 of Spain's foremost lawyers had signed a protest against 'lawless killings' in general, but specifically citing the Calvo incident. Later those who had signed were ordered to be arrested and tried. Their protest had been interpreted as an express of sympathy for the Rightist cause. Only 69 of the 112 could be found, however. The rest had either already met their death or fled the country. The 69 succeeded in establishing their innocence of the charges and were acquitted. A number of them never reached their homes. Their bodies were found at the morgue."¹

And public opinion was made. "The newspapers have poisoned the whole atmosphere, which was already tense in Madrid. By giving exaggerated or invented accounts of alleged or actual cruelties committed by the insurgents in their territory, they *have driven the mob to take reprisals*. The newspapers, therefore, deserve a great part of the blame for the martyrdom of Madrid."²

The principal Madrid newspaper was *El Sol*, the organ of "The Party", with the same symbol, the hammer and sickle, as it uses throughout the world.

The "Government" also did not fail to consider foreign opinion. But sometimes the idea was clumsy. Take the strange case of the bombing of the British Embassy in Madrid.

"That night we in Madrid all heard *only one plane* overhead; the noise of the engine was quite distinct, as it was manoeuvring for some time above us at no great height. Although the machine itself was not seen, its presence was marked by the enormous number of rockets sent up from the sites of the anti-aircraft batteries. Then we heard the explosion of two or three bombs which it dropped. Immediately afterwards it disappeared.

"The strangest part of the affair was that although that machine was over Madrid for some time and all the batteries were on the alert and sending up rockets, *not a single rifle or*

¹ Knoblaugh, *Correspondent in Spain*, p. 79.
² de Fontcriz, *Red Terror in Madrid*, pp. a»j.

gun was fired.¹ This was directly contrary to the usual custom of blindly wasting ammunition as soon as the noise of the hostile machine was heard.

"If to this be added the situation at that moment in diplomatic circles, it will be readily understood that the Government of Valencia itself was strongly suspect of having ordered these bombs to be dropped on the British Embassy."² That "strong suspicion is" known in all well-informed circles as a certain fact.³

One of the most notorious examples of the unscrupulous and callous methods of the Valencia Government to conceal the true position occurred in connection with an International Red Cross protest to the League of Nations. The Defence Council of Madrid, whose meetings at that time had the benefit of the counsels of the Canadian-Russian "General" Kleber, decided to reduce the prison population of the city. Prisoners were to be divided into three classes. The innocent were to be tried quickly by the prison militia or by the so-called "Guard Courts", and, in the unlikely result of acquittal, released immediately. The second group, against whom no very serious charges were made, were to be taken away from Madrid and tried by the Popular Tribunals. The third group was "to include all prisoners against whom there was some serious accusation *or IUIIO were suspected*, from their names, previous occupation, profession, etc., of being enemies of the present regime. They were to be shot at once, without trial."⁴*

This decision was not only ratified by the Valencia Government, but they themselves created another Council called the "Delegate Defence Council of Madrid". "In this way the Valencia Government gave permission to a few unknown persons to do as they liked with thousands of prisoners. Within a month of that ratification "a large number of persons had been sent to jail at Alcala de Henares, several hundred had been set at liberty, and more than 1,500 had been shot without trial".

The Diplomatic Corps and the International Red Cross were powerless to prevent this infamy. But, no doubt, in an attempt to restrain to some extent similar inhuman conduct

¹ We have had ample private confirmation, including that the anti-aircraft batteries had orders not to open fire.

² de Fonteriz, *Red Terror in Madrid*, pp. b7-8.

³ Cf. Knoblaugh's conversation with a British diplomatic official.

⁴ de Fonteriz, *ibid.*

in the future by the moral force of world opinion they obtained, with great difficulty, details of the facts, and made a report upon them. As Alvarez del Vayo, the Minister of State of the Valencia Government, had asked for a meeting of the League of Nations for the purpose of denouncing the atrocities committed by the Nationalist "rebels" in their territories, the International Red Cross arranged to send their report to Geneva. Dr. Henny, the Swiss representative of the International Red Cross in Spain, offered to take the documents himself to Geneva.

Two days before the meeting of the League he set out in the French passenger mailplane from Barajas aerodrome at 8 a.m., accompanied by several other travellers, including the French journalist, M. Delapree.

The machine was attacked by warplanes and brought down, its occupants wounded. With big headlines the Red Press loosed their indignation against General Franco, whose aeroplanes they accused of "this terrible breach of international law committed by the enemies of France, etc." But the truth was soon known, though it was hushed up in the English Press. As soon as the French plane left Barajas, two Russian planes belonging to the Valencia Government (some two hundred of these had just been received in Spain) rose from the same aerodrome and manoeuvred near the French machine for some time. The passengers and the pilot himself, as he afterwards stated, never dreamed of any attack. They even waved handkerchiefs to the occupants of the warplanes. Suddenly one of these opened fire with a machine-gun. The pilot, realizing that he was being attacked, for bullets pierced his plane and wounded some of the passengers, made a hurried landing. The machine capsized and one of the women passengers had her arm broken. . . .

"Dr. Henny, who was hit in the foot, was taken to the Red Cross Hospital in Madrid, where he recovered in a fortnight. The French journalist, M. Delapréé, died of his wounds. Naturally the documents contained in the suitcase never reached Geneva, which was precisely the aim of the Valencia Government."¹ Equally naturally, Senor Alvarez del Vayo was able to address the world's Press on the subject of the iniquities of General Franco and his murderous rebels, and continue, with the assistance of the Press, to give the impres-

¹ de Fontcriz, *Red Terror in Madrid*, pp. 62-4.

sion that Madrid and Red Spain was governed by a reputable "legitimate" and democratic Government; and hundreds of innocent decent citizens continued to be carried off for the *paseito* without world opinion being roused. Sixty thousand at a "conservative estimate", 100,000 as a probable approximation, in a single city.

This partial record of what happened in various centres in Spain when the war broke out cannot close without a brief account of what took place at a small place in Andalusia, too small to be shown on the ordinary Michelin "motor" maps.

The Sanctuary of Santa Maria de la Cabeza lies in the heart of the great Sierra Morena. On 29th July, 1936, 1,500 people took refuge in this small sanctuary of pilgrimage on the top of a spur of the mountain after the Red terror had broken out in the province of Jaen. These poor survivors had seen hundreds of their relatives and friends massacred and made the victims of infamous indignities. Out of all this number, only five hundred were possible combatants. The rest were old people, children and women. They were alone in the sanctuary, because when they reached it its chaplains and custodians had already been assassinated.

The local mayor summoned them to surrender. They refused, so he sent a body of Civil Guards to arrest them. The Civil Guard thus found themselves faced with the alternative of either handing over innocent people to be slaughtered or disobeying their orders. They chose the latter. They threw in their lot with the defenders of the sanctuary, and joined the defence.

For nine months this little band held out against incessant attacks. They were subjected to heavy bombing by planes and bombardment by artillery and mortars. Tanks were brought up against them. They had only one machine-gun for the defence and a few rifles. Assault troops were brought up; the 16th International Brigade led the attacks, assisted by a veritable army of brutalized Reds.

Captain Santiago Cortes Gonzalez, of the Civil Guards, took charge of the defence. Next in command was Lieutenant Rueda Garcia. They dragged his aged mother to the top of a neighbouring peak and showed her to him in an effort to induce him to surrender.

Two volunteers managed to reach the Nationalist lines in disguise and told the story of the beleaguered folk in the

sanctuary. Aeroplanes were dispatched, and food supplies, medicines, and letters with messages of encouragement were dropped to them from the air. An intrepid doctor joined them by parachute to attend their sick. Twenty-two babies were born in the sanctuary during the nine months of the siege.

But the defence could not hold out for ever. Persistent bombing from the air, and heavy casualties, including Captain Gonzalez, made further resistance impossible. The place was rushed. All the gallant defenders were executed, including Captain Cortes Gonzalez, while still helpless from his wounds.¹

El Sol, using its largest headlines, proclaimed this as "AN IMPORTANT and GLORIOUS VICTORY" by the Red Army of the south, "including the storming of the rebel stronghold of the Cabeza". The propaganda section is very thorough. They miss few opportunities. It was many miles behind the fighting lines, and there had been no other victory in the south.

Less than two years ago—though it seems a lifetime to-day—by a path that led to the sanctuary, there was a marble stone on which was engraved :

" Wayfarer, tarry awhile.—Let this stone speak to you.—This is the Sierra of Andujar—glory of the Sierras, enchanted crags of the Sierra Morena.—Divine emanations thrill the soul, gazing upon this summit of the Virgin Queen—who wished to make of it a temple of rock.—The rock-rose is its incense; the crests, its altars;—and its lamps are all the stars in the sky.—For that reason the traveller who visits this place,—however far he may wander later,—leaves here his heart."

We have read a good deal of the culture and of the solicitude of the Red Government for works of art; yet somehow we cannot help feeling that this stone was too human to have been spared. We little appreciate in England the causes of this war; we hear little of the innumerable instances of self-sacrifice like that of these Civil Guards, or of the motives which guided them; or of the tens of thousands of youths in Nationalist Spain who go to the war with the song on their lips:

"No llores, madre, que me voy a las armas
El cuerpo vale nada, todo valen las almas."

"Do not cry, mother, because I go to war—
My body is of no value, my soul—all."

¹ This is believed to be the case, though proof is not to hand. At all events there is still no news of them. The proof will no doubt be forthcoming.

APPENDIX I

The *Echo de Paris* published an article giving the text of instructions intended for the Red militia at the end of April 1936. The *Echo* states:

"These instructions to the heads of the Spanish Red militia . . . do not emanate from a Spanish Central Organization, but from the * Technical Services ' in Paris, which sent them to Spain at that date. These * Technical Services ' are those of the French Communist Party, working in close co-operation with the Comintern and its delegates in France. . . . The document which we are publishing is in the hands of the Government; we were not the parties who communicated it to them. We are convinced that M. Daladier, Minister of War and Defence, has given orders for preventive measures of defence and protection to be taken."

The abbreviated text is as follows:

1. Reinforce the Shock Troops and the guards over the barracks, and supply them with automatic pistols.
2. These troops will be in communication with the groups who are to break into the barracks. The latter will be in uniform and under the orders of one of our officers of complete confidence.
3. When the fight has commenced between Shock Troops and the staff of the barracks, the group which is to break in will enter easily, getting into contact with its respective committee and carrying out the arranged plan of attack inside the barracks.
4. The provisional committees in the barracks shall renew, every two days, their lists of enemies, neutrals, sympathizers and experts. When the barracks are taken, those classed as enemies, including in particular all the chiefs and officers, etc., shall be rapidly eliminated, and without hesitation.
5. Each member of the committee shall have a list of the individuals who are to be eliminated by himself personally. . . .
- G. Afterwards . . . neutrals shall be subjected to severe tests, in order to kill in them any hesitation, habitual in such undecided characters.
7. The neutral committees will make the necessary arrangements for the vigilance groups outside to enter the barracks, on the pretext of assisting to put down the rebellion. . . .
- g. Those detailed to attack Generals on the active list shall consist of ten men with repeating pistols. These Generals have two adjutants and a secretary, who must therefore be attacked at their respective houses. The elimination shall be effected by groups of three . . . who shall not withdraw in face of any obstacle, and shall act against anyone who opposes them whatever their sex or age. . . .

10. Those detailed for the Generals not holding command . . . shall consist of three men
11. ... As the military officers have protected cars, groups of our militants must proceed to the strategic points, by car and armed, in order to attack the road crossings and the military cars.
12. The construction of platforms for machine-guns and selected sites shall be completed with urgency in order to attack those troops which may succeed in leaving the barracks.
13. Platforms shall be constructed on lorries for machine-guns. These lorries will also carry hand-grenades.
14. The militia infantry shall rapidly put on uniforms and equipment already prepared for them, and they shall be served with rifles.
15. When the rebellion breaks out, militant groups wearing the uniforms of the Civil Guard or of the Assault Guard shall arrest all the heads of the political parties under pretext of the necessity for their personal protection. They must follow the instructions given for the elimination of Generals not holding command. Uniformed groups, and on grounds of protection, shall detain the important capitalists appearing in Appendix B, of Circular No. 32.
16. Violence shall not be used against these capitalists, except if they resist; they shall be forced to hand over the balances of their current accounts at the banks, and securities. In the event of concealment they shall be completely eliminated, including their family without exception. ... It is desirable that complicity, where possible, should be sought amongst their staff. For those purposes mechanics and domestics can be of great utility. . . .
18. As regards the military who appear to be sympathizers . . . the same tactics should be followed as in Russia, namely, to use their services at first, but later to treat them as our enemies. For our work to be permanent, a neutral officer is better than one who has betrayed his uniform and may therefore betray our cause.
19. Instruction amongst the militia must be intensified as regards movement, use of arms and marksmanship. . . .
20. Militia shall be stationed near the exits to the cities to prevent withdrawal of troops defeated. . . .
21. Nests of machine-guns shall be situated trained in the direction of cities . . . and if, in spite of this, the enemy are able to get out, they shall be attacked with hand-grenades.
23. Other militia shall be placed at a distance of one kilometre in the principal cities, similarly armed and with protected lorries carrying machine-guns. . . .
24. Liaison shall be by light motor-cars, with repeating pistols . . . and in the cities by cyclists.
26. By means of minutes, the intimate character of the military sympathizers and neutrals shall be ascertained, including the details of their family requirements, and the influence which their children or these necessities may exercise over them, If

any authority of any kind shows weakness or resistance, this must be denounced to the highest committee of the organization . . . for denunciation on grounds of complicity or reaction.

27. . . • The men must operate away from their houses and centres, because it has been found that through sentimentalism at the last moment, the plan to be executed in the city where their families and friends live is less enthusiastically carried through.
28. Owners of depots of goods shall be regarded as important capitalists. These depots must supply the proletariat . . . through the administrative groups.
29. . . . During the first week, and until the constitution becomes normal, all supply of food to the *bourgeois* class is prohibited. . . .
30. Stocks of foods in barracks shall be rendered useless by mixing paraffin or some similar substance with them.

APPENDIX II

Several copies of the Spanish document have been published. The translation below is taken from Jacques Bardoux, *Chaos in Spain*, who states: "This document, seized at Majorca, was communicated to *Gringoire* on 9th October. In the second (the French) I have suppressed names. They appear on a copy which has come into my possession, and denote active Communists in this region well known for their Bolshevik zeal."

SPANISH DOCUMENT

INSTRUCTION'S AND COUNTER-SIGNS

With the object of being able to control the smallest details of the movement, from 5th May only the link agents will be able to give orders and they will communicate with each other by means of the cipher E.L.M. 54—22. The local leaders must give verbal instructions to the committee with the help of the following code:

1. 2. 1. Order to begin mobilization.
2. 1.2. Order to begin the revolt.
2. 2. 1. 1. Order to attack at determined points.
3. 3. 3. Provide for counter-revolutionaries.
2. 4. 3. Mobilization of Trade Unions.
2. 5. 5. General strike.
2. 6. 5. Acts of sabotage, i.e. blowing up of railway lines.
1. 3. 2. Signal to put off the revolt.
1. 1. o. Order to provision.
1. o. o. Reorganization is ready.
- o. o. Close frontiers and ports.
1. 1. Execution of those whose names are on the black list.

All these orders will be given on the day before the revolt, 1st May or 29th June, at midnight, from the transmitter installed in the Casa del Pueblo at Madrid, the wave-length of which is nearly the same as that of the Madrid Union Radio.

Organization of Madrid

To be divided into the following sections:

- A.B. Chamartin de la Rosa. H.Q. at the Casa del Pueblo of this district.
- C.D. Cuatro Caminos. H.Q. at Socialist Club of the district.
- E.F. Palace District. H.Q. at the printing works of *Mundo Obrero*.
- G.H. University District. H.Q. at editorial offices of *El Socialista*.
- I.J. Latina District. H.Q. at the Socialist Club of the district.
- K.L. Hospicio District. H.Q. at Casa del Pueblo.
- M.N. Inclusa District. H.Q. at Socialist Centre.
- N.O. Pardinas District. H.Q. at Garage, at Castello 19.
- P.Q. Southern District. H.Q. at Socialist Centre of Vallecas.
- R.S. Carabanchel District. H.Q. at Socialist Club.
- T.U. Centre of Madrid. H.Q. at Casa del Pueblo. Secretary's
- V.X.Y. Offices Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 (balcony room).

Plan of Campaign in Madrid

The revolt will be announced by five bombs let off at dusk. Immediately a Fascist attack on one of the C.N.T. centres will be faked; then a general strike will be declared and the soldiers and chiefs who support us will rise in revolt. The groups will come into action.

Those designated in T.U.V. will take the Bureau of Communications, the Presidency and the Ministry of War. Those belonging to the district will attack the Commissariats, and those belonging to the X.Y.Z. section will take the Bureau of Public Safety.

A special group composed exclusively of machine-gunners with hand-grenades will go to the headquarters of the Government and attack it by the following routes:

Carretas, Montera, Mayor, Corrcos, Paz, Alcala, Arenal, Preciados, Carmen and San Jeronimo. The groups, composed of fifty cells of ten men each, will act in streets of the second and third order, and of two cells only in those of the first order and in the avenues.

The orders are for the immediate execution of all the counter-revolutionaries who have been detained.

The Republicans of the Popular Front will be asked to support the movement, and in case of refusal they will be expelled from Spain.

FRENCH DOCUMENT

Secret

To the Leaders of Groups and Sections:

Cell of St. George du Bois, Look-out Station.

First Group. H.Q., Town Hall. Leader of Group, A. President.

First Section: B.

4 volunteers.

5 rifles, 1 revolver, 70 rounds of ammunition for rifle, 20 for revolver.

15 grenades.

Second Section: C.

6 volunteers.

4 rifles, 3 revolvers.

70 rounds of ammunition for rifle, 20 for revolver.

Third Section: D. Leader, C.

4 volunteers for distributing arms and ammunition and for making ammunition.

6 revolvers.

15 cans petrol.

25 cans (5 litres each) reserve, issued to Comrade C.

Second Group. H.Q., Railway Station. Leader, D.E.P.

7 volunteers.

8 rifles.

80 rounds of ammunition.

20 sticks of dynamite issued to Comrade E.

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THE SPANISH ARENA

Third Group. At the Station. Leader, F.E.

5 volunteers (2 experts).

6 rifles.

1 revolver.

60 rounds of ammunition for rifle, 20 for revolver.

1,500 metres insulated telephone wire issued to Comrade F.

Fourth Group (attacking party). H.Q., Basement of Town Hall.

Leader, G.

First Section: H.

4 volunteers.

4 rifles.

50 rounds of ammunition.

10 knives.

12 ropes.

Second Section: I.

4 volunteers.

4 rifles.

50 rounds of ammunition.

10 knives.

10 ropes.

Special Instructions

Second Group: Blow up railway and Fascist convoys.

Third Group: Link immediately Telephone Exchange P.O., Railway Station and Town Hall.

To all Groups: Save ammunition pending arrival of arms and ammunition from the cell at Rochefort.

First Group to commandeer all provisions, animals and fodder pending arrival of instructions from Rochefort for distribution.

COMR/VDE PRESIDENT.

CHAPTER X

CORDONS SAN1TAIKES

BY July 21 st, four days after the Army had risen in Morocco, the fate of many of the centres in the Peninsula had practically been settled for the time being. In most of them the Government had armed the extremist sections and so ensured their domination; in others the attenuated garrisons and the local inhabitants, assisted by the police, had declared for the Nationalists.

In many cases, the posting up of the *bando* was a declaration of peace rather than war. Wherever the inhabitants were thus able to support the movement, the factories commenced again, personal security and liberty and the right to work were re-established, and even in this war period a measure of prosperity returned almost at once, though the gold reserve had been seized by their opponents. The people found a social and an industrial peace which they had not known for over four years. On the other hand in the areas where the Government armed the extremists—not to mention some tens of thousands of ordinary criminals released from the prisons—the revolution, which had already been in progress for many months, soon reached its logical climax.

In many other places the chaos was indescribable. Accurate information of the fate of particular towns was hardly known outside their walls. The Government radio incessantly gave out that the rising had failed everywhere. General Queipo de Llano, so far as his lower-powered station could reach, brought hope and courage to the Nationalists. When the initial fate of the units of populations throughout Spain, in cities, towns and villages, had been settled for the moment and it was possible to take some sort of "trial balance", superficially the Nationalist position appeared to be hazardous in the extreme. The Government, once again, appeared to hold nearly all the cards, for control of the chief capitals was in the

hands of the "loyalists", and in the great cities were the chief factories, the "sinews of war", and the largest reservoirs of raw material for recruiting.

The main hazard which imperilled the whole Nationalist Movement had been the failure of the fleet to assist the rising.¹ The success of the Generals and their cause appeared to rest on the quick transportation of the African Army. If Madrid, for instance, could be seized, the *coup d'état* would have every prospect of rapid success. Every day of delay meant an increasingly difficult position. Their chief hope of success appeared to lie, almost entirely, in surprise and rapidity of movement. When that failed, and the advent of the African Army was held up, the Nationalist situation looked perilous in the extreme.

But, in point of fact, what appeared on the surface to be the most dangerous feature of the rising afforded the proof of its justification. It was to be a fortnight before the influence of the Army, apart from leadership, was of real operative value. For two whole weeks the brunt of the rising rested on the populace. As General Duval points out, "if the Spanish Generals had only represented themselves within the country, their power of resistance would have been of short duration".² During that period the rising largely depended on the conscious choice of the people whether they would support the movement or not. They did support it, or it would have died at birth. This civil war, for the first phase, was mainly a domestic affair, however far alien influences had been responsible for its inception. It was only after the attack on Madrid that its foreign aspect became predominant. If to-day there still be anyone who asks the question as to the justification for the Nationalist rising, the answer is to be found in the developments during the first fortnight. During that period it was the ordinary citizen who, where he could, held the fort for the Nationalist Movement; and to explain how this was a fact—in spite of the impression conveyed in most of the organs of the British Press—let us look at the figures of the notorious elections of the preceding February.

The electoral register consisted of approximately 13,500,000 people. By the Right groups the election was

¹ The whole of the crews of three of the chief units of the fleet had been initiated into the revolutionary Masonic Lodge "Atlantis" (Marqucs-Riviere).

² *Les Lemons de la Guerre d'Espagne.*

fought on a straight anti-Marxist issue; by the Left groups it was for the supremacy of a "Popular Front". The Government interposed a Centrist Party according to the first returns—and they were notoriously weighted by chicanery in favour of the Left—the Right Wing groups polled over 4,500,000 votes, though the new Centre Party robbed them of some hundreds of thousands of votes which otherwise would have been cast for law and order; for the public was falsely led to believe that the Government also stood for that policy. The "Popular Front" groups polled a little more than 4,000,000. In these elections the anarchists threw their whole voting power into the scale, almost for the first time in their history, for they had previously made it a point of policy to abstain from voting at elections; large numbers of the *bourgeoisie*, "liberals", and others, also voted for the "Popular Front", for they did not appreciate the real forces which were controlling that amalgamation. Yet in spite of this, the Popular Front polled 10% less votes than the anti-Marxists. From the figures on the register it also follows that well over 4,500,000 of the population failed to vote. This was largely due to their disgust at the workings and results of party politics, and largely also because of the great numbers who were too intimidated to record their votes.

These figures are undisputed; and they are the explanation of both the initial and the subsequent success of the Nationalist Movement, although in the earliest stages there were large numbers who did not immediately grasp the full significance of events. Perhaps one of the most touching examples of the difficulties and mental struggles of the "liberals" is the dedication which Señor Perez Madrigal gave to his book describing the first fifty days of the war:

"To little John, my son, wondering what may have become of you and your mother, I write these things. I have written them so that, if you should live to be of age, you may say with pride that your father, though he was a politician of the second Republic, was nevertheless a good man."

As regards arms and organization the balance was just the reverse. The militia had been prepared and well trained for this occasion, of which, as we have shown, the Government bad full knowledge. They had boasted of their 200,000 shock troops, with 1,200,000 reserves. There was the Asturian Army which had had its baptism of fire during 1934. There were

the French reservists who had made direct, on the rising, for Irun,¹ and, from the first day, the French Communist volunteers or "pressed" and purchased men were pouring through the passes of the Pyrenees. It was commonly stated that some 12,000 Russians and Internationals had already entered the country on the pretext of attending the Popular Olympic Games at Barcelona; and from the subsequent evidence dealt with in Chapter XII, there is little reason to doubt the accuracy of those statements.

On the Nationalist side the number of *armed* men was small as compared with the "loyalists". Ramon Sender, Sir Peter Chalmers Mitchell's protégé,² has reported how, anticipating trouble, he had gone into the mountains to Guadarrama, where he found "the town full of militia . . . also Assault Guards, Civil Guards and two or three batteries of light artillery. In all they must have been 3,000 strong."² This force alone was several times the total *military* forces of the combined garrisons that were with Cabanellas and Mola in Zaragoza and Pamplona.

General Mola made Burgos his headquarters on 21st July. His few troops were scattered over a wide area—Aragon, Navarre, Alava, Old Castile, Leon and Galicia, the districts which most speedily rallied to the Nationalist cause. His difficulties were immense. He was not short of officers, but he had few trained men and still less material. The Government had denuded the arms parks and had taken the precaution of supplying all available arms to their own supporters, where they were not already armed. Volunteers flooded into the Nationalist headquarters, but Mola's problem was how to train them, and, even more urgent, how to arm them in time. Every kind of armament was pressed into service, and the greatest economy had to be exercised with such arms as were available.

"During the period from February to July the regiments had been gradually deprived of their arms, which were then concentrated at the mobilization centres."³ *These centres had been created in 1931, and their control was put directly under the (civilian) Minister of War.* Similarly, and with the same objects, the Air Force had been put under a separate Ministry

¹ Andrd Marty (the organizer of the International Brigades).

² Sender, *The War In Spain*.

³ Duval, *Les Lemons de la Guerre d'Espagne*.



1. GENERAL FRANCO, WITH GENERAL DAVILA, ON HIS LEI I, AND COLONEL VIGON

2. GENERAL GARCIA VALIKO 3. GENERAL VARELA

5- GENERAL MOLA

4. GENERAL YAGUE "

6. GENERAL SOLCHAGA



to detach it from the Army General Staff and communize it separately.

There were two slogans in the British Press which will be recalled: "Franco short of men", and "Time is on the side of the Government." Both were false. It was not, and is not, Moors, Italians and Germans who were the backbone of the Army: it was the Navarrese, the Basques, the Galicians, the men of Aragon, Castile, Leon, Palencia, Zamora, Caceres, Majorca, the Canaries and Andalusia, whom Franco was quietly training behind the lines in their tens and hundreds of thousands, whilst a few were detailed to hold the "walls", bridge-heads and passes against the better-armed hordes of Reds. (And to-day he also has Santander and Asturian units and tens of thousands of men from those liberated provinces.) It was *arms* in which the Government had the advantage. And every day the Nationalist rearguard was organized to repair the deficiency, whilst Marxism steadily impeded the Government output from their larger and more numerous factories. If they were short of technical staff, it was chiefly because they murdered them.

An interesting sidelight on Burgos, a typical centre of the Nationalist rising, has been given by Señor Antonio Ruiz Villaplana, who left Burgos to join the Reds, and wrote a book on their behalf, *Doy Fe*. In this he says:

"In Burgos, as in the great majority of the cities which rose in revolt, Fascists did not exist. . . . When the Popular Front Governor, on instructions received, tried to close the meeting-places of the *Falange*, and to arrest its leaders, he found there was no meeting-place and no organization. . . . Only in Seville, Valladolid and Zaragoza, where previous social struggles had brought the *Falange* face to face with the Workers' Syndicalist organizations, did Fascism make any progress.¹ * . . . In Burgos, Pamplona and other places, the *Falange* was hardly known of at all."³

What Señor Villaplana records was so well known in Spain that it ought not to be necessary to refute the suggestion that this was in any way a struggle begun or instigated by Fascism. But the many inaccurate, and usually inspired statements and implications to the contrary given currency in the English

¹ Ruiz Villaplana thus confirms the opinions of Lord Baldwin and Joaquin Maurin.

³ Ruiz Villaplana, *Doy Fe*.

Press, have made it necessary for us to quote the above evidence from the mouth of a bitter opponent of the Nationalists. For, in point of fact, the people of all ranks and classes gave their support to the Nationalist cause because they realized that it stood for Spain itself, the traditional Spain they loved. Questions of misgovernment, of religious power, of wrong distribution of the national wealth, and a hundred other questions, which, at other and less crucial times, might have been matters for heated political controversy, were subordinated to the major question which confronted them. Did the Nationalist Movement stand for the liberation of Spain or was it just another Army revolt for power? The answer could not be in doubt. It might almost be said that in Spain there was *no army*. And the answer was given in unmistakable terms. The majority knew that it stood for the liberation of Spain, and for that reason it received the support of the best elements of the population. If it had not been so, it must have failed almost immediately.

A brief survey of the position on the 21st July discloses the hazardous nature of the Nationalist position. In the south, the only practical base of reception for the African Army, General Queipo de Llano was holding Seville and Cadiz by sheer bluff and courage, and in the expectation of reinforcements; but from Seville to Cordoba the "corridor" was long and dangerous. Granada was isolated. To the north of him, the territory south of Cáceres was practically all held for the Government; Malaga, on his eastern flank, was a Government stronghold.

In the north along the Biscay littoral the position was also critical. The loss of San Sebastian had been a great blow, for now there was nothing to stop the influx of men, arms and munitions from France. The Government had the money with which to pay for all they required; part of the gold from the Bank of Spain—the fourth largest gold reserve in Europe ($\text{f} 5^{\circ} > 000 > 000$)—was already being flown to France to pay for them. The capture of Irún alone could check this flood of supplies over the border; and, as we show later, this was one of the first operations which General Mola was compelled to undertake. For, except for Oviedo, where Aranda's small force had organized the defence of that city, the whole of the provinces of Asturias, Santander, Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa was dominated by the Reds, since Santander, which had voted

strongly anti-Marxist, was shut in between the heavily armed Asturian miners on the west and, on the east, the Basque Nationalists of Bilbao, who had thrown in their lot with the Government.

In the north-east, the Nationalists held the four bastions of Jaca, Huesca, Zaragoza and Teruel, but they had not the arms to equip sufficient men to form a continuous line between them, and they had, at all costs, to block the road from Barcelona to Madrid; and Teruel at the south end of the line was then, as it has since been, a prominent salient inviting attack.

It will thus be seen that the Nationalists had to fight upon the many fronts which were gradually forming, and at the same time they had to answer calls for help from all directions where isolated garrisons, with large distances between them and their nearest friends, were struggling to maintain themselves. Many of them were destroyed, usually through the Government having the artillery and the aeroplanes, as occurred at Gijon, Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, and many other places; at other centres they held out for weeks or months and were eventually relieved. Even when the front later became relatively stabilized, the extent of the line was considerably more than 1,500 miles in length—much longer than the western front of the World War of 1914.

During this period there were naturally many exciting incidents. One of them was the adventure of the Signals Battalion stationed in El Pardo barracks on the outskirts of Madrid. On the 18th July this battalion found itself confined to barracks and the telephone wires cut by order of the Madrid Government. Only rumours reached them as to what was happening, but they learnt enough to know that it was impossible for them to assist in the capital. The officer commanding, Colonel Carrascosa, called the officers and men together and proposed that they should try and join the Nationalists. This was enthusiastically agreed to, and they loaded up their lorries with arms and food. Amongst those serving his time of military conscription was the son of Largo Caballero. He was placed on one of the lorries and told that he would be shot if he betrayed them by word or sign, and the column started off.

They passed through the Marxist patrols with clenched fists, shouting "U.H.P." or other Red slogans. At village after

village the Red militia greeted them. In one village they successfully changed one of their worst lorries for a new one. At Boca del Astio disaster seemed certain. The bridge had been destroyed. But the Red militia worked eagerly and carried out repairs, and the column pushed on with cries of " *Viva Rusia!* " Finally, at La Granja, they fell in with Nationalist supporters from Segovia and were deliriously welcomed amidst mutual cries of " *Viva España!* "

At first, apart from the essential relief operations, it was naturally a positional war for the strategic points. It was at this early stage that foresight was of greater value than at any of the later stages. A glance at the map of Spain shows that it was necessarily governed by the orography of the country. It would almost be true to say that the limits of many of the provinces of Spain are traced in silhouette against the sky. Great natural barriers have divided up the country and traced the boundaries, and through them the all-important passes wind their way. In its early stages the war was, therefore, largely a race to control these passes and the heights which control them on either side, and, where possible, to establish a bridge-head on the farther side.

This feature of the war was all the more emphasized because the sympathies of the inhabitants and the areas dominated by the two respective parties were naturally distributed geographically; in the Nationalist camp they were mainly the hardy countrymen of the high central plateau, and in the Government camp the people of the big industrial centres and the warmer and more cosmopolitan littoral regions; and this generalization holds good in spite of the fact that a number of provinces, such as Santander, Guadalajara and Cuenca, which had voted decisively anti-Marxist, found themselves caught within the area where the Government authority could be imposed.

Thus it will be seen that along the coast of Biscay the important points were the passes through the Cantabrian range which runs, roughly, parallel to the shore; and here the supporters of the Government won the race in most cases, or at least secured the home end of the *puertos*, the gateways through the mountains.

On the road between Oviedo and Leon they had a large " bridge-head " of territory south of the southern end of the pass at Pajares; farther cast they also had bridge-heads south of

Isoba and Tarna. At Oseja de Sajambre the Nationalists were able finally to dam the route midway. Farther east again a large bridge-head was formed south of the Cantabrian Mountains by the Red authorities of Santander, probably to protect the armament works at Reinosa. Farther east again, south of Santander and in the northern part of Burgos province, the Nationalists were able to control their own entrance to the dehesas; and the same applied also in Alava, north of Vitoria.

(In the above summary we have referred to "the Government", but this is not really correct terminology. In point of fact Asturias, Santander, Vizcaya and other provinces lost little time in disclosing the real nature of the revolution, and proclaimed themselves independent Soviets. At one time the independent State of Santander even closed its frontiers against the Asturian group when a shortage of food began to be felt in the north. Vizcaya, upon the much advertised ground that it was founding a Basque Republic, proclaimed itself as the independent State of Euzkadi—a new country in Europe about the same size as Herefordshire with less than half a million inhabitants, and having no more claim to represent the Basques than Monmouthshire would have to represent Wales. However, it is wonderful how an impression can be created by a party which acquires a virtual monopoly of the means of propaganda. Even within the individual provinces, separate Soviets were set up, sometimes consisting of a single village by itself. The fiction of a Spanish Government was largely maintained for the deception of foreigners and to conceal the real nature of events within the country.)

Similarly, down in the south, the principal part of Malaga province was within the "cordon" of the sierras—of Ronda, Abdalagis and Tejeda. And one of the most notable "rims" round an important area was that of the mountainous system which stretched from Teruel north-westwards and continued north of Madrid by the great Guadarrama range to the regions north of the Escorial, and the Sierra de Gredos, which continued the line and swept southwards along the eastern limits of the province of Avila towards the Tajo, or Tagus, River.

Until they could train their men and obtain sufficient weapons with which to equip them, the aim of the Nationalists was to make for these key objectives wherever they could spare their armed men from the many other calls upon them; and, though it often used up large numbers of men, whom they

could ill afford, to hold back the Reds where the latter had established bridge-heads within the Nationalist provinces, they managed, by judicious selection of strategic points, to contain the enemy behind the mountain ranges we have mentioned above. In this they showed, at an early date, the chief difference between their mentality and that of their opponents. For, as will be shown later, their motto was always that of Marshal Foch—"Attack!" And they chose to attack railway routes and junctions and points which might be useful at a later date, rather than centres which might be useful principally for propaganda purposes, such as towns of which the names were widely known.

The defensive attitude which the Government usually adopted was largely due to their military philosophy, if one may honour their philosophy with that description. They placed their faith chiefly in vast concrete emplacements and works like the Iron Ring, the huge defences at Riofrio, Ochandiano, and Maqueda, or in defending populous cities where the military operations would be from houses and barricades, and the casualties would provide material for world propaganda when they were bombarded or attacked, after they had been made part of the front line of battle. For, in their view—and to some extent they were correct—the inevitable hardships inflicted upon the non-combatant civilians would be bound to assist in the creation of a favourable public opinion and so secure supporters amongst the numerous neutrals who would otherwise have been disposed to withhold their support.

In the early warfare the Nationalists had the advantage of the experience of the officers, and, later, of the men of the small but efficient army which they were able to transport eventually from Morocco. But it is not out of place to mention once more that the total number of this force was in the neighbourhood of 17,000 men, and that the native troops in Morocco did not reach a total of more than some 8,000. This may help to keep the picture in the necessary perspective, which has been so distorted by inspired Press utterances. As may be judged, the striking force available for any particular operation must, therefore, invariably have been very small in numbers. The population of Spain is about 25,000,000.

One other great advantage was possessed by the Nationalists, both as regards their "spearhead" and the type of civilian Spaniard who rallied to them; they understood the value of

discipline. More than most men, Franco knows that armies, like nations or individuals, are of little use without discipline. Discipline in an army is the basis of all true morale; an undisciplined mob may possess morale in the sense that it may be enthusiastic when its emotions are roused, but it seldom stands the test of reverses, and precludes efficient organization. Probably this factor, in the individual and in the mass, in the front line and in the rearguard, will clearly be seen as the decisive one in this civil war.

The Government's attitude is well exemplified by the regulations which they published at the end of October 1936, amongst which were the following:

“ (5) The militiaman enters the militia as a volunteer: thereafter, a soldier of the revolution, he must take his place and accomplish his duty.”¹

So far the idea is good. But in accordance with the revolutionary' inspiration, the next regulation is as follows:

“ (6) He who fights on his own authority without liaison with the militia shall be considered as a mutineer and subject to the penalties which his battalion may impose.”¹

Whilst admittedly the regulation was probably euphemistic, like most of the terminology and slogans of the Reds, since the political commissar would in practice determine the decision of “ his battalion ”, the circulation of such a principle is clearly incompatible with efficient central control of an army.

The discipline of the militia is a standing jest among the Nationalists, and by no means without reason. One night General Queipo de Llano broadcast from Seville (411 m.) the text of an actual order issued in April 1937 to the Magno Battalion of Bailen to the effect that in the interests of good discipline and hygiene, “ *à los milicianos rigurosa y terminantemente se prohíbe orinar en los paredes del Comedor* ”. And the General concluded, “ However, the Marxists were so shortsighted that they posted the notices up on the mess-room walls, and, naturally, in a very short time they were quite illegible.”

Bad discipline amongst the Marxists was inevitable in the

» Kaminsky, *Ceux de Jlarcelone*.

early stages. Only in the later stages, when the propagandist promises are falsified and terror becomes the instrument with which to dragoon the Communist rank and file, can any measure of discipline be obtained. For to achieve the revolution by "direct action", one of the first principles is to recruit militants by the illusory promise of freedom from restraints—and from discipline. *Facilis descensus Averni*. In addition, in order to bring the Army into disrepute and unpopularity, and to build up cells within the military units, such ideas as army discipline have to be ridiculed. The well-disciplined good soldier learns to go on fighting when judgment falters, when fear is known and physical resistance is at a low ebb. Even discipline by terror is not enough; for the terror has to be greater than that inspired by the noise and frightfulness of modern weapons. Emotional frightfulness without discipline—the spirit of the *dynamiteros*—instilled to ensure the ruthless extermination of anti-Communists (collectively known as "Fascists") may cow the weak and defenceless—it may even be useful in action, when winning; but in times of crisis, retreat or repeated defeat, it compares very poorly with the discipline of the *Credo* which Franco taught the Legionaries in Africa and is teaching the Nationalist troops in Spain to-day.

The Red army also suffered from another evil as a result of the inherent weaknesses in the Communist doctrine: they have been badly led, both as regards their officers and their N.C.O.s. "It made me reflect", says Mr. Cardozo, after witnessing a massacre of Red soldiers through their complete lack of training and soldierly sense, "on the crimes of those who in any country persuade young men that political speeches and extremist propaganda can be a substitute for military training and discipline or that the science of war can be learnt by listening to Communist or Socialist tub-thumping. I picked up on the field of battle many little pamphlets on how to use an automatic rifle or on the training of a platoon. Half the pages were full of rubbish about freely consented discipline and the uselessness of the old forms of military severity, and the other half contained a few pious maxims about the value of trench warfare."¹

When part of the African Army had been landed in the Peninsula, it was used with great skill and daring to try and bring the war to an early close by a rapid coup, but at the same

¹ Cardozo, *March of a Nation*.

time the real Nationalist forces were being trained in the rear-guard. Except where there was urgent necessity, Franco used the minimum of untrained men, preferring to throw in efficient troops at a later date rather than attempt to fight with inexperienced men. The wisdom of this course has since been demonstrated in every major action that has been fought, and it has saved thousands of the lives of his followers. But the troops of the African army were relatively very few in numbers, and General Varela, in his attempt on Madrid, had constantly to move his men from one point to another to disguise the smallness of his forces. The almost incredible successes of this small body of men were chiefly due to their extreme mobility and their astonishingly well organized motor transport. This was all the more necessary because considerable numbers of the troops who landed from Morocco had to be sent northwards as soon as junction was effected, to help to organize the "wall" on the eastern front—which did not have the advantage of a mountain barrier and against which the whole weight of Catalonia was repeatedly thrown—and others to stiffen the poorly armed forces in the north, and, in particular, to assist in the relief of Oviedo.

The first important task, perhaps, was to join up the northern and the southern forces, for on July 21st the only connecting link was through Portugal. With such officers as Tella, Asensio,¹ Yagie, Barron and Castejon, columns pushed on northwards and captured the important railway junction of Merida, and thus assured contact with the men coming south from Cáceres. At the same time they cleared the country on their left flank, and attacked Badajoz to open the principal route into Portugal.

At Badajoz the local garrison and the militia put up a desperate resistance. The Nationalists were met by a withering machine-gun fire, and in one period of twenty seconds they are said to have lost 127 men of the 7th Bandera of the Legion; but the remainder fought their way on without checking, and conquered the city.

This first defeat of the Government in what was, at that stage, a major engagement, was a very bitter disappointment; and there is no doubt that this was the reason for the overwhelming publicity campaign let loose in connection with the

ⁱThis is Col. Asensio Cabanillas. There was a Red General named Asensio Torrado.

capture of the city. Then, as later, a defeat had to be balanced by a good story or turned to account to obtain world sympathy. In the case of Badajoz, the allegation was that, after the Nationalists took the city, they proceeded to a mass murder of the defenders and citizens.

Three accounts were broadcast and believed throughout the world. The first was alleged to have come from Mr. M. Reynolds Packard, United Press correspondent. Mr. Packard states categorically that he was never in Badajoz, and that he did not write anything at all in connection with the taking of the town. He further states that he was in Burgos at the time of the capture; and he adds that he had many times had to complain before that his name was used on messages which were untrue and had not been sent by him.

The origin of the second account is perhaps more curious than the first. It was from a certain M. Marcel Dany, whose story appeared in the Paris *Populaire*. The third was from M. Jacques Derthet. In Dany's report it is stated that, at the time of writing, executions *en masse* were going on in the bull-ring. However, upon the day on which these gentlemen state that they saw those sights, they were shown round Badajoz by a Portuguese journalist, Senhor Mario Neves, who never left them; and Senhor Neves' account of what he saw differs in every particular from that of M. Dany, who could speak no Spanish, was not an accredited representative of the Havas Agency from which he sent the story, and suddenly disappeared from Portugal directly afterwards. And Senhor Neves' account similarly differs in every essential particular from that of M. Derthet.¹

There is not the slightest doubt that there were executions after Badajoz was taken. For a hundred hostages had been shot in that town during the Reign of Terror, and where any of the assassins of the victims were discovered, and the case was proved against them at court martial, they were executed.²

We need say nothing further for the moment about the mendacious publicity. We return to that subject later. But we would here remark that stories based upon such slender evidence would have obtained no credence a few years ago and certainly would not have been published; yet now the

¹ Major Geoffrey McNeill-Moss has investigated the whole evidence of the "Badajoz Legend" in his book *The Siege of the Alcazar*, to which the reader is referred for further details.

² Cardozo, *The March of a Nation*, p. 74.

machinery appears to exist whereby they obtained ready acceptaⁿ goodTaPt? CVen, *n some cases> by papers apparently acting in

TJ¹⁶ JV-ay WaS now ?Pen between the north and the south; but the distance by rail from the southern base to Pamplona was o^ver 55® miles—approximately the same distance as from the extreme north coast of Scotland to the Isle of Wight. It was necessary at all costs to protect these lengthy communications, and with the utmost economy of men. The Madrid Government had ordered, through the Unions, a general strike. In the north. General Mola issued a decree ordering all strikers to return to work under penalty of execution under martial law. He appointed an executive committee of railway technicians to whom he gave military rank and power. Almost at once a normal service was recommenced, and that sendee has been maintained ever since, and on most of the lines without any special guards. As an example we quote from the report of the Chairman of the Anglo-Spanish Construction Company Limited in July 1937 :

“ Since the first day of hostilities the whole area served by the Santander-Mediterráneo Railway system has remained under the control of General Franco’s Government. Between the 18th and 27th July (1936) there were some minor interruptions in the train services, but since the latter date the system has been regularly and efficiently operated, and you will be interested to hear that no special precautions by way of supervision have had to be taken, and that the general sympathy with the Nationalist cause in the provinces through which the line passes has been sufficient guarantee of peaceful and satisfactory working conditions.”

And that railway is over 220 miles long.

Meanwhile the Nationalists also organized the supply of petrol from Vigo and El Ferrol by lorries throughout their zone of influence.

One of the first Nationalist triumphs of the war was the capture of the Alto de Leon Pass in the Guadarrama Mountains north of Madrid. This was achieved by General Serrador who previously, with a few others, escaped in a small lobster boat from exile as a political prisoner at Villa Cisneros in Spanish West Africa, making his way to Lisbon with hardly any provisions or water for the whole of that perilous voyage. The column of which he was put in command had to attack

the Reds who were strongly in force on the summit of a mountain, with numerous machine-guns and supported by artillery. General Serrador decided that only rush tactics could carry so difficult a position, and this he did by motor-lorries, with the Farnesio cavalry to guard his flanks. "The General himself drove in an open car, so that he could effectively command the whole column. Lorry after lorry was put out of action and men killed and wounded. Those who were uninjured were ordered to pile into the nearest moving vehicle, to hang on somehow or other, but to keep going. And those untrained volunteers, fired by their patriotism and fervour, kept going. By the time the lorries reached the point where it had been settled they were to stop, more than half had been put out of action." In accordance with the Franco tradition, the General and his staff led the hand-to-hand fighting.

"It was almost impossible to believe the evidence before one's eyes that these men had managed to storm such heights in the face of the enemy's fire. But they did so, and when, with bayonets fixed, the first breathless platoons arrived at the top, with their grey-haired General in the front rank, the Reds broke and ran in confusion down the hill-side on to the first slopes of the plateau stretching to Madrid. Another door through which the Reds had hoped to pour had been banged and bolted."¹ But it took a whole week of strenuous effort before it could be said that the Alto de Leon was securely held. Two days after General Serrador's brilliant achievement, General Mola further threatened Madrid by capturing the Alto de Somosierra, on the northern spur of the Guadarrama. On the following day it was reported that the three provinces of Aragon had established communication by road and rail. The eastern wall was formed.

In the north the Nationalists were forced also to try and reach the eastern end of the coast. Irun and San Sebastian had to be taken or the whole of the northern fronts were endangered; for the Basques and Asturians were far better fighting men than those of the east and south-east, and officers, men and munitions were already pouring over the French frontier to them. Mr. Harold Cardozo described, in August 1936—before the "non-intervention" pact had been signed—what was happening.

"The Reds were receiving unashamed aid across the

¹ Cardozo, *The March of a Nation*, pp. 43-4.

French frontier. They received hundreds of thousands of rounds each night from France. Machine-guns, spare guns and spare parts were taken across from France.” And the result he describes later. At Irún on August 26th. “The machine-gun fire was overpowering. At one moment I estimated there must have been something like four hundred machine-guns, automatic rifles and sub-machine-guns firing' from the Red trenches.”¹

This hardly suggests a helpless “democracy” taken by surprise by brutal soldiers. The supplies were being sent by the Soviet through the international Communists and Anarchist organizations. 1 he position at that time was that the Government had the weapons, the Nationalists had the men. As General Duval says:

“ The Third International handed to the Government most of the territory of the Peninsula and mastery of the sea. Without understanding, it let everything slip from its hands by pure imbecility in the etymological sense of that word.”²

The siege and capture of Irún was mainly the work of the Carlists of Navarre. On the day Navarre rose 14,000 of them volunteered. They joined without expecting pay, and those who could provided their own equipment. The ranks of these *Requetes* soon reached a total well over 100,000, the great majority of them Basques. For those who know the Navarrese it is unnecessary to add that they were a magnificent body of men.

It would be difficult to overrate the value of these men or the influence which they exercised upon the whole movement. In every town and village the windows were hung with the legend, “ God, Country and King ”, and they went to the war to the strains of the “ Oriaundi ”:

“ For God, our Country, and King
Our fathers fought.
For God, our Country, and King
So shall we fight.”

It was they who pointed the way for the country as a whole. On issues such as those at stake in this Spanish war, in the turmoil of false news and suggestions, it is not given to the majority of men immediately to see their way clearly. The

> Cardozo, *The March of a Nation*,
a Duval, *Lecons de la Guerre d'Espagne*.

Carlists gave the lead, and their spirit leavened the whole population. For example, in the Franco area the workmen were mostly members of the U.G.T. or the C.N.T., and had been drenched for years with the pernicious Red propaganda. But many of them came forward, and an avalanche of recruits followed. Over 300,000 men joined the Falangist Party. Most of them were "proletarians", inhabitants of the cities and factory workers, and they had not the same ideals as the *Requetrs*. In some quarters they were distrusted and were described as "*cenetistas oyendo misa*"—C.N.T.s going to Mass. But the heart was sound. Franco's tact and example, the *Requetes'* high standards, and the sound Press and radio propaganda have raised this force of volunteers to an almost uniformly high level, enthusiastic not only for the defeat of the enemy, but for the constructive social and economic policy which is being evolved.

On the day of the rising, the Carlists had gone out at night and seized the peaks and ridges which overlooked Irun. But the position of the town lends itself admirably to defence, and its defenders were more than well supplied with artillery and machine-guns. "Impregnable" Irun took stiff fighting and several weeks to capture. Mr. Theo Rogers makes the statement that he was informed that the siege was prolonged by the Red use of French artillery.¹ Members of the International Anarchist Organizations were helping in the defence of Irun, notably Chapic, later to command the Rakosi Hungarian unit on the Madrid front, besides many French, Belgian and other reservists who had been rushed there by the International Communist Party as soon as the rising began. The charges that German and Italian troops and assistance were being given to the Nationalists before the Reds were receiving it from Russia and her camouflaged organizations is the usual inversion of the facts. And, in particular, as regards infantry, no foreign troops were used by the Nationalists until some three months after large bodies of foreigners had been abundantly proved to have been fighting with the Reds. General Franco had, in fact, refused Irish and Italian offers of men, although he knew that Russian aid was being extensively used against him.

After Irun, San Sebastian fell easily, though there was a short delay due to lack of ammunition. Irun had been burnt

¹ Rogers, *Spain: A Tragic Journey*, p. 130.

by its defenders before evacuation, and the local Basques were anxious to prevent their own property similarly going up in flames in their native town. For most of the Bilbao Basques, by a paradoxical process of reasoning, had backed the Red Government on a bargain whereby they hoped to obtain complete autonomy and to be free from its control, and found, too late, that they were identified with everything that was alien to their own natural and national ideals.

At the time of the rising many officers had sent their wives, relations and families to San Sebastian in the belief that it was the safest place for them to be. But the garrison failed to win through because of this last minute change, resulting from the machinations of emissaries from Madrid. Many hostages then were seized by the Reds, and as the Nationalists drove the Reds westwards from place to place till finally Asturias was reached, these unfortunate people were taken with them—that is to say those who survived the massacres and privations.

San Sebastian was the first big test of Franco's attitude towards the towns in Red hands and their inhabitants. "In White Spain," says Mr. Theo Rogers, "when the Franco forces take a town, the word goes forth to the working men to return to their daily tasks. They may have heretofore sided with the Reds. Now they are to forget politics and war. It is their present and future that counts, not their past. . . . But in Red Spain, when the Government militia takes a town, the first request is for names of those w'ho have aided Franco. If a single whisper is raised then the family against whom the malignant finger has been pointed is destined for extermination. This may sound an exaggeration. It can be attested by thousands of sw'orn statements. There can be no denial of such evidence."¹ Franco holds the view' that he is trustee for the future of Spain; he has never destroyed any part of a town except from military necessity. Nor is it his practice to shoot prisoners indiscriminately. The charges in that direc-tion which have been levelled by Communists and their sup-porters are merely covering, once more, the dreadful record of the Government. It was Largo Caballero who, in Madrid, three weeks after the rising, said:

"Go and sort out all your enemies—the capitalists—and finish with them for ever. Don t let this oppoi tunity go, and once you have found them use your own judgment. The best

¹ Rogers, *Spain: A Tragic Journey*.

way to trace them down is by their *cedula* (income-tax form)."¹

On the other side, General Queipo de Llano had as early as August instituted properly constituted courts for trying cases under the military code. The trials were public. The death penalty was only imposed on people guilty of murder or other infamies, or those in position of authority who had encouraged or permitted such crimes. Mr. Cardozo, after his wide experience of all parts of the Nationalist front, says, "Throughout the time I have been with the Spanish Nationalists, I never heard of a single case of torture, of prisoners grossly ill-treated or of execution except by shooting in accordance with the military code for the infliction of capital punishment. I have, during the last year, met dozens of newspaper correspondents and visitors to Spain of every shade of political opinion, and not once have I heard any serious accusation of any form of atrocity having been committed by the soldiers of the Nationalist army."²

In August the headquarters of the troops between Seville and Malaga were under General Varela. On 12th August he left La Roda and routed the Marxists after a stiff engagement at Mollina. With his usual rapidity of movement and decision, he personally entered Antequera, unexpectedly and by night, with thirty men. When in the morning the inhabitants thus found themselves freed from the terrorist control of the local Communist minority, the town went *en fete*.³

Seven days later his troops established contact between Seville and Cordoba, then surrounded by Marxist militia.

As at Granada, Cordoba was receiving daily visits from the Red air force, though the indignation in the British Press at the bombing of such towns, at that stage quite undefended and almost entirely of a civilian nature, was notable for its absence.

The Legion pushed on from town to town. On every occasion this was done at great risk and called for men of courage and decision, for power had been put in the hands of the Marxists at practically every centre. Town after town and village after village they entered, burying their dead as they went, until hundreds of the centres in Andalusia had been re-established for orderly government.

In these early operations there were three columns operat-

¹ Heard and reported by J. M. Pinto.

³ Cardozo, *The March of a Nation*.

ing towards Malaga: one via Grazalema in the south-west, one by Almargen, and another from Campillos, farther to the north. Campillos, important as the granary of the Legion, fell without much resistance. There had been fifty victims of the Red terror in this small centre.

The column from Campillos pushed on to Penarrubia and to Teba. Here the Marxist controllers shut themselves in houses and the inhabitants hunted them out. Here, as elsewhere, their toll of murders and atrocities was something for which they had to answer to the villagers.

From there they pushed on to Ronda, where anyone reputed to have over 20,000 pesetas had been murdered, if found. As usual, the Communist mayor had organized the hunt. There was a brief fight outside the town, and the Reds were put to flight. During the fighting, whilst the Marxists were trying to hold up the advance, the inhabitants, as at so many other places, seized the town; and when the Nationalist regulars and volunteers entered, it was to a triumphant reception from the townsfolk of Ronda, where six hundred and twenty-two victims had been sacrificed to the Communist "ideals".

Ronda and Antequera were the two chief towns of the province other than the capital, Malaga, and were so situated as to control the approaches to the interior through the sierras. These two centres were organized as the bases for the final attack upon the capital at a later date. General Varela's few troops were wanted for the advance on Madrid.

The history of events in Ronda itself is briefly told. On the 18th July there were practically no troops or military in the town, but a Lieutenant-Colonel of the school of recruits tried to take over control of the city, and shot a man who opposed him. The local mayor, of course, was a Communist, like all the other heads of the Largo Caballero cells. He disarmed all Rightists, and soon the Red "Lions" stalked the town, joined by the "Eagles", from some of the villages in the hills around and led by the last of the *bandoleros*, Flores Arocha, who was reputed by the Reds to be "a very great General". Arocha had long been sought by the police for a goodly record of crime. Now he took over, and became the local agent of "the legitimate Government" and the arbiter of the lives of the townsfolk. The daily toll of loot and murder began. The whole clergy of Ronda were wiped out in a single

day, and many people of the Right and many workmen were shot on the very grave charges, in the view of this official arbiter, that they were " decent people ". The banks, of course, were rifled; official Communism was installed, and the system of " vales " (vouchers) introduced—it was the simplest way of taking anything wanted without paying for it. According to the Marxist euphemisms, this was merely official money—a credit granted by the popular Government for redemption in due course. Not that they would ever have been redeemed; and even if they had, the unlimited " issues " would have made them of negligible value.

From the date of Ronda's occupation until February 1937, operations on these fronts remained purely defensive against the sporadic and ill-organized attacks of the Reds.

General Varela was then sent for and left the Malaga front to join the troops on their march up the valley of the Tagus towards Madrid. This advance was contrary to all the rules of the text-books. They took great risks, trusting to their skill, and with all the fierce courage and blind faith of which the Spaniard is capable. When challenged upon the point, they frankly admitted that there was no justification but the exigencies of the situation and the hope that they might bring the war to an end by a speedy *coup*. They were only a few thousand, consisting of the highly trained men of the *Tercio* and the *Regulares*, and a number of partly trained volunteers. From Seville to Badajoz, about 110 miles, they had already covered the ground. From there to Madrid was another 250 miles. A fortnight had already been lost through not having command of the sea. Yet in about three months they reached their objectives, in spite of a number of necessary delays.

From Merida they advanced to Oropesa, which they occupied on the 29th August, after covering about 12 miles a day on average. Talavera was occupied on the 4th September, after a battle which lasted between two and three days. This battle was of the greatest importance, for the forces with which he attacked the town possessed only one battery, but in the course of the engagement they captured a whole regiment of artillery. Talavera is about 175 miles from Badajoz, and their progress up to that point thus also averaged about 12 miles per day. It fell on the same day as Irún. Behind them their lines of communication were so long and unguarded on the flanks that they could never have been maintained without

the goodwill of the majority of the inhabitants. This explanation is borne out by the evidence of Major-General F. J. Fuller.

"Wherever I have journeyed through National Spain I have seen . . . the will and support of the millions who have vitalized his citizen army and imbued it with an unconquerable spirit. In two visits I have covered 3,000 miles of his territories, and on the first occasion what amazed me most was that, when travelling from Seville to Salamanca, I found the whole of that vital road and the vital railway alongside it all but unguarded.

"As a soldier I was perplexed until a peasant put me right. I asked him how it was that the Reds did not raid these communications. His answer was direct: 'We had enough of them when they were here, and we do not intend that they shall come back a second time.'

"In short, that road and that railway were protected by the *morale* of the peasantry, and without that *morale* Franco's cause would collapse."¹

It may be added that there were also thousands of miles of telegraph and telephone wires in use for military and other purposes, completely unguarded.

Varela "shunted" men to the extremes of his lines to bluff his opponents, for he had few men for this daring advance. As Franco advanced along the Tagus valley his right flank was protected by the river, but his left was badly exposed to attacks from the Sierra de Gredos and the Guadarrama. He instructed Mola to free his flank by pushing into the Gredos Mountains and opening the Puerto del Pico and the valley leading to St. Martin Valdeiglesias. "All these operations were exceedingly venturesome," Mr. Cardozo states, "but the Reds at this stage showed so little courage and initiative that General Franco and his officers felt they could afford to take risks."²

Mola's cavalry under Colonel Monasterio was detailed to clear the Puerto del Pico portion of the Gredos range. The Red position was immensely strong. "It was a position which could have been held by a hundred men against a brigade."³ They were also well supplied with artillery which they had carried to the heights. They had a superb position which

¹ Fuller, *Spain No. aj*, 8th March, 1938.

³ Cardozo, *March of a Nation*, p. 95.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

commanded as much as eight miles of road and defiles. The defence force was about 500. Two squadrons of cavalry were all that could be spared to clear this formidable position. How they succeeded is another example of how ingenuity was able to overcome strong but conventional defence.

The Sierra de Gredos is famous for its mountain goat hunting. The guides who accompany the hunters know every inch of the mountains. Colonel Monasterio obtained the services of one of the best of these guides who promised that he would lead the cavalry by little-known tracks which would bring them to a position behind the artillery positions. At three in the morning the attack was made on foot. The Reds abandoned their position in panic and made for the road, where Monasterio's machine-guns completed their rout. Over one hundred were killed and a similar number fell over the precipice.

Pushing on along the main road to Madrid, the right wing reached Maqueda, where for the first time they met with huge prepared concrete lines, protected by pill-boxes, gun-emplacements and dug-outs, elaborate in their use of material as the Hindenburg line. The determined assault was hardly necessary, for the militia fled almost at the first shot and abandoned the whole of this impressive system of fortifications.

It was at this point that the road branches off to Toledo, and Franco had to take a difficult decision. Should he dash direct for Madrid or turn aside to the relief of Toledo? It is true that nothing but purely military considerations should usually influence a Commander's decision; and it is true that there were considerations other than military ones which beckoned in the direction of Toledo. Above all, in civil war, the "symbol" has greater significance than in an ordinary one, and the relief of this heroic garrison would have great moral value in the rest of the country. As a result, it has been suggested that the relief of Toledo was a military blunder; but in point of fact this argument does not bear examination. To begin with, Toledo lay in a fold of the northern bank of the River Tagus, and was, in effect, the end of the Nationalists' right flank; and in such a short distance from Madrid, it was obviously unsound to proceed without having control of the network of roads which crossed the river through this town. Incidentally, also, there was a large ammunition factory there.



TOLEDO

[Facing page 294]



At all events, Toledo was decided upon. There was some stiff fighting, especially at Torrijos, where the small army scored a decisive victory; and Toledo was relieved on the 27th September.

From the 19th July the ancient mediaeval fortress, the Alcazar, in use as the Military Academy, had been closely besieged. It was under the self-appointed command of Colonel Moscardó. He was Director of the Gymnastic School attached to the Academy. On the murder of Calvo Sotelo, anticipating trouble, he had returned from Madrid and took charge in Toledo. First of all he installed himself in the house of the military Governor, but later he deemed it wiser to move into the Alcazar. There lie took with him 1,300 civilians and armed men, consisting of officers, Civil Guards, volunteers, and six cadets taking special courses at that time, with the additional problem of five hundred women and children, flying from the Red terror. He had been so engrossed in the defence of Toledo that he had taken no precautions for sending his own family out of the town. His wife and his two youngest children were captured by the Reds, but he would not allow this dreadful fact in any way to influence his own sense of duty. He set about organizing the defence and laying in stores. He was ready when the first attack came.

Within a week his family, taken prisoners, were used against him. He was told on the telephone by the officer commanding the attack that his son, Luis, would be executed if he did not surrender.

"Neither the life of my son nor of my whole family will deter me from my duty," Moscardo replied.

"Your son shall speak to you. If you do not consent he will be shot at once."

Luis Moscardo, only aged seventeen, spoke to his father:

"What am I to do, Father? They say they will shoot me if you do not surrender."

"My dearest boy," the Colonel replied, "I order you, in the name of God, to call out, 'Long live Spain!' and 'Long live Christ, the King!', and die like a hero. For your father, for the honour of Spain, will never surrender."

"Right, Father."

"Good-bye, my dearest boy."

They killed Luis Moscardo within two hundred yards of the Alcazar.

The siege went on well into September. Again and again the Government had reported that they had taken the fortress. They had bombed it from the air; they had fired it on many occasions and sprayed it with petrol. Two huge mines had failed incredibly to bring the desired result, although they had caused enormous damage. How there were any survivors of the second colossal mine is a mystery. Artillery was used from close range.

For three days after Varela's forces had surrounded the town they were unable to make any headway. Some thousands of Reds defended the town. The rescuers were but a few hundreds, but they were men of the Legion and Moors. No quarter was expected on either side. First the cemetery was carried, then the bull-ring, the infantry barracks and the hospital. This ended the resistance. The Alcazar was relieved.

"Nothing to report, sir," was Moscardó's greeting to Varela.

During the siege two children were born and two old women died natural deaths. Only 82 soldiers were killed, though 87 were missing and 580 were wounded. When relief came there was only sufficient food to last for four days. Once again the minute Nationalist force had achieved the apparently impossible. It is safe to say that few people dreamed the Alcazar could be saved. It was one of the greatest setbacks the "fiction factor" of the Reds received, so often had they announced to the world the capture of the fortress. Recently again mendacious Red publicity about the Alcazar had been busy in England. It has been stated that the women were deliberately taken into the fortress as hostages and were exhibited from the walls to prevent the Red forces from destroying it. The Reds had, therefore, not really been trying, for fear of hurting them. This story is absolutely false. The women who followed Moscardó into the fortress went of their own free will to escape the horrors outside; and there are all the survivors as witnesses, and the priest Señor Camarazo who was sent to visit them.

Yet it would seem that not even such careful records of events as that of Major McNeill-Moss, nor a host of survivors, prevent the Communist versions propagated by Comrade Ilya Ehrenbourg, the Russian local chieftain of the Iberian Anarchist Federation, and the Hungarian, Mr. Arthur

koestler, correspondent to the *Nexus Chronicle*, from being given currency in England.

Just after the relief of Toledo, the Burgos Junta of Defence appointed General Franco Head of the State. It is important to recall that on this historic occasion he once more announced to the world the fact which was well known within the country itself, though regarded as a fairy story by those who wished to create a different impression and by those who refused to see the significance of the world forces which are operating and had chosen Spain as their battlefield: "In Spain we are fighting, not a Spanish internal foe, but the Russian Communist International, which has its affiliations in every country."

"We are determined to free our Spain from the deadly influences of those Marxist principles which are not only false and anti-Christian, but are also foreign to all our traditions and culture."¹

Whilst Toledo was being relieved, troops were also pushing on in the direction of Madrid, which was about seventy kilometres (forty-two miles) distant; and it took them about thirty days to cover the distance—about two kilometres a day, all of it hard fighting by a handful of troops, the men almost exhausted from the effort. It might almost be said that the offensive which had started at Badajoz had petered out almost automatically in the suburbs of Madrid. But before we come to the story of that last dash for the capital, we must turn our attention to the north, where another heroic garrison was putting up an historic defence. In order to find a success with which to balance the fall of Toledo, the Red Government were furiously assaulting the town of Oviedo where General Aranda had less than two thousand men, with whom he was besieged by a great army of Asturian *dynamiteros* and Red militia. The attacks were incessant and the wastage heavy. It seemed that the fall of the city was only a matter of time.

In the previous chapter we have referred to the defence put up by General Aranda. The determination of the Reds to eliminate him was increased by a bitter personal hatred, for at one time he had been an advanced Socialist. He had visited Russia and had been a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, and an ardent worker for Socialism in Spain for some three years. Aranda, who was

¹Cardozo, *The March of a Nation*, pp. 151-2.

the son of a sergeant in the Army Medical Corps, had obtained entry to the Staff College by hard study, and was one of the few officers to be kept in his command after the February election returned the Popular Front Government. He was left in the post of Military Commandant of Asturias, and there was little doubt the Government fully expected him to hand over Oviedo when the rising broke out. However, though he had not been in the councils of the Generals, he declared, when the time came, for the Nationalist Movement.

Two columns were sent to relieve him. There was the column from Galicia, Franco's own province, a magnificent body of men, who, as their ancestors centuries ago, go into battle to the cry of "For *Sant Iagol*"—St. James; for the shrine of that saint at Santiago de Compostella was a place of pilgrimage for all Christendom in the Middle Ages. They fought their way for many miles through difficult mountainous country and along the coast past Castropol and Grado (the granary from which the Legion thereafter derived their rations), while a mixed column forced a passage north from Leon, after nearly as arduous a march; and together they created the famous Oviedo corridor. Colonel Martin Alonso was in charge of the forces, which consisted of only forty-seven companies, mostly of volunteer Falangists, Assault Guards and Civil Guards. This tiny force was spread between La Espina, Grado and Escamplcro, far too wide a front for the number of effectives. But the bluff succeeded. They eventually carried the Narranco Hill after severe fighting—and the Red armies gave up the siege. When they discovered how much smaller their victors were in numbers than they were themselves, the Reds started a series of furious attacks, but by then the added number of the relief force allowed Aranda to beat off with less difficulty their strongest assaults. The town was relieved on October 19th, but it was impossible with the small force at his disposal for Aranda to clear the surrounding hills, and it was long into 1937 before the Reds were compelled to give up all hope of retaking the city. In December 1936 they launched furious attacks against Otero and the Grulle Massif, but these cost them 6,000 casualties. In the following February an even more formidable attempt was made. For sixteen days they persisted in their attacks, although on the first day alone they suffered over 7,000 casualties, and the whole effort cost them more than 18,000 men. This was the

last of the systematic attacks. They had been unable to overcome the forty-five very efficient battalions which Aranda had organized. Thereafter, the famous corridor, only a few hundred yards wide in places, and *over fifteen miles long*, was maintained without much anxiety until the Asturian campaign ended in the autumn of 1937. Thus another position, important strategically and for its moral value, was held through that spirit of refusing to accept defeat in defence, and attempting the apparently impossible in attack, which has characterized the military operations of the Nationalist forces throughout the war.

The dangerous march on Madrid was ready to go forward again in October. From first to last it took Franco three months to reach the capital. To have reached Madrid in that time, with numerous engagements and the relief of Toledo on the way, was a masterly achievement; but, as will be shown, it had taken too long to take the capital by a rapid stroke.

The first stronghold after Maqueda which the diminutive Nationalist army had to conquer was Navalcarnero. This position was considered impregnable. Largo Caballero and other leading politicians went down there and told the world that this was the rock on which the little Nationalist rivulet would break. It certainly looked impregnable. There were three lines of protected concrete trenches, with machine-gun "nests" and every possible kind of defence work. But the town was captured in a day. It took two and a half hours more than expected schedule. Once again determination and high morale beat material protection with bad leadership and inferior inspiration and discipline.

And once again an appalling story has to be told of what had happened in the town during the Red terror. In the words of the local chemist to Mr. Cardozo:

"We were all right until the fall of Talavera, because all that time the local Committee of Public Safety was formed by townspeople and persons we knew. But after that Madrid sent us out an entirely new Committee which we were obliged to obey implicitly. It was made up of the worst scoundrels in Spain. Murders and tortures then became a daily occurrence. Women and young girls were not spared if they resisted the desires of the young criminals of the Committee. I can tell you that there is hardly a woman in this town who

has not been raped by the Marxist crowd from Madrid and their friends and their armed escort. But they all left Navalcarnero two days ago."

Out on the right flank the Nationalists pushed forward to seek the protection of the Tagus, as they had done at Toledo. The details of the campaign are too voluminous for us to deal with them here; but we must once more relate what they found at the small town of Ciempozuelos. For within our limited space we are compelled to deal rather with the spirit of this struggle and those features which illustrate its true causes.

Ciempozuelos was one of the small places where Largo Caballero and his friends had created one of the ten thousand Red cells which he boasted they -would create throughout Spain. Naturally the mayor—a nice, respectable *bourgeois* title, which comes in useful for foreign propaganda when quoting evidence on subjects like Guernica—was the leading Red of the village. The point is important because many such officials have been executed by the Nationalists; and unless one appreciates the nature of most of them, and the fact that they were the leaders and instigators, directly responsible for the atrocities which were perpetrated on such a widespread scale, a false impression might be obtained. Under the usual "official" auspices the "Popular Tribunal" devised refinements of cruelty which, dreadful as they were, unhappily were by no means unique nor worse than occurred in so many hundreds of places. For we repeat: they were the result of organization; they were the execution of a plan, partly by specific instruction and partly the logical result of previous teaching.

Apologists for Red "ideology" speak respectfully of the "Popular Tribunals", as if they were in the same category as the military and civil tribunals of the Nationalists. These statements can only be due to ignorance of the true state of affairs, or partisan cynicism, or to subsidy. One had never discovered, for instance, priests being handed over, bound, by judicial decree, to lunatics in an asylum, who had been given knives; or of old men being sentenced by Nationalist Tribunals to be thrown into the bull-ring to be gored to death by an infuriated bull, with the members of the "Popular Tribunal" and their supporters in the amphitheatre to applaud this edifying spectacle. But both these things hap-

pened as the result of "judicial verdicts" of the "Popular Tribunal" of Ciempozuelos!

Whilst Varela was fighting his way towards Madrid, Mola's men held the heights of the mountain barrier in the great semi-circle north of Madrid; and from the north-east the Nationalists pushed on to try and complete the encirclement of the capital, pushing forward along the main road connecting Barcelona with the capital. In due course, after bitter fighting, they occupied the town of Sigüenza.

Amongst those they took prisoner there were the survivors of the battalion of Alcalá, consisting of five hundred men and two hundred women. As an example of the Red methods, a brief history of this battalion is of the greatest interest. The following details are extracted from a report by Marcel Dutrey, who visited these prisoners at Soria:

"The white-haired Carlist who was acting as chief warden introduced me to them: * From morning to night the women are begging for ribbons of the National colours, medals of the Virgin, and scapulars. Look at them! Their chests are covered with patriotic and pious emblems. . . . These women have every imaginable crime to their credit. It is hardly possible for a warden to go near their cells without being the object of obscene advances. . . . Here is the very depth of ignominy; I do not think it would be possible for human beings to sink lower. . . . There has been an epidemic raging in my country, Señor, an incurable furious madness. . . .

"We have only shot one of this battalion, the officer who assassinated the son of Moscardó—a child of seventeen years. They called his father to the telephone to listen to the revolver shot with which they killed his only son. . . . As for the rest, when we take Alcalá, their cells will be waiting for them.

". . . Alcalá was a Spanish prison. . . . All the riff-raff of Madrid passed through it. . . . On the 20th July, when the Reds obtained mastery over the town, they opened the prison gates and freed a thousand civil prisoners, and about two hundred women—thieves, incendiaries and poisoners. The Marxists gave them their liberty and rifles. . . . Eight days later the battalion of Alcalá made a triumphal entry into Madrid.

"They sent this battalion of crime to Sigüenza. There these militiamen and militiennes only put to death two hundred of the inhabitants, it is true, but they did it with a rare cruelty.

. . . ‘ Perhaps not as bad as at Ciempozuelos, where they turned over a hundred religious brothers, bound, to the lunatics from the asylum, whom they furnished with knives. . . . ’

“ ‘ However, you will find their victims at Sigienza,’ the head warder concluded.

“ I did not understand it at first. How could they be there, five weeks after the town had fallen to General Franco? ”

At Sigienza he learnt what was meant:

“ The people there no longer had that sense of shame which, in Spain, enjoins silence when it concerns misfortunes of a certain kind. . . . My first informant was a doctor. He was brutal: ‘ All the women of Sigienza ’, he said, ‘ from the age of ten to the age of fifty have been violated. Those who are not enceinte are diseased. Many are both.’ ”

“ The battalion was in Sigienza for four months. . . . The proprietress of the hotel was with child; the maids also, and the laundress who called for my washing. I hesitated to speak to her on so painful a subject. I was wrong: the evil was so general in the town that she replied, with no apparent embarrassment :

“ ‘ I was lucky . . . the first who assaulted me wished to marry me. . . . Marriage? . . . One of the Reds, dressed up in the Bishop’s¹ chasuble, wearing his mitre, blessed the “ husband ” then there was a banquet, at the end of which most of the militiennes performed the *dance du ventre* on the tables. . . . Of course, it was a burlesque ceremony, but at least it gave the woman over to a single master. ”

“ ‘ It was better than belonging to everybody. Thus I escaped disease. . . . My man was an assassin condemned to a life term of imprisonment. . . . There were many worse off than I.’ ”

Unfortunately we have not space to give the rest of Dutrey’s report upon what else he found in this city, which was the victim, like so many others, of the invasion of the perverted Red “ ideology ”. But by way of corroborative evidence it should be mentioned that he went to the local dispensary on the following morning and chatted amongst five hundred patients who attended there.

¹ The Bishop of Sigienza had been put to death in an unspeakably barbarous manner.

Only a full perusal of the three books of the official *Reports on the Atrocities* relating to a part of the redeemed area of Andalusia, and such details as are given in the record by the Rev. Toni as regards the diocese of Avila, can convey the scale, the widespread nature, the design behind the deliberate degradation of the people, clearly evidenced throughout whole provinces and towns. And where the propaganda agents had not perverted and armed sufficient inhabitants to complete the picture, they sent down special columns or patrols to initiate the infamy. Borkenau, a writer of good faith and of very Left views, evidences this as regards Catalonia; it was the same west of Madrid at Navalcarnero and other places; it was the same in the province of Jaen, and the western parts of Toledo province; and when free access can be obtained elsewhere, there is not the slightest doubt that there will be further overwhelming evidence in respect of the other areas where the Reds have been able to impose their sway.

When the various provinces were redeemed by the Nationalists, the same sort of thing was to be found almost everywhere—and they have redeemed some four and a half provinces, apart from Badajoz, Huelva and other Andalusian provinces, Guipuzcoa¹ and parts of Aragon. We touch upon these in a later chapter. How comes it that the nature of this Spanish revolution, and these amazing stories of degradation which illustrate the Red methods and inspiration, have found no echo in the British Press, usually so eager to exploit anything of that description—even without the moral justification which is so obvious in the case of this civil war? We return to that question in a later chapter. But we would now point out the moral and repeat again the words of a great Spaniard: "War for material interests can never be justified: but questions of principle and ideals may do so." There are times when rebellion is a duty; and the climax had come in July 1936, as time has abundantly proved.

After the capture of Navalcarnero hopes ran high that Madrid might surrender in face of a rapid assault. That city was held down by terror; and the oppressed majority might find an opportunity, though unarmed, of throwing its weight on the side of the Nationalist columns. If Navalcarnero had

¹ For a good account of events in Tolosa, Guipuzcoa, similar to those described in Sigüenza, see André Zwinglestein's *Au pays de la Terreur Rouge*, Ed. "Alsatia", Paris, September 1936.

fallen thus, was it likely that Madrid could stop them?

The advance went forward until it was at last possible to attempt an assault on the line of the Manzanares River. By 7th November Cerro de los Angeles had been taken. The fall of the capital was expected at any time. Major Mizzian with his *llegulares* actually got into the Plaza de España; but he could not hold on. The main defence line held on the river.

During the fighting there was a significant episode at the Segovia Bridge. The Legionaries were opposed there by the newly formed Women Militia. As they deployed, the Legion officers thought that they were seeking surrender. Men were sent across to question them, when, suddenly, the whole of the Amazon battalion opened fire with rifles and machine-guns. There could be only one reply. An hour later the battalion was in flight. The Legion did not fire on them as they fled.

It is unnecessary to state that the Nationalists do not organize battalions of women, nor mixed battalions. Their origin with the Spanish Reds was merely part of the Russian Communist technique, which lays down that they should be created to produce that appalling phenomenon, the blood-crazed and hysterical creatures such as the French Revolution produced, as an instrument of massacre, and even as an example to their troops in the field. They are used as a basis for propaganda, as a method of creating heroines, and for propagating a thirst for revenge. They are just a standard means of creating "revolutionary' zeal".

The same day Franco ordered a move for which he has been much criticized in certain quarters. A heavy aerial bombardment on Madrid was carried out. He may have felt that the position of the minute army was desperate. But in point of fact Madrid was the front line, and had been made so by the Reds. The demoralization which set in as a result amply justified his move from a military point of view. Indeed, it might well have decided the situation if the International Brigades had not been suddenly thrown in to determine the issue of the struggle. We fear we can have but little respect for what General Queipo de Llano has called the tears of the "International crocodiles" who, with such heart-rending pathos, condemn the barbarous methods of General Franco in bombing "open towns" and "destroying women and children". This wail has increased in direct ratio to the

superiority of Franco's air force over the Government's. Of late months the Reds have almost succeeded in making it an international question. But the "International crocodiles" did not raise their wail at the beginning of the war when the Government had a great superiority in aeroplanes and used them daily for raiding open towns such as Cordoba, Granada, Majorca and a hundred other places; Oviedo and Teruel they practically destroyed; and they killed hundreds in bombarding coastal towns. They only do it now as a recruiting call on a one-sided humanitarian appeal, and to win the battle which they cannot win on the field, by methods which they have found so efficacious since Badajoz.

"Down in the south," said Quicipo de Llano one night over the radio, "where our two armies are face to face, at the present time the aviation I possess is superior to that of the enemy. The enemy aircraft, therefore, do not dare to give battle to ours and only appear when the sky is clear of opponents. I want all those hypocritical crocodiles who condemn my methods to listen to me carefully."

"Enemy aircraft bombarded the following open towns: Fuenteovejuna, Penarroya, Espiel, Villaharta, Villa del Rio, Montoro, Pedro Abad, Lopera, Porcuna, Cordoba, Pliego, Motril, Amunecar, Malaga and Algeciras. In other words, they bombarded fifteen peaceful towns, some of them more than a hundred kilometres from the front.

"In view of this low-down activity, I threatened to adopt similar methods if they continued. This I was able to do, if I wished, because I had more than sufficient means at my disposal. But, as I am more humanitarian than they are, I waited. Well, they bombarded Montoro in a pitiless and cruel fashion, causing numerous victims in the workers' quarters, and in the Provincial Asylum, which they destroyed, causing victims among the wounded who were being cared for there, and their relatives. To show them I could do the same, I ordered the bombardment of Jaen, causing a considerable number of casualties.

"The other day they again bombarded the Virgen de la Cabeza Sanctuary and Montoro. I then ordered the bombardment of Andujar.

"These are the only two cities which have been bombarded by my aircraft, and it was in reply to their bombardment of sixteen.

" And so I ask—How is it that these facts did not arouse protests and the indignation of this vast body which is now giving voice to them? "

Once again, we can only say that, following the war as carefully as we have, with the closest attention to many sources of information, from the official Press news of both sides and from listening to as many radio stations as possible, we have continuously been appalled at the seemingly endless series of false stories with which the Red Government have " got away ", and at the difficulty of refuting them; but the taking of the smallest village by the Nationalists is sufficient to send most of the British Press hysterical about baby-slayers or faked atrocity propaganda. And, unless there is incredible ignorance of the facts, we can only conclude that there are undisclosed influences, which are directly or indirectly responsible.

The attack on Madrid was definitely held up by 17th November. The first surprise had failed. The city was too well guarded for the small attacking force. In the neighbourhood through which the Nationalists must attack, the Casa de Campo and the University city, every house was a fort, every window a machine-gun post. Every street was barricaded and there was artillery at every approach. Above all, rushed from Albacete, came the first organized instalment of the International Brigades, shortly to reach a figure of 30,000 men from all countries. Not that they were the first contribution of the Internationals; but these were complete units, on the arrival of which, in the defence of Madrid, it may truly be said that the " local " civil war had ended, and the second phase begun, in which the real international character of the war was patent.

Interesting information has been given by the organizer of these International Brigades, Andre' Marty, in a book which he wrote upon the subject. Such armies do not drop from the sky. Foreigners, from all over the world, do not volunteer to risk their lives in a civil war—unless induced under false pretences, by promises of loot and high pay, or collected by an organization teaching an " ideology ". So the world's Press has been led to give out the inspired opinion that the Government was bound to have an easy victory and was fighting for democracy. Both statements were, of course, false; but the conspiracy of silence on the part of most of the Press, the keen partisanship of those who believed the Press, and a one-sided

organized appeal to humanitarian sentiments resulted in very large numbers being collected and sent out as combatants or " *foi* civilian work in the rearguard. The Communists of every nation and region sent their quota—Tartars, negroes, and all who believed the promises or in the " ideology " propounded to them. . . . *"The Spanish Republic would long ago have been crushed but for the creation of a great popular-army directed by a single command."*¹

It is not possible to have better evidence of this than that of M. Marty, who recruited them.

" The International Brigades have been one of the bases of this [the ' Spanish '] new army, thanks to their high technical qualifications and strong discipline " [szc].

Later, it became necessary to conceal the huge numbers that Russia was pouring into the fray. The men were made Spanish citizens. As often as not false papers were issued to them, and they were planted with the Spanish militia to hide them in case of the necessity for the withdrawal of foreign combatants from Spain. In Marty's own words:

" To-day there are no longer International Brigades in the sense in which it was understood some months ago. . . . They have been definitely merged in the young, popular Spanish Army."

From a Communist point of view, Madrid was the perfect place to hold up the small, highly trained Nationalists army. Had they been able to force battle in the open country around the Casa del Campo, where skill and tactics would have carried their full weight, the Nationalists might yet have won the city. But the Red command had every reason for determining to fight in the city itself. There was the necessary mentality of the barricades and the French Revolution to be considered. There was the further fact that the type of men fighting for the Red defence were much better fighters in houses and streets than anywhere else. The construction of houses as fortresses, with the incredible amount of equipment at their disposal, was obviously their best policy. But most important of all, this line of defence would throw upon Franco the odium of destroying the Spanish national capital. If he attacked Madrid, he must, against his will, attack and destroy private citizens. He was bound to be responsible for starving them and causing them the greatest miseries. This might bring

x Andr^e Marty, *Douze mois sublimes*, Poussain.

recruits from the "neutral masses", Its siege also provided a fine sentimental appeal to the rest of the country based on the horrors which the good citizens of Madrid were experiencing at the hands of the wicked Generals. This appeal might affect public opinion throughout the country, so that he might find opposition to him suddenly stimulated or his lines of communication in serious jeopardy.

The whole inspiration for this defence of an open city was from its Russian Communist directors. Mr. Moses Rosenberg, the Soviet Ambassador, presided over the defence, with relays of sentries at his door. On the psychology of the Russian, Mexican, German, Italian, Hungarian, Austrian and other revolutions, in which his organization had perfected the technique, he sent out the slogan, "*Madrid—la tumba del fascismo*"—"Madrid should be the tomb of Fascism". Really meaning, of course, the triumph of International Communism and the World Revolution.

Franco viewed the problem with his customary cool sanity. With 5,000 men on the spot, there was little to do. Probably less than 10,000 trained men could be spared for the task if all were rushed up from the rear.

He did not want to face the losses which a frontal attack was bound to bring, and a few thousand men are soon lost clearing house after house in a capital city. Yet he could not stand idle. He offered to respect a neutral zone for civilians; and the Government, in reply, did all they could to make him violate that neutral zone. They used it for arms parks and training their troops, and they installed batteries and used them there. Meanwhile they continued to pour men and munitions into the city. Franco, when he had brought up enough men and guns to attack, would have to bombard the city so thoroughly as virtually to destroy it. As General Duval says, he could unquestionably have done so, and would have been justified militarily. But he chose a wiser course. He decided to invest the city and bring about its surrender by other means. "Madrid is our city," he said, "it is our capital. The Reds from Moscow may contemplate its total destruction, but that is a thing which I cannot do."¹

And in order to refute the propagandist stories of huge Nationalist losses in repeated attempts to assault the city, we should mention the reliable statement of a highly experienced

¹ Cardozo, *The March of a Nation*.

soldier, General Duval, in his book (prefaced by General Weygand, who was General Foch's Chief-of-Staff), that Madrid was never once subjected to a single serious effort to bring about its capture by a military operation.

Franco *could* not attack Madrid. The Nationalists must wait. Soon the great citizen army that was being trained would be ready for the field. The first phase of the war was ended.

CHAPTER XI

THE REDEMPTION OF THE PROVINCES

THE arrival of the International Brigade in the Madrid defence apparently brought about a period of stalemate in that sector. And then for three weeks the Nationalists had to withstand a series of attacks on every front: Avila, Madrid, Guipuzcoa, Teruel, Aragon, Asturias, Andalusia and Guadalajara. But Franco was not to be diverted from his policy of training an efficient army. Troops were sent to stiffen the defence at hard-pressed points. Occasionally there was a local operation to relieve pressure or incorporate a strong point in the line. But no men were wasted on premature major offensives, whilst the enemy continued to attack in vain, and, in particular, the line through Jaca, Huesca, Zaragoza and Teruel, against which, in the bull-fighting terms applied by Queipo de Llano, they kept on "*rompienclo sus cuernos*"—breaking their horns on the barrier. In December, the Bilbao Basques made a surprise attack in some force against Vitoria. They reached Villareal, where a brilliant rally by a few hundred men, aided by lack of resolution and efficiency on the part of the Reds, brought the advance to a halt. The operation was thus reduced to a minor tactical success.

A ver}' determined attack was made on Oviedo in the following February. Once more a victory⁷ was sought at all costs, though on an unimportant front. Oviedo had a moral, but little strategic, value, and the attempt was bound to be expensive. Some 35,000 men, with large numbers of foreign officers, supported by 50 Russian tanks, 200 field-guns and over 1,000 machine-guns, were thrown against General Aranda's force of 8,000 second-line troops. The Red militia got within a few hundred yards of the eastern side of Oviedo; there they⁷ were checked for a week, and, after a further two weeks' fighting, were ultimately driven back. In this terrific

THE REDEMPTION OF THE PROVINCES gil

battle more than half the Red effectives were casualties. The defence was a triumph for good generalship, morale and inspired leadership.

With such minor modifications as resulted from the above operations, the battle front became more or less stabilized; and to some extent it represented a division of the country according to the results at the voting in the elections of February 1936.

It was a civil war, and upon each side of this line were many sympathizers, in every town and province, with those upon the other side of it, but where the Popular Front had returned deputies, the Left extremists had been able more thoroughly to impose their will upon the inhabitants by seizing the essential machinery. Large numbers had voted for the Popular Front, though they were far from Marxist, believing they were furthering moderate reforms; and such people had not expected a government which acted like that which resulted, or the kind of official that was appointed to the executive posts of authority. A British Liberal, for example, whilst in favour of improving the education of a completely "an-alphabetic" door-keeper of the Midland Bank, might think it strange if he were made a director: yet that happened in the case of the Banco Hipotecario, and this was typical of the rule rather than the exception, in Government-controlled concerns before the Civil War started.

Among those provinces which had voted for the Right, but were on the Government side of the battle line, were Albacete, Cáceres (until its early relief by Franco), Santander, Castellon, Ciudad Real, Guadalajara and Cuenca. The last-named province had voted solidly Right, without returning the minority seats for their opponents, as had happened in nearly every other constituency except in Navarre. Those constituencies which had shown a Left majority of votes, but which soon came under Nationalist government, were Cadiz, Badajoz, Las Palmas, Oviedo, Pontevedra (according to the final declaration, which was disputed), Seville (both province and capital) and Zaragoza (capital).

The provinces which had not voted anti-Marxist and were now on the Red side of the line included Almeria, Granada, Jaen, Lerida, Madrid (capital and province), Murcia (capital and province), Tarragona, Valencia (capital and province) and Barcelona. What happened in these provinces may be judged

from the description of events in Malaga which we give later in this chapter.

Although it is only a very broad generalization, it may be said that the people upon either side of the final dividing line were of very different types, and that those who were the more liable from their nature and environment to infection by Marxist doctrines were to be found on the eastern side.

The Red revolution which brought about the war has not been caused by the misfortunes of the peasantry; it has not been an uprising of the poor against the rich; it has been largely a privileged branch of labour trying to impose its will upon its poorer brethren. The Marxist revolution was preached by agitators who obtained a following mainly amongst classes of labour such as the city bakers, typographers, textile and metallurgical workers and others whose annual revenues were far greater than those of the peasants of Navarre, Galicia, Aragon and Castile; their hours of work, moreover, were far shorter. The small farmer and plot owner, dignified with the name of *bourgeoisie* by the Marxists, works hard from morning to night for little return; but it is they who have flocked to Franco's standard to stand up against the Red terror. "It was not the desperate work of the down-trodden, but the brazen licence of concupiscence" stirred up by agitators with a propaganda based almost entirely upon impudent falsehoods.

The breeding-grounds of Marxism were in the industrial areas and populous centres, and the professional agitators and directors of the movement did not pay much attention to the men of the countryside until recent years, when they needed a nucleus of country labourers to prepare the attempted revolution of 1934, and the intended revolution in the summer of 1936. It may be said that the grouping of the forces to-day does not indicate the injustices of Spain, but the *justice* with which the majority of the nation was treated. It is true that there were evils, such as unnecessarily high taxation, and, curiously, these were mainly the fruits of parliamentary government and "democracy". And so, speaking broadly, this was a revolt of the countryside against the theories of a proletarian minority, of which many, if not most, were receiving better pay and working shorter hours. These, like many townsmen, had a dangerous small measure of education and learning, and were much further from realities than the

countrymen living close to the soil and earning their living from it. The former type of citizen is far more easily corrupted with false propaganda and discontent; the nature of his life takes him further from the eternal verities, and breeds large numbers of the self-styled "intellectuals".

Incidentally, when, in the old days, the families were too large to earn a living from the family property, or the village farm, emigration resulted, but if the industrial proletariat breed beyond the capacity of absorption by the fluctuating labour market, there is far less emigration proportionately, and the evils of casual labour become accentuated.

The grouping therefore threw the Asturian miners, with their very thorough organization and foreign advisers and assistants, solidly upon the "Government" side, but the agricultural Asturian was against it. The Bilbao Basques were also mostly upon the Government side, though for a combination of reasons. The industrial workers of Bilbao, Renteria, Mondragon, Eibar (a small-arms manufacturing centre) and similar places were mostly Red; and at the same time certain of these Basques played for Separatism, not because they were supporters of the Government, but for precisely the opposite reason. They desired *to be independent* of the Madrid Government and naturally, when it was too late for them to turn back, the Reds took charge. The propaganda about the conservative Catholic Basques as a solid, enthusiastic, orderly community, fighting for a legitimate Government, was a myth created by the Press—and largely by the British Press. Those who ran Bilbao during this war were the current classical type of Reds. And that is why they collapsed, like Santander collapsed; it was not because of lack of arms or inferior numbers. It was, as elsewhere, lack of real conviction in the majority, disgust at those in power, and poor discipline.

Almost the whole of the rest of the north and west of Spain was instinctively Nationalist, except for Catalonia, where again there was the combination between the Reds and the short-sighted Separatists. The Catalonian, like so many other Spaniards, is so fiercely individualist that he often chooses strange allies to achieve his purposes. Whatever their views on Separatism, the true Catalonians, usually small farmers, or engaged in commerce, bitterly rue the day they threw in their lot with the extremists with the object of becoming independent of the central Madrid Government.

Almost the whole of the south-east of Spain was very Red, and its people are certainly a very different type of Spaniard from those in the Nationalist area. They have a much greater infusion of blood from Africa and the east, and from the peoples of many nationalities who have invaded their coasts. They lack the stability of the plateau dwellers, and their temperament is so mercurial that given good leadership and freed from the overwhelming Communist propaganda, they might well have swung over in many parts but for the initial firm grip with which the "Government" dominated them. One of the greatest surprises of the war was the way in which Seville rallied to General Queipo de Llano as soon as he was able to seize the machinery of power; to the majority there to-day he is literally a *dios*.

As a result of the groupings we have mentioned, it is almost true to say of the position in 1938 that one man in arms with the Nationalists is worth, as a soldier, two on the side of the Government, and that without the International Brigades and the Italians and Germans the war would have been over long before that year had begun.

With the enemy contained behind the barriers he established, General Franco next turned his attention to the capture of the province of Malaga, in order to secure the right flank of his southern communications, and to obtain the use of its valuable harbour. It was in this campaign that a complete unit of Italian volunteers first appeared in action upon the Nationalist side. Their numbers were small—they only took part in some of the operations carried out by one of nine columns engaged. The impression created to the contrary was merely another Press falsehood.

Before passing to the actual operations, we will add a few more words concerning Italian intervention. The number of Italian troops in Spain has varied from between 40,000 and 50,000 and has never exceeded the latter figure. When Mr. Lloyd George, in the *Sunday Times*, put the figure at 85,000, Signor Mussolini invited commissions to go and see for themselves; he stated there were then 40,000 Italians, and that anyone who stated to the contrary was deliberately lying. Within a few days the correspondents or leader-writers of the Left newspapers were reporting that large numbers of Italians had been withdrawn. It was a shuffle. The Italian armies that were so frequently being landed and removed from Spain



THE WALLS OF AVILA

[facing page 3x4]



existed only in imagination, or by the invention of Communist agents, reporters and agencies giving currency to information supplied and emanating from Red headquarters.

Not a simple Italian infantry unit appeared in action with the Nationalists in Spain until some *three months* after large numbers of Italians had been recruited by the International Communists for the Gaiibaldi Battalion of the International Brigade. They had called upon every Italian who was against the Government of Italy to go to Spain to fight "Fascism" and to form a new base from which they could attack Italy. They had a considerable response, but those who responded, though numerous, represented a small proportion of the Italian nation. The Italian nation's reaction was the large number of volunteers who were ready immediately to proceed to assist General Franco; and General Franco declined their assistance until *tens of thousands* of Communists of all nationalities had been sent to Spain by the Russian-controlled Third International, recruited by means of its world-wide propaganda and organizations, and with the assistance of the various branches of the Grand Orient Lodges.

So intense has been the propaganda that it is almost impossible to remove the false impressions created. We put forward, however, the evidence of General Duval, who personally has been present as an observer, following the campaigns in which the Italians took part. He states categorically that they were volunteers; that they were not men of the regular Italian Army, and that they lacked both the organization and training of the regular troops. He states that their officers were intelligent, adaptable and keen on their work, but that the very operations themselves proved that there were no regular army units. It was this lack of experience, coupled with their impetuosity, that caused the tactical reverse at Guadalajara; and at Bermeo—where they pushed on beyond their proper objectives, and where, nevertheless, they maintained themselves against greatly superior forces with great gallantry (again, precisely the opposite to what was reported in the British Press)—they temporarily jeopardized the whole plan of operations.

As to the Germans, the "internationals"—i.e. the undisclosed leaders—recruited heavily for the Ibañez Battalion in Germany, where large numbers of Jews, and part-Jews, were called upon to fight for an anti-Hitler, described as an "international" force.

Fascist ", home. Not that the whole of the Thaelman Battalion was Jewish; but most of the officers and organizers were, and the anti-Hitler Jews used their every effort to obtain recruits from among the Germans. And by reason of Hitler's oppressive anti-Semitic policy, they were assisted in this by Jews throughout the world. That is the reason why Germany decided to help the Nationalists. Her contribution has never been more than a few thousand—far fewer than the Germans in the Thaelman, the Edgar André and other international units, though they have been extremely valuable men—technical experts, aviators, anti-aircraft units and so on. There were never units of Reichwehr in action on any front. The statement to that effect was a lie propagated by the Third International and its friends and allies. This fact is known to ever}' Chancellory in the world. And it is not too much to say that Germany was *forced* to take the line which she took. She has not sent infantry, as she would have been justified in doing, because Franco was not short of *men*. He was short of equipment and arms, whereas the Government was receiving assistance throughout the world from the agents of the Third International, and from Russia, France, Mexico and elsewhere; and they were buying arms in all directions with the tremendous resources which the " Government " had seized—over £150,000,000 in bullion, the proceeds of sale of "collectivized " industries and produce, and the vast sums of public and private money and treasures which they stole.

Incidentally, it should be mentioned that Spain does not produce a single internal combustion engine. We may ignore the sole possible exception, the Elizalde; it would be a miracle if one were to be found in any of the aeroplanes, lorries, " Red Cross " and assistance vans which have poured into Spain in their tens of thousands. Both sides have had to rely entirely on supplies from abroad for their Air Force and for their motor transport. The Government has had far more in quantity than the Nationalists. If they have failed to make good use of this advantage, it has been through poor morale or inferior pilots, and bad discipline and disorganization in their repairs and maintenance services. They have also had many more aeroplanes, but their losses have been tremendous.

Confining this question to only one of its aspects, we should mention that the Bank of Spain's gold reserve was the third largest in Europe (excluding Russia), and alone by *far*

exceeded the whole combined gold reserves of Italy and Germany put together. Admitting that a lot has undoubtedly been stolen by Internationals—where is it?

At no time have the foreign troops—and this means substantially the Italians—exceeded 5% of the Nationalist effectives.

When the Spanish “Government” “officially” stated that there were 20,000 Germans and over 100,000 Italians with General Franco—and semi-officially they have often exceeded these figures—they have been practising their usual inversion. And the subsequent stories of tremendous bodies landed as well are worthy of the same credence as these original statements known to have been false. The source of information is the same “fiction factory”; the reports in that sense from the special correspondents come directly or indirectly from the Red Propaganda Bureau, put out to arouse Communist enthusiasm, to exploit British prejudices, and to exacerbate political feeling throughout the world in the interests of Communism. Why, then, does our Press continuously give these falsehoods splash headlines? Is it credible that they have not long ago fathomed the nature of this source of information? It is very hard to believe that they have not.

We deal more fully later with the International Brigades, but will here quote from *Le Journal de Genève* of October 30th, 1937, which printed an interview with the gentleman they speak with affection of as “the old Schutzbundler”, Julius Deutsch, who has been promoted to the rank of General and has influence with the Red “War Office”. General Deutsch said:

“I have had the good fortune to frequent International Brigade Circles and note a few details. First, the flood of foreign recruits, despite the *non-intervention policy*, has not abated a whit.

“The Thaelman Battalion is full of Austrians and German-Swiss.¹ The units of the International Brigade are indeed formed according to nationalities and languages, otherwise no officering would be possible. The supreme chief is a Russian, who only speaks Russian and always has an interpreter with him.

“The opinion is general that Thaelman is right in claim-

¹ Actually, mostly ordinary Germans but General Deutsch is obviously ^{TMIC} interested in his fellow countrymen and their immediate neighbours.

ing that all 'Red' victories are due to the International Brigades, and that the resistance to General Franco would have broken down long ago if the International volunteers had not always rushed into the breach, dragging the Spaniards after them.

"Well-informed circles estimate the International Brigade effectives at 80,000 men at least, without counting 3,000 Soviet instructors and numerous airmen."

To the words of this Swiss observer must be added the testimony of one equally competent, a Dane, Hakon Mielche, who wrote:¹

"It was Valencia who first called foreigners to interfere in what should have remained an absolutely national affair, and by doing so forced Salamanca to take similar measures. It was Valencia who brought world politics into the bloody arena, because Valencia's horizon has not its frontiers at the Pyrenees but included Moscow."

After first capturing Estepona, the operations against Malaga began in earnest. First Marbella fell; then at the beginning of February 1937, nine columns from different points began an impetuous but methodical advance towards Malaga. Eight of the columns were Spanish.

There was not much hard fighting, for the troops of these columns were converging like the spokes of a great fan, and kept dribbling behind the forces which tried to resist in the sierras. There was much difficulty from isolated posts hidden in strong points in this difficult country, and the Reds had blown up the culverts, the bridges and whole sections of the roads, giving themselves time to escape. As usual, any such delay was given out in the Government *communiques* as due to a victory; and each defeat was accompanied by fierce world-wide Press propaganda about Italian or German atrocities.

On the night of the 5th February, the Marbella column reached one kilometre from Fuengirola, capturing the castle and considerable material. The fleet co-operated. On the 6th, they pushed on again, and by nightfall they were at the gates of the city, having covered 60 kilometres (some 36 miles) in two days. When they reached Torremolinos, the local detachment of the Civil Guards, seventy strong, greeted them, standing rigidly to attention in formation, with their wives,

> Mielche in the Danish paper *Jyllandsposten*.

families and ancients behind them, and the cry of *Viva Espana* was once more heard in that little town.

At 7c³⁰-!¹¹ the following morning the troops of the Duke of Seville entered Malaga, overcoming weak and sporadic resistance. This column had had some hard fighting on the heights of Istan pie\ ously; but that was almost the only serious resistance encountered.

There was some fighting at the Plaza of die railway station. Shortly after, two more columns arrived—from Loja and Antequera; and when the other columns entered, the people began to come out into the streets.

At first there was little demonstration. The inhabitants had been seven months under Red "government". There was no bread; the streets were foul; there were no trams; and everywhere signs of demoralization.

But soon the demonstrations commenced. Prisoners were liberated, and the jubilation lasted long into the night, whilst the Reds and many refugees fled along the coast, partly forced to leave by the militia, partly because they *were* militia; many because of their crimes, but most of them from fear of the tortures which they had been told would be inflicted upon them by the Moors, "Fascists", and the brutal Nationalist soldiery. As to the few Italian troops who took part, it is pleasant to have the tribute of Sir Peter Chalmers Mitchell that he considered them well-disciplined, smart and well-behaved. They bivouacked near his home and fraternized with the local inhabitants. We may accept such evidence from that source without a moment's hesitation.

Some of the English Press, of course, as we learned to expect later, came out with the usual inspired Red propaganda, "the rebels have entered Malaga and the slaughter *has begun*". The figures went up to some 10,000. In point of fact, the slaughter had *ceased*. The thousands that would speak no more were the victims of the Communist cells and anarchist organizations during the seven months of typical Red rule.

The Red leaders fled to Motril and tried to escape in a boat flying- thp Rritish flair—a method of escape later to become familiar along the north coast of Spain. Some of them were caught, including the President of the Popular Tribunal. The military Commander, Villalba, fled with his troops, leaving behind a suitcase full of jewels, 110,000 pesetas, and some church plate.

Within twenty-four hours food was distributed by the Nationalists, queues had ceased, trams were running, a newspaper started, and the lighthouse once again was in working order. The Red "literature" was collected and publicly burnt in a huge pile, and the ruined and desecrated churches were cleansed.

On the 10th, the Nationalists entered Motril, 109 kilometres (65 miles) to the east of Malaga. The rout of the Government troops was quite indescribable. The importance of the fall of Malaga was certainly appreciated in some quarters: for the London Communistic circular periodical *The Week* issued a stop press supplement which summarized the results as follows:

"The effects on Europe ... of the fall of Malaga are likely to be far greater than on the position in Spain....

"The army in occupation has the possibility of attempting to continue its progress eastwards, but this is impossible without the continued aid of German warships, as in the attack on Malaga itself. . . . The road (between Malaga and Almeria) cut out of the precipice between the mountain-side and the sea ... is easy to dynamite. All this involves the holding back of large bodies of new German and Italian troops from the Madrid front for the time being, with a consequence which may be very serious for the German General Staff in the Madrid sector." (Of course, at that time, the Press lie about German infantry in Spain had not yet been exploded.) "... The occupation and immediate fortification of Malaga is an essential point in the German plan, which already includes the fortification of Ceuta. All German calculations are ... on the assumption that all these positions will remain in German hands at least ... up to the moment of their essential utility."

The paper quoted has obtained the small amount of popularity it has achieved by giving the impression that it has secret sources of information and is taking its readers into the "inside" of things. There is no doubt at all that it has secret information. So has Madame Tabouis. The above is a fair sample of its value. Neither discloses from whence that secret "information" comes. The Editor¹ informs us that he visited the Madrid front with the internationals: nor are we in the least surprised.

¹ Claude Cockburn. He broadcast on Spain from the B.B.C. at Easter, 1938.

As in the north later, the poor people returned in thousands to learn that the wicked Nationalists did not cut off the women's breasts, or disembowel babies, but gave them food. The distress and disorganization were pitiable in the extreme; it might, in fact, be stated that one of the first and principal objects of Marxian Communism, the destruction of the foundations of family life, was thoroughly fulfilled.

The 400 prisoners from the hold of the coal boat in the harbour, where it had been moored to deter the Nationalists from air-raids on vessels unloading munitions and on the Red warships, had had the kind of experience one might have expected. Incidentally, a leper had been put amongst them.

These survivors were in a dreadful condition. At first, prisoners had been put in the *Cister*, a small mail boat; but after all its inmates had been executed, this boat was no longer used. On the 28th September some 600 were put into the old coal boat, the *Marqués de Chavarri*, from which there were 32 *sacas*, i.e. removals of prisoners.

At the prison on land there were Civil Guards for the "protection" of the jail, but the military command deprived them of arms. From this prison some 500 were taken out from time to time, including the occasions when there was a Nationalist air-raid on the harbour. Usually they took out batches of 20 and shot them near the door within the hearing of the survivors. On the 30th September they killed 125, selected by whim.

On the 18th July, 1936, the forces in the town were small for so large a capital—two battalions of the Victoria Regiment No. 8, though one of these was only a skeleton as the troops had been sent on leave by the Government; about 600 Civil Guards; a company and a section of *carabineros*, and about 600 Assault Guards. When the movement in Morocco was announced, only the Assault Guards were on the side of the Government. Of the *Falange* there were approximately 400 members in the town. They had previously offered their services to the Governor to keep order, but were refused.¹

About 5 p.m. on the 18th Captain Huehn left his barracks with one company and marched to the military command headquarters. Here a Staff Major came out and posted up the notice. Armed Communists were stationed all around the building. As he was fixing the notice, a Communist standing

by raised his fist and shouted, "U.F.I.P." (Unite, brothers of the proletariat!). The Lieutenant-Colonel, standing by, shot him. Immediately bullets started to fly in all directions, the Communists firing from behind trees, and the Assault Guards from a post where they had installed a machine-gun. One company of the troops went out into the Calle Larrios under Captain Saavedra, who cried out, "To me, countrymen!" but few of the townspeople joined him, for the Reds were numerous and had been armed.

The Colonel ordered the Civil Guards to join the movement, but the Inspector, General Pozas, intervened, and at his instigation the Lieutenant-Colonel harangued the Guards, saying, "Your Colonel wishes to lead us all to suicide. I will take over the responsibility." The Guards hesitated—and then consented. The Colonel was placed under arrest.

At 8 p.m. the rest of the troops came out with eight machine-guns, one y¹-inch gun and two mortars. They took up strategic points; the streets emptied and the centre of the town was thus dominated.

On the morning of the 19th, Captain Huelin received orders from General Patxot, the local military Governor, to retire to barracks, and he did so, though much against his will. What had occurred was that the news from Morocco was confused, and direct messages had not been received from the Nationalist Generals. Meanwhile the *carabineros* and most of the Civil Guards remained in barracks, waiting to see what would happen. The President of the Cortes, Martinez Barrio, informed General Patxot by telephone that the movement had failed everywhere, that the licet was with the Government, and that, if he retired the troops, his life would be guaranteed. He agreed.

In due course the military were arrested by the Assault Guards and taken off to the prison ship. General Patxot, on reaching the boat, was riddled with bullets. He was then taken to the Noble Hospital where he recovered. From there they took him out again and shot him, this time without mistake. Captain Huelin, after having his eyes put out, was dragged through the streets, and his body left unburied.

Then the incendiaries set to work on the buildings of the city. The damage to buildings was valued at some 100,000,000 pesetas. Every case of arson was justified as due to "Fascist provocation & thorough Communist regime was installed

and put into proper working order. In three months the "comrades" drew 32,000,000 pesetas from other people's current accounts, and the syndicates started to collect for themselves the rents from tenants, excluding "friends". This presumably was contrary to the official Communist doctrine, for the syndicates and committees thus became, in effect, "blood-sucking property owners". However, this sin against their principles was pardoned them by the authorities.

The churches in the province were then systematically destroyed by order, so that in some places, like Fuengirola, not a stone was left upon a stone. Seventy-five of the *curas* were slain. Neither old age nor a record of lifelong devotion was any deterrent. Seventy of them escaped by hiding, disguise, and the help of friends and inhabitants, who shielded them, at the risk of their lives, from the leaders of the local cells, notably at Palo, Alcaucin and Camillas de Albarda. Don Manuel de Camara, when he heard they sought his protector, presented himself to the Tribunal and was shot. Canon Lopez Linares, a saintly man of modest origin (the son of a barber) who had founded a school for 200 poor children, was dragged from his bed and murdered.

Then there is the case of the brothers of St. John. These brothers devoted their lives solely to caring for the sick, and, under a vow of poverty, worked in the hospital they provided from charitable donations. At 8 p.m. on the 17th August, whilst they were serving the meals to the sick in their sanatorium, a patrol of twenty-five or thirty of the F.A.I. called and removed twelve of them for slaughter, taking two of them from their sick-beds. They were literally shot to pieces with machine-guns.

What connection was there between these events and a "military rising"? The answer will be found in the explanations given by the Marxist organizer, Joaquin Maurin.¹ It was merely the Red revolution.

Another interesting case is that of the Salesians at the monastery of San Bartolomé, where they had 196 pupils resident and 349 day scholars, all of them children of poor people. On orders received, their building flew the Red flag. On the 21st July various militia appeared round the building, a shot was heard, and a voice cried "That is where it came from. The priests are firing from the windows". There was

a burst of shots at the building, and the militia entered to find the stall and the children all clustered on the staircase landing. The intended sequel to this frame-up commenced:

"Why did you shoot at the workers? Produce your arms. Bandits—you shall die like bugs." One of the militia blew oil part of the face of the lay brother Don Rafael Mesa with a shot-gun, before the cowering inmates.

Thirty-six hours later they were brought from prison before the Governor, Fernandez Vega, who declared them innocent, but stated that it was not safe to release them, for their own sakes. They were taken back to prison, and on the 23rd they began to be released. On leaving, most of them were hunted down and slain, usually for refusing to blaspheme, or without that preliminary. Sometimes it was petrol instead of a bullet. Ten were murdered, some of them after the most sadistic tortures.

There were some curious anomalies, however, for there were a few Reds only partially depraved by the intensive propaganda of the Internationals. The F.A.I. patrols called on the Carmelite nuns, who cared for 120 children—any that appeared, -within the capacity of their premises—and demanded the arrest of the Mother Superior on the ground that there was a priest in hiding. She came to the door and said to them, "Certainly—but would you be so good as to wait until Mass is finished?" The patrol hesitated, withdrew and conferred; they then went back to their headquarters and reported that they had "found no priest nor arms".

The figures of the ordinary civilians massacred are difficult to arrive at, for many have merely disappeared, are still in hiding elsewhere, or have not been traced, though they have escaped. As regards those taken in the lorries to the cemetery, the local attendant said the figure was "certainly not more than 8,000" in his cemetery.

The Communist regime presented some interesting features. Various newspapers were founded or reorganized; one of them, the *Vida Nueva*, was so good at bringing down aeroplanes and repeating the Government *communiqués* that the Malagueños, with their ready wit, always used to ask the sellers for the "anti-aircraft gun".

Writers of repute, where they were not slain, were forced to sign articles contrary to their own views for use as propaganda elsewhere. The news itself was mainly confined to

extra £s from the Madrid Press (and those who have read *El Sol* for the last eighteen months will appreciate the kind of news it was) and messages from the Febus Agency. No damage by enemy aircraft was permitted to be reported, and aircraft were always put to flight by the accurate fire of the local anti-aircraft batteries. Later, instructions were received that they were to talk only of women and children killed or wounded.¹

The newspapers' advertisement revenues went up. A Red patrol used to go round and collect them.

As for the news, it excelled even the Barcelona reports on Brunete, Belchite and Teruel, so faithfully reflected in most of our own papers. The great local hero was Corporal Navas, whose exploits included the capture of Seville with forty men—the typical inversion. The papers were, naturally, filled with the exploits and victories of the "loyal" armies, and their descriptions of the high morale in Red territory were almost as glowing as Mr. Lloyd George's eulogium in the *Sunday Times*. The Malaguenos were treated to the fairy stories of the great Red columns of their province that were conquering Seville and the south of Spain, right down to the day when Nationalist columns from Seville marched into Malaga.

The Communist regime did not destroy banking; it only "reformed" it. In the event of a citizen being missing, the "Hacienda delegate on requisition by the committees or syndicates could dispose of his balance". This typical Marxist euphemism caused many deaths, as was doubtless the intention. False notes for 1,000 pesetas were soon put into circulation, and in six months new paper money sent to Malaga from Madrid, Cartagena and Murcia of 100, 50 and 25 peseta denominations, reached a total of 52,000,000 pesetas, or some 9,000,000 pesetas a month. The local gold and silver was removed in lorries sent from Valencia on 25th January, 1937*. The local committees proceeded to open current accounts for

■ This seems almost like an English newspaper, or the B.B.C. On Saturday, the 5th February, '38, at 9 p.m., the B.B.C. reported: "No news of fighting in Spain, but an air-raid on Alcaniz with . . . casualties. . . But at 11.15 p.m. and 11.30 p.m. on Friday the 4th no/ reported in Saturday mornings P/ess and at 7.40 p.m. on the 5th, on four loud wavelengths—Florence, Rome, Milan an< Bari—the continuation of an important operation . . . announced, being the text of the ordinary Salamanca official communiqué, to 8 P.m. of the 4th, nor did Um newXwS seem td have any inkling that one o(the Irtggest opentuons o lite war was proceeding noth ot Tented to the disadvantage of the Reds. Tins kind of phenomenon has been very frequent.

themselves. The delegate of the Institute of Agrarian Reform had an account which gradually reached 400,000 pesetas. Regiment No. 34 had a modest credit of 30,000 pesetas. The syndicate of Oilice Workers, the President of the Popular Tribunal, and the new Chief of the Artillery Command were other examples of important "new business" accounts opened with the bank.

Need we say what happened to industry? Or seek further causes for most of the misery that resulted under this Government? Stocks became exhausted as they were appropriated or collectivized. Naturally they were not replaced. Agriculture too was collectivized, usually by means of the most brutal murders. And as for the Utopia promised to the peasants, they soon were worse paid (even in nominal pesetas) than those in the Nationalist territory opposite, with the added distinction that their pesetas had very much lower purchasing power. And the militia coerced them to their work and appointed "watchers", at approximately three and a half times the pay of the peasant, to see they did not slack up.

Commerce in the port of Malaga soon came to a standstill. This was partly due to the Red fleet, which, although several times the tonnage of the Nationalist fleet, was too undisciplined to keep the seas free.

The professions suffered equally. "Ninety-seven members of the Malaga Chamber of Commerce and twenty-four members of the Malaga Bar Association were assassinated during the Red Reign of Terror in the city. ... In making public these names in Malaga, it was pointed out that *no protests against their assassinations were received from any foreign intellectual organizations, though protests have since been received by General Franco against the trial by court martial of Communists accused of complicity in assassination plots.*

"It is now estimated that the total number of political murders in Malaga during the Reign of Terror exceeded 5,000, practically all of whom were normally respected members of the city. Copies of the merchants' and lawyers' death-rolls are being sent to twenty-five American and Canadian university professors who recently cabled General Franco, asking him to spare the lives of the officials captured in the fall of Santander."

"I¹ understand that the death-rolls will be accompanied

> Mr. Gault MacGowan in the *New York Sun*, 18th September, 1937.

by a statement as follows: 'While the courts of justice in Nationalist Spain respect the laws of war, they will show no mercy to those who have been responsible for and have been perpetrators of assassinations.'

For the purposes of these trials, the prosecutors have material evidence in their hands in the list of lawyers assassinated. The same objections cannot be alleged against them as have been sometimes considered valid when excusing the assassination of churchmen and nuns. It is held that the freedom and independence of the public tribunals cannot be maintained if the President and Vice-President of the Bar Association are liable to execution whenever a Leftist Government assumes office. It is assumed that the judges will take special cognizance of this.

"In Malaga it was estimated that approximately one-tenth of the city was destroyed during the Reign of Terror."

Municipal government was upon corresponding lines. Ever since the 16th February elections, no one but the Popular Front nominees dared to attend the meetings. Now a new "Executive Committee" was appointed, 12 in number. Syndication of employees was made compulsory and 400 municipal workers were thrown out of employment, of whom 200 were "re-admitted" to the pay-roll later. The funds were soon exhausted, but the Committee managed to get a loan of 250,000 pesetas from the bank. The syndicated workers of the bank, through their Committee, refused to give them any more. They "used" that in a month, and thereafter they paid their own "staff" only. The receipts dropped from 22,000 pesetas per day to 8,000 per day, in spite of the methods of collection employed. Suppliers were forced by the "comrades" to supply such orders as they chose to give.

Here then was the veritable Communist state in full activity! But it would be a mistake to imagine that all the local fortunes were made from robbery. That was not so. The Communists, presumably contravening again the pure theory of their creed, were not averse from opening up new businesses. Officially, the Communists here numbered 2,000 before July 1936; they were soon between 15 and 20,000, charging approximately 20 douros (100 pesetas) for the protection of a *carnet* or identification card. Furthermore, being, as Mr. Louis Fischer (with Major Attlee's blessing) says, "the best organized party", they were quick to arrange a lucrative

business of *life insurance*! However, the sum insured became difficult to collect in the end; for though the idea of this racket was an excellent one, people, if they could, were soon anxious to avoid paying the premiums, even when the rates were gradually reduced as the money became exhausted. We have no record of any claims paid.

Air-raids were usually made the excuse for looting and detentions on the ground that the inmates of houses had been making signals. This had the strange result that during raids people would leave their houses and go into the streets rather than risk being found at home. For there were a number of cases where, when the militia shot people in the streets, this was made the excuse for looting houses near by and arresting or killing the inhabitants.

In the province of Malaga, as opposed to the capital, we need only give a few examples of what occurred. At Coin, a town where there was no distress and there was widely distributed property, some of the worst incidents occurred. It is true the known victims only numbered seventy-two, but their fate was dreadful. Some had their faces slit from mouth to ear and were then ordered to smoke. The patrols would call at the prison, summon the prisoners out to the lorries ■which took the place of the tumbrils of the French Revolution, spit in their faces, and send them back to prison, laughing at their terror. Ten of the prisoners were put in a lorry, which was set in motion and sent over a high cliff. The people of Alhaurin arrived with a doctor, thinking it was an accident, but the Coin Communists drove them off and attacked the eight prisoners still living with knives, sticks and shot-guns, and finally took the bodies back with them for "celebrations".

The story¹ of the chief of police of Alora, in Malaga province, was that of so many persons in Spain who found themselves caught within the influence of the "international" agents. When the Nationalist revolt began, he had to choose whether or not he should do his duty as a policeman, to maintain order and follow ordinary decent instincts of humanity, and risk the consequences of opposition to the violence of the initially small group of violent ruffians who embarked on the excesses so universally practised. He did not take part personally, but he had official responsibility in the horrors which occurred in his village. He stifled his conscience, or else his courage failed. As the Nationalists approached he fled the

village and wandered about the hills and ravines. He lost his way, and went out of his mind. At last he found himself in a place that he seemed to know, and instinctively found his way back to his home, still ignorant of his whereabouts. There the villagers found him. They lynched him.

His was a typical case of a man caught up and entangled, as were so many others, in the consequences following upon the "unpublished" text-book methods of the Communists. The choice was difficult; it is not given to every man to be a hero or a martyr. To his credit, he did not sink to the usual level of the Marxists as a result of their example; he was at least free of the responsibility of having been one of those who had spread and followed their doctrine of hatred.

At Ardales, for some curious reason, attention was concentrated mainly on the aged. At Pizarra (4,000 inhabitants) they only slew eight people. The chief pastime here was robbery, the total of which amounted to 7,000,000 pesetas. At Cartama the victims numbered forty-two, and the classical technical instructions that the faces should be destroyed to prevent identification were strictly observed.

Is it difficult to understand why the military court of the Nationalists had decreed some *few dozens*—not many hundreds—of death sentences in the province of Malaga?

This brief and incomplete account cannot close without putting on record, in honour of the small town of Torrox, that there were no atrocities there.

We have dealt at some length with the history of Malaga, for it is a good example of the "ideology" put into practice.

We commend these facts relating to Malaga to the careful consideration of Sir Peter Chalmers Mitchell, and to Arthur Koestler, his friend, the Hungarian representative of a British "national" paper. We regret that they seem not to have heard of them before.

General Franco and the Nationalists, throughout this war, have suffered from an unprecedented campaign of calumny, mendacity and inversion. That is why we have felt compelled to tell in full a part of the story of Malaga, though it is not nearly so bad as that of many another region.

The province of Malaga having been added to the Nationalist territory, and a short new front established on a line running approximately south from G^{ana}(1?) G^{5?era} Franco began to turn his attention towards Madrid. There

was no question of a frontal attack, but an attempt by a rapid surprise move to cut the city's principal communications towards the east.

On the south-eastern side of the capital there was a series of hard-fought engagements 011 the Jarama River, at the end of which the main road from Madrid to Valencia was no longer available for supplies. And then in February a sudden and violent offensive was let loose north-east of Madrid, in the direction of Guadalajara. At the outset, the attack was entirely successful, and from a point near Baides, on the Madrid-Zaragoza railway, the right wing fought its way to beyond Cogolludo. On the left wing important progress was also made. In the centre, where the Italian troops were operating, the column, after its first overwhelming success, rashly swept forward down the main road to a point not far short of Guadalajara capital itself. Meanwhile, blizzards of snow and sleet, and the difficult country, held up the advance on the two wings, and the state of the ground made it very difficult to manoeuvre, especially for mechanized units. When, therefore, large numbers of the Red aeroplanes appeared and made a terrific bombing attack upon the isolated central column, the Italians perceived their error too late and beat a hasty retreat in disorder. At the same time also the liaison between the centre column and the Spanish troops operating on the flanks was poorly maintained, and the Red command launched heavy counter-attacks from the east. Troops of the Legion went to the rescue, and after driving back the Red counter-attack for a distance of nearly three miles, stabilized the line on the ground above Brihuega, and the offensive was discontinued.

It will be appreciated from the above very brief summar}' that the principal reason why Guadalajara did not fall was the loss of the element of surprise when the bad weather slowed down the operations, but that the majority of the troops engaged were Spanish, much territory and many villages were captured, and the losses of the Nationalists were not very heavy. The reverse suffered by the central column was a minor, not a major strategical one, though the losses of the Italian volunteers were considerable. They were, however, not nearly as heavy as was suggested in most of the organs of the British Press. *In the whole of the year 1937*, which included the fighting at Malaga, Guadalajara, Bilbao and San-

tander—there were no Italian units in the Asturian campaign, *pace* the *Daily Worker*—the total Italian casualties amounted

of these casualties were in the course of the battle of Santander. It may therefore be deduced that the number of prisoners and killed in the Guadalajara battle cannot have been of the order suggested in our Press. These figures are easily verified from the Italian journals, which have published in full the names 6,000 men killed and 4,000 were wounded. Two thousand

During the fighting a part of this column, consisting of one company with two tanks, was nearly wiped out. Many of them were taken prisoners by the Garibaldi Red battalion of the International Brigades, through a misunderstanding; for, hearing their own language, the men thought they were in contact with their own main body and so were captured.

Thus it was that they suffered the penalty of their rashness and inexperience. And on the radio from Seville, General Queipo de Llano, with his customary frankness, reported the failure of the *coup*. "Well, Señores, the Reds have scored a point. They don't often. It was our own fault; it has taught us a valuable lesson, and it isn't likely to happen again."

Though the attack thus failed of its principal objective, many villages and towns were captured, and we give an extract from a typical article in the *Diario de Navarra* which, by its restraint, presents a convincing and very interesting picture of what was found in the area captured :

"On the 10th March, 1937 . . . our troops took Jadraque. . . . From the high lands of Castcjon de Henares and Argecilla they reached Miralrio. As Miralrio dominates Jadraque, the Reds, when they saw the Nationalists in command of the former, prepared to evacuate Jadraque and left in trains from the station. Amongst those who took Miralrio and advanced from there to Casa de S. Galindo there were many Navarrese. Fortunately, there were very few casualties.

"This is merely a military incident in the present campaign. . . . The most remarkable fact when our troops entered Jadraque it was found that nobody had been killed in that town and the priests were alive. There was the parish priest, Valentin Garcia Gonzalo, Valentin Pascual, a curate of Madrid, and an aged pensioned curate, Don Angel Moreno, over eighty years old. It may be added that Jadraque

¹ Georges Oudard, *Chemises noires brunes vertes en Espagne*, Plon, Paris.

is unfortunately a village with few religious leanings, although it retains some few remnants of its old faith. . . .

" For eight months the Reds had dominated Jadraque. They attempted to attack the priests, but the village put up a decided resistance. . . . This fact strikes the attention because it is so contrary to what usually occurred. . . . The Reds knew that Jadraque was mostly a *pueblo* of the Left Wing, and perhaps it was for this reason they bowed to the unanimous desires of the people of that municipality. By way of contrast, Sigiienza and Brihuega, villages with Right sympathies, were badly punished. At all events, the example of Jadraque shows that the inhabitants could have done something in all parts to defend the lives of the Right Wing people. They would not have been so successful as they were at Jadraque, but they could always have done *something*.

" . . . This case of Jadraque is unique. We know that not far from there the parish priests of Jidrueque, Mandayona, Mirabueno, Utande and Argcilla, and a priest who was in Valfermoso de las Monjas were assassinated, and in Casa de S. Galindo the parish priest, Don Juan Ilerrero. It is also asserted—though not yet confirmed—that the same fate befell the curates of Alcarria, Budin, Duron, Henche, Ruquilla, Masegoso and others; nor were the curates of Brihuega more fortunate, or those of the other villages in the province of Guadalajara. . . ?

" There were other excesses in Jadraque, although bloodshed was not one of them . . . and in spite of the relative gentleness of the Reds, at Jadraque you could observe, when it was occupied, the same feeling of relief as in other towns which had suffered more. The Reds committed one further excess on their withdrawal. Having agreed on evacuation, an order was published on the morning of the 10th ordering all men of the 1932 to 1936 classes to go to the stations. They then issued another order in respect of all men between eighteen and fifty. Rifle in hand, the Reds went through the houses to carry out this order, and a great part of the male population and youth of Jadraque and eight other neighbouring towns, presumably unarmed, was bundled into the trains to go towards Guadalajara. How many of these unfortunates will die, no doubt, from hunger or bullets! "

The effort to cut the Madrid lines of communication by

¹ The writer's suspicions have since been confirmed.

a rapid coup having failed, General Franco decided that he was, nevertheless, strong enough to act on the defensive for the time being on the main battle fronts whilst the northern provinces were cleared. The main object was to release, for a decisive campaign at a later date, the large numbers of troops engaged in the north in holding Oviedo, and the many passes and bridge-heads from Asturias to the borders of Guipuzcoa. Excluding sinuosities, this front was over two hundred miles long, and the Reds in that area were the best fighting men on the Government side.

The country in the north was extremely difficult, for it consisted principally of the Cantabrian Mountain Range and its spurs, with a narrow coastal strip between the mountains to the sea. The ground thus lent itself admirably to defence, and artificial works of fortification had been so lavishly constructed that it might well have been thought impossible to carry the successive lines constructed. General Franco, however, time after time in this campaign, by brilliant surprise and rapidity of concentration, was able to break through at the least expected points, and turned position after position; and in less than eighty days Bilbao fell. During that time there were two enforced periods of inactivity, and often the meteorological conditions hindered the operations, for it is a region with a high rainfall, dense early morning mountain mists, and a characteristic local fine rain, known as the *siri-miri*, which greatly reduces visibility. It was in this campaign that the new armies which Franco had been carefully creating in the rear took their place in the line as properly trained and organized units. The casualties were often heavy, for some of the positions assaulted were incredibly strong; but the quality and enthusiasm of the troops proved amazingly high, and, whatever the losses, the reinforcements proved of the same high standard as the first line troops.

One of the first features which General Franco had to recognize was that there was no possible chance of reducing Bilbao by exhaustion, for he was soon informed that he could neither blockade the coast, nor seize, nor examine "neutral" vessels. This was part of the working of the "Non-Intervention". Not only was there adequate revictualling of the defenders and a stream of munitions and technical advisers, but even evacuation was assured by sea. This evacuation was also used as a cover for removing bank securities and stolen

goods now the subject of litigation; the removal of the non-combatants, though a neutral zone was offered, was equivalent to a present of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of pounds to the besieged; and it was intended, and used, as one of the biggest propaganda "stunts" of the whole war.

At the end of March the 3rd, 1st and 4th Navarre brigades (in that order from right to left), having a strength of twenty battalions (of about 750 men each) and thirty-three batteries, including eight of the Italians, broke the front between Arrechavaleta and Villareal. Driving the enemy before them, they reached the Ochandiano front. They had then reached the foot of the Cantabrian Range. On the 6th and 7th of April they forced the three passes—the Urquiola, the Sumelza (Dima Road) and, on the left, the Barrazar Pass. To give themselves flank protection, they occupied the great Peak of Amboto, and a detachment of the 4th brigade established a base on Gorba Chiqui commanding the communications west of the Barrazar Pass.

These first manoeuvres were difficult, even laborious, because of the time of year, the ground, and also the resistance. Simultaneously the 23rd March Division of Italians established itself on the right by the sea facing east on the line Eibar-Marquina-Berriatua. The 5th and 6th brigades of Navarrese were in reserve. There was then a suspension for reorganization of troops and of the positions conquered. The 3rd Navarre brigade was relieved by the 1st brigade, and the 2nd was introduced between the 1st and the 4th.

The second phase of the operations began on the 22nd April by the 1st, 2nd and 4th Navarre brigades (right to left). There were twenty-six battalions. On the left the 4th Navarre brigade, under the command of General Solchaga, starting from Barrazar and Sumelza, was able to break the enemy's resistance. On the right the 1st brigade succeeded, on the 24th April, in forcing the Amboto Coll east of Urquiola. The Nationalists threw all the reserves at their disposal through this breach. This excellently directed manoeuvre defeated the enemy, who proved unable to move with the same rapidity.


After Guernica fell and was burned by the Reds,¹ the Basques took up a line through Mount Jata, Mount Sollube, the heights west of Guernica, Mount Bizcargui and Amorebieta. They still held the peak of Manaria between Durango

¹ We deal with the vexed question of Guernica in a subsequent chapter.



TYPICAL FIGHTING COUNTRY IN NORTHERN SPAIN

[*facing page* 334]



and Dima. The progress of the 4th brigade on Dima was slow and difficult.

On the right, the Black Arrow Brigade, over-enthusiastic at their success, developed too much self-initiative, and six companies on the 30th April occupied Bermeo. The Basques sent five battalions to crush them, but they held their own, and even pushed on before the arrival of the troops sent to relieve them.

This move of the Italians had been a mistake, for the line had thus become too long.

It was then that the Basques saw their fault in not including in their system of defence the heights of Lemoniz facing Mount Jata. They tried to construct works hurriedly, but they were given little respite.

The Black Arrows were relieved by Navarrese troops, who captured Sollube on the 7th May, and began to clean up the surrounding country. On the 15th and 16th, the 23rd March Division and the Black Arrows captured Mount Jata and pushed on to near Munguia; the 2nd Navarre brigade took Amorebieta; then, from the 22nd to 24th, the 2nd and 4th Navarre brigades reduced the Manaria salient, and the 4th brigade was thus able to pass beyond Dima.

At the end of May the attacking troops thus occupied, from Lemona to the sea, a preliminary position at a distance varying from three to six kilometres from the "Iron Belt". There was a suspension for necessary rest and reorganization, and to leave nothing to chance.

It will be seen merely from this description of them that the first part of the Bilbao operations were *perfectly conducted*. They had only needed eight days, from the 22nd to 29th April, radically to transform the situation as between the Nationalists and the Red Basques. "The latter did not dream that an attack on the Coll of Ambota on the 24th April could have as a consequence, on the 26th, the break-up of the Eibar-Marquina line. Such are the surprises which result from the purely defensive mentality."

This description of the operations has been taken, in the form of a précis, from the detailed account given by General Duval, whose able book should be read by those who desire fuller details. Incidentally, it is interesting to quote that distinguished soldier's comment upon the subject of Guernica.

"The Basque disappointment was shown by invective in

connection with the destruction of Durango and Guernica.

"Whether or not part of these destructions had been due to the rage of the defenders, the bombardment of this place was perfectly justified militarily."

And, as another observer has remarked, we have no recollection of any such outburst throughout the world, when, for example, Villers Brettoneux was destroyed to the rear of the advancing German Army during the World War, or by the Germans when we did the same in their rear, as we regularly did. Even if—as was not the case—the Nationalists had destroyed Guernica, the outburst by those assisting the third International would have been the purest hypocrisy. In point of fact, as we show later, the Reds had destroyed the town themselves, in accordance with their own normal declared tactics, and put out this tremendous false appeal on a "humanitarian" campaign to assist recruiting and the collection of funds.

The attack on the three peaks of Enchartas, which protected Eibar, with its munition factory, and Durango provided an excellent example of Franco's ingenuity, by no means divorced from a sense of humour. At that time it would be idle to pretend that Franco was popular with journalists. He had instigated very strict rules, of necessity, for the supervision of "accredited correspondents". Too many spies on behalf of the Internationals were using a journalist's passport for obtaining information for the destruction of the army to which they were "accredited", Nor was Franco popular with some of them after his remark to the newspaper representatives that he had no money "either for journalists or bill-posters", as all his money had to be used for munitions and aeroplanes. It was therefore with some surprise that the newsmen received a personal invitation from the *Caudillo* to be present as his guest at the attack on the Enchartas. Mr. Cardozo tells the story with his customary point:

"We went to an artillery observation post and we saw one of the greatest air and artillery bombardments of the war. Scores of batteries of every calibre from field-pieces to giant 10-inch howitzers sent their thousands of shells against the rocky heights. A hundred aeroplanes came and went without interruption, dropping their heavy bombs. And then nothing took place. A Staff Officer, giving an account of the day's activities, mentioned, as if accidentally, that there had been

some slight progress in the Aramayona valley. And there was the key to the whole situation, as we found out two days later. The Reds had been looled and so had we. The bombardment of the Enchartas and of Santa Maria was merely to keep the Reds busy ivhile the 1st and 2nd brigades of Navarre moved dots n the Aramayona and other valleys, seized the reverse side of Campanazar, and then boldly rushed the heights of Adale.”¹

It was just after this that General Mola was killed. He left Vitoria by plane for a Staff Conference at Valladolid, with two members of his staff and his own personal pilot. Flying conditions were unfavourable, and the visibility did not improve when the sun was up, as had been hoped. A few miles from Burgos the plane flew into the side of a hill. All the occupants were killed immediately. General Mola, who was Cuban born, was a great Spanish patriot; he had a fine record of public service, and, like General Franco, had given his allegiance whole-heartedly to the Republic. As head of the Ministry of Government, which had charge of the police, he had a thorough knowledge of the work and influence of the Russians and Internationals throughout Spain, and in the great fight against them he had been second only in influence to General Franco. His death was a great blow to the Nationalists, for he was an extremely able, as well as a very gallant and humane soldier.

General Davila was appointed to take over General Mola’s command in the north, and, acting with the closest collaboration with his Commander-in-Chief, he prepared the final stage of the attack on Bilbao. The principal defensive line to be carried was the much vaunted *Cinturon de Hierro*, the iron belt which the Red foreign advisers considered quite impregnable. And so indeed it must have appeared, with its tremendous fortifications of reinforced concrete and its system of barbed-wire entanglements in three lines. As usual, General Franco personally examined every detail of the positions to be carried; and as usual, he found its weak spot.

First of all, however, we must mention the general weakness which General Duval points out: “Militarily speaking, the designers, though intelligent, lacked deep knowlcege. They gave it a periphery of about 70 kilometres. Such an extent would, theoretically, need a garrison of at least 70,000

* Cardozo. *March of a Nation*, pp. 277-8.

men. But, in fact, the garrison used was between 40,000 and 50,000. When this error became apparent they hastily tried to correct it, but only partially succeeded."

No advantage, the General goes on, was taken of the counter-slope to protect the infantry, and the trenches were not organized in depth but as a single line, although they were well and carefully built. "In fact, they gave the impression that labour and material had been unnecessarily spent. . . . Facing the enemy, extremely visible, there was an unnecessarily thick protection of concrete."¹

Once again Franco surprised the enemy. Apparently against all his tenets, he prepared to carry out a frontal attack in the centre of this tremendously strong defence line. General Duval explains the reason. "A salient north of Larrabezua had been selected and fortified with incredible ignorance of the most elementary rules of fortification. It was a right-angle with no flank protection on its two sides. On the north it could even be enfiladed at less than 4,000 metres by artillery on Mount Biscargui, with excellent opportunities for fire control."¹ The rest of the defence position came under excellent artillery fire at a range of about 5,500 metres. "The objective was on a front of 3 kilometres. The idea was to form a breach there, pour through, and branch out like a fan."¹ To support this infantry attack, Franco concentrated all his available artillery. Every kind of cannon was concentrated into a very small area, and because the roads were in some cases bad and in others non-existent, bullocks were used not only to get the heavy guns into position, but to carry shells.

The 1st, 5th and 6th Navarre brigades (left to right) were chosen for the assault. The artillery preparation and aeroplanes commenced at 7 a.m., and continued for eight hours. At 3 p.m. the Navarrese went forward; at 6 p.m. they were at the base of the heights on which were the defensive works and the belt. During the night, the Red Basques made unsuccessful counter-attacks with four battalions.


On the 12th June there was another preparation by artillery and aircraft. At 1 p.m. the infantry attacked. At 2.30 the 5th brigade in the centre had gained its objective, Cantelbasos. At 3 p.m. the 6th brigade was near Urrusti, and the 1st brigade, by 3.45, was at Gastelumendi. In the evening the 6th pushed out troops to the right.

¹ Duval, *Les Legons de la Guerre d'Espagne*.

It took practically two hours to smash through the wall round the entrenched camp.

"Defence does not lie in entrenchment. It is in the line of fire. It is the power of the fire in front of the concrete which makes the entrenchment strong."

"With sufficient artillery employed against them," General Duval continues, "the Navarrese could never have crossed on the afternoon of the 12th the zone of three kilometres which



THE DILBAO CAMPAIGN

separated them from their objectives or remained the whole night and morning a few hundred metres from the enemy trenches; nor would they have been able to launch an assault which no longer had the element of surprise.

"People often think that machine-guns, with a good barbed-wire entanglement in front are an insurmountable obstacle. The Basques had both. But against these there is artillery. . . .¹

¹ Duval, *Les Legions de la Guerre d'Espagne*.

"On the 13th they continued to spread out in the interior of the entrenched camp, taking it in reverse. On the 14th the three Navarrese brigades were reorganized. . . . On the 15th the Black Arrows [the Italian brigade] pushed forward to 1,500 metres east of Bilbao; and the 1st Navarre, followed *en échelon* on the left by the 3rd and 4th, began a vast enveloping movement towards the south round Bilbao, and reached Galdácano."

On the 16th the Black Arrows reached Las Arenas. The 5th and 6th were held up before Archanda, where there were three days of stabilized resistance. The 1st pushed out on the left to Miravalles, south of Bilbao. On the 17th and 18th June the grip was tightened and the Basques hastened to evacuate the city. On the 19th the Nationalists entered Bilbao.

! "Before leaving, the militia blew up five bridges over the Nervion and partly destroyed the reservoirs which supplied water to the inhabitants. This was quite unjustifiable militarily and merely reflected impotent rage."

However, victory is incomplete where territory is captured but the enemy troops escape. Most of them did escape, and it was thus mainly a tactical success. The advance soon came to an end a few kilometres beyond Bilbao. On the 29th June the troops had a period of comparative rest. The Black Arrows remained alone by the sea and on the banks of the River Barbadun; the 1st, 2nd and 4th brigades of Navarre were grouped farther south near Valmaseda, and the 6th Navarre brigade occupied Bilbao.

The victory was not chiefly a triumph for weight of material, as was represented. The whole of the artillery used by the Nationalists in the attack on Bilbao was only approximately thirty-two batteries. Against Santander they used less. They captured in the north as many guns as they had used.

Incidentally, General Duval gives us the following interesting technical observation:

"The lesson of the Spanish war is definite upon this point. The gun with which to support infantry is the gun with a curved trajectory—the mortar. The German and Italian Armies, even more than the French, have taken good note of the lesson."

Many times during the Bilbao campaign the Red command endeavoured to create diversions to draw off the

Nationalist troops from the northern front. In April they made a terrific attack on Cerro Garabitas in the Madrid sector. In this attack they certainly showed that they had a superiority as regards armament and munitions, which they were receiving in tremendous quantities from abroad; but, according to the estimate mentioned by General Queipo de Llano, the Reds suffered the colossal number of 30,000 casualties. There were also diversions in April attempted by attacks on the Cerro del Aguila, in Asturias and against Teruel; but it was not until the last day of May that they recovered from the repulse outside Madrid sufficiently to launch another heavy attack. For this they chose Segovia as their objective, though its capture would only have added a further salient at the end of the large pocket in which lay Madrid. After the first rush, this attack was easily contained, though it held up operations in the north for a short while during the absence of the air force units.

After the fall of Bilbao, the Reds launched their biggest attack of the war up to that date. Its object was to free Madrid from pressure on its western side and compel the besieging troops to withdraw west of Navalcarnero, and militarily the operation was by no means badly conceived.

The Government occupied all the country from the Escorial to Madrid on both sides of the road. They tried to advance this front and push on to Navalcarnero. This would have cut off the Nationalists' retreat on the Manzanares, and pushed back the Nationalist front to a point nearly thirty kilometres west of Madrid. The plan was the result of long and careful study.

In Bilbao, the battlefield was mountainous; at Brunete the country is almost a plain, crossed by beds of streams. The idea was to break through and exploit the breach. Numerous aeroplanes and tanks were used.

In the first attack the patrols nearly reached Navalcarnero itself. Then the Nationalists brought up reserves, and as the defence stiffened gradually, the attack weakened and equilibrium was established. The assaulting line formed a pronounced salient. A counter-attack delivered by the Nationalists then regained some part of the lost ground. But this, too, came to a standstill, and the front returned to its previous immobility. The Government troops had advanced resolutely, but more anxious to move quickly than in 01c¹er. Contacts were thus broken. Moreover, the detachments of Nationalists

in villages and organized strongholds did not surrender, even after the Reds had passed, but continued to resist, and some of them remained behind the Government advanced lines to surround the attackers later.

The battle commenced on the morning of 5th July, when the Government attacked the Cuesta de la Reina, but had to retire. This was only a feint attack. On the night of the 5/6th July they effected the breach.

The Spanish front is not a continuous line of trenches. In many places it is not even marked out on the ground. Between the posts a whole division filtered through to the wood north of Brunete, and in the morning they threw themselves upon that village. The garrison, taken by surprise, was overwhelmed and the survivors surrendered. Red patrols are said to have reached even Navalcarnero. A second division attacked Villanueva de la Cañada, but there they were held up by the defenders, who fought until every man was killed.

The battle soon spread the length of the whole front between Villanueva del Pardillo and Navalagamela. On the 7th there was a violent attack by four Red brigades, preceded by tanks, to increase the pocket east of Villanueva de la Cañada as far as the River Guadarrama, supported by large Government air forces.


The Nationalists brought up reinforcements from all parts, and General Varela took charge. On 8th July the Government again attacked with two brigades, one of them an International Brigade, and on that day and the next they tried to exploit the breach towards the east, advancing upon Boadilla, but without being able to reach it. On the 9th they managed at last to take Quijorna, and on the 10th enlarged the pocket by taking Villafranca del Castillo. The Nationalists disputed the ground foot by foot and made a number of counter-attacks. The fighting became very confused.

The first stage of the battle ended towards the 12th July, when the Nationalists were strong enough to press counter-attacks on the new Government front. It was a pocket with the supports solidly established at Navalcarnero, Navalagamela and Villanueva del Pardillo, the line being two kilometres south of Brunete and three kilometres east of the Guadarrama River.

From the 6th to the 12th the fighting had been very violent,

but, as it were, of a local kind. The Government threw in new troops almost every day and used great numbers of aeroplanes and tanks. On the Nationalist side there was a great disorder because reinforcements, wherever necessary, had to be thrown in in great haste as they arrived. The bitterest fighting was around Villanueva del Pardillo, which changed hands several times, but eventually remained in the hands of the Nationalists.

When his necessary troops were assembled, General Varela



THE BATTLE OF BRUNETE

considered taking the offensive. The Government, however, on the 15th, launched an attack south-west of the Esconal on Robledo de Chavela, and it was thought best not to embark on an ambitious scheme which would divert troops and energies from the Santander and Asturian campaigns. Only operations immediately necessary were to be undertaken, the most important of which was to retake Biunete.

The conception was a simple one. The troops were organized on the three faces of the salient and advanced towards a single point, the height of Lijas, 2,500 metres north of Villa-

nueva de la Cañada. The attack was preceded by three days' artillery preparation. On the eastern flank there was a very violent attack towards Villanueva del Pardillo. A Government counter-attack against its flank was held up at Las Rosas and the Bar Anita. Villanueva del Pardillo and Villafranca del Pardillo were then attacked, and the lines pushed west to the Guadarrama River. Brunete, the objective in the south, was occupied "according to plan" and left in the rear.

On the left, or west, flank, very little progress was made.

Brunete, the desired objective, was thus attained and the new line was stabilized.

General Duval states that aeroplanes, flying low, had a great moral effect, increasing disorder and impeding movement. There was little bombing from high altitudes through danger to the Nationalist troops—a lesson learnt, at some expense, in the Bilbao operations. "I am told that anti-aircraft fire was almost impossible against machines flying low," the General adds. "On the other hand, I am told the anti-aircraft guns were very effective in this battle. I do not know the answer to the problem."

The Government used Russian tanks of two kinds. A heavy one with a 45 mm. gun and 7 mm. machine-gun, with armour plate 10-16 mm. and a speed up to 30 or 35 kilometres per hour. In bad ground it was not very stable or manageable. They also had a light one. The Government also used an old model Renault with a 37 mm. gun, and light Spanish ones, type Trubia 1936, with two 7 mm. machine-guns and a light machine-gun with 11 mm. armour.

The Government sent the tanks in front of the infantry to open the way. But the tanks were decimated; they were even regarded with contempt. Men would throw petrol and grenades at them. Clearly, infantry were needed to prevent such manoeuvres. "They also said that the guns cut through them like sponges. Yes, all of them, not only the German ones, as was said in France," comments the French General. "One does not need a battle to demonstrate this. It can be proved on the parade ground."

The Government then treated the tank as an armoured gun. It accompanied the infantry and took station somewhere near by. But its dimensions merely made it more vulnerable than an ordinary cannon.

The Nationalists made a wiser use of their tanks. They used them in close liaison with the infantry, and during the fighting they were usually attached to the individual battalion.

Such, briefly, was the hard-fought battle of Brunete, which completely failed in its principal object, and in the end did not even prove of local tactical value. It showed once again the great superiority of the Nationalist command in both strategy and tactics; and it was perfectly clear, after the first rush was over, that the Nationalists had the situation thoroughly well in hand. They stabilized the line finally in advantageous positions and returned to the campaign in the north, from which they had not withdrawn any important part of their infantry to meet the threat.

When the Government launched its attack on Brunete, as usual they gave out over-optimistic reports, and their friends on the Press gave way to premature jubilation. However, when they found the attack had utterly failed, it was given out, with huge headlines and full-sized posters, that *Franco* was flinging in every man in a last desperate attempt to capture *Madrid*. Anyone who received the Spanish newspapers was fully aware that Franco was not attacking Madrid, for he would have read the daily songs of "the victorious offensive" in the Red Press. Was the whole of our Press so profoundly ignorant as that? We do not believe it.

When Bilbao was abandoned by the Reds, it was fortunate to escape the fate of Guernica and so many other towns burnt to the ground by their defenders on evacuation. The list of such places was eventually a formidable one—Orduña, Irun, Amorebieta, Rigoitia, Potes, Eibar. Sometimes it included every village in the district affected, as occurred in some of the northern parts of Leon province and southern Asturias. Guernica was no isolated exception. One of the reasons why Bilbao escaped was that General Franco decided to capture the heights south-west of the city before making a direct entry; and this was but a repetition of his tactics, and of their motive, in the case of most large towns. One of the notable of the later examples was Cangas de Onís, which was left miles behind the two columns, though the Reds still managed to wreck part of that town before escaping. In the case of Bilbao the Basque Separatists themselves saved the city from their Asturian allies, and five battalions of Basque Separatist

troops sent messengers to state that they were remaining to protect it and would surrender. Except at the bridge-heads and the houses near by there were few signs of wanton destruction, in spite of the fact that the notorious Karl Liebknecht Battalion had been fighting throughout the campaign, and had been conspicuous for their dynamiting, burning and pillaging of the villages and towns in other parts. Bilbao thus escaped the effects of the "democratic" revolution; and on the night before the Reds fled from Bilbao the "fifth column" emerged and shot down those who attempted to loot or set fire to buildings.

The Bilbao campaign was notable for the amazing rapidity of concentration at vital points, and the great speed with which successes were exploited. But the operations which resulted in the collapse of Santander province, and of Asturias afterwards, were even more striking in that regard.

The plan of campaign was a simple one.

To attack Santander from Vizcaya it is necessary to march along die coast in the zone Ramales-Laredo. From the south approach is by the Burgos and Palencia roads, between which no communication or liaison is possible owing to the mountains. The Palencia road crosses the mountains north of Reinosa, an important arms factory', with another at Arija near by. Twenty kilometres farther to the east the Burgos road passes through the pass of Escudo. In this space of 20 kilometres between Reinosa and Cabanás de Virtus *there is no way northwards over the Cantabrian Mountains.*

The defence of Santander was designed to meet these two threats. Facing east were the troops from Vizcaya, some 20 battalions of Basques from Bilbao, their left by Castro Urdiales, by the sea, and their right near Villaverde. On the south, not content with holding the mountain passes, they maintained a huge zone in the direction of Burgos and Palencia, a kind of broad salient, 40 kilometres wide and 30 kilometres deep. The army of Santander held this with 31 battalions and about 10 or 12 batteries. The two armies had no communications except via Santander.

The maintenance of this salient was, no doubt, to protect the arms factories at Reinosa and Arija. It also provided the possibility of a base for attacking the enemy. The Nationalists, however, were so little disturbed in mind over this that

they had only maintained a screen with men from the 1st Castilian brigade.

On the eastern end of the line they stationed die Black Arrows and the 2nd, 3rd and 6th Navarre brigades. The 6th of Navarre, on the left, tried to link up with the 1st Castile brigade, but without success.

The scheme of attack was to oppose only light forces on the eastern front, and deceive the enemy as to the real direction of the attack, moving forward only if the enemy retreated; meanwhile to attack the two sides of the *bolsa*, or pocket, by a Spanish army in the west and the Italians in the east; and to seize the road communications and prevent the possibility of escape by those inside the *bolsa*, at the same time attacking frontally with the troops all round the salient in order to hold the enemy. Then a secondary detachment was to clean up the centre.

The Spanish troops were the 1st, 4th and 5th Navarre brigades, reorganized with 7 to 8 battalions each, and the 1st Castilian brigade, divided into two unequal parts, of which the weaker was only to watch as a screen in the region of Espinosa, its left linking up with the Italians and its right with the 6th Navarre brigade on the eastern front. There were thus about 30 battalions of Spanish troops and three "divisions" of Italians or mixed troops—the 23rd March, the Black Flames and the Littorio.

The artillery consisted of 20 batteries (80 guns). Half were 65 mm. mountain guns, and half were 149 mm. mounted on tractors. The latter were used at the beginning of the first attack, but could not follow up for the march on Santander.

The Italian Legion had the principal task on the eastern side of the pocket. The ground there was very difficult. It was mountain w'arfare. I hē key point was the Madalena, dominating the Escudo Pass. The difficulties were overcome with great ingenuity. The 23rd March Division, finding itsel f faced with the enemy artillery, had to branch ofl northwards by goat tracks, which they improved for purposes of com-
munications. They were aided by the usual passivity of the Red in inspiration and action.

On their left, the Castile brigade operated to seize the most important roads. Farther to the west the 411 ¹ brigade ??1^{shd} an on towards Las Rozas, where it joined up with a special Italian

detachment and formed a barrage east and west across the mouth of the pocket.

The 1st Navarre brigade, to the west of the 4th, was not directed against the salient; already total success was being envisaged. From the first moment they went straight through northwards and prepared to debouch in the direction of Saja, with a view to following later the road to the Cabuernica valley, so as to cut off the enemy's retreat from Santander itself towards the west.

There were a few hours of artillery preparation, supported by the Air Force. The resistance was energetic and the advance at first relatively slow. The Madalena was strongly defended, with deep trenches and a treble line of barbed-wire, though each was only three metres deep. Moreover, the Italian artillery was not strong in numbers and consisted mainly of mountain guns of 65 mm. (about 2½-inch gun). They were not powerful guns. The 149 mm. (6-inch approximately) could not follow in such country⁷.


The success of the attack on the Madalena largely governed the enveloping movement. The battalions were allotted a front of only 350 metres each. Each battalion only threw in one company, disposing the remainder in depth and organizing reliefs so as to be able to live for a long time upon themselves.

On the 15th August the Black Flames took the Madalena and its left reached Corconte. On the night of the 15th also the 4th brigade of Navarre reached Reinosa and the Castile brigade occupied half the southern part of the salient. The 1st Navarre brigade had reached its point of debouchment, the summit of the slopes dropping down towards the north.

On the 16th, the Italian troops had captured the Escudo Pass. The special detachment reached the Ebro and assured its liaison with the 4th Navarre. Without delay the railway was pushed to Cabañas de Virtus, where the Italian engineers hastily improvised a railhead. The same day the 4th Navarre passed beyond Reinosa.

The enemy was soon in full flight, leaving over 5,000 prisoners.

The first phase of the operation thus took *three days*. Without a moment's delay they passed to the second phase. They had to cross the passes they had taken and re-group



THE SANTANDER CAMPAIGN

with a new base of departure. *One day* was allowed for this task.

The 1st Navarre was to go via the Cabuerniga valley. The 4th Navarre via Reinosa and Torrelavega. The 5th was in reserve. The Italians farther east were to go via Ontaneda (the Littorio, now brought into the front line) and via San Pedro and Vega de Pas (*the Black Flames*). Each division had its own supply transport and its own communications with railhead at Cabañas. The lateral communications between the Spanish and the Italians were organized along the Reinosa-Corconte road, and later the Arenas-Ontaneda.

The enemy's resistance was overcome by detachments which moved along the higher ground, away from the road of the march, whilst on the roads the engineers pushed forward to repair the destructions prodigally carried out by the retreating enemy.

These destructions were so complete that they delayed the victorious advance in spite of prodigies of engineering skill—bridges destroyed, the defiles filled with rocks by dynamite, the cliffs shattered on each side, whole sections of the road blown up. A huge workshop was created and work continued day and night, whilst improvisations were devised—deviations of route, temporary repairs. In spite of every obstacle the advance continued with astonishing rapidity.

This Santander campaign was one which tested to the utmost the marching abilities of the troops. The mountainous nature of the country hampered motor transport, and the Reds threw every obstacle in the way of rapid advance along the principal roads.

The advance on Santander began on the 18th August. On the 20th, the Spaniards reached Saja and Barcena, whilst the Italians reached Ontaneda and Selaya. By the 24th the Spaniards entered Torrelavega, and the Italians Vargas and Saron. That evening the population of Santander appealed to the Nationalists to enter the city, and they did so on the 25th.

West of Torrelavega the Spanish troops pushed on to the sea. Retreat was no longer possible. The Nationalists took 50,000 prisoners.

The Santander manoeuvre was better than that at Bilbao because it had no times of suspension of operations and gave not the slightest respite. It is not too much to say that its pace

was shattering. In that respect it recalls the finest models of military history.¹

As usual it was the inherent indiscipline of the Marxists which had been one of the determining factors, greatly reducing the possibilities of their resisting well-trained and disciplined troops, even where they fought with bravery, as often occurred. Some short while before the Santander campaign opened, an amusing incident which illustrates both this point and the nature of the Civil War in the northern part of Castile occurred near Sargentes.

Sargentes is famous in Nationalist Spain as the scene of one of the Government's many mythical victories. On occasions when defeat has overtaken the Government or its shadow is looming near, two things almost invariably occurred: the foreign Press became flooded with stories of Nationalist atrocities, or news of further Italian and German intervention, without any mention of the greater Russian and French; and the official Government *communiques* gave out circumstantial accounts of great Red victories in defence and attack or the capture of towns. The good news was duly reported in Great Britain and elsewhere, sometimes in good faith. Apparently there are no large scale maps of Spain in modern newspaper offices. Even their special "military correspondents" seem unable to help. Many of them undoubtedly are parties to moulding British public opinion in the direction of the Spanish variety of Marxism.

Time and again places were reported to have been captured from wicked Spanish "Fascists" when they were really many miles *behind* the Red line. Sargentes was one of these places from which a completely mythical successful attack upon Burgos was proclaimed. The details were most impressive: "The loyal troops are now only 29 miles from Burgos. Rebel losses are extremely heavy." However, Sargentes, in Red hands throughout, remained, like Gibraltar, geographically in the same position as before—namely 29 miles from Burgos. It was, in fact, a very quiet part of the line; and in this civil war on many fronts there was often no fighting except when there was a definite offensive or a specific patrol action. Near Orduna the troops from the heights could watch a bullfig ht

"As before, the above particulars are almost entirely from General Duval's brilliant analysis.

held by the Reds, for example. At Oviedo, and many other places, there were periods when sniping was "not done". At a village near Sargentes there was a farmer with a lot of corn, but no mill; and opposite, on the Red side, was a miller with nothing to grind. One day, after preliminary signals, the farmer loaded up his donkey, and took his corn across to be ground in the Red territory. In due course, he returned with the flour, leaving a proportion with the miller as the reward for his services. The news spread amongst the troops; and as a result there followed one of the rare instances of fraternization. Usually, when within shouting distance, the conversation consists of mutual insults. Here, however, the "Reds" invited the "rebels" for an evening's beer and entertainment in the village square, on the occasion of a Saint's feast day, and "a good time was had by all".

During the party a Red officer arrived. A Nationalist sprang up smartly to attention and saluted him as he passed. "What's that for?" said one of his Red hosts. "Sit down. We don't do that *here*."

There was less mutual bitterness generally in Santander, for it was largely of Nationalist sympathies, and the behaviour of the Reds—which we have touched upon in an earlier chapter—met with little sympathy. Within forty-eight hours of the fall of Santander, volunteer battalions of Santanderinos, newly equipped, were leaving to fight for the Nationalists on the Asturian front. Before long over 10,000 men were enrolled; and to-day there are many more.

After the collapse of Santander province, the British Press came out with its usual outburst. In three of the principal London newspapers, which prominently reported that the Nationalists had taken 90,000 prisoners, there were screaming headlines, "Franco shoots one in ten". There was not much doubt as to the impression conveyed. Some papers reinforced it with "Franco's Death Courts at Work", and similar splash headlines. Actually, the total number of executions which followed the capture of this province was only a very *small percentage* of the number of Reds who had been guilty of cold-blooded murders, and worse. Had justice been done, even in a country such as England, there would have been *many thousands* who would have legally suffered the death penalty which they had so thoroughly merited.

On the question of these courts, Brigadier-General

P. R. C. Groves made the following comments in the *Observer*:¹

■' The procedure followed by the Nationalists when they occupy territory is as follows; in the first place prisoners of war are sent to concentration camps where, as I saw for myself, they are well treated, they receive the same rations as the Nationalist soldiers. They are interrogated at the camp, and those who can show that they have committed no crimes are liberated. . . .

" The remainder are detained pending the receipt of the reports from the courts of inquiry which meanwhile have been established in every town and village in the occupied area. . . .

" When a *prima facie* case has been made out against a prisoner for any serious offence, he is sent to prison and tried by court martial. These courts, a number of which are sitting at Bilbao and Santander, each consist of a President, who is a Lieutenant-Colonel, and four other officers, one of whom is invariably an officer of the law corps and acts as legal adviser to the court.

" There are three other law officers present, the secretary, the prosecutor and the counsel for the defence, who is chosen by the accused. In addition, the accused may, and frequently does, address the court in his own defence.

" All these courts martial are open to the public. . . .

" There is no shadow of doubt that these trials are absolutely fair and above board, and that every precaution is taken to ensure that there shall be no miscarriage of justice.

" From the records which I inspected I found that the charges ranged from murder to cruelty to prisoners. . . .

" Examples of cruelty to prisoners were the charges against two women, formerly fishwives, who had been employed as wardresses and were accused of frequently striking female prisoners, robbing them, forcing them to stand for hours in a stifling courtyard in the sun, depriving them of water for days at a time, and forcing them to scrub the floors with undiluted acid which skinned their hands. . . ."

General Groves then describes various cases he attended, ending with those of two sergeants in the Red army.

" One was a member of a committee appointed by the Town Council to confiscate property. . . .

" Subsequently he became a member of the Secret Police. He was accused of a number of murders. He admitted that he had taken two men ' for a ride ', but said that he had shot them ' by order of higher authority '.

" The other man was also accused of several murders, one of which was proved. While he was beating up a man in a street of Santander a woman interfered; he shot her.

" Both these men were sentenced to death.

" This does not necessarily imply that they will be executed, for all death sentences must be confirmed by General Franco personally, and he has proved himself to be very lenient. His clemency is borne out by the following figures: Of 90,000 prisoners of war and other persons held by the Nationalists in the course of their operations in northern Spain, 45,000 were at once released; 15,000 more went free a few days after capture.

" Of the rest, many are being liberated daily as inquiries proceed, 344 have been tried for felony, 34 of them have been found guilty and sentenced to death. Of these sentences 23 have been commuted to imprisonment by General Franco and 11 have been executed."

The following is an extract from the issue of 4th September, 1937 (chosen at random), of the *A.B.C. of Seville*, under the heading " Sentences by the Courts of Justice ":

" *E. Bermudez Moro.* For denunciations of persons on the Prison Ship, where he was lodged as a ' prisoner ' for espionage purposes. Took part in slaughter of prisoners, killing of wounded, and threw the bodies into the sea. (At Bilbao.)

" *C. Tudela Nogueras.* A prison attendant at Cagalera. Permitted assassination of all prisoners at Cagalera prison, urging that none should be left alive. (Bilbao.)

" *B. Salacre Moro.* Assassinations in the Larrinaga prison, and robbing of the dead. (Bilbao.)

" *A. Montero Hoyos.* For assassination of Señor Harremberg. (Bilbao.)

" *M. Marquez Rey.* For assassinations in Puente Genii.
(Cordoba.)"

Various other cases are reported, mainly from Bilbao, giving details such as that the condemned, after the assassination, immediately stole and wore the clothes of his victims. An interesting case is R. Marquina Palacios, who was given

the usual full trial for having murdered, amongst others, a fellow Socialist.

The proceedings at these trials are perfectly open to the public; and the events recorded in the reports are ample answer to the suggestions in recent manifestos, alleging violent repression on both sides ", in an effort to save the instigators and perpetrators of these thousands of cold-blooded massacres.

Incidentally the abolition of the death penalty is one of the causes sponsored by the Communist leaders in non-Communist countries. It enables them to be associated with " humanitarian " movements, which gives the desired deceptive impression as to their real methods and objects. But it is still more important that the abolition of the death penalty enables them to employ gangsters, as in Barcelona, at a much cheaper rate, and there is also less risk to their ordinary followers in the violence which they provoke. Even if a life sentence results, there is always the chance of an amnesty, or a change of regime which may bring the condemned freedom and responsible posts of authority, as occurred in so many cases in Spain.

Once they obtain power, however, their attitude is the reverse, and the death penalty without regard for justice, and all kinds of terrorism, are immediately employed. In Russia, after restoring the death penalty, they even extended it to children, *of both sexes, of twelve years of age, and for offences including theft.*¹

On the day on which the Nationalists entered Santander, the Government launched their much-publicized offensive in Aragon. Their objective was chiefly to restore the falling morale of their troops, and they desired to show some success to exploit at the League of Nations, due to meet immediately afterwards.

All the best Red troops were drafted to Aragon for the " Push to win the war "—though at best they were unlikely to get beyond Zaragoza. Among the 84,000 men concentrated were the International Brigades and the most experienced of the Spanish divisions—Tf rueba, Modesto, Lister and El Campesino. They supported the extreme Communist divisions which held the line, including the Iron Column, the Durruti and Carlos Marx divisions, and regular Catalonian and Valencian troops, to the number of another 80,000 men.

¹Arnold Lunn, *Spanish Rehearsal*, p. 1.J7-

So certain was the Government that they would succeed in taking Zaragoza that they issued special invitations to the best-known journalists, and even invited representatives of the Catholic Press to see with what reverence they would—for propaganda purposes—treat the great Shrine of the Virgin de Pilar in Zaragoza when they triumphed. Their optimism was so great that they neglected to supply an adequate commissariat service for the troops, feeling certain that they would capture the supply depots of the city.

The offensive was launched with a general attack on the whole front, from Huesca in the north to the salient of Teruel in the south; but soon it had resolved itself in specific attacks on Almudevar, Zuera, Villamayor, Albarracin and towards Belchite. Within three days the conflict had been localized. In the south at Teruel and Albarracin only an artillery duel was continued, while extreme pressure was maintained at three points—Almudevar, Villamayor and Belchite.

Almudevar was successfully defended. The communications between Zaragoza and Huesca were not cut. In the Villamayor sector the Nationalist line was broken, but with vigorous counter-attacks the positions were regained, and the enemy was repulsed with such heavy loss that for the time being the whole attack was discontinued.

It was continued again in one sector, between Quinto and Belchite. Here 50,000 men were launched to attack on an area eight miles wide and some three and four miles deep. It was the bloodiest battle of the Civil War. By sheer weight of numbers and artillery, the Red command broke through the Nationalist line. For four days the struggle ebbed and flowed. Then the Nationalists counter-attacked, and for a whole week the counter-attack was continued. The Red armies were held. The enemy left more than 11,000 dead on the field, and their total casualties were estimated at about 38,000 men.

Thus ended the great attempt on Zaragoza. There was not much talk of Zaragoza in the British Press. This action, which was the greatest and most bloody defeat suffered by the Red armies until the disastrous Catalonian offensive in May 1938, was trumpeted as the great "Victory of Belchite", with long circumstantial accounts of how it cut the main road from Zaragoza to Teruel. In fact, it did nothing of the kind; and the area where the vast offensive had alone achieved a minor local success—and that a pyrrhic one—was the only one where

there was room for retreat by the Nationalists without endangering Zaragoza, the real objective. It was one more paper victory like the great defeat of Franco's "inverted attack upon Madrid via Brunete. The Reds needed victories for recruiting and for political purposes. Only two of the chief British London papers presented the action in proper perspective.

Among the divisions that suffered heavily in this great failure was that named after Durruti and formerly led by him. When Durruti formed his notorious Catalan column, their reputation spread quickly all over Government Spain. They were regarded as the bravest and best fighters on the Red side. They were said to be invincible. They certainly were ruthless. They also played their part in improving the morale of the Government and helping the enrolment of unwilling troops through the fear they inspired. But there was little of idealism about Durruti and his column. It is of some importance to see the nature of this leader and the philosophy that actuated his column. Let us first give Dr. Borkenau's opinion of these two points. Nobody would accuse Dr. Borkenau of being, in any degree, "pro-Fascist". Indeed, the Doctor would agree that his political faith was advanced Liberalism of the most "modern" kind, tinged with a pale Communism. Dr. Borkenau writes thus of Buenaventura Durruti:

"He and his men are the popular heroes of the Catalan war, to the detriment of all other Catalan columns. Durruti has the reputation of being a sort of avenging angel of the poor. His column is known to be more ruthless than any other in shooting the Fascists [sic], the rich, the priests of the villages, and the glory of their self-sacrificing advance towards Zaragoza, careless of heavy losses, is told all through the militia of Catalonia. Some of the guards in the Governor's office had served under him. With a naive smile . . . they showed me their dum-dum cartridges, which they have made out of regular cartridges by an incision at the top. Prisoners . . . one man tells me, meaning that a cartridge is ready for every prisoner."¹

Dr. Borkenau has further description of the great Durruti and his column:

"It seems that, amidst the general enthusiasm of the peasants for the Republican cause, Durruti and his column

¹ Borkenau, *The Spanish Cockpit*, pp. 95 and 109*

have found the strange secret of how to make themselves hated." In the village of Pina " it seems they had been so ruthless, both in requisitions for the militia and in executions of both real and pretended ' Fascists', they had very nearly provoked a rebellion in the village ". So much so, indeed, that they had to leave the village, unable to overcome " the silent resistance of the peasants "?

Durruti was killed by his own men, shot in the back, some say because he incensed his followers by too strenuous discipline, others because of a small quarrel about the destination of some valuable loot. He was given an impressive official funeral, and the Passion Flower and other Government notables held him up in their panegyrics as the model for all good Red militiamen.¹²

His record is of unusual interest as it illustrates the type of men whom the Soviet " democratic " revolution has thrown up into power. In Montevideo, Durruti was known as an international gangster. He was born in the province of Leon, and his dossier was transmitted all over the world by the Spanish police for his complicity in the murder of the Bishop of Zaragoza, and for assault and robbery at the Gijon Bank of Spain, where he made away with 550,000 pesetas. The Chilean police also " wanted " him for an attack on a branch of the Bank of Chile, though there he had only got away with 40,000 pesos. The Cuban police wanted him for just such another exploit on the Bank of Havana. In 1925 he carried

out a robbery in the Las Heras station in Buenos Aires. In the same year he carried out an attack on the Cabillito del Subte station. The following year he went back to bank robbery, and was successful at the San Martin branch of the Buenos Aires Province Bank. The next year the French expelled him from their country because of his participation in a plan to assassinate King Alfonso. As soon as the Republic was proclaimed, Durruti returned to his " spiritual home ".

The words of Professor Unamuno seem singularly appropriate in relation to this Red " hero ". " Not all the Spanish Republicans are riff-raff, but all riff-raff are Republicans."

The " Iron Column " also was in the line and suffered heavy loss at Belchite. They too take high place in the ranks of infamy. *The Columna de Hierro was app. organized at the*

² See *El Sol* of the relevant date.

beginning of the war when the Government dared not take a strong position against the anarchists because they formed the backbone of the loyalist forces". It consisted of "a band of some 1,000 armed anarchists, many of whom were ex-convicts", and "the *Columna* travelled loyalist territory from one end to the other plundering and killing in open defiance

of the authorities. Their raids, directed principally against small rural towns, became more frequent as the *Columna* became bolder."¹ Women served with it.

The methods whereby the Communists strove to improve the bad discipline which had resulted from their own teachings, which they had inculcated in order to bring about the Red revolution and so achieve power, are illustrated by the following details given in the *Diario de Burgos*:

"At the present time the desire for surrender amongst whole battalions is such that measures of almost unlimited brutality have had to be adopted.² Many deserters have had to conceal their identity and publish reports of their own death because of reprisals taken upon members of their families. These stories were regarded with some suspicion, as the deserters would naturally wish to obtain favour with the Nationalists and explain why they had been in the opposite camp; but the stories were so frequently repeated that there was already little doubt as to their being well founded. During the beginning of June the whole of the 2nd company of the 116th battalion from Santander were captured, and amongst their papers was the following, which we quote verbatim:

"There having been various cases of desertion from the battalions in this sector (Sector No. 3) . . . it is ordered that the officers of your battalion . . . should proceed to take a note of all individuals, setting out their place of residence, relatives and houses, including the class from which they originate. . . . And they should be warned of the responsibility incurred by acts such as are referred to above, and where this responsibility cannot be brought home to those who desert, it will be exacted upon their relatives, who shall be held to account. . . ."

The family hostage—perhaps the most loathsome of all the Russian Communist methods, but a standard one in the

¹ Knoblaugh, *Correspondent in Spain*.


² This document was taken on the northern front.

"unedited text-book" of the revolutionaries. Similar threats were published by way of a *Government notice* in Barcelona newspapers, advertising the reprisals on families in cases of desertion or failure to enlist.

"In addition, all those who are on isolated duties, such as sentinels, troops holding parapets, etc., must now be posted in pairs, and in the event of the desertion by one, his companion is held responsible and shot without further inquiry. Deserters state that there have already been a number of persons shot under this regulation."

Difficult as was the ground over which the Bilbao and Santander campaigns were so brilliantly fought, the natural ramparts of Asturias were even stronger. The eastern approach to the province was between the great Picos de Europa and the coast. The passage between these mountains, which soar to nearly 9,000 feet, was only about 10 miles wide, and the spurs and foothills of the Cantabrian range give every facility for the reinforcement of this narrow front. On the south, the mountains themselves look like an impassable barrier. But once again the inefficiency of the Red command and Franco's brilliant seizure of the resulting opportunities made it possible for him to crush the defence. For the Reds were established with large bridge-heads well on the southern side of the passes. If they had held the passes only, they would have properly fortified them, and it would seem as if nothing could have forced a way through them; as it was, they concentrated their attention mainly on trench systems in the lower ground south of the passes; and when these were overwhelmed, the Nationalists pressed on, and invaded Asturias through the passes themselves before the defenders could recover. At the western end of the line the position seemed, if anything, even more inaccessible, for the Reds were established many miles south of "the Gateway of Asturias", the Pajares Pass, and to wrest all the territory between their front line and the pass looked an utterly impossible task. And yet once more an enveloping movement to the westwards of the Oviedo-Leon road and an almost incredibly rapid march by the Galician columns suddenly endangered the whole of this key position.

There is not space to describe in full this phenomenal campaign. The most interesting features were the capture of the passes in the west and on the south; for, even if the attack had been held up along the coast, where the line of defences



TARNA, ASTURIAS: RED DEFENCES

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was situated in relatively easier country, the fate of Asturias would still have been sealed. An attack through Pajares, synchronized with a heavy push southwards from the Oviedo corridor, was one of the many alternatives, though a difficult one; but even that was not necessary, for the troops had pushed forward over the Tarna and Isidro Passes south of the very centre of Asturias, thus turning the coastal defence line which stretched along the banks of the River Sella and the Sierra of Covadonga. It was this threat which demoralized the defenders of the coastal section; and although eventually the Sella line was carried by a brilliant break-through in the centre at Arriondas, the columns from the south were already pouring down the northern slopes of the mountains towards Infiesto in its rear. Thus, what appeared an almost impossible line of approach had already become a comparatively simple one; and in the western sector, the chief difficulties of yet another alternative had been removed.

Undoubtedly the loss of Vizcaya and Santander to the eastwards had already affected the morale of the defenders; but had the troops been of equal quality, with equally good leaders and an equally well-organized rearguard, the capture of the Asturias by the Nationalists would have been extremely costly, and must have taken a very long time, as our Press lost no time in prophesying.

The advance along the coast from the east was methodical in the extreme. Strong-point after strong-point was captured and organized to assist in the reduction of the one to follow. The essential operations lasted *less than one month*. After the rapid push which carried the line up to the Pajares Pass itself, and directed the attention of the defenders towards their south-western defences, on the 24th September serious operations began against Asturias. By the end of the month the narrowest part on the eastern front was negotiated and the town of Ribadesella occupied. Covadonga followed. The Sella River line was reached. Then came the conclusion of the seizure of the southern passes—the Tarna, the Ventaniella and the Espante, followed by the pass of San Justo (or San Isidro). In these operations mountains 6,000 feet high were captured one after another. To the troops engaged, the task facing them must have looked superhuman, for fresh peaks and great sierras kept coming into view as each was captured.

At this stage the Reds tried a diversion by another great


offensive on the Aragon front. The chief fighting was in the north, near Jaca, though the activity extended as far south as Teruel province. The whole of the best Shock Troops of the International brigades were flung into the battle—the mixed Lister, Campesino and Modesto brigades, and the Polish and Hungarian battalions, the Dombrovsky and Rakosi. Their repulse was extremely violent, though an enormous number of tanks were employed in the attack.

Then in Asturias, on Sunday, October 10th, the important town of Cangas de Onis fell. This was followed by the usual lying propaganda issued by the Valencia Publicity Bureau. Most of the chief buildings of Cangas de Onis, which the Nationalists tried to preserve at all costs, were destroyed by the Asturian Reds, and "worst since Guernica" was blazoned in our British Press—*on Tuesday!*¹ It had neither been taken by frontal attack, nor subjected to bombardment; and upon the news agencies' own stories this town of 21,000 inhabitants had apparently suffered no casualties. But someone was seeking to cover the doubts beginning to be felt about the Guernica invention, by an impudent repetition of the same kind.

At about this same time there was fresh pressure south-east of the Pajares Pass; and apart from the value of the positions captured, this prevented reinforcements from being sent to stop the troops advancing on Infiesto from the south or those pressing on the eastern front. And again, the advance on Infiesto so threatened the tremendous fortifications on the Sella River that when Arriondas fell its defenders had already withdrawn on finding themselves taken in reverse. The whole of the tremendous expenditure of labour and material upon this "impregnable barrier," and the natural defences of the Ponton Defile south of it had been rendered useless.

For students of military history there may be a deep significance in the remark attributed to General Franco when he was told of these great successive lines and the tremendous fortifications thrown up round Bilbao, at the approaches to Santander, and to bar the way into Asturias. His comment was: "What a fatal mistake!" It may be that such systems, even when well defended, in themselves may induce the

¹ *Evening Standard* "Reuter, Exchange, British United Press and Central News message (not giving Febus as the origin). See also "Reuter" message in the *Telegraph*, 13th October, quoting a Febus message of the 12th.



defensive mentality which has characterized the International plan of operations upon all fronts, and the loss of morale among the troops whenever such a system is pierced.

This Asturian campaign deserves far closer analysis than our space permits. In conclusion we will only add that, whatever the weaknesses of the Reds, the operations against them could only have been successful with the finest quality of troops in the world, under officers leading men prepared to follow them with a complete disregard for their own lives. No finer tribute can be paid to the Nationalists, from their *Caudillo* to the private soldiers, than this perfectly truthful appreciation. Perhaps one of the greatest factors in the destruction of the Red morale had been this apparent invincibility of the Nationalist troops. It is the spirit which earned for General Franco and the officers of the Legion the unstinted admiration of the Moors during the campaigns in Morocco, a tradition they have handed on to their new army.

It was only a few days after the abandonment of this last prepared rampart that Gijon called upon the Nationalists to enter; and the last stage was covered without fighting by a tremendous forced march by the indomitable Navarran troops.

As usual, the Red leaders had fled at the first sign of the collapse.

We will draw a veil over what had been happening in Red Asturias. It was no less than might be expected. We will give two brief paragraphs only.

The bulletin from Oviedo published in the Nationalist news for March 14th, 1938, states: "Yesterday morning the execution took place here of Luis Campanal, self-confessed perpetrator of 3,000 assassinations. He was formerly Chief Clerk of the Gijon Cheka. . . . He was also guilty of several acts of rape." Such was the end of this "good Communist", a typical official of the local government, and of the "legitimate Government". The "legitimate Government" repudiates its officials as "local" when their records are disclosed; but their acts and decrees they rely upon where there are claims in foreign law courts for ships or stolen moneys which they wish to retain from their true owners.

As with Guadalajara province, the conditions throughout the whole of Asturias are best appreciated from the mere fact that there was *only one* town where assassinations and other Marxist excesses of the usual kind did not occur. Mieres alone

had the unique good fortune that its local Red *alcalde* refused to permit murder.

On October 22nd, 1937, General Franco issued his laconic announcement: "The northern front no longer exists."

The words of General Weygand in his preface to General Duval's book were as true of the Asturian as of the previous operations to which he was referring. The true weakness of the Reds is "because they are under the handicap of a foreign influence".

"The Government weakness", he adds, "has sometimes been attributed to lack of war material. There is no reason why the Government troops should be less well equipped in this respect than the Nationalist troops. At the beginning of the war most of the material of the regular Army fell into their hands. . . . Later, both sides -were supplied from abroad. The Government has the gold of the Bank of Spain and means of payment lacking to the Nationalists. . . . The real weakness is technical. . . . On the one side there is Franco, on the other side there is nothing."

General Duval also discusses the criticism of Franco made in certain quarters that, with his manifest superiority over his adversaries (due only, they imply, to foreign aid), he should have won the war far quicker. The General's reply is that the attacks have evolved more rapidly to a solution than those in France during the Great War. "In some cases, such as at Santander, the rapidity has been astonishing. The intervals in the operations have been partly due to the necessity for moving methodically and surely, but the principal reason is the part played by war material in modern warfare. . . . Industrial production imposes its rhythm on war. . . . Where Franco has moved slowly, he has not had the means of moving fast. . . . Time has meant munitions, and instructions and training of troops, to create those needed and to replace wastage."

To this summary we would add that General Franco was also applying his first principle—to save men. And this is true both as regards his friends and his enemies. Except where military' necessity has left him no option, he has always done his utmost to spare Spanish lives and Spanish property.

To those who have been fed upon the Red propaganda and have believed that, his defeat was inevitable, this statement may sound unconvincing, for they do not realize that the Nationalists, as soon as the front was stabilized, have known

that they must eventually win—and for a reason precisely opposite to the impression which was created here in England, namely, because the majority of the nation is behind them. And knowing this, they have always looked to the future, when the nation and the country has to be rebuilt.

The work of reconstruction has been steadily proceeding behind the lines for many months; and not the least of the factors which should help in the moral and spiritual regeneration which Spain so sorely needed is the mutual respect amongst all ranks, which he has created in their training, based upon the creeds of the Legion and of the cadets. Those who have *lived* those creeds together are the hope for the future of Spain. With such a lead there would indeed be little room for faith in humanity if the Red doctrine of hatred, which was destroying the country, could survive.

With the fall of Asturias, 100,000 seasoned troops of all arms, with their artillery and aviation, were ready to form a mass of manoeuvre for use on the eastern and southern fronts. And some tens of thousands of Asturians went into training or accompanied them. The resources of Asturias and its arms factories at Trubia and elsewhere were added to the others captured at Reinosa, Bilbao, Galdácano, and all the other centres in the north. The Nationalists were ready to enter upon the final struggle.



el Interventor y tome la dirección con plena personalidad y responsabilidad.
Para todo el Gobierno mi saludo y mis mejores salabas de afecto
y fe en nuestra España; para U. algunas de abajo suscrito de un viejo amigo
tuyo Fernando de los Ríos

Senador Presidente del Consejo de Ministros
París - 21 Julio 1935

Dra. José Giral

Amigo querido: Deusto se hace historia porque la avanza
de hora en que comencé esta carta, después de haber tenido
una última conversación con el Gobierno, o mejor dicho, con
elementos desvinculados de él, haría imposible su salida por el avión
Douglas que la ha de llevar á Madrid para entregarla per-
sonalmente a U. - La batalla que la prensa de París, tal vez
con la única excepción de tres periódicos, había emprendido con
tra la prudic entrega de armamentos a partir del momento
en que por infidelidades ^{de} fue entregado el Telegrama cifrado
que en la noche del lunes al martes envió U. al Gobierno,
se agudizó con la llegada de los aviadores, de aviso al ser
considerada mi venida, y al informarse la prensa con minucio-
sidad que revela traiciones estatales, de todo y cada uno de los cap-
tos que abarcaban nuestras peticiones. Aquíme, urgentemente que
estaba por el Jefe del Gobierno a ir a su cara; allí estaban los

CHAPTER XII

THE MANY-HEADED HYDRA.

WE submit that in our earlier chapters we have thoroughly established the nature of the forces engaged in the disruption of Spain. We would here summarize them again as follows:

There is an international body mainly directed by international atheistic Bolshevik Jews—nothing to do with the ordinary Sefer Jew, any more than a Red Christian or Gentile is the same as a White one or any intermediate shade. This body is the organization which runs the Third International. Amongst its directorate are people who also are in a position to influence other revolutionary bodies apparently unconnected with the Third International—for example, the International Anarchist Associations. Apart from that, it also forms, or inspires and controls, innumerable bodies charged with carrying out the various aims of the principal body, the Third International. It works through Youth and Peace, and Atheist, and Free-thinkers, and Left literature organizations, and associations exploiting the slogan “Liberty, Equality and Fraternity” in every conceivable manner and in every country. It will be found that responsible officials and leagues, such as the League against Imperialism, have perfectly obvious connecting links with either this parent, the Third International, or some of its natural or adopted children. And is it to be wondered at? For the effect of such leagues as the last named is to loosen central authority, to create violent change, and to make opportunities for the new type of leader supported by the Third International to achieve power.

Russia was responsible for most of the trouble in Spain; but that was because this group to which we refer was controlling Russia. Even if Russia abandoned her declared programme—and the present insidious propaganda suggests this, in order to lull suspicions—and the international groups thus lost control in Russia, the parent body would still continue

its work, using the same methods, and raising funds through the many organizations which they have established during the period when they had the vast Russian resources behind them.

We have seen even in England, where so far the activity has perhaps been less than in any other part of the world, the clear indications of their activities. We can, therefore, guess their intensity in other countries, such as Germany. We know what they did in Spain. It would be extremely short-sighted if we were to assume that because they do not yet appear very strong in England they may not rapidly become so. Already they are forming bodies to attack us by spreading discontent in our colonies and dependencies. India will be one of the next, perhaps, to feel the force of a heavy attack. And as to our home country, we must remember that there are large organizations which to-day are not of a Communist nature, but have leaders whose influence at a critical moment may determine their action and policy; and we may take it that at such a critical time, these leaders will be offered *fantastic* sums of money, or power, or other inducements, to further the ends of the Internationals. We need hardly add that there are also politicians, representing large bodies of opinion in the country, who would similarly be approached. There is no doubt that it would suit the purpose of the heads of the Third International to do so, that they are capable of such action, and that they have almost unlimited funds with which to do it. We may, therefore, conclude that *they will*—if they are not already doing so.

Most of us in England have an insular outlook due to our geographical position and history, and we find it difficult to appreciate how such powerful factors work in centres like the League of Nations, where delegates are representing their personal interests to a greater extent than is the case with the average British politician, people who represent countries made up of numerous nationalities and lack that deep-rooted basis for patriotism, which, even in countries such as ours, is often insufficiently strong to resist the strain of such strong inducements.

The youth and similar leagues and associations exist abroad in far greater number and with far more subtle ramifications than would appear conceivable to us. Perhaps the best source of information on such a point must be the Vatican, for it has information from every country in the

world, and the priests in all the countries of the world work amongst every class of the population, from the highest to the lowest; there are thus few powerful movements of a social or political nature of which they can be entirely unaware. And we find, in the encyclical of Pope Pius XI, the confirmation of almost everything we have stated:

"In the beginning Communism showed itself for what it was in all its perversity; but very soon it realized that it was thus alienating the people. It has therefore changed its tactics, and strives to entice the multitudes by trickery of various forms, hiding its real designs behind ideas that in themselves are good and attractive. Thus aware of the universal desire for peace, the leaders of Communism pretend to be the most zealous promoters and propagandists in the movement for world amity. Yet at the same time they stir up a class-warfare which causes rivers of blood to flow, and, realizing that their system offers no internal guarantee of peace, they have recourse to unlimited armaments. Under various names which do not suggest Communism, they establish organizations and periodicals with the sole purpose of carrying their ideas into quarters otherwise inaccessible. They try perfidiously to worm their way even into professedly Catholic and religious organizations. Again, without receding an inch from their subversive principles, they invite Catholics to collaborate with them in the realm of humanitarianism and charity; and at times even make proposals that are in perfect harmony with the Christian spirit and the doctrine of the Church. Elsewhere they carry their hypocrisy so far as to encourage the belief that Communism, in countries where Christian faith and general culture are more strongly entrenched, will assume another and much milder form. It will not interfere with the practice of religion. It will respect liberty of conscience. I here are some even who refer to certain changes recently introduced into Soviet legislation as a proof that Communism is about to abandon its programme of war against God."

We revert to this subject in the chapter on propaganda. We mention it here to introduce the "Hydra", so that the influence of this naturally polyglot creature since July 1936 may be kept in mind in the following pages.

During the Spanish Civil War there has been intervention by many people. According to our Press it would seem that it has been mainly—almost entirely, according to some papers

—by Italy and Germany. In point of fact, they were by no means the first in the field; and, as regards extent, their intervention has been less than that on behalf of the “Government”, *both in men and material*. If this seems hard to believe, we have the Press to thank for the false impression.

As the German and Italian intervention has already had so much publicity—to say nothing of the publicity given to intervention at times attributed to them on a scale quite out of accord with the facts—we propose to deal principally with France; because it has been respect of the French intervention that the “conspiracy of silence” has been mostly concerned.

We do not believe that this silence in the Press was due to foreign policy or indications from the Foreign Office, though suggestions to that effect have been made. It could not, for example, have been due to a desire to prevent German aggression; for publicity of the facts would have checked, not aided, Bolshevism in France, and would have thus strengthened France against possible aggression. The silence could only help the Internationals; it could only provoke retaliatory “Fascist” intervention and so increase the chances of war.

The facts are simple. Led by M. Blum, Prime Minister of France, the European Powers made a collective declaration of neutrality as regards the “civil war” in Spain. They all agreed that they would not interfere in any way in the Spanish struggle. On /Xugust Sth, 1936 (the date is of great importance), the French Government published its acceptance of this declaration of neutrality. On August 15th, the Foreign Minister, M. Yvon Delbos, presented a note to Sir George Clerk, the British Ambassador in Paris, which stated that it was the Government’s decision to abstain strictly from all intervention, direct or indirect, in the internal affairs of Spain.

At a later date, again through the instigation of the French Government, “Non-Intervention” regulations were tightened up to prevent the flow of volunteers to either side in Spain.

“Non-Intervention” was a farce from the commencement. *More than a fortnight before* the French Government published its agreement, *they had already made all the necessary arrangements* to supply Red Spain with men, planes and munitions. They had also received the money for the large orders that had been placed. Furthermore they have, deliberately and consistently, abused their declaration of neutrality ever since. They have withheld no possible means of assist-

ance to the cause of the Reds against the Nationalists of Spain. France has become the base for Russia's attack on Spain.

The connection between the Popular Front Governments in France and Spain has not been a secret. At a meeting of the Clarté Lodge of the Grand Orient in Paris, at which Brother Gustavo Rodriquez discussed the Popular Front and called for unity, M. Albert Vigneau, Past-Master of the Grand Lodge of France, reports that the following statement was made:

"The (French) Government, which includes eighteen Masons, is awaiting the favourable moment ... to introduce into our economy the great reform which will, at least, liberate us from the bandits of finance. ... As for Republican Spain, I cannot say much here—indiscretions are always to be feared—but, Brothers, you may be sure our Government does not abandon our unfortunate brothers of Spain. The appeal of the very illustrious Brother Ceferino Gonzales, Grand Master of the Spanish Grand Orient, has not been in vain, you may rest assured. . . . Mexico is far away¹ . . . but miracles are possible. Franco's scum will never take Madrid."

These Lodges have done their work well. Not only Clarté but others such as Plus Ultra, La Marseillaise, L'Internationale, provided the contacts with the Spanish Grand Orient Lodges, who arranged the supply of arms by and through France to Red Spain. Communist fêtes were openly organized to raise money for Spain at the seat of the Grand Lodge of France, Rue Puteaux, Paris, and at other Lodges such as "La Philosophic Positive" and, as we shall show later in this chapter, even the great Trade Union organization of France, the C.G.T., was directed by them to assist in producing arms for the destruction of Nationalist Spain.

On July 20th, 1936, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, acting on orders from the Spanish Foreign Minister, requested M. Blum, Prime Minister of France, to send immediately to Red Spain supplies of war materials, including 13 bombing planes (to be delivered that afternoon at the Prat del Llobregat aerodrome (Barcelona)), 50 light machine-guns, 2,000,000 machine-gun cartridges, 1,000,000 Lebel cartridges, 8-75 cm. guns with ammunition, and 20,000 gas bombs.

¹ The reference to Mexico was, apparently, an indirect allusion to lorry loads of arms lying at Marseilles (the centre of Red support for Spain) which, it was pretended, were for shipment to Mexico.

At a Cabinet meeting it was decided to agree to the request of the Spanish Government. The only stipulation made was that all war material should be obtained and dispatched in accordance with French law.

The same day, with the active co-operation of M. Pierre Cot, Minister for Air in the French Cabinet, four Potez 54 planes, and 17 Potez 25 planes, were sold by the French Government to the Madrid Government by contract. This led directly to the resignations of two members of the Spanish Embassy in Paris. The military attache', Don Antonio Barroso, refused to sign the necessary papers, and the Counsellor of the Embassy, Don Cristobal del Castillo, refused to sign the necessary cheque which had been prepared beforehand. Señor del Castillo explained his position to the Press, and at once there was a public outcry. It may have been this demonstration of public opinion which determined the policy of "Non-Intervention". But in the meantime the French Government had acted to some extent.

It should be noted first of all that *no action has ever been taken in France against any man for trying to cross the frontier*,¹ that there was not a single case on record of a successful denunciation by a Non-Intervention official observer, though hundreds of boats have taken war material to the Red zone.² We hear plenty about Italian and German supplies, and though Red Spain is packed with Russian, French and other tanks, planes, men, guns and munitions, all reference to the means whereby they enter the country was hushed up.

At the start of this chapter we print a facsimile copy of the opening of a letter sent by Señor Fernando de Los Rios to the Spanish Prime Minister, José Giral. Here follows a translation of that letter. It is dated "Paris 25, 1936", and is addressed to "His Excellency Don José Giral, President of the Council of Ministers". It goes on :

" DEAR FRIEND,—I refrain from entering into details because the advanced hour at which I start to write this letter, after a last conversation with the Government, or rather, with some of its prominent members, would make it impossible that it should leave by the Douglas aeroplane which is to carry

¹ Up to May 1938.

² There was one case, the Stancroft, in May 1938. By this date there was no Spanish Government mercantile marine! And it was held that coastal trade did not count.

it to Madrid so that it may be delivered to you personally, the fight that the Paris Press, with the sole exception, perhaps, of three newspapers, had started against a possible delivery of armaments, from the moment in which, owing to infidelities, it had knowledge of the coded telegram you sent to the Government last Monday to Tuesday night, became more acute when the aviators arrived,¹ was stirred up by news of my own presence here, and as soon as the papers learnt, with details so minute as to reveal the existence of widespread treachery, all and every one of the points embraced by our requests. Last night, on my return from London, I was urgently summoned by the Leader of the Government to his house, where I found the four Ministers, who, as far as we are concerned, possess more influence within the Cabinet, owing to the nature of the departments they direct. The conversation was essentially political, and at their request I made a few considerations upon the character of the Spanish struggle, which cannot be looked upon as being strictly national owing to a series of reasons which we analysed : military frontier in the Pyrenees, Balearic Isles, Straits of Gibraltar, Canaries and breakage of the political unity of Western Europe.

"DUTY, therefore, and *direct interest on the part of France to help us. How?*² We examined our demands and, from the attitude of the Ministers, I gathered that there existed a divergence of opinions. A new question arose: *that Spanish aviators should come to Paris to fetch THE machines:* I pointed out the semi-impossibility of this owing to our scarcity of personnel *and to our intention of retaining the French pilots.* I was told, by one in a position to say this, that the whole consignment of aeroplanes and bombs was ready and could leave in the morning of *to-day* (25th July, 1936). ... I retired to sleep and one hour later I was urgently aroused: the Air Minister, P. Cot, wished to visit me: he had inquired for me at the Embassy, and not finding me there, I was advised by mutual friends that *in order not to awaken more suspicion I should go to his house:* I went there, and he told me it was impossible to convince the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the legality of French pilots in taking aeroplanes to Spain: *the formula was to take them to Perpignan, etc.: this is what I communicated to you last night, the 24th.*

¹ To take over the Potz machines.

² The italics, throughout this letter, are ours.

" When I went this morning to the Air Ministry everything was going well: when I arrived at *f/te Potcz firm* the difficulties seemed insurmountable. The Press campaign and *f/ie publication of the documents in which the Counsellor* (of the Spanish Embassy) *resigns* LOOMS SO BIG THAT when BLUM went this morning to see the President of the Republic, he found him perturbed and in such a state of mind that he said, ' What is being planned, this delivery of armaments to Spain may mean war or revolution in France ', and he asked that an extraordinary Cabinet meeting should be summoned at four o'clock in the afternoon.

" The position of the President of the Republic is shared by several Ministers: the Cabinet was divided in its views, and the President of the Chamber, Herriot, has seen Blum and begged him to reflect, for he considers that this has never been done before, and that it *may justify a de facto recognition by Germany and Italy of any semblance of government set up in a Spanish city and provide it with arms and ammunition in greater quantities than those France can supply.* From half-past two until a quarter to four I have been with the Prime Minister and another Minister at the house of a third party: ' My soul is torn,' said Blum, *who is as convinced as we ourselves are of the European significance of the struggle that is being fought in Spain.*¹ Never have I seen him so profoundly moved: ' *I shall maintain my position at all costs and in spite of all risks,* ' he said. ' *We MUST help Spain* that is friendly to us. How? We shall see.'

" At 3.30 I again met some of them: the fight *had been* stern, and a great rôle has been played in the discussion by a secret clause which fate revealed to me: in the Commercial Treaty or Commercial Agreement signed in December 1935 by Martinez de Velasco, there exists under the form of a confidential note an undertaking on the part of Spain to purchase from France armaments and munitions to the value of twenty million francs. The Minister of War had inquired last night about this, and asked if I knew something with reference to this clause, to which I answered ' yes ', replying thus because, speaking in Embassy circles to Señor Castillo (the Counsellor) he had said something to me in half words which made me not a little suspicious: I asked for the dossier of the Treaty and

¹ This is yet further evidence on the question whether " Fascist " intervention preceded French-Russian assistance to the Reds.

found the confidential note in question, *a note* of which none of the present French Ministers was aware, *which our Constitution forbids*, and which has not been submitted to our Foreign Affairs Committee.

"*The resolution of THE CABINET has been to avoid delivery from Government to Government, BUT to grant us the necessary permits so that private industry may deliver to us and circulate such material as we may purchase. The method of executing this and facilitating it will be decided by a Committee of Ministers, on which we have some of our most faithful friends: to-morrow they will hold their most important and decisive meeting, and they anticipate that it is almost absolutely certain that we shall be able to take the aeroplanes out of the country after the 25th : on Monday or Tuesday, and we shall organize or, rather, I shall organize, aided by Cruz Marin and some other Spanish, as well as some excellent French, friends, the safe passage of the bombs, a difficult matter, especially for one who, like myself, is not an astute fox; but we shall see what necessity makes one capable of. The Potez 54 machines will be constructed, and we shall endeavour to shorten the terms. As regards all the armaments I think we can only deal with Hotchkiss.*

"Our conversations are overheard and everything that you say is published with slight alterations: for the good of Spain and the efficiency of the negotiations, it is advisable to speak with the utmost reserve, and to resort to prearranged words and make only occasional references to the necessity of employing such or such means for the struggle.

"When you use words such as indispensable, urgent, essential, etc., you pave the way, given the secret organization which exists, for the sabotage of things that matter.

"I want to tell you that to-night, acting on a request made to me by the Prefect of Police, I have taken up residence at a room at the Embassy: I regret it, but I do not think you will consider this indiscreet: *I think it indispensable that the Ambassador should arrive quickly and assume the direction of this with full personality and responsibility.*

"To all the Cabinet my greetings and my best words of encouragement and faith in our Spain: for you besides the sincere embrace of your old friend,

"Yours,

"(Signed) FERNANDO DE LOS RIOS."

M. Blum, in spite of his "torn heart", was soon at work. The two members of the Spanish Embassy who had refused to sign were compelled by the police to leave France. The vice-consul, Señor Erice, was also given his *congé* for refusing to sign the papers of S.S. *Arar Mendi* which had come to Bayonne to load war material. Then the good continental Masons proceeded to help with their Soviet friends. On August 6th, 1936, M. Daladier, French Minister of War, issued an order for immediate delivery to the Spanish Government, 8-75 cm. guns with 1,600 cm. shells, 2,000 rifles, 50 machine-guns, 6,000,000 cartridges and 10,000 10 kilo aeroplane bombs. These were shipped in the *Ciudad de Cadiz*. M. Cot, too, though his heart was no doubt torn, also got to work. The French manufacturing firm Bloch was ordered to supply to the French Government eight bombing planes, payment to be made by exchanging them against 17 French Army "Potez 25". The latter would then be bought from Messrs. Bloch by the Madrid Government. The text of this official order was published by the Paris Press in full.

Then came the signing of the Non-Intervention agreement. The French Government admitted that before this understanding was reached they *had* supplied munitions to the Madrid Government. They added that the supply would then cease. How they broke their word, while the ink of the agreement was hardly dry, can be seen from the following facts:

August 30th.—A train from Toulouse left on the Hendaye No. 10 siding a truck P.L.M., mark F.V. 37661, loaded with machine-guns and other munitions. A Spanish mail-van arrived. Six militiamen loaded the van from the truck, and the van returned to Irun.

September 2nd.—Forty-seven cases of machine-guns and parts, made by Heurtz and Co., and sent from Hamburg to Hodcidah via Port Sudan, were unloaded at Le Verdon, loaded into two P.L.M. trucks 185081 and 181833, and sent to Hendaye.

On the same date truck 245882 from Toulouse, labelled "Cerbère, Pascual Ibanez, 1st September, Munitions, Cartouches", arrived at Hendaye. It contained 136,000 cartridges.

No wonder that Generals Mola and Franco saw the necessity of cutting off this barefaced assistance to the Reds in the north. On September 14th the arms train from Hendaye was turned back, for the Nationalists had taken Irun. But there was still the sea. To give one early example, the steamer *The Bess* delivered her cargo of munitions to Bilbao on October 9th.

The land traffic in arms thereafter was only over the Catalonian frontier, where the chief centres were Cerbère and the Red base Marseilles. It is impossible to set out the endless list of railway transferences made in this way.

The rail traffic, however, was insignificant compared with what passed by road through the Pyrenees. To show the methods used and the widespread influence behind the gunrunning, the following examples should suffice. On October 8th, 1936, eight trucks from Belgium passed through French territory to Marseilles *with the Belgian Customs seals intact*. They were stated to be "agricultural machinery ordered by the Spanish Government", Nearly every day trucks were leaving Perpignan for Spain via Monthonos without inspection at the frontier as they were known to be carrying arms. On one occasion, October 14th, some zealous gendarme examined a truck apparently carrying cabbages and found 1,400 rifles hidden underneath. lie received orders *from the Prefecture of Police* to allow it to pass!

The Prime Minister was fully informed of all these facts. The Deputy Jacques Doriot gave them all in the Chamber.

M. Cot was so cynically open in his efforts that an article appeared in *The Times* (August 8th) condemning this air traffic. The French apology', of course, was that these had been ordered before. In point of fact the traffic never ceased. Early in September the Spanish Government bought four Potez machines from Air France, which is subsidized by the Government and which cannot make such sales without their permission. On October 12th, twenty-seven French aeroplanes arrived at Barcelona.

On October 15th Maurice Pujo stated in *Action Fran^aise* that "nearly all the air strength of the Madrid Government, material and men, is French".

Air France has been almost entirely at the disposal of the Reds since the beginning of the struggle. *Le Jour* stated on August 17th, 1936, "Such complicity could never have existed

without the formal orders of M. Pierre Cot." The Civil Governor of Alicante was allowed to take and use an Air France machine, and it was one of their machines which took the Chief Secretary of the C.G.T., M. Léon Jouhaux,¹ to Alicante for a purpose which was seen shortly afterwards. The French Government permitted the C.G.T., *to work without wages (!)* to supply Red aeroplanes and munitions. *Candide*, in its issue of November 5th, openly accused M. Cot of permitting the direct violation of the Non-Intervention Pact.

The effect of M. Jouhaux's visit to Alicante was shown in other factories. In the Etablissements Brandt the Syndicate Section passed the following resolution: "The Executive Committee have decided to work intensely in order to give efficient help to our Spanish comrades who are fighting the rebels for the defence of the Republic and for peace. Following the example of our comrades of the factories Bloch, Nieuport, Gnome and Rhone [all aeroplane factories], we agree to start working hard on the turning out of 81 mm. guns and 50,000 shells." The speeding up in the Bloch factory had been organized by M. Moulin, one of M. Cot's most trusted assistants.

Early in December 1937, in *El Sol* of Madrid, there was a typical article on the work of Comrade Zyromski and his visit to "those soldiers who are the glory of the most vital representation of the proletariat of the world—here in Madrid". "And, Comrade Zyromski, tell this to the workers of France ... let them not cease their efforts in turning out aeroplanes for us." Zyromski paid a visit to the 14th International Brigade and inspected a party of one of the French battalions. "Flere, amongst these combatants," said Zyromski, "is to be found all that is the most powerful, live and strong in the proletarian movement, in the international movement . . . a high example of unity for the French parties, in whose way the enemies of proletarian action continue obstinately to place difficulties. . . . Long live the French Popular Front! Long live democratic France! . . . What we wish to hear is the distant voice of the true workers of Paris crying, 'Arms across the frontier! Aeroplanes! Aeroplanes!'"

¹ This is Jouhaux *père*, not the son, who was imprisoned in Belgium for illegal arms traffic.

Zyromski ended by promising his fervent assistance to obtain unity "in my country" and decisive assistance for Spain. (From the text we gather that Mr. Zyromski is a Frenchman, and refers to France.)

The Air France workshops at Toulouse-Montaudran were used by the Spanish Reds as if they were their own. "There are as many Spanish machines as French machines there undergoing repair. The landing-ground has become an air base for aeroplanes destined for the Communists. The company has kept up a regular service between Madrid and Alicante. The planes are constantly carrying enormous cases for the Governments of Barcelona and Valencia. At the beginning of October, for example, one carried fourteen large cases which the French papers stated contained the parts of guns. To sum up, the Air France Line ever since the beginning of the war has acted on the side of the Spanish Anarchists and Communists. And this is no secret to the French Air Minister, M. Pierre Cot."¹

Thus it will be seen that the object of the Non-Intervention proposals was precisely the opposite to what appeared upon the surface. "Non-Intervention" was a classic "inversion". France, in her Bolshevikized condition unable to produce tremendous quantities of arms even for a Bolshevik friend over the border, was afraid that Germany might be provoked to send more than France. Very well, then—introduce "Non-Intervention", whereby *everybody* undertook not to supply arms. See that the friends of the Nationalists were made to respect it, and get every international Communist spy to denounce infractions in all countries (if the arms were going to the Nationalists), and call in the vast Press machine to proclaim such infractions. Meanwhile pour your own supplies into the neighbouring Red Spanish zone. M. Blum's own newspaper was indiscreet enough to proclaim it: "There is no blockade except for the rebels." And if England counsels moderation, it would always be possible to distribute deliveries to unauthorized leakages of goods in transit and "uncontrollable" elements in southern France. It was even possible to use the blackmailing threat that an effort to restrain them might provoke such violence as to precipitate France over the Red precipice, and so almost inevitably produce a European war.

¹ *I Accuse France*, by a Barrister.

Meanwhile, of course, they all did an enormous business. The idealists made a very good thing out of it. There was £150,000,000 to be spent, stolen goods to be negotiated, stolen jewels and bank notes to be "passed on", the collectivized produce to be negotiated with official agents. And the men engaged in such business, both in France and Spain, were mostly what one might have expected. General Queipo de Llano complained bitterly that he had been swindled by the Spanish Red representative in America, for example, when the Nationalists captured one of the Red arms ships (*the Mar Catabrico*) and found it full of badly worn aviation engines and other "scrap iron" purchased at a high price.¹ As he remarked, "*Marxistas puros!*"

Meanwhile, also in the south of France, big business was done in the sale of human beings as cannon fodder for Spain. The price varied, and the commission per head was anything from 10s. to £2. After Irun fell, the chief French centre was Perpignan on the Mediterranean coast. Here the Chief Soviet agent, Roger Tolera, was to be found. He has never made a secret of what he is doing. But the control officers appointed under the Non-Intervention Pact somehow did not seem to know.

Supporting Tolera are, amongst others, the Deputy Jean Cristofol, Deputy for Bouches-du-Rhône in the French Parliament, former supervisor of Customs at Marseilles, and regional leader of the Soviet Party. There was hardly a day, or a night, when he and his collaborators, Salavatore, Portalis, the ex-Italian Deputy Amadeo, the German Kraft Sachs and, of course, the inevitable representative of the Comintern, did not supply Red Spain with war material either by land or by sea. Cerbère, the frontier town, has a Socialist mayor, M. Julien Gruzel. He, with his associates, Julien Paraman, the deputy mayor, *Castello y Garrigo*, Pedro Bosch and Calvet e Hijo, have organized the contraband traffic where some measure of concealment was thought prudent for political reasons. (The armament industry in France is under Government control.) Once over the border, convoys are sent on from Cerbère to Barcelona.

¹ Queipo gave a list of the contents which included millions of dum-dum bullets. In referring to the *whole* cargo, much of which was Mexican rifles, he said on the radio, "It was a fine capture. Now we can use it against the Reds." In our Press, with their perverted cynicism, it was announced with screaming headlines, "Rebels to Use Dum-Dum Bullets".

But there were times when even the officials of the Non-Intervention control betrayed a morbid curiosity in the activities of these local worthies. There were several other routes to be used. Control officers, however honest, could not be everywhere. Near Cerbère is Prats de Mollo, on the second principal route in this sector, and there are also le Perthus, Massanat de Cabrenys and Requesens. . . .

Farther to the west is Bourg-Madame. In this town there is a quite openly recognized "refuge" when waiting for control officers obligingly to go off-duty.

But these were only forwarding depots. Most of this gigantic traffic was directed from the centre of Paris at the Maison des Syndicats and the Red Aid Organization, both of which share the same address, 8 rue Mathurin-Moreau. Every day these offices were crowded with persons seeking to supply arms to assist in the Soviet conquest of Spain or to sell men for the International Brigades. Every day this "scandalous traffic in human beings"¹ was carried on under the eyes of the police. Its activities were well known to the French Foreign Office and the Ministry of the Interior.

The democratic Britain and her sister democracy France were thus seeing fair play, and being very badly provoked by the wicked Germans and Italians. The object of the Press was thus doubly served. Some of their friends could make money out of the racket, others would obtain reward for helping the "Party". The silence in our Press about the conduct of the French and Internationals nearly succeeded in handing over Spain to the Soviets, with France to follow, and Europe plunged in the blood-bath through which so many of her countries have *actually passed* in the last twenty years. It brought us very near the brink of war, for it moulded an opinion in England based upon consistent falsehood and, consequently, upon ignorance of the facts. *Publicity only* could have stopped the blackmail exercised by the French politicians and the private individuals who urged the futile policies and suppression of facts which were the feature of our daily "news".

Why is it these facts, which constantly were published in the French Press, were given no currency in England?

As confirmation of the methods used we quote from an

¹ Pierre Héricourt, *Arms for Spain*.

official complaint by the Dutch Minister to the Quai d'Orsay on the 10th June, 1937 :

" During the past month or thereabouts one hundred Dutch citizens have passed into Red Spain by the following method: leaving Holland in groups of four or five, they went to Antwerp and proceeded from there to Roubaix, passing the French frontier at Jeumont, with the assistance of the local Communist cell. From Jeumont they went to Paris, where they were entertained by the International Red Aid in the rue Mathurin-Moreau, to which I referred when I published the statements made by the prisoners. From Paris they proceeded to Alès, and were put up at a farm pending their departure for Béziers, where they -were received by an Italian Communist, Monino, at the Hôtel Ramon, in the rue Bertrand, and sent on to Sète, where they embarked on a Greek ship for Barcelona or Valencia."

This official complaint of the Dutch Minister in Paris was forwarded by the Quai d'Orsay to the Ministry of the Interior. And, of course, nothing was done—or if it was, it was something quite ineffectual.

A large number of automobiles, the numbers of most of which were well known, plied to and fro over the frontier ever}- day, never bothering to avoid the main roads, and never by any chance being stopped by the proper authorities. The customs guards and police at Perthus had instructions not to examine cars on such important business.

After " increased severity " in the application of Non-Intervention was applied, some small effort was made to save face. The same traffic and the same " racket " went on, though a little less openly. Instead of flagrant transportation of war material, " food " and " raw material " figured far more than formerly. " Occasionally a little accident happens: a consignment is found to be wrongly labelled, two cartloads of delicacies in oil are seized, and on analysis are found to contain T.N.T., which is not usually considered a bread substitute for the civil population. There is no excess of inconvenient curiosity, however, and no attempt is made to fix the responsibility on the forwarding agents."¹

The arms which the French had asked us to assist in banning poured in by land, sea and air. A few figures are more

¹ Pierre Héricourt, *Arms for Spain*, p. 12.

eloquent than generalizations. In January 1937 General Franco instituted a "Recovery" Department which took over and sorted all enemy material captured. Until that date no record had been kept of enemy material taken. In the figures given below *account has only been taken of material fit for further use*. No material is included which is too damaged for repair. The list given in August 1937 gives some indication of what the Nationalists have had to face. Among the foreign material CAPTURED by the Nationalists, and now being made fit for use by them against the Reds, are the following:

- 318 French machine-guns.
- 948 Russian machine-guns.
- 565 foreign machine-guns of varying types.
- 954 spare gun-barrels (various).
- 1,358 French machine-rifles.
- 2,600,000 cartridges for 8-mm. Lcbels (French).
- 120,000 loaders for French machine-guns.
- 2,800 French rifles.
- 12,575 Russian rifles (two types).
- 886 Czech rifles.
- 3,852 Mexican rifles.
- 4,875,000 cartridges for Russian rifles.
- 24 French mortars (stock type).
- 53 37-mm. French guns.
- 32 75-mm. French guns.
- 16 155-mm. French guns.
- 18 124-mm. French guns.
- 52,000 shells (French and Russian).
- 110 Russian tanks.

These are a part of what they captured on the battlefields *in just over six months* of fighting. Any genuine inquirer can visit the recovery yards to verify their existence.

From captures at sea in one year, from about 50 cargoes, the Nationalists have taken:

- 100 aeroplanes.
- 3,000 machine-guns.
- 150,000 rifles.
- 80,000,000 cartridges.
- 120,000 shells.
- 19,000 aeroplane bombs, and all kinds of material.

A typical haul was that of S.S. *Silvia*, captureci in the Straits of Gibraltar:

Maxim machine-guns	250
Cartridges for same	6,592,850
Loading machines	42
Schneider " 75 " guns	10
Schneider limbers and ropes ...	10
" 75 " percussion shells	25,088
" 75 " expanding shells	9,945
" 75 " shell fuses	8,757
88-mm. mortars	99
81-mm. bombs	40,731
81-mm. shell fuses	24,330
Projectile cartridges	34,392
Cartridges for other models than mortars	32,485
Mountings for mortars	86
Extra projectile charges	34,460
Stands for mortars	90
Bergman machine-guns	1,260
Browning machine-guns	100
Mauser 7-92 rifles	3,010
7-92 carbines	1,971
French machine-guns	4,541
Cartridges for same 13,713,720
Loaders for same	36,078
Loader-carriers	2,160
9-92 ball cartridges	7,298,000

In the first nine months of the war 759 foreign aeroplanes had been safely delivered to the Red Command. This is only the number the Nationalists have been able to check: how many more they have received as well it is impossible to say. This total was made up as follows:

Russian350
French212
American . . .	-31
German ...	20
Dutch11
English16
Unclassified .	-129

It was this supply of arms, practically unchecked, which

gave the Third International the whip-hand over the Spanish Government if they tried to shake off the yoke of their foreign masters. And that Government had sold themselves and their country to men who knew how to consolidate their position. Moses Rosenberg and Antoneff Avseenko left no loopholes on the political side, and Generals Lukacz and Kleber saw to the organization of the troops and their control by an army of "commissars". It was only sufficient to threaten to cut off all supplies of further munitions, and to take "measures" with the refractory—and they gave them a few examples, like Andres Nin—to bring the Government to heel.

As for other members of the French Cabinet, in many cases there is little doubt as to what were the actuating impulses. Some were members of the Grand Orient, or merely lower grade Communists. Some of them could not resist the inducements, whether they were political or personal. Was it not for the good of France? For the gold reserve that was the guarantee of the notes in circulation throughout Spain—the property, in trust, of the shareholders of the Bank of Spain—the patrimony of the *whole* Spanish nation—was exported for propaganda and the purchase of arms for the Internationals and the benefit of those "doing business" with them.

Part of this gold went to Russia and to Mexico, the U.S.A., and other parts of the world; but the largest individual consignments went to the Bank of France in Paris and Toulouse.

So long as it can be maintained that this was a legal action by a legitimate Government acting within its rights, presumably the Bank of France is not receiving stolen goods. We will not pursue that subject further, but it gives food for thought as to the reasons for the maintenance of certain of the current fictions.

Between August 26th and October 8th, 1936, the gold equivalent of 474,080,000 French francs arrived from Madrid at Francazal, the airport of Toulouse, and was paid into the Banque de France. From Barcelona, 10,540,000 francs were sent to Le Bourget in twelve days in October.

" Apart from all this gold, which arrived under official conduct, millions of gold, in objects and bank notes, is arriving daily in France from the Catalonian frontier, and taken to the Communist and Anarchist organizations of Marseilles, Toulouse, Perpignan, Clette, etc. *It is perfectly well known to the French police and customs officials, but they do not seem*

very alarmed at these interior revolutionary preparations."¹

"These interior revolutionary preparations." All the money not spent on armaments, or which does not "stick" on the way, will be used for Soviet propaganda in France, or will pass on for the same purpose into Belgium and other countries, not excluding our own. For the chosen few who act as the Communist spearhead there is no lack of funds. And personally they take a "short view".

The assistance from the French was uninterrupted, even according to the information of specific deliveries of arms and men. There was, of course, far more which was not traced. We give one last example of the known cases because it was not published in the daily Press in England in spite of its sensational nature. One weekly paper alone, so far as we know, published this information, although it was an official communication from the Duke of Alba to the British Government and was available to the whole Press (March 29th, 1938):

"The British Government is informed that from January 1st to March 20th, of the present year, there have passed over the Franco-Spanish frontier to the enemy zone 2,308 volunteers, among whom were two Generals, two superior officers, one member of the headquarters staff, 107 army officers, two naval officers, five fortification officers, 44 engineers for special purposes, 55 other technicians, eight mechanics of the Dewoitine firm, and 11 gas specialists as well as 135 trucks with guns, 600 tons of munitions in cases, 909 lorries, 138 trucks with tanks, 29 trucks of machine-guns, 22 trucks of aeroplane engines, 5,000 tons of scrap-iron, 174. aeroplanes of different types, and 37 trucks of aviation material.

"On February 4th there passed via Tour de Carol 18 15-}-inch guns and 8 101--inch guns from the Castres artillery park belonging to the French Artillery Regiment No. 115. From the same source came 40 trucks loaded with gunpowder.

"Considerable numbers of Renault armoured cars and flame-throwers have also begun to arrive in Barcelona. There is also evidence that the authorities on the Franco-Spanish frontier have given permission for the transit, in the near future, of many thousands of tons of war material coming from Russia.

"The details given above all refer to men and material

¹*I Accuse France*, by a Barrister.




THE SANCTUARY OF THE VIRGEN DE LA CABEZA, JAEN



PONTOON BRIDGE OVER RIVER EBRO NEAR QUINTO

[facing page 205]



arriving by road or rail, excluding arrivals by sea. . . .

"Information has also come into the hands of the National military authorities to the effect that to delay the inevitable victory of the Nationalists by provoking an international conflict, the enemy is preparing in Barcelona Italian Caproni aeroplanes with distinctive markings and colours of the Nationalist forces, with the intention of bombarding Port Bou and Cerbère."¹

It is abundantly clear that France has acted as a base hospital, as a supply base, a recruiting centre, and almost as Spanish territory for transferring combatants defeated in one area to continue to fight in another—from Asturias and the north coast and from Aragon in the north-east. It would be difficult to find a means of intervention which they have not devised.

There has been far too much money about in this Spanish war. And it has not come from Nationalist Spain, which was despoiled of almost every thing it possessed. The incredible sums produced by collectivized labour in Russia, the incredible sums stolen from Spain, the huge funds which the Internationals have extracted by specious propaganda from the workmen and the poor of the world, have all gone to further the triumph of "The Cause" in Spain. It must have seemed as though they *could* not fail. That is the reason for their rage and indiscretions when it became clear that they would lose this war against the Spanish nation. They must beat those who will not succumb to Communism. Is an army required? Then let an army be purchased with the cry that it is an army to conquer "Fascism". They had their vanguard in Spain. An army of 300,000 additional foreigners should have been decisive. At a cost of £5 per head the army of mercenaries would absorb less than 1% of the Spanish Gold Reserve of some 2,280,000,000 gold pesetas. If they had to pay £500 per man it would still have been a good business proposition, though it cost £150,000,000, for the control of Spain, by such men, under collectivized labour, could produce ample funds, for which no account need be rendered. And, in accordance with Lenin's injunctions that the *bourgeoisie* could always be made to destroy themselves, they have provided a comfortable competence to many a hard-working publisher and publicist willing to write and distribute to their orders, regardless of the

¹ The air attack on Cerbère followed on May 26th, one month later.

consequences to his own country or any other. And their name is "legion".

There are exceptions, though they are fewer than this mercenary army. Mr. Knoblaugh records the reason why one of his American friends left his position as head of the "Legitimate Government's" Propaganda Department (American Section):

"I left Valencia because there is no longer any semblance of democracy there. If the Government wins, a Communist dictatorship will be established. Recent developments have split the Government forces to such an extent that victory will be possible only if the labour unions throw out the Communist elements controlling the Government and take power into their own hands."

The Russian Internationals also understand another principle which they have put into practice throughout the world. They appreciate that if you can induce a person to subscribe even a penny towards a fund, the donors become interested in the future fortunes of that cause. You establish a contact, and often the donors become amateur or professional supporters. To this end schemes have been started in various countries, each with the suitable national "twist" to them. In England, for instance, sixpenny tokens for "milk for Spanish babies" have had great success. It meant excellent business from the point of view of the Co-operative Wholesale Society, for the appeal was made through the 20,000 branches of the C.W.S.

It is fortunate that a thousand people did not subscribe a daily sixpenny token in each of the shops. For there were corresponding schemes operating in France, and others in various countries of the world. The Spanish babies would have been dangerously glutted.

Such an appeal could only be put forward *if it could conceal the real extent of funds and deceive the public about the rest of the facts.* That was the chief reason for the emphasis upon Germany and Italy in the discussions on breaches of "Non-Intervention".

New York, as one would expect, responded magnificently to their Red local appeal. Over £3,000,000 has been subscribed in funds. Ninety-five travelling ambulances have been sent to the succour of the Reds, and lorries, whether they are ambulances or not, are a most important factor in this war

of mechanical transport. Even the Russian proletarians have themselves been compelled to pay a "voluntary levy" out of their poor wages for this stage of the World Revolution in Spain. Nearly half a million pounds was extracted from them "for Spain" within a fortnight of the commencement of the war, "as a first instalment" of {-% on a month's wages.¹ The Trades Unions of the world have also done their share. And the cynical tragedy was that the subscribers were honest men who really thought they were helping the cause of a penniless people, fighting for liberty and justice.

The Spanish Red radio station, "Flota Republicana", recently officially gave some figures of funds collected. After extolling the wonderful work done in Spain by the Communist International, it was stated that funds had been collected from the following countries:

England	36,000,000	French francs equivalent
United States	22,000,000	
France	13,500,000	
Switzerland	13,000,000	
Argentine	16,000,000	pesos
Holland	2,000,000	florins

and Czechoslovakia and Belgium a million each in their own currency.

Quite frankly, we disbelieve the above figures. They are, of course, grossly under-stated, like the figures of the International Brigade. For the official International technique is to show sufficient to encourage, but without disclosing enough to alarm the world. But as an avowal of the working of these organizations, the list is of great interest.

In discussing what happened under "Non-Intervention", it is necessary briefly to say a few words as to what must, in practice, constitute intervention from the theoretical point of view. *Any* assistance of *any* kind given to either side in a war is intervention. The possession of money is the means with which to buy arms, recruit men even, in the case of the Internationals, or obtain political support by buying Press space. Even without the last two, the ability to buy arms alone is sufficient in itself. For the carrying on of a war it is necessary also to have clothing and equipment for the army, and for the civilian population. Any assistance to the civilian population

¹ *The Times.*

releases funds which can be used for purchasing army equipment. The requirements of hospitals not only save money which could be so utilized, but it also means saving the lives of men to be returned to the front line fighting strength. The provision of sanatoria for convalescence not only saves money and the lives of men, but helps to maintain morale. Provision of Red Cross ambulances not only saves money, but releases other motor transport for more immediate military purposes. The provision of "Milk for Spanish (Red) babies", for example, means that the Spanish Government will not have to buy the milk with its own money, and can use it for buying French or Czechoslovak aeroplanes, for example. Not that the Republican Government was short of money, unless those sums have been stolen by its agents; for, as we have mentioned before, the bullion which they took from the Bank of Spain, the treasures they sold, the currency they seized (where they could find buyers or could evade the Nationalist control) and the collectivized produce which they exported, they had *literally some hundreds of millions of pounds*, and far more than the combined gold reserves of Germany and Italy together.

The morale of the rearguard is one of the most powerful factors in any war, and most of all in a civil war. One can imagine, therefore, the feelings of the Nationalists when they were almost ordered, in threatening tones, by the British and French Governments to permit the evacuation of civilians in their tens of thousands from areas which were being attacked. General Franco had even offered them a neutral zone in the Red territory in Santander province, or, if they liked, in his own territory. But the attitude of these two Governments as regards belligerent rights resulted instead in these huge evacuations which literally were the equivalent of a contribution of some millions of pounds to the Red cause.

There were impudent appeals, to kind-hearted people not endowed with great critical faculties, to supply fleets of motor-lorries for assisting the starving inhabitants of centres like Barcelona. Thousands upon thousands of lorries were sent, nominally for those purposes, subscribed by funds abroad. Even if all the milk reached the babies, and the lorries were used for the purposes for which they were subscribed—and it would be a bold man who would make that claim—these contributions constituted direct intervention, as those who organized their collection must have been well aware.

It must also be pointed out that when the insincere suggestion of Non-Intervention as regards arms was put forward by the French, the Italian and German Governments immediately, and quite logically, pointed out that *men* came under the same heading, and also propaganda. The agreement should be extended so that the Governments undertook not to deliberately encourage recruiting meetings or great rallies at which people could be incited to co-operate in the work of sending contraband, or officials such as *gendarmerie* could be made to sympathize, and connive at the traffic across the frontiers. These suggestions naturally did not find favour in France, and with the backing of others, the French point of view was maintained. It was the direct result of this that the Italians were forced to send their volunteers to Spain, as we explain later. And this, of course, suited the Internationals, for if they did not win and things became really bad, it might result in an international incident, a European or world war, which would save their prestige and, though premature, still serve the final ends of Communism.

The number of "volunteers" who have joined the International Brigades is not accurately known. The Red Command has been careful to disguise the total, and hidden large numbers in the Spanish battalions. Tens of thousands are now "Spanish citizens" with Spanish passports. The Italians state that more Frenchmen only have fought on the Red side in this "civil war" than the total of their own countrymen *on both sides*. We have had private and unquestionable evidence to support this.

The figure of 100,000 men is in our view certainly far below the total of those who have served on the Spanish front in the International Brigades. We do not know, and can never know, the full total or even how many finally survive, but we know, from the mouths of the Communists themselves, that they fought in *every major engagement* since early November 1936, both in offence and defence. Many have deserted, large numbers of them have been shot, and by the 2nd February, 1938, nearly 13,000 were still being held as prisoners in the Nationalist concentration camps; by mid-March there were over 15,000; by now there must be many more.

It might seem a remarkable achievement to raise an army of that size for an "international cause". But the funds

and the misrepresentations used to recruit them were almost inexhaustible. Many joined through idealism, or false ideals, or from the spirit of adventure, or in the hope of loot, under the mistaken "inspired" impression that the Government was winning and bound to win. Probably the motive in many cases was an unanalysed mixture of the good and the bad. Large numbers were unemployed—and this was particularly true of the increasing numbers of Americans from Canada and the U.S.A., where bad conditions made such a handsome recruiting-ground that one of our own newspapers conveyed what seemed a veiled threat to send 60,000 more men to Spain from America. Anyone might think they had not been trying. We do not know all the paper's connections, or the source of its information. Many recruits were "sold" for work on the roads behind the lines, only to find themselves pushed into the front line. With their passports taken from them, probably with the threat hanging over them that they were disowned at home through breach of official regulations in enlisting or not having papers in order, they had little redress, even if they could manage to desert. And whatever their motives, the pay, on paper, looked by no means bad; it was eight times the allowance of the ordinary Nationalist ranker, apart from possible loot.

The International Brigades were organized by André Marty, a Deputy in the French Parliament. Marty's own record is well worthy of recall. He was a deserter from the French Navy in the Black Sea where he instigated a mutiny during the war. He was condemned as a traitor, *and only saved by the Grand Orient demand on the Harriot Government in 1924*, because, of course, he was a fellow member of a Grand Orient Lodge. Like Ferrer, he was "one of us", and to be protected. M. Marty tells us in *Douze Mois Sublimes*:

"The volunteers came from all countries of the world. . . . On October 14th the workers and peasants saw with astonishment the arrival of hundreds of men, talking French, German, Italian, Polish and Bulgarian. . . . Nineteen days afterwards a complete brigade embarked for Madrid. Five days after a second took the same route. Already instructed by events in February 1934, old French soldiers rushed to Irún and Catalonia." We must break in upon M. Marty here to quote one of our own Communists, Mr. Fenner Brockway. Mr. Brock-

way states that the International Anarchist Organizations had already sent "comrades" to Spain before the International Brigades made their appearance?

Ever¹' Communist organization throughout the world, says M. Marty, assisted. The Edgar Andre, the Barbusse, the Dumont, the Commune de Paris, the Paris Centuria for the French, the Thaelman (for the Germans and German Jews), the George Washington, the Dimitrov, the Gastone Sozzi (for the Italians and Poles), the Dombrovski, the Rakosi (for the Hungarians), the Saklatvala (for our own countrymen), the Lincoln, the "Sixth February"². . . . All these were formed with the money poured out by the Third International on behalf of Moscow. As the organization grew, money was spent without stint. Modern hospitals were built. "A political section with its own Press services, *communiqués*, literature in twelve languages and its system of political soldier-militants. . . . From the Casa del Campo (Madrid) to Andujar (Cordoba), from Guadalajara to Belchite, from Almeria to the Jarama River, there was not a single battle in which the Internationals did not take part. . . . The Spanish Republic would long ago have been crushed but for the creation of a great popular army directed by a sole command. The International Brigades have been one of the bases of this new army, thanks to their high technical qualifications and strong discipline [sic]. . . .

"The Communists can be proud. . . . In the course of twelve months they have been the worthy members of this workers' revolutionary⁷ party of a new type, the Bolshevik world party . . . they are now the worthy children of that party which, formed and directed by the greatest brains of to-day, Lenin and Stalin, has upset the whole world. Yes, all are worthy⁷ of the great George Dimitrov . . . with his clear proletarian vision and anti-Fascist hate. . . . Every international volunteer is a centre of organization and unity; he is more precious than ever. . . . They have accomplished their duty. . . . North Americans, Canadians, Africans, French, etc. . . . all of them are here."²

It is a pity the English representatives do not remain there. The *Evening Standard* of June 17th, 1938, records the following incident: "The Duchess of Atholl organized a meeting in a committee-room at the House on Wednesday and brought

¹ Fenner Brockway, *Workers' Front*.

³ Andri Marty, *Douze Alois Sublimes*.

down three speakers who had served in the International Brigade.

"The meeting had a strange conclusion. Sir Henry Page-Croft, warmest of General Franco's champions in Parliament, rose and asked 'whether it was not a fact that all three speakers had at different times been in serious conflict with the forces of the Crown'.

"Upon which, without the slightest sign of embarrassment, one owned to eight months in jail for sedition; the second replied, 'I was one of the instigators of the Invergordon, and I'm proud of it'; while the third revealed that he had been in prison for ten years for espionage.

"This concluded the proceedings."

Much indignation has been stimulated, especially in England, at Franco's use of Moorish troops, who are citizens of the Spanish Empire and regular soldiers in the Spanish Army; but there is little said concerning the enrolment of French Moroccan natives and Senegalese troops or the other deluded natives, of all parts, to be found in the International Brigades, though General Franco has announced their presence and M. Marty is proud to proclaim it. Nor in England do we hear of the blind eye turned on this recruitment in the French colonies.

The French Government's complicity in the recruiting of these "volunteers" was often referred to in the French papers. During August 1936 *Le Jour* informed the Government that the Profitern had, on July 26, decided to send 1,000,000 francs to the Spanish Reds and were forming an International Brigade of Workmen Volunteers. The meeting-places for this brigade were all in France: Toulouse, Bordeaux and Perpignan. French Communists, Vade, Cristofol and Amelot, working under the orders of Comrade Monmousseau, President of the European Committee of the Profitern, had arranged the lodgings for the men. "Thus France", M. Pierre Jacquier wrote in this same article, "has the sad privilege of becoming merely a financial and military dependency of Moscow. For can one give any other name to this recruiting in France of reinforcements on behalf of the Soviet for the Spanish Communist Government?" The French Government took no apparent action.

Later in the same month M. Maurice Pujo announced that the then Spanish Ambassador in Paris, Alvaro de

Albornoz, was signing contracts with French aviators to join the Spanish Red forces, with payments of 25,000 francs a month and an insurance policy of 200,000 francs. M. Pujo said:

" To recruit mercenaries, above all for a civil war, is generally forbidden by the Government of any country because of the responsibility involved. But this recruiting is a grave breach of the laws of diplomatic relations, especially when the recruiting sergeant is the very Ambassador of the country at war. . . ."

In October *Le Jour* accused the new Spanish Ambassador, Luis Araquistain, of being a " mere recruiting sergeant in agreement with our Communist mayors ".

Le Jour later reported that volunteers were coming forward from the northern recruiting centres of Lille, La Madeleine, Marquette, Marquen, Baroeul and Saint Andre.

The recruiting of the aviators took place in every part of the world, though most of the air force were Russians sent officially by the Russian Government to fly their machines. Mexico was the centre for the American continent. Promises of enormous pay and a handsome life insurance were the bait; but in most cases, as many have testified, they have had difficulty in obtaining that pay and often, having signed on as teachers, have found themselves forced into the air as fighters at the revolver point.

There was also the training of Red aviators. At Orly, Esbly, Bourges and especially at Royan, all places in France, hundreds of Red pilots have been trained, quite apart from the number sent to Russia on a similar mission. There is ample evidence that the 80,000,000 francs subsidy which the French Parliament had voted to encourage French youth under twenty years of age to be trained as pilots, was used, at least in some degree, for the purpose of training Spanish nationals to be Red pilots, and clubs which provided such facilities had precedence of reward from that subsidy. At Royan it was stated that an aviation school was being started for rich young men who would pay to be taught so that they could become " air tourists ". At the meeting of the municipal council of Royan to grant permission for the school to be carried on, it was pointed out that, by a most curious coincidence, all the pupils were of Spanish nationality, and none

were paying; indeed, all were being paid. Permission, however, was granted. Royan is less than an hour's flight from Spain.

The state of the Red army and the influence of the Communists therein has been well summed up by Major Eugene van den Bosche, a Belgian Reserve Officer, who served for several months under the Red Government as a Commander. Among the positions he occupied were, Fifth Army Transport and Supply Inspector under General Assenio, Chief of Section Four of the General Staff of the International Brigades under General Kleber. He was expelled from Spain by order of Largo Caballero, and on his return to his native country he described his adventures in a book, *Je parle au Peuple*. Major van den Bosche says:

"In a very short while the War Office—which was the most important of all the Ministries—and also the Air and Navy Departments, were thronged with Communists who acted both as saboteurs and spies. These Communists countermanded orders given, and decried responsible leaders and the General Staffs, saying they were composed of traitors, spies and Fascists. At the same time they try to pass as the sole possessors of all the virtues capable of rescuing the Republic from chaos. With the formidable financial aid furnished by the U.S.S.R., they acquired a powerful Press which they used to attack the Government and everybody who did not think the same as they did.

"Of course, they seized the chance of praising everything that was done in the new earthly paradise of Soviet Russia. . . . This propaganda was supported by the war material, victuals, clothing, etc., sent from Russia, which formed part of a well-conceived and executed plan. What it was sought to show was that *only* Communism assisted the Spanish Republicans . . .

"What the people do not know, as it has been carefully concealed from them, is that, in exchange for the benefits(!) it showered on the Republic, Soviet Russia had monopolized all the orange crop, and gained, besides, control of Largo Caballero's Government through the Comintern. This was pure and simple abdication.

"Not content with being masters of the Government and the main State Departments, the Communists wished to have

at their disposal reliable forces on which they could count if necessary. *To this end, they created the Fifth Regiment, intended to be, said they, the nucleus and origin of the future Army of the Spanish Soviet Republic.*

"The Fifth Regiment's task was to work in conjunction with the International Column, of which I shall speak to the reader in a future chapter. *In this regiment's barrack-yard took place the execution of such volunteers of the International Brigades as the Communists wished to put out of the way.* Shall we ever know how many of these wretches were shot because, tired of all they had learnt about Spanish affairs, they wanted to go back to their own countries?"

This formation of the Fifth Regiment is of great importance. Had the Red army won the war, this regiment would have been the means whereby Spain itself was subjugated by the Communists. It was selected from suitable material, and its methods were ruthless.

It is hard to tell the full story because it is very difficult to accept the evidence of most of the prisoners of the International Brigades for a diversity of reasons. Whilst many were certainly deceived into joining, believing it was for work on roads only or on similar pretexts, they would say so even where it was false, hoping to curry favour and obtain release. And as regards information from Red Spain, we show later why that is not available.

Needless to say, every kind of lie and inversion was brought to bear to obtain recruits quite apart from the cry of "liberty and democracy". Frenchmen were brought in by the fantastic story that Franco intended an invasion of the French Pyrenees. This story had a twofold object: to raise so much local feeling that France would be agreeable to invade Spain, following upon a manufactured "incident", or to provoke southern France to a pitch of fury so that a local invasion might be undertaken in the heat of the moment. The fullest details of this plot "by the German General staff" were circulated in the French Red Press. The same propaganda was used after Franco's tremendous Caspe-Alcañiz success in March 1938. It was then alleged that the French Army was ready to defend their frontier against an invasion either by Franco or by Germans. And they nearly pushed two divisions on to—and over—the frontier on the strength of it.

As was the case ever since the war was seen to be lost, what was aimed at was an international "incident" which might provoke a general war to stave off the Red defeat in Spain and save the prestige of the Internationals.

The "manufactured incident" has frequently played a part all through the war. The "accidental" bombing of the *Deutschland* would have done so if the Germans had been over hasty. They saved the situation without inviting a repetition, by shelling Almeria and "closing" the incident.

Before passing to the question of the control at sea, and in order that our insistence upon the French participation should not be ascribed to a desire to be one-sided, instead of to a desire to produce the true perspective in reply to the false one created in England, we should here make it plain that, in some ways, the Non-Intervention greatly helped the Nationalists. It helped them in a way which was entirely contrary to the intentions of those who devised the formula; for Great Britain certainly used her influence with France to prevent the French Communists giving immediate and full effect to their plan. Franco had few arms, for the Government had most of them at the beginning; and if the Government had been able to use also the whole hundred and fifty millions to buy French army equipment and had used it all within the first few months, nothing could have saved the Nationalists but a European war, and possibly not even that. As it turned out, the application of the scheme slowed down the *rhythm* and saved Spain from being crushed by this utilization of her own gold reserve. The Germans and the Italians had already in the past been through the attacks launched upon their countries by the International Communists, and they perceived what was happening and the future threat which it implied. That was why they came to the assistance of Nationalist Spain and helped with aeroplanes, men and munitions until the rearguard could be organized to fight on equal terms with the output of the big industrial centres in the Government hands and the flood of material which was pouring into the Red zone. As we have repeatedly said, Franco had the men, though they were not organized; and it was because the Red puppet Government was at a disadvantage in that respect that they required, and received, from the Internationals so much additional material which they were unable to put to good use. It was this which finally delivered

them, without hope of escape, into the hands of the aliens who had planned to control their policies, and eventually did so.

We do not propose to go into all the arguments for and against belligerent rights to the parties engaged in this struggle; we propose merely to set out the effect of the published pronouncements of British policy. We state that, in effect, by denying belligerent rights, even after they were declared by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons to have been "long overdue", the following commandments were imposed upon Nationalist Spain.

Spanish ships may be registered in the name of any foreign nation, including British.

Any ship belonging to any nationality other than Spanish must not be molested outside the three-mile limit, a distance equivalent to fifteen minutes' sailing even for ordinary low power steamers.

And consequently they shall neither question nor interfere in any way with vessels until they were well inside the range of the enemy's shore batteries.

(We can imagine the British Government agreeing, during the war of 1914, to demands by, say Guatemala, that Guatemalan or any other ships might proceed under escort of the Guatemalan Navy up to a point well inside the protection of shore batteries at the mouth of the Elbe, or any other German river or harbour, no matter what their cargo might be.)

There should be no interference outside the three-mile limit with any ship evacuating the directors or troops of the defeated enemy, though conveying them to French harbours, from which they could—and did—proceed to other parts of the enemy territory there to continue the war. The Spanish Government itself stated that over 40,000 men had reached Catalonia in this way from the northern provinces. The same thing applied to the national treasures and the stolen contents of private houses and banks. Whole chests of securities, jewels and money were stolen and thus removed.

Arms and food can thus go in; civilians and soldiers can be evacuated.

And if the above were not enough, the principle was stated in the House of Commons that even inside the three-mile limit no "British" ship, or alleged British ship, could be interfered with. In the case of the *Thorpehall*, the

Nationalists were informed that in principle vessels could not be bombed even when they were lying alongside quays in the enemy harbours. In that case the vessel was carrying coal required for the local munition works. Also, we may state, the whole of the coal for the Spanish Red Navy came from Wales. But whether it was coal, or the cargo was not known and might have been munitions or any other essential for war—and food is just as essential—the Nationalists apparently can be debarred from bombing in enemy territory.

Vessels with Spanish produce (like the *Edith* carrying oranges), sold for cash which could purchase munitions, must not be interfered with.

We do not propose to discuss the motives which led to these extraordinary contentions on behalf of Great Britain. No matter what they may have been, the resulting position was preposterous from the point of view of the Nationalists, fighting for their lives against Russia and the Internationals.

In the highly suspicious case of the *Endymion*, General Franco was provoked to reply to the British Government, "We are not fighting a war for colonial expansion, but a war of ideals. We feel sure that this difference will be appreciated by a country so well known for its sense of proportion." Only one British newspaper, the *Daily Mail*, printed this statement by the General, though it was, of course, published in the better-class French newspapers.

Under the above strange interpretation of our rights, and by the refusal to grant belligerent rights, the Nationalists had even to watch thousands of their children exported to Russia to be trained as Communists for the future corruption of Spain.

We will give one incident of several within our personal knowledge. It was merely one of very many. A certain Spanish nobleman, hunted in Madrid, went into hiding. The Reds seized his two children and placed them in a convoy intended for export to Russia. Some friends advised a South American Consul of what was happening, and at great personal risk he committed the "irregularity" of getting them out of the country with false papers of identity. For this and several similar "offences" he was expelled the country, though he did not suffer the fate of a number of other foreign diplomats who were murdered for less. Undoubtedly other instances will be published later elsewhere. Unfortunately, at the moment

many innocent people, still in Red territory, would, in many cases, sullen if the facts were at present disclosed.

To till the cup of bitterness of the Nationalists, they had to witness the huge organized campaign of propaganda carried on to their detriment, based upon the evacuation of non-combatants from Bilbao, an evacuation, as we have stated, equivalent to a contribution of some millions sterling to the defence.

Without disparaging the marvellous work done by British and other diplomatic officials in saving the lives of many thousands of innocent people of Nationalist sympathies from Madrid and elsewhere, nor seeking to diminish its value in pointing out that most of them were not "Nationalists" but merely people hunted by the Red extremists, we state that much more could, and should, have been done, both in advertisement of the facts and in active assistance, to save the lives of tens of thousands who were massacred by the Reds. The blame is largely upon our Press, in some cases from ignorance, in concealing the truth as to the causes of this war and its conduct by the two respective sides.

It says much for the ability and level-headedness of General Franco as a diplomat, and for the strength of his cause within Spain, that he was able to steer clear of the many pitfalls contrived for him in the development of the policies of Non-Intervention, control and refusal of belligerent rights.

Sufficient publicity has been given in some quarters to make it unnecessary for us to emphasize the nature of the vessels engaged in blockade running to northern and eastern Red Spain. Every device was used to provoke an incident. The British flag was flown on Spanish vessels, and "British" ships disguised as Spanish. The ship's papers were false, their "destination" a fiction. The crews were generally Levantine Greeks and all kinds of oddments recruited by means of high premiums. The owners were sometimes British, or, like their vessels, of British registration; or individuals, nominally British subjects, using vessels with the Panama or some other neutral flag. Every form of trickery such people could devise was practised to create an atmosphere unfavourable to the Nationalists, whom the Reds then accused of violating British and International Rights. Patrol boats frequented dangerous waters, inviting an incident. Destroyers of the Red fleet, which managing to leave the Bay of Biscay for the Mediterranean, passed through the Straits of Gibraltar disguised as

British destroyers, painted with British distinguishing letters and numbers—the type of vessel was similar, for the vessels were designed by our own yards to a similar pattern when they were ordered for the Spanish Navy before this war. There were two sides to the “piracy” so much exploited in the British Press. And we say this, although we know that there was Italian assistance given to the Nationalists at sea which may have induced those directing British policy to permit the campaign of misrepresentation to “have its head”.

Amongst the centres where the “many-headed hydra” was able to make its influence felt through its international and national “humanitarian” and other organizations, was the League of Nations at Geneva. Nor is it to be wondered at. Geneva is the centre for a large number of organizations which the world usually assumes to be independent of one another, but which, in reality, are all connected.

“The centre of the International Freemasons is at Geneva, the League of Nations is at Geneva, and the offices of the International Masonic Association, which is the meeting-place of delegates of nearly all the forms of Masonry throughout the world. The interpenetration of the League and the I.M.A. is easy, apparent and confessed.

“One can well understand the exclamation in 1924 by Brother Barcia, past Grand Master of the Spanish Grand Orient at the Convent of the G.O., when he returned from Geneva: ‘I have assisted at the work of the commissions. I have heard Paul-Boncour, Jouhaux, Loucheur, de Jouvenal. All the French had the same spirit. Beside me were representatives of America, Freemasons, and they asked each other: ‘Are we in a secular assembly or a Masonic order? . . .’’

“Brother Joseph Avenol is the Secretary-General of the League.”¹

M. Marques-Rivière thus sums up the atmosphere and influences at work in Geneva.

It is easy to understand why Russia and her directors set out to corner the League of Nations. It is the glorification of the joint stock principle in world diplomacy, and the most convenient centre to launch all those Leagues of Liberty, Peace Societies, and other instruments for furthering the World Revolution.

This statement must inevitably offend many supporters of

¹ Jean Marques-Rivière, *Comment la franc-maçonnerie fait fine révolution*.

the League, and of the principles upon which it is supposed to be founded. We are strong supporters ourselves of the theoretical policy of the proclaimed objects of the League; but these, like so many other noble ideals, have been made slogans in the service of an evil cause. For of what does the League consist to-day? Its principal members are England, France and Russia, the three countries which the Internationals seek to bracket together as the three "democracies", in the hope that, with their influence in France, the League can be bent to the will of Russia, or of those who direct Russia. The other great nations have cut adrift from this centre of intrigue, where the terms of the Covenant can be invoked for the provocation of war at any time, if the unscrupulous lobbying, bribery, and policies of compromise can obtain the necessary backing. In March 1938, Russia even pointed out that if Czechoslovakia were attacked—and "aggression" is a difficult thing to define—they could force a passage through the Polish territory, because Poland would be bound, under the Covenant, to go to the assistance of Czechoslovakia no less than Russia was bound to do so. If such an argument can be invoked, any kind of violation of territory or attack upon a neighbouring state could be justified; for the origins of the incident which could be used as a pretext are seldom clear at any time, least of all to-day when the Third International exerts such a tremendous influence upon the Press output of the world. To use a homely simile, it is very difficult to know the real origin of a fight which breaks out in the nursery upstairs. It is true one small boy may have punched the other first; but he may have had his hair pulled; and, if this were so, it may have been under extreme provocation. Only too often a position arises, as it arose in Spain, where the people defending themselves are held up as brutal aggressors. Without condemning or approving the policies of Signor Mussolini and Herr Hitler, but regarding the matter in a much wider light, we state categorically that it is the standard policy of those directing the Third International to provoke "reaction" and to throw the onus of "aggression" upon those they are seeking to make their victims.

Is it strange that the continental Lodges have been shut down in Portugal, Nationalist Spain, Austria, Germany, Italy and Hungary—all of them countries that have been attacked? Or that Turkey, Poland and other countries are seeing the red

light and are acting in the same direction? Or that there should be a reaction against the League as it is to-day? Or that there should arise that indefensible wave of anti-Semitism which is terrorizing and wreaking gross injustices upon so many hundreds of thousands of innocent Jews? Or that the Catholic Church, even in countries whose Governments do not promise or afford to it the degree of liberty it considers its due, is still prepared to co-operate whole-heartedly in the defence against the Communists?

It may be asked: Why should Russia as a country attack Spain? Why should she wish to Bolshevize other countries? The reply is that it would bring power and the control of vast wealth to the Internationals, and it would give her a position in the world which otherwise she could not obtain. Yesterday she had no friends. The dreadful record of the Russian Revolution placed her beyond the pale, and the memory was still fresh. The men responsible have fashioned a philosophy for the country; they have built a new "ideology" and a new means of converting the unsuspecting or obtaining their support. She has worked hard to weaken other nations and to fashion them in her own image, as future allies. She has obtained recognition, and to-day is an honoured member of the League of Nations and the largest single power in the League; with impudent cynicism, she poses as the protector of all that is "liberal" and "democratic". Public memory is short, nor has the British public learned much of what happened in Germany, Hungary and other countries, which to-day are free of her, but otherwise might have placed their resources or influence, as Mexico did, at the service of her evil cause.

Even more than to enter upon war, the policy of Russia, as an instrument of the Comintern, is to cause the non-Communist nations to fight amongst themselves. This is the reason why the Press is so often found playing their game in fomenting ill-feeling and international distrust. For these forces are working for *war, for its own sake*, as a means of disintegrating the Governments, the institutions and the civilizations of nations, with the idea of eventually overthrowing "capitalism". It is one of their fundamental policies. Hence the origin of Leagues for the Rights of Man, and Peace Conferences cunningly organized to provoke wars. The tactics being employed against Europe are the same, on a

larger scale, as were employed against Spain—federalism and separatism in her case, racial prejudices and distrust in the former; the object always is to drive a wedge of discontent into the weak points of the “enemy’s” ramparts.

The so-called “legitimate” Republican Government, with the assistance of France, Russia and Mexico, had a free field at the League of Nations, a platform from which they could address the world without opposition from the Nationalists. The “Government” was duly given its ample publicity. The Nationalists presented a document to the League to summarize their case; but as it received but little publicity, and as the Government was, in any case, given so much more space that even that small measure of publicity was swamped, we give here a précis, which sets out the facts in the form of a statement of the Nationalist case:

“The delegate of the Red so-called Government of Valencia, far from representing a nation of glorious history like Spain . . . can only appear as the ambassador of anarchy and crime. . . . The constitution of Spanish Law, upon which the Red Government claims to found its legitimacy . . . has been systematically set aside by them.

“Examples of this are: The splitting up of the integral State, as laid down by Article 1 of the Spanish Constitution of 1932—

“Abandonment of the principles of International Law, which had been wisely recognized by Article 7.

“As to Municipalities and Provincial Deputations, they have replaced these elected by vote, and handed over office to hordes of uncontrolled assassins, without fulfilling the constitutional requirements for their election.

“The concession of autonomous statutes to certain regions without the necessary formalities of Article 12 of the Constitution, and granting powers to fictitious organizations in excess of the limits set out in Sections 3, 4, 7 and 12 of that Article.

“Granting of privileges incorrectly described as juridical to act as a licence for brigandage to members of political workers’ organizations, contrary to Article 25.

“Persecution and extermination of the Religious Orders and secular clergy, prohibition of worship, assassination of religious of both sexes . . . contrary to Articles 26 and 27 of the Constitution.

“The monstrous practice of declaring innocent acts to be

punishable and making penal laws retrospective, entrusting their application to popular tribunals and committees functioning secretly, contrary to Article 28.

“Violation of the immutable rights and guarantees of Sections 32, 33, 41 and 42.

“The sanctity of the hearth, as regards private property and artistic wealth and the export of Spain’s artistic treasure . . . contrary to Article 45.

“Despoiling the rural classes, seizing their produce, to the extent of extirpating the herds and flocks, as if they were not included in Article 47 of the Constitution.

“Disappearance of representatives to Parliament in the prisons, and iniquitous torments, which began with the assassination of Calvo Sotelo, immolated for so-called governors, who entrusted this inhuman mission to their agents and troops, contrary to Articles 53, 55 and 56.

“Abandonment of their legislative functions to anarchist committees. . . .

“Suppression of the machinery and system of Parliament and entrusting the sacred function of justice to those proceeding venally in not preventing the mob from assassination of the worthy representatives of the law . . . rendering ineffective Articles 94, and 96 to 106.

“Seizure of the property of banks, gold . . . and goods in their care or under the care of the legal functionaries, contrary to Articles 107 to 120.

“The perpetration of 300,000 assassinations under the presidency of the Government made up of the same men as now appear represented in Valencia; destruction of almost all the churches in their zone; the removal of all the religious; martyrdoms of the cruellest nature inflicted on prisoners and persons arrested, not only in the State prisons, but in private prisons; assaults on embassies and private houses, and murders and attacks upon diplomatic and Consular representatives—in brief, violation of all the natural principles of justice and Rights.

“On the other hand, General Franco has under his jurisdiction two-thirds of the Spanish territory and the whole of the colonies and protectorate and more than half the Spanish population, who are perfectly disciplined and assisting his control and administration.

“In the Nationalist zone individual rights of Spaniards

which are compatible with a state of war are fully maintained, the Church has freedom, and all creeds enjoy respect and consideration; the Army and Navy observe the previous codes and regulations. . . . The State guarantees the internal life of the country and the normal development of the activities of Spaniards and foreigners.

"The tribunals of justice continue under provisional magistrates belonging to the Spanish judicature, and apply the codes and complimentary laws in force before the Movement.

"Economic life . . . taxation . . . agriculture and commerce continue in accordance with the previous juridical laws, and with respect for private property.

"With the social order, the workers are not only maintaining all advances achieved, but also new ones with previous consent of interested parties.

"National Spain also maintains the integrity of its sovereignty, both as to the occupied territory and in respect of international agreements, which the Valencia Government has tried to disregard, and to break the *status quo* of the Mediterranean, offering to foreign countries rights which cannot be ceded (i.e. Morocco and Balearics).

"For these reasons the Government of the Generalissimo puts forward this solemn protest and proclaims before the League of Nations and the honourable opinion of the entire world not only the illegality, but also the illegitimacy of the Red so-called Government of Valencia . . . and aspires rightly to be considered as the only Government representing the Spanish nation."

From the English point of view not the least important point in this statement on the Nationalist position is the question of the Mediterranean. Franco is accused of desiring to "trade" Spanish territory—in particular the Canaries, the Balearic Islands and Morocco—to the Italians and Germans in exchange for their support. Actually, General Franco refused certain overtures made to him upon these lines. He has stood firmly for his original cause in all its entirety, for a Spain, *Una, Libre, Grande*. The charges and suggestions were the usual inversion, for it was the Red Government which offered the territorial and commercial bargains to obtain support from other powers, including Britain. At the time of their biggest outcry—preceding the minor nonsense about Gibraltar—there already existed the offer of the "Govern-

ment ", known to our own Foreign Office, of some of these territories as the price of collusion. The facts were published in *The Times* and other papers.

As regards British policy, though there were many foolish things done and minor errors in piloting the course through the difficult waters, there was only one major policy seriously urged in responsible quarters, to which the strongest exception must be expressed. We refer to the suggestion that what we should aim at was not the defeat of General Franco, but a weak Spain—a Spain exhausted by the struggle. In view of the facts and the cause for which the Nationalists were fighting, such a cold-blooded and cynical suggestion, with the loss of the thousands of lives it implied, can only provoke fierce indignation in any decent person. Yet it was advanced in quite a matter-of-fact manner. We can only hope that it had no influence.

During the course of the Spanish Civil War much has been heard about the danger to our British imperial communications, and genuine alarm aroused in large numbers of people. Dangers unquestionably exist; but it is from the quarter precisely the opposite to that so loudly announced that the greatest danger of all is to be anticipated. (Incidentally there is a strange list of names amongst those concerned with our Mediterranean communications—and in France with the French Mediterranean communications. Many of their names are neither English nor French.)

The appeal is, of course, purely to our material interests: and the reply can therefore be upon the same footing.

If Spain had been won for the Russians and Internationals, and France had gone Bolshevik—it is still on the edge of the precipice—we should have found ourselves ranged, at a not far distant date, against a hostile France and Spain serving the cause of the Internationals, solidly planted across our communications to our Empire in the East. That success by the Communists would afford another base for the attack upon our imperial interests. Not only would our communications be cut, but we might soon find no Empire with which to have communications. That is a far greater danger and a far wider and more important issue. The declared object of these people is the breaking up of our Empire, in the like manner as they used "federalism" in Spain, as Maurin so lucidly explains. And, as Maurin also explains with obvious sincerity

and truth, the final object of the Internationals is a line across Europe from Portugal and Spain through France and Germany to Russia; and when that front is solidly established, everything will be ready for the final assault upon the "capitalist stronghold", England.

The world is standing upon the threshold of big economic and social changes, and England no less than other countries faces many alternatives. She has many advantages, and not the least is that we have the past events in Russia, and Mexico, Germany and Hungary, as a guide; we have the tragedy of Spain and the precarious position of France as a present warning. Abuses exist and must be remedied. A nation with a mortgage of 70% or 80% upon its national wealth in the form of national and municipal debts must pause and think of the consequences, and of the dangers and injustices which that may imply, and—paradoxically?—only the greater if the unpropertied labourer becomes a minority. But in whatever direction we may progress, or evolve, at all events no sane Englishman can wish for a change which will bring in government by such men as are behind the Communist Movement, or for the system, the methods, and the "ideology" which they represent.

CHAPTER XIII

THE WRECKERS AND THE BUILDERS

MUCH of the sympathy which has been extended to the "Government" of Spain has been due to a complete misconception of its legitimacy and its nature. The facts are so completely the reverse of what has been widely broadcast and as widely believed that it is necessary to find an explanation. The only one which appears to fit the case is that there has been a conspiracy of silence, and a systematic, organized campaign of lying to create the substituted picture. These are harsh words, but the reader can judge for himself whether they are not justified.

In the first place, if there was a Government at all, it was a completely Red Government. This was well known to all informed people, and should never have been presented otherwise before the world, no matter what figure-heads may have been used to cloak its real nature. In Spain itself the principal newspapers permitted in the "Government" territory—*El Sol* and *Solidaridad Obrera*—were utterly and aggressively Red, and rejoiced in proclaiming the fact. The chief Government supporters claimed to be Red. Their flag is red. Their symbols were the hammer and sickle and the five-pointed star. The other papers permitted, superficially more moderate, also disclosed their complicity in almost every issue. This fact is obvious to anyone who read the Press from Government territory. The papers told the truth directly and by inference.

In a little booklet, *Why Spain Fights On* (price 6d.), published by the Union of Democratic Control,¹ it is pointed out that in July 1937 220,000 men in the Red army of 520,000—that is to say, two-fifths of the army—were Communists. In addition, it may be gathered from that and similar publications, and the words of Communist authorities like the "Passion Flower" and the organizer of the International

¹ Louis Fischer, with a foreword by Major C. R. Attlee, M.P.

Brigades, M. Marty, that all the regimental units were controlled politically, and in point of fact in every other essential way, by the Commissars appointed to each. These Commissars were, in effect, the Communist controlling agents, though there are a few exceptions like anarchists and so-called "Socialists"—sometimes genuinely so, but generally camouflaged Communists to maintain the "democratic" fiction. The army thus controlled the Government. In case that was not sufficient, the Government depended mainly upon the Soviet for most of its war material, and in particular for its air force, material, pilots and machines. The mere threat by the Russians to cut off supplies has alone been sufficient to control the Government and bring it to heel if it hesitated.

Among the ordinary typical news in the Spanish papers we find, for example in *El Sol*:

"Valencia was, on Saturday, 13th November, 1937, the centre for the meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Amongst the foreigners present were Mr. Robert Minor (North American Communist Party), Galle and Stella (Italy), Franz (Germany), and Monmousseau and Cogniot (France). The Secretary-General of the party was José Diaz. The following were elected Honorary Presidents: Stalin, Dimitrov, Thaelman, Vorochilov, Thorez, André Marty and Vaillant-Couturier. The opening speech was by Sénor Uribe, the Spanish Government Minister of Agriculture, who dealt with the question of the solidarity of the international proletariat."

Jesus Hernandez, Communist Minister of Education in the Spanish Government, and Joan Comorera, of the Catalan Unified "Socialist Party" (so described by their own friends for purposes of camouflage), confirm all this in a pamphlet¹ obtainable from all Left book shops, like *It Can Be Done*, and other works on the progress of Communism, whether in England or elsewhere.

"We, the Communists, demanded the removal of Galarza from the Ministry. . . . We wanted the policy I have just described to you. . . . And the recently formed Government represents this." Galarza was making his position far too much of a personal monopoly. His place had to be taken by an official Stalinite Communist.

¹ Issued under the auspices of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Spain (Spanish section of the Communist International).

The moving force was Red. It was the Red flag which was hoisted on every one of the warships taken over for the Government. The streets were plastered with pictures of Stalin and Lenin. *Viva Rusia* was to be seen on the walls of villages throughout Spain even *before* the rising. The predominant literature and films were Russian, and even loud speakers have been employed to "educate" the populace to Russian ideals. To quote one of their own accounts by Ilya Ehrenbourg: "On the 19th July, the column marched forth. . . . Red rosettes adorn all the bayonets." The men in control were like the chief of the arsenal he describes, not just theoretical Communists with national ideas. There are none. "I have been a member of the party for fourteen years," he explained. Or men like Tito Gerassi who, as he states, left for the front in Spain, from wherever he was living, "on the ver}' first day of the Civil Wär They are members of the professed world-organized militant party of the Third International.

There are huge numbers of men masquerading as Spanish to-day. Many are merely recruits; many are Communist official agents. There are many German and other Jews. The origins of large numbers are lost in obscurity. In Spain all this probably comes under the Minister of the Interior. In September 1937 the French police arrested no less than thirty-one agents and sellers of false passports, and stated that in France over 60,000 false passports were still known to be in circulation, in spite of the big clean-up. Even "diplomatic passports" were issued by the thousand. On the 27th September five Poles were arrested in connection with this remunerative traffic.

Now, let us turn to those whose names were more freely disclosed, principally the Spanish agents of the International organization, or appointed as their tools and assistants.

In his broadcasting from Seville, General Queipo de Llano was always referring to this "Government of criminals"; this was one of the reasons why the friends of the Communists hated him so. He was seldom quoted, though occasionally misquoted. In England this description he habitually used was regarded as vulgar abuse. But let us take a few cases to illustrate the kind of men who were at the head of affairs, presumably appointed by the other Ministers and "authorities" as fit and proper colleagues and associates

José García Oliver was the Minister of Justice. He had been serving a life sentence when he was called upon to take office. Presumably he was able to get his own back. He is said to have produced a very fine code of laws. We suspect that, if this be true, it must have been "lifted; but, in any case, this is quite immaterial, for it was not applied. For operative "justice" is administered by the secret police and the Chkcas such as those who assassinated Andres Nin and the hundreds of other Marxists whose "ideologies" were tinged with "heresy".

Another Minister, regarded by Jesus Hernandez, Communist Minister of Education, and Joan Comorera, Secretary of the P.S.U.C., as far too moderate in his treatment of the Fifth Column, was running a private jail in Madrid for the extortion of blackmail and ransom money. His chief assistant, well worthy of the post, was none other than an individual who was in jail at the outbreak of the revolution in connection with a hold-up of the Banco Hispano-American in Madrid. He had been the gang's chauffeur.

That distinguished office, the Directorship of Public Security, was entrusted to a gentleman who before the war had been a corporal in the Customs Guard, degraded for smuggling. To grace the new position they made him Colonel. General Queipo de Llano said he shuddered to think what that gentleman would have to perpetrate to qualify for the rank of General.

There were many other important local and judicial posts to be filled. One of them was the important office of the Fiscal, or Attorney-General of Barcelona. This gentleman was very nearly prevented from taking up his post through an oversight, for on the very day he took office he had been cited to appear in the afternoon before the court on a charge of pick-pocketing. He was, however, just in time to quash the proceedings in his capacity of prosecutor. He had also been convicted previously in several countries of forgery⁷, false pretences and theft. His long police record can be checked even from the files of Montevideo.

Education, too, was one of the great cares of the Red Republican Government. They have made great publicity about it, particularly to *Daily Herald* special correspondents. They appointed as Rector of Barcelona University a student

agitator named Sbert, whose proud record was the unique one of failing in *every* examination for which he had sat. For this reason he was known as the "perpetual student". However, for teaching to young children (of both sexes) songs about dynamiting the Government, and the rest of the "ideology", the curriculum is probably rather an unusual one, and demands different qualifications from those to which we are accustomed.

Naturally there was no Minister of Religion. There was a Minister of Education whose functions, no doubt, largely replaced those of the old Ministry of Grace and Culture. His chief job is to inculcate the "ideology". It is hard to say whether it should have come from him, or from the Minister of Justice, to speak at a meeting presided over by the Minister of Propaganda, on the subject of prostitution. The view taken was that this should not be punished, but legally organized.¹

Apart from the better-known blackguards in high Army posts, the ordinary less-known military officers were, as we have stated, mostly those who had been punished by the Military Boards of Honour, or newly imported and highly paid foreigners and international revolutionaries.

All these people were appointed with the knowledge, and presumably concurrence, of those great statesmen with whose names the ordinary readers of the English Press are more familiar—Azaña, Prieto, Negrín, Company's, etc. True, there was some slight mention in the Press of that little matter of the oil contract when Prieto took office; and Azaña seems at one time to have had an awkward check in his early career. Still, the little band has been clothed with an air of the greatest respectability. How comes it, then, that they have selected for their principal posts men equivalent to the inmates of Wormwood Scrubs and Dartmoor—Ministers of Justice, Ministers of Home Affairs, Chiefs of Police and the high posts of the Army, not forgetting the A.S.C. and the Supply Services, where the people's money requires such careful handling? Yet this is, without any exaggeration, precisely what occurred.

Not that all of them were dishonest. Some of them were so fanatical that they would not only renounce their oppor-

¹ Arnold Lunn, *Spanish Rehearsal*, p. 204.

tunities, but destroy other people's resources for the sake of their principles. Araquistain, for example, the Red Ambassador at Paris, was announced in the French Press as declaring that if "the Government" were defeated, rather than see any of the Spanish gold reserve fall into the hands of the Nationalist Government, they (the Reds) would throw it all into the sea! We, therefore, have little hope that any of this £150,000,000 reserve will ever be recovered, even if the Government intended to take every precaution to preserve this patrimony of the nation, as was ambiguously declared in one of their "semi-official" notes.

Over the nature of these men at the head of affairs in Red Spain the Propaganda Bureau has been able to draw a veil which all the ingenuity of our red-hot news-hawks has not pierced. And the same policy of the veil has also been remarkably successful as to the purely Communist nature of the Government. The "Liberals" and "Moderates" that have been incorporated in the Cabinets have merely been put there as a blind which has deceived even authorities and led them to speak of them, in tones of the deepest respect, as a democratic government, or at least as "having become more moderate".

It is the proclaimed basis of the Communist doctrine that they are to build an entirely new order of things, and to do so they are determined first of all to destroy the existing order. And by that they mean the moral outlook, the ordinary accepted standards, as the key basis of the principles governing our everyday lives, derived from the development of our legal codes and the teachings of the Churches. Let us see how the application of this theory was made.

We have lifted a corner of the curtain to show what the Nationalists found when they recaptured the provinces of Santander, Asturias, Guadalajara and Malaga. The same thing was true also of Valencia, Catalonia, Jaen¹ and practically every province in Red Spain. You cannot train the most ignorant elements of the population to hate the very thought of religion, to adopt as a creed the extermination of all who prefer to disagree with them, all in posts of authority, and all who are employers, and then fan their passions deliberately with pre-

¹ In Jacn was one exception so far already known: when the village of Porcuna was taken, it was found that the inhabitants had driven out the Marxists and prevented them from carrying out their purpose.

pared lies, without the logical and intended results, which, in fact, occurred in Spain. It is not too much to say that, to ensure the thorough liquidation of enemies, "Officials" were deliberately recruited from the lowest dregs of the population—such men as the great "General" Durruti, or Garrido, the pick-pocket and murderer, and the many similar "heroes" in charge of the Columns. Such regiments as the infamous Battalion of Crime, whose exploits at Sigienza we have described, or the "Iron Column" were not unique exceptions. As has been mentioned, the whole 40,000 inhabitants of Spain's jails were armed, and the crime battalions marched through Madrid triumphantly. It was from such people they recruited the infamous patrols, used as police and for the degradation and recruitment of others of the militia—the ordinary average working man who, under good leadership, would have behaved as did most of his fellows in Nationalist territories.

In England we have been presented with a completely false picture of the nature of the "legitimate Government". The names of the high offices they held were made to clothe them with a dignity and respectability which they did not possess. It may sound impressive to hear a man described as "the mayor", but less so if you know that he was a local criminal or the official head of the Communist cell. And the majority of them were of this description.

In conservative England, as Mr. Douglas Jerrold has said, they preached the "legitimate Government" to obtain sympathy; in France they preached the French Revolution. The nature of the Government was concealed precisely for this very reason, viz., that had the facts been widely known—such facts as the Press usually delight to publish with large headlines—even a "legitimate Government" could have had little sympathy in England.

Destruction of morality was part of the attack upon the family. If the facts were not so overwhelming, the truth would seem incredible. The thousands of Basque children who were taken from their families, largely under false pretences and through false stories of National atrocities, and sent to England, France, Mexico and Russia, served a wider purpose than mere propaganda. Whatever may have happened with those sent to England, in most cases elsewhere it was to remove them from parental influences that they might be trained as

future Communists and agents. And many were orphans whose parents the Reds had assassinated.

So too with certain other ideas and standards which even in England are being subjected to attack. In Russia, according to the figures published by the Commissariat of Public Health (what irony!), there were the following interesting figures for 1934:

1934			
In the towns	Births	573-593	
	Abortions	374-935	
In the villages	Births	242,979	
	Abortions	324,194	
In Moscow	Births	57. ¹⁰⁰	
	Abortions	i54.5 ⁸⁴	
1935			
In Moscow	Births	70,000	
	Abortions	155,000	

After these interesting social and political experiments which had the above dreadful results, there has been somewhat of a reaction. The figures are now said to be less striking. The "destruction" was done. Perhaps they might now rebuild on a "new revolutionary foundation". Is it a coincidence that in 1938 the Red Barcelona authorities voted 100,000 pesetas to be set aside for an abortion service in the town? We do not think so.

It is curious how many of the extreme Left writers have curious ideas on such subjects, though naturally their political and moral views are not always necessarily connected.

Let us give also two scenes described by Monsieur Yves Dautun as regards the Valencia district.

In Valencia there was a great Frenchman named Monsieur Charbonnicr who spent his time trying to save the lives of members of the French Colony and watching their interests. He hunted up those arrested, and aided by the French Consulate, he did his best to try and obtain their release by using the threat of international complications or the undesirability of alienating French opinion. Poor Charbonnicr went mad as a result of his experiences.

With M. Charbonnier, M. Dautun,¹ on the day before his own arrest, visited a prison to inquire after some French nuns.

"The warder banged the door noisily, apparently on purpose. I saw a number of figures of men leave some of the cells. 'They are the guards,' said our guide. . . .

"'Are there many nuns here, Comrade?' asked Charbonnier.

"'Yes,' said the warder, 'two hundred, and only some twenty wives of "Fascists".'

"'I would like to see the French ones,' said Charbonnier. . . .

"I approached the grilles to the door of the cell. Two unfortunate women were there on their knees on the straw mattress. The elder was deathly pale and in the attitude of a saint. She was praying. The younger was bathed in tears. Her right hand was bound with a piece of blood-stained linen; and, above her head, the white wall was marked with a scarlet cross.

"The warder began to shout, 'There they are, at it again. Would you believe it, these fools will even bite themselves until they bleed in order with their wounded hand to mark up the sign of their God upon the walls.'

"Charbonnier turned to him coldly, 'Try and see they are cured soon, for the Consul will be arranging their embarkation in a few days to take them back to France. What would the officers say if they saw them in this state?' And through the grille he said, 'Courage, my sisters, you are not forgotten . . . you are French and no harm will come to you . . . you will be free and home again soon.'

"The elder of the two replied, 'Oh, God! Thy will be done.' "

When Dautun got back to France he saw Camille Chautemps, then Minister of State, "the real chief of our diplomacy, to whom we owe it, despite the infamous Monsieur Blum and his Communist allies, that we have not been dragged into the terrible adventure of intervention. M. Chautemps acted promptly, and several days after seeing me arranged for the nomination of a Charge d'Affaires at Valencia, and thus

¹ Yves Dautun, *Valence sous la Bolte Rouge*.



ON THE HUESCA FRONT, UPPER ARAGON

I, acini' page 418



by giving the Consulate the rank of a Legation was able to provide it with the rights and privileges of extra-territoriality."

Dautun later visited the hospital to see Charbonnier's adopted daughter who was dying of typhoid. The typhoid in Valencia was largely because they did not spare petrol for all the bodies.

"A dreadful row came from the other end of the corridor. A band of militia advanced with accordions, bugles and mandolins. . . . They entered the women's ward where some fifty patients were. . . . Soon there was a diabolical rumba . . . and I will never forget the awful spectacle. . . . Soon they were joined by the nurses, their eyes heavy with sleep. . . . The ball followed, and the orgy.

"I drew back and leant against the wall of the gallery. Charbonnier was near me, with a calmness that disconcerted me. He raised his shoulders and softly he laughed, 'But, my dear friend, it is like this every night. . . .'

"On the following day in this hospital his little adopted daughter died."

In most of the other parts of Spain the same sort of thing was encouraged deliberately. The object was to break down the habit of mind which civilization had given most of the people—to destroy all idea of discipline and self-control, and to break down the idea of the family. Mr. Langdon Davies in his book *Behind the Spanish Barricades* describes the proceedings at a meeting of the C.N.T. at Zaragoza: "They passed a resolution that if anyone, male or female, chanced to rouse the sexual feelings of another, it amounted to a gross and palpable interference with the freedom and happiness of that other unless the guilty person was prepared to relieve the feelings he or she had produced. They, therefore, carried with acclamation the proposition that such a person if they refused to alleviate the suffering they had imposed on another by rousing sexual feeling, must be exiled from the town or village where they resided for a period long enough for all fires to be quenched."

The results were what they intended, and they were produced largely as a result of the tremendous importation of pornographic literature.

As so often happened the Marxists defeated themselves in this. It is true they broke down the previous habitual discipline, but they could not regain it, and this adversely affected

their military value. And, in addition, we understand from a number of informants that the "miliciennes" caused probably more casualties through venereal disease in the ranks of the Red army than were caused by bullets in the firing line. The volume of evidence for this is convincing. It is recorded by Marcel Du trey in respect of Malaga province; by Knob-laugh as regards the conditions generally; and an inquiry from doctors in territory liberated will confirm the state of affairs.

As regards what has happened to religion in the country, one might have thought it was sufficient to point to the 15,000 odd clergy and religious who were murdered; or to the churches destroyed or profaned and used as stables or for baser purposes, not in one place, but persistently—Tcruel, Malaga, Santander, even in Vizcaya among the "Catholic Basques", practically everywhere.

We are assured that the uncontrollables no longer have power (cf. Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons, October 1937), but we are not so sure, for we have read from *El Diluvio*, the organ of the comparatively "moderate" Government statesman, Martinez Barrio, "We have destroyed the rats of the confessional in their entirety." And that was in January 1938.

As regards respect for life, earlier chapters are sufficient indication of the real position. In spite of the propaganda the word "Madrid" will not stand in history as the scene of "Fascist terrorism" by bombing, but as the Communist charnel house. The Communists cry out that their ardent supporters are to be placed in concentration camps. Most of Franco's prisoners are at liberty; many of them fighting for him; proven criminals are being executed; the residue will probably have to be in concentration camps. Even if it proves a big one, it is better to have a large concentration camp, with the hope that time may undo the creed of hate in the minds of its inmates, than a vast cemetery such as the Communists created by their "liquidations".

Not only has there been no respect for human life, but never has there been such unspeakable cruelty in the treatment of victims. And not only of the victims, but even of their relatives. It is only when one has learnt the character of the people who inspired these things that one can see the real object which otherwise one would not credit. For example,

M. Charbonnier also drove M. Yves Dautun to see the famous Saler, some few miles south of Valencia. He tells us what he saw:

"We followed the sandy road, under the twisted pines . . . at the foot of each tree was a motionless corpse face downwards. André Charbonnier went from body to body looking for identification . . . every face had been destroyed as if it were an over-ripe pomegranate. We counted over a hundred.

"On the beach we saw nearly as many. The sea had already covered some of them.

"Those in the wood were killed last night upright with a bullet from behind the head . . . rendering them for ever unrecognizable. . . . The others were taken here, turned loose as "free", and chased and shot down like animals. . . . It is like that every night.' "

On the next day the police sent for Dautun. He had sent no reports, but he had seen too much. The sequel is told in our next chapter. It is only because these stories were steadily boycotted in England that the people of England had their opinions for so long, and to so great an extent, moulded to sympathize with the perpetrators.

In some places unquestionably the destruction of the identity of the victim was deliberate, and it raises the suspicion, amounting to almost a certainty, that it was done with a view to disguising the real names, and so the number, of the victims, no less than to spread terror from the very fact of the uncertainty. For example, when prisoners were transferred from various jails, including the big removal that took place in Madrid, and the prisoners mostly failed to reach their destinations, the few that survived were given numbers. We know several cases of people who still hope that their relatives who were once imprisoned may be alive amongst the few that survive; yet they have no means of knowing for certain. These methods came from Russia; and from what one knows of events in that country, it does not surprise us, for the same brains have inspired both.

As for the boasted justice, it was reported even in our Press that the private jails in Barcelona and Valencia—and they were only some of many—had to be discussed in Parliament in Barcelona. The evil was too widespread merely for the police to deal with the matter. The fact is that this suppression was the result of lack of discrimination by the owners of

these jails, for they started imprisoning Government supporters, and that was going too far. The work of exterminating, ransoming and terrorizing "Fascists"—and even Marxist heretics like the P.O.U.M.—had to be brought under a stricter Government control.

It may be thought that we have been mildly exaggerating. That is not so. Most readers will remember what happened to Russia in 1917, and after. What happened in country after country since then. The kind of government in Russia in 1937 and 1938 is not reassuring. We know the methods used, and we know the text-book methods the Marxists advocated, and advocate, for other countries. Even before 1931 the whole of the scheme to attack Spain and the evidence of the preparation and of the attack in progress was reported from time to time in *The Times*. Throughout the life of the Republic attention was called to the progress of the later stages and finally the imminence of the decisive thrust. Why, then, should there be surprise when the blow actually fell? Or that it followed the expected lines?

As late as February 10th, 1938, at last we have again a hint from a special correspondent: "Deep shadows fall across the picture. On December 15th last the Home Minister ... set up a Council for the defence of the regime and persecution of adversaries. . . . The Council, empowered to act secretly, to imprison and arrest without any judiciary control, is in all but name a Cheka. The difference between a governmental and a union Cheka is immaterial. Is the era of clandestine action, which everyone hoped yvas past for ever, to re-open? . . . Suspicions that Communistic Chekas survive in the provinces re-awaken. *These dark features strengthen the evidence supporting the theory that unhappy Spain is caught in the toils of a vast Communist plot.*"¹

The suggestion of the possibility of a vast Communist plot refers, of course, to an obvious fact. Although it took nearly two years of war before the truth yvas clearly proclaimed, the confirmation is set out in the issue of *The Times*, 3rd May, 1938. The corollary may one day follow—a frank exposition in detail of methods employed by these Internationals in the execution of their scheme and a recognition of hoyv they were experienced in Spain, and previously elsewhere.

¹ *The Times*, 10th February, 1938. The wording of the dispatch of June 2nd, 1932, quoted by us in Chapter V (p. 113) is almost identical.

The Times Riga correspondent's article contains the following truths:

"The Comintern, described in its official organ as the 'General Staff of World Revolution', has been very busy . . . and is changing rôles, not for the first time, with the Moscow Foreign Office. . . ."

"The new Soviet diplomacy forced the Comintern into a relatively furtive existence of masked activity, which led in 1934 to the *crowning shame*¹ of having to condone, approve and explain the entry of Soviet Russia into the League of Nations. . . ."

"This Congress (the Seventh World Congress of August 1935) had accepted instructions to discard the word 'war' . . . in favour of the word 'peace'. . . . The word 'socialism' was also adopted for use in public . . . in preference to the words 'Communism' and Bolshevism."

"The * mass struggle against war must now be linked with reliance on State help from the Soviet Union and its mighty Red army' and operations in the different countries would henceforth be directed through the Communists of those countries."

The idea of war was to be turned into "civil war against the *bourgeoisie*".

"Paris had already been made the European centre of the Comintern. . . . With Paris as its *point d'appui*, the Comintern engineered the outbreak of the Civil War in Spain."

In France, "the *front populaire* . . . has not yet¹ produced open¹ civil war. . . . France has been *kept*¹ in a constant state of turmoil."

The article also refers to Communist activity from time to time in Germany and Japan, Italy, France, Spain, Austria, among the Arabs, in India, China, Poland, Finland, the Baltic States, and the world generally. Strangely, there is no reference to Mexico, though British oil interests seemed recently to have been affected there through the Communist activities.

The Times' leading article of the same date says: "The international class war goes on"; it refers to "the Comintern, converted into an instrument in the hand of M. Stalin", and to the Communist "frank disregard of the conventional canons of international morality for which it is necessary to go back to Machiavelli for a parallel.

¹ Our italics.

"Disorder ... is itself an omen of hope and war is to be welcomed. . . . Their (the Barcelona Government's) mentors in Moscow have already claimed the instigation of the Civil War as a triumph of their own subversive diplomacy. . . .

"The steps to the compulsory millennium are four in number: the first is the 'United Front'; the second, strikes and disorders'; the third, civil war; and the fourth, Soviet Government.

"There is no reason for England to expect immunity."

These articles in *The Times* in May 1938 were the greatest service that paper could have afforded to Nationalist Spain, to our own country, and to the world in general. And we diffidently suggest that there is not a single sentiment in them that is not expressed in these pages, illustrated by specific examples, and supported by the most cogent evidence.

Knowing the record of what happened in Spain, it was pleasant to read in an article in the *Daily Express* that when the anarchists, much nicer fellows, committed murders, "they were done without hate". In Barbastro the murders done without hate by anarchists, or without that possible qualification by the local Cheka, reached the figure of two hundred per day at one time. That was in one of the smaller towns of upper Aragon, liberated in March 1938.

When one goes through this awful record of what the Communists have done in Spain and tries to find the basis of their "ideology", one discovers the curious fact that there has been a methodical inversion of every one of the Ten Commandments.

A curious word, this recently fashionable "ideology". Somehow we feel it must have been popularized to fit cases where the use of the word "ideals" might have provoked ironic laughter. One would not discuss the ideals of Marxist Communism with the history of Russia and with their textbooks in mind; but one might refer, with less chance of derision, to the ideologies of Mr. Charles Peace or Dr. Crippen.

The direction and intention of the Marxists in Spain are clearly shown to have been atheistic. Blasphemy is encouraged. The family and parental discipline and authority is attacked. There is a complete contempt for the truth. There is a complete disregard for human life. Morality is methodically undermined. Respect for property is a thing of the past. The masses are taught to covet their neighbour's wife and his

goods. Admittedly they aim at a day of rest, but hardly to keep holy the Sabbath Day. Usually they change the number of days in the "week" to get rid of any such suggestion. Finally one would hardly suggest that they have preached the complementary commandment "Love thy neighbour as thyself." One is almost inclined seriously to apply to them and their "ideological" friends Matthew xxv. 41: "And He said to those on the Left: 'Depart from me, ye cursed, into the everlasting fires which are prepared for the devil and his angels.'"

The task which faces Franco and the Nationalists is the rebuilding of Spain. In this vast task the most important part by far is the moral and spiritual reconstruction of the country.

We prophesy that in undertaking this they will exercise a very strong Press censorship and control. They will, therefore, be described in our Press as unliberal, reactionary and repressive in their dealings with a number of papers, and probably authors. We can almost forecast in detail the nature of the protests that will be launched against the measures they will take to control the output of local and imported literature. But it is inevitable. The evil that has been done has been largely the fruit of propaganda and vast expenditure upon authors and agitators. It will require a vast propaganda to undo their work. And in our view the necessity could not be greater.

They have many other tasks, for there has been a ruination of the industries and production of the country which will take very many years to remedy.

Let us take one example from the *Campo Libre* of 20th November, 1937, the weekly anarchist agrarian journal:

"With an almost suicidal disregard, the country labourer is being despoiled of everything indispensable to him for properly carrying on his work—transport, cattle, assistance. He is being deprived of everything. By reason of this, it has not been possible this year to deliver manure to the majority of villages. . . . When we have been able to inquire, the reply we received from the majority of the villages has been, 'Do not send it because we have already sown our seed.' Failure to manure the ground will mean a heavily reduced crop."

We described at some length what was found in Malaga.

The kind of "economics" which were put into practice in Asturias can be guessed. There is not space to give the details; we will only say they were even more thorough Marxists in that part of the country.

The collectivist' organization, the C.L.U.E.R., has also played havoc in the orange-growing industry; we refer to the details given by Dr. Franz Borkenau upon this subject; but it is an open secret and has been frequently referred to, with full details, in the Nationalist Press.

As to economics, we may take it that the gold reserve has gone; an effort might be made to recover it on legal grounds, but we doubt its success. All the old Nationalist notes were taken out and negotiated, where possible, to help to destroy the Nationalist currency, just as they were destroying their own. They forged money for the same purpose. Yet their own notes fell to one-tenth of the value of the Nationalists, though the latter had no gold reserve. One of General Queipo de Llano's jests was that you no longer heard the slogan "*No pasaran!*"—"They shall not pass!"—in the front line any more. It was only used by the civilian rearguard as a name for the new notes issued by the Government. The Nationalists maintained almost the same total of notes in circulation throughout the war as there was, area for area, at the commencement.

The Nationalists have developed their factories and their industries until finally they could produce practically the whole of their war materials except internal combustion engines. The Government, with the principal factories, were inherently incapable of obtaining full output, as a legacy of the doctrines which hoisted them into power. Spain will have to get along without her gold reserve. Perhaps it may have one good result: if the Nationalist Government continues to govern wisely, it should help to force the country to maintain an even or favourable balance of trade.

The principles of justice will have to be re-inculcated. Is this perhaps the reason why the friends of the Communists so dislike Franco's courts of justice? Is it even possible that it is the danger to the lives of their friends which has provoked their solicitude? As so often in Spanish history since 1931, the punishment evokes so much more clamour than the crime.

It is the task of the Nationalists to govern by the maintenance of just order, in place of by terror. It is their aim to

substitute the Christian doctrines in place of the creed of hatred. With this in view, they have undertaken two great works in the liberated territories. One is the "Auxilio Social" for the relief of distress; the other is the great housing schemes, such as General de Llano has carried through in so astonishing a manner in Seville.

In education they are determined that no knowledge shall be imparted without morality, no science without ethics. Their draft decrees already cover this scheme, and are being-put into operation. Are they not here going right to the root of the whole trouble?

The Nationalist programme aims at work and thrift as civic duties. They preach it little, but the measures they take are designed to encourage those virtues. Under the late Republic these virtues were preached much, in a nebulous manner, whilst in practice everything tended in the opposite direction. In Spain, and perhaps in other countries too, it is a very great mistake to have a parliamentary system of a kind which brings into power those who promise most, whether the promises can be fulfilled or not, as their means of climbing to positions of political prominence where they earn a living from politics as a career.

There is one curious feature in this war. There is, of course, no doubt about the feeling against General Franco which the Marxists have tried to work up in their Press. The cartoons to be seen in their papers—and even in some of the English ones—leave no doubt of this. But they seem not to have found a single serious charge to level against his personal character or even his measures. And herein lies one of the greatest hopes of reconstruction. It is the man—or the men—which eventually determines the nature of a country's government. Every system has some sort of weakness. It is the executive which matters. Franco appointed a First Council of fifty people to preside over the nation's administrative machinery. It consisted mainly of civilians, one or two military, and several women, including the mother of José Antonio Primo de Rivera. At first sight it was difficult to find the distinguishing note that was common to them all; but on examination it could be seen that they were all ordinary, decent citizens, as the lowest common denominator. The key was the personal character of the people selected. There was not one of them whose name had ever been associated in any

way with graft or shady business transactions, or who was not respected. And, perhaps, after all, that is not such a bad foundation upon which to build.

In the Nationalist areas there is no greater insult than to suggest to a man that he might be a Marxist. He has seen Marxism in operation under his own eyes. He has experienced all its evils at first hand. By reaction, he is even a better man than ever he was before. It is *that* which, from the day the forces were ranged against each other in Spain, has made it impossible to hope for any kind of reconciliation. No chicanery or pressure used by the Reds in Spain or other countries could bring it about. The moral difference was profound, and to the Spaniard it was, therefore, all-important. Only the complete victory of one side or the other could bring the conflict to a close. For, rather than submit to government and control by men of the Communist "ideology", the Nationalists would die, as they have done, in their thousands. Perhaps one of the most cruel ironies ever uttered was the suggestion that "ever)- endeavour ought to be made" to bring to an end this struggle "which is *morally* ruining the nation".

CHAPTER XIV

THE FICTION FACTORY

WE have shown that Spain was the victim of a vast Communist plot, inspired and controlled by continental Freemasons, largely Jewish, and international agitators, working with certain Spaniards as their tools and assistants, to establish a world domination for the Comintern, which at present is identified with Stalin and Russia. How is it that the sensational truth about the causes of this "civil war" has not been disclosed in the British Press? The answer is that those directing this scheme knew that if their plan, and its real nature, were fully appreciated, they would meet with strong opposition both in England and elsewhere in the world. It was therefore essential to disguise the facts in every possible way. For Spain, important though it was, was merely the first stage towards world domination.

These would-be world-conquerors have met with astounding success. Those who have been able closely to follow the facts of this war have often despaired at the difficulty of obtaining publicity for them, and have marvelled at the impertinence of the methods, the steady *suppressio veri*, the barefaced falsehood which has been a constant feature of the daily news. The causes of the war have been misrepresented, the conditions in the respective zones of control, the conduct of the two parties, and the progress of the military operations. Anything possible has been done to blacken the Nationalists and their cause, and to extol the virtues of the Communist-controlled "Government", to cover up the dreadful record of the Reds, their crimes and the diabolic nature of their methods.

To achieve this every conceivable means has been used. Every influence they have openly controlled, like Russia and Mexico, every less patent influence, as in France and the League of Nations, every secret influence which they possessed within all the nations has been exerted to the full. Their

methods have been utterly unscrupulous, unbelievably cynical. Every form of bribery, political or merely hard cash, and every kind of blackmail, have been employed.

The development of their machinery of propaganda was not sudden. It has been the creation of many years of work, of infiltration, of "peaceful penetration". For years it has been operating silently, preparing the ground, and probably its nature would not now have become so evident if the probability of defeat had not provoked indiscretions and caused the adoption of counsels of despair.

At first it was necessary to misrepresent what had been happening in Spain for many years past, and, thus, the real causes of the war. Then to cover their awful record and its inspiration. Next, to stimulate recruiting and to gain support by creating the impression that they were bound to win. Then, faced by the spectre of defeat, they had to suppress the truth whilst a last desperate effort was made to keep the recruiting going and to maintain their prestige, in the hope of a last-minute reprieve, an arbitration, a truce, a reconciliation by outside pressure with those who could never willingly consent to it. That was the period of the "stalemate" slogans. And finally came the great effort to provoke an international war to "save face" before the world and to create the consequent conditions which they hold favourable for the spread and growth of their doctrines. War among the nations *for its own sake* is part of their policy.

In Chapter XII we have indicated some of the local machinery¹ by quotation from André Marty. Mr. H. E. Knoblaugh, an experienced and observant journalist, confirms the boast:

"Money was no object . . . crews of foreign experts were engaged. . . .

"Typewriters, mimeographing machines and printing presses began the laborious task of moulding public opinion abroad and at home."¹ As he says, the first job was to remove the odium attaching to the Government for "the long series of violent and ruthless acts which had preceded the war and the merciless liquidations of non-combatants which followed it." . . ." One had only to watch the American newspapers to see how successful the campaign was." We can confirm this as regards other countries than America.

¹ Knoblaugh, *Correspondent in Spain*, p. 170 *ct seq.*

"A Ministry of Propaganda was created. . . . Reams of copy, every word of which is carefully weighted for its possible effect, are turned out by alternate crews of trained writers. . . ."

"Mailing clerks work at long tables wrapping into packages the written, drawn and photographic propaganda destined for use abroad."

"The first effort . . . was a rather crude stunt staged for the purpose of counteracting the deluge of unfavourable publicity attending the Loyalist liquidation. The French correspondent who invented the Badajoz bull-ring massacre, a story which had been picked up by other correspondents and published the world over before English investigators proclaimed it a hoax, unwittingly inspired the new venture."¹

We recommend the whole of this chapter of Mr. Knoblaugh's book, for he goes on to give illustrations and proofs of the working of this machine which we too can vouch for and have seen for ourselves. This book is objectively written by a man who had worked for four years in Spain, and his descriptions of the conditions and the Reds' methods are at first hand.

Let us analyse the machinery of the fiction factory and its work in the names of "democracy", "liberty" and "justice", and so forth. It has been logically developed, and it has three obvious rules:

1. To deny the facts, and to misrepresent the initial causes and subsequent events.
2. To justify by the use of "slogans" whatever facts or incidents escape through this smoke-screen.
3. To accuse the enemy of those crimes which they themselves had committed, so that, at the worst, the specious cry of "It's the same both sides" will divert sympathy from their victims.

The system is the historic instruction of Voltaire. "One must lie like the devil. Not timidly, not for a time only, but boldly and always." In fact, fulfil the Marxist inverted Commandment, "Thou shalt bear false witness." The technique of doing so convincingly has been highly developed. The chief methods are (1) the impertinent reiteration of false state-

* See the letters from Mr. W. F. Titterton, Mr. Robert Sencourt and Mr. Andrew Rothstein in the *Daily Telegraph*, early 1938. The two former corroborate Mr. Knoblaugh.

merits, even after they have been disproved. Obviously for this you need "superiority-of-fire"—the volume of willing assistance. (2) Methodical inversion of incidents, conditions and information. (3) Exploitation of local prejudices and bigotry. (4) Appeals to political or "strategic" arguments. (5) Enlistment of the aid of persons or firms, not of Communist "ideology", by putting business in their way on a "short-view basis". (6) Either roundabout or direct bribery, and its inevitable sequel, blackmail, for the victim thus harnessed to the machine. (7) For the ordinary uncritical person with a kind heart, there is a separate technique. Their humanitarian and noble principles are echoed and surpassed, their indignation stirred till they cannot see reason or detect the lies. The fiction editors know exactly the right moment to pull out the *vox humana* of "bombed (Red) babies", "open (Red) towns" and the rascally sinking of "British" ships. All the failures in the field were disguised, failures made victories, and victories invented; the unending political strife behind the lines was camouflaged; and not only have the atrocities been covered up and ignored, but even the most bloody and satanic religious persecution ever known was refuted by the "evidence" of prominent clerics from England who, on official advice, found it safer to leave their clerical collars behind.¹ How the Reds must despise those "churchmen". For there is, as Mr. Lunn points out, "nothing left to persecute".

The head reader of one of the best-known London newspapers, on hearing that we were engaged on writing this book, requested us earnestly to deal thoroughly with this subject: "In all my long experience as a reader to the press I have never known so much deliberate lying. It has been an insult to our profession, and a tragedy to journalism that such stuff has been allowed print."

"Since last July", wrote Mr. Arthur Bryant early last year (1937), "some 350,000 non-combatant men, women and children, living helplessly in that corner of the Iberian Peninsula subject to the rule of what is euphemistically called the Valencia Government, have been butchered in cold blood under conditions of indescribable horror." Did this fill the front pages of our Press? Or was it Guernica and Badajoz and Madrid bombings?

Not that the Red massacres are completely denied—that

¹ Arnold Lunn, *Spanish Rehearsal*, p. 221.

would be impossible: but even so—"it was the same both sides" or better still the cynical cry of Jean-Richard Bloch, a French citizen:

"Plus vous me parlerez des 'massacres rouges', plus je vous dirai, le cœur serré et l'esprit net: 'ces horreurs justement prouvent à quel point il 'était temps'."¹ One can imagine the head of the local Cheka in Madrid speaking to Comrade Moses Rosenberg: "What about a bit more proof, Marcel? Say, another 10,000 'Fascists' next week? That ought to show 'em how necessary it was."

To demonstrate the weight of the Communist propaganda, during August, September and October of 1936, when the Red excesses were at their height, the prevailing opinion in Great Britain was that the whole of Spain "was an inferno"; yet people who visited the Nationalist territory during those months or who lived there will testify almost without exception—and the "almost" is very important—that this description was utterly false as applied to those areas. This suggestion was based partly upon deliberately false statements designed to cover up the popular horror which the Red excesses would necessarily provoke. Sometimes statements to this effect were also made in good faith by people who knew only the Red zone, and who believed the propaganda which the Government machine was using to fan the "revolutionary zeal" of the Red militia. But why could those who knew Nationalist Spain at this time obtain so little hearing? It was almost impossible. The "authorities" were nearly all strangers to that country and their views were preferred. The public in England naturally accepted as correct the picture presented to them. News space in the papers devoted to Spanish news, even in the most reputable papers, was derived almost entirely from Red sources and Red territory, or rumours from the frontiers where the Red agents abounded. Ninety per cent was by no means unusual; in some papers it was 100%. One of the very few exceptions was the *Daily Mail* amongst the dailies, and the *Observer* amongst the weeklies. The newspaper files speak for themselves. *That* is what made possible the great smoke-screen of the Communist-inspired propaganda on Spain, and the consequent moulding of public opinion in this country in favour of the cause of the Communist International.

ⁱ Bloch, *Espagne! Espagne!*, Introduction

This was undoubtedly due, in part, to ignorance and credulity on the part of many foreign news editors and selectors of news. But that does not explain everything. For if in business you find a man is consistently lying or deceiving you, you do not do business with him; and with newspapers that are honourably run, where they find that news from a certain source is false, they ought not to give to future news from that same source preference over news from other sources, least of all where the latter are shown to be consistently correct. If they *do* continue to give the false news 90% of their space, and huge headlines, and base leading articles upon it, one may be excused for suspecting collusion somewhere.


Where a paper finds it has been deceived and genuinely remedies the position, that is very different; it is even a proof of its soundness in essentials. *The Times*, for example, became a ver} different paper about a month after the exposure of the Guernica swindle: the reports from Spain, the "weighting", the relative proportion and the selection of news, the frequent reproduction of the Salamanca *communiqués*—all became in sharp contrast to what was the case before early May 1937. Many of the obvious Barcelona "stunt" stories were just omitted. It still laboured under a few misapprehensions, but there was an evident *intention* to be "impartial" and "neutral".

We state categorically, from a long study of the Nationalist *communiques* which we were able to hear and see at great inconvenience by taking French and Spanish papers, and living with one ear to the foreign radio stations—for they were not published in our papers, nor their import usually, except in the *Daily Mail*—that they were, as they claimed, "*nunca desmentida, siempre confirmada*"—"never contradicted, always confirmed". And we checked them day by day on large-scale maps. But the "Government" *communiqués*! The Belgian paper *La Métropole* published a perfectly correct compilation of the Government's claims. They included the capture of 775,000 machine-guns and of territory three times the total area of Spain, and the destruction of 56,779 aeroplanes. That was only up to April 19th, 1937. Huesca and Oviedo were captured over twenty times each, Toledo—lucky town—only eleven. Towns like Higuera de la Calatrava, miles behind their own lines, were announced as captured after bitter—but successful—fighting whenever



TRENCHES, CASTELLON FRONT

[*facing page* 434]



the Government was doing badly in some other part of the country. Anyone who took the trouble to follow events carefully, knew that the only way to do so successfully was to ignore the Red bulletins completely, except where there was a probable "inversion." For one could usually tell what was wrong in Red territory by noting what they said was happening in the Nationalist territory—food shortage (!), mutiny, and so forth.

And this was as regards the *official communiqués*. The kind of thing that came from the semi-official or unofficial agents and the Red Propaganda Bureau was infinitely worse and as obviously false if checked. Time and again the proof of bad faith was seen. Stories were told in the Red Spanish Press with details that could not pass in England. Those papers were seen by the local correspondent—or should have been, for we saw them even in England; and then we would see the English version, identical but for the tell-tale details.

And so with the whole question in its wider aspect. We only know the general result. There were brains, direction and intention behind what occurred. Was it the fault of the news agencies, the sympathies or interests of the proprietors, the work of representatives abroad? The news machine is vast, and there were certainly contributory causes. For example, there is a considerable volume of Jewish influence in our Press, partly direct and partly exercised through Gentiles, and there are many Jewish or partly Jewish journalists and employees of various grades. We personally believe it likely that they dislike Hitler for his treatment of Jews. This may have induced them to throw their weight in favour of the Internationals, who were largely Jews and supported by them. Their misfortunes in Germany, and the closing of the Lodges in Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Poland and elsewhere may even have induced some of them to interpret the truth in a rather elastic manner. If this theory has any foundation, it might account for a number of curious misconceptions in England about Germany, Italy and Spain, to say nothing of other countries like China and Austria.

Or was it due to Foreign Office indications? It has been so whispered. But we find it hard to believe that the *Daily Mail* was rebellious, or that the *Observer* sought to embarrass the Government. If it was so, the evil went deeper than we believe.

Newspapers of late years have increasingly obtained their information from central sources known as news agencies. This centralization has in many ways curtailed the liberty of the journalist and the freedom of the Press. It has also been used by newspaper proprietors to deprecate the profession of journalism. Central news agencies are a powerful means of distributing opinion over a very wide area. They are also, to-day, the main means of obtaining information. And to-day, as never before, information means money. The carrier pigeons of Waterloo are but one of the many object-lessons. And the fewer the number of gatherers of information, the greater the power to disseminate a particular view. Is it therefore to be wondered at that some of the most astute money-making brains should be suspected of trying to corner the news agencies and the central means of communication of news? The joint stock principle permits the real owners to remain anonymous, and we cannot state how the balance of power in the best-known agencies is held. But we think it would be prudent for such "news" services as are dependent entirely for their information on agencies and have no reporting stall of their own—such as the B.B.C., for example—to make inquiries as to the truth of the rumours in that connection which are freely mentioned in every capital city of Europe.

The authoritative position enjoyed by Madame Tabouis¹ is an interesting case in point. Madame Tabouis's activities are admirably described by Mr. Wyndham Lewis.²

"Madame Tabouis is generally supposed to be the mouth-piece of Soviet diplomacy in the French capital.

"If this is true, no wonder that her news is pretty potent and worth listening to, and, of course, just a shade *Red*, or a good, steady, hectic pink.

"So how does this work out? Let us see. (1) Madame Tabouis is ver}' disagreeably stimulated by some information she receives from Soviet circles in Paris. (2) She expresses her painful excitement in an article in her paper, *L'CEuvre*. (3) A news agency is very (disagreeably) stimulated to an alarmist degree by what it reads. It translates what it has read. It telegraphs it to London. (4) The London evening papers are very (disagreeably) stimulated by the shocking news they have received from the news agency, in whom they place implicit

¹ Madame Tabouis now contributes to Mr. Ostler's *Referee*.

² Wyndham Lewis, *Count Your Dead—They Are Alive*, pp. 151 *et seq.*

confidence. (5) They all receive the *same* (disagreeably stimulating) news. (6) Large posters are rapidly printed. (7) They do not say 'Madame Tabouis' very alarmed, but *Paris* very alarmed, naturally. (8) The news-vendor is very stimulated by the poster. He opens his mouth very wide. He bellows, 'Paris very alarmed!' (9) In my club I hear his cry. I am startled. I rush out. (10) I hastily 'scan the news'. (11) My alarm was apparently justified. Paris is in a turmoil. The situation is very grave!"

All of which excellent satiric truth calls from Mr. Wyndham Lewis several important questions.

"Who is the 'British United Press'? Who is 'Reuter'?" he asks. "I know who the *Evening Standard* is. It is, of course, Lord Beaverbrook. . . . But the 'British United Press' has no name for me. It is an 'Agency'. It is an 'It'. It collects news. Upon what principle, political or other, it works, I do not know. . . . That it is *selective*, even highly selective, is obvious. . . . That it considers 'Madame Tabouis' important, even supremely important, is plain enough. For invariably it quotes her. Perhaps it has heard that this lady is in close touch with the Soviet interests in Paris. That, of course, would make her a particularly reliable source of information: an infallible index of Parisian public opinion. But what *it* is—I mean the jolly old Agency—I'm damned if I can guess.

"Yet it is awfully important."

A curious feature of our three chief London evening papers is that their *news* seems to be based on an almost identical message. It is generally a little differently dressed, but for days on end the three have almost identical Spanish news, though it comes from a whole group of agencies, apparently.

We say that news comes from the agencies "with an angle", and that should not be. We say that news should reach the papers from the agencies factually accurate and that is all. It is for the papers to put their own construction on the *facts* received. And there should be more competition. Such news we may call the "pointed news".

Next comes the deliberately false news, specially constructed in the fiction factory and presented to the authorized correspondents of the great independent Press as "hand-outs". Another method of ensuring the certain reception of false news

is by "gulling" a guileless young man, possibly doing his first foreign "assignment".

The fiction factor¹ has obtained incredible success with its false news department. The story of Guernica provides a classic case of its success. Franco's troops were victoriously pressing on with their campaign to "end the northern front" when the whole world was startled by the news that Guernica had been "destroyed suddenly, for no military reason, by aerial bombardment."²

"The news of the destruction of Guernica, and the statement that it was the direct result of an air attack on a market day, was contained in a telegram to *The Times* from its special correspondent. Mr. G. L. Steer. The wording suggested that he had been an eye-witness of the events he described. Subsequent messages made it clear that he had not, in fact, been within many miles of Guernica at the time of its destruction, and that he had relied for his vivid narrative upon the panic-stricken reports of refugees. lie did not, on his own showing, reach Guernica till 2 a.m. on April 27th, some six or six and a half hours after the alleged bombardment had ceased,² and even then he was not allowed in the centre of the town. Having claimed that it had been destroyed by air, Mr. Steer stuck to his story, and has since published a book in which, without adducing any new evidence, he repeats his version of the events."³

The world and his wife fin England) went mad over this "infamy" of Guernica. And in face of what the reports, and leading articles, had to say, it is not surprising. The indignation was terrific. Amongst those almost—but not quite—too shocked to speak about it were politicians like M. Léon Blum and Mr. Lloyd George, the Duchess of Atholl, the Dean of Canterbury, a host of kind-hearted people, Senator Borah and other prominent Americans, the Right Honourable Mr. Winston Churchill, George Attlee fMajor) and other less distinguished Parliamentarians. Even Mr. Eden—and we suppose his department—in the House seemed unable to see the dynamite or smell the petrol through the smoke-screen. And there were, of course, the usual well-known writers and

¹ Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P., *Introduction to the Guernica Official Report*.

² Actually the correspondent sent two contradictory reports. He claimed in one of them to have left the town before 2 a.m. In the oilier he arrived then and seems to have stayed till dawn.

orators *La Pasionaria*, Professor J. B. S. Haldane, Professor Víctor Basch, and Georges Dimitrov, the wandering Bulgar. They, too, were supported by a goodly company. Ilya Ehrenburg of the F.A.I., Arthur Koestler, Louis Fischer, Vernon Bartlett and other great commentators on ** International Affairs'; and even André Marty, the organizer of the International Brigades—all these were shocked and voiced their horror at this crime against civilization. Even the representatives of the Madrid Fcbus Agency and Reuter's own correspondent did not seem to smell a rat. All these worthy people and many others found themselves basely deceived by the trickery of the International machine.

The Guernica story has proved, however, an excellent touch-stone of the good faith of the various English papers. The *Daily Mail* adequately indicated the falsity of the reports and printed fairly General Franco's denial. Proof of the falsity was published as early as 2nd or 3rd May in the Press in France and elsewhere abroad. *The Times*, by its investigator's report, made some effort to present both sides, though at first it seems to have believed the Reds. But the others? The official report on Guernica has just been published. The report is manifestly restrained, conscientious and true. Did it make front-page news? Of course not. A résumé' was to be found on an "away" page. But what of the past indignation, the great "leaders" based upon the falsehood and the prejudices and passions then aroused? Are these to be corrected? Or was that the original object anyzvay?

Every journalist knows how impossible it is to "chase a lie". That is why it used to be a jealously guarded tradition to check the news, and, if doubtful, discard it.

As Salamanca had stated, and no less than twenty-one foreign journalists had been able to see for themselves, the town had been destroyed by fire by the retreating forces of the Madrid Government on April 26th when the advance lines of the Nationalists were within four miles of Guernica. The report of the commission, made up of two magistrates and two civil engineers who examined twenty-two eye-witnesses, states: (1) that Guernica was destroyed by fire; (2) Guernica was attacked by aeroplanes on April 26th and bombed intermittently; (3) the town at the time was occupied by Basque troops; (4) the market was sparsely attended that day because a number of the inhabitants had been warned of an "impend-

ing destruction "(5) the total casualties were less than a hundred; (6) buildings started to burn for two days after the alleged raid; (7) *explosions took place all night of April 26th.* Most important of all, most of the damage in the streets was caused by subterranean explosions at nine different points. *In each case the explosion occurred at the same distance from one of the nine manholes of the main sewer.*

The story of Guernica's "wanton bombing" raised the indignation of Britain. It was untrue in almost every particular.

"Since last July some 350,000 non-combatant men, women and children, living helplessly in that corner of the Iberian Peninsula subject to the rule of the Valencia Government, have been butchered in cold blood under conditions of indescribable horror. . . ."

Which was the more important "news"? The truth was stranger—and more awful—than the fiction, but fiction finds the front page—when it comes from Communist sources. It almost seems as if the policy behind the news was "don't check it up, for the Lord's sake! Print it quick; the subs won't know any better. It will be * cold mutton 'by to-morrow."

On May 27th, 1937, the B.B.C. made two curious and opposite announcements. In the 7 p.m. news it was stated: "The third German airman, Wandel . . . was sentenced to death in spite of his *admission* of the bombing of Guernica." In the news which commenced at 9.5 p.m., "The third German airman, Wandel . . . was sentenced to death . . . in spite of his *denial* of the bombing of Guernica."

The bombing of Guernica? Who compiled this version? How does the B.B.C. check its news? And is it fair to deduce that the first statement was the one submitted or prepared for broadcasting—an attempt by someone to support the story of the destruction of Guernica by the Nationalists? But as that might appear too partisan, the statement was corrected by someone, but so as to retain the implied fact?

Incidentally, to keep things levelled up a little if there was good faith, Salamanca tried some captured Russian aviators, in order to get publicity for THEIR STATEMENTS, viz., that they were *Russian officers officially sent by the Soviets.* How many, we wonder, saw these declarations? And why was their trial less sensational than the one staged by the Red machine?

In this connection the report by Ronald Monson in the

Daily Telegraph is also of interest. He says, "After long . . . consideration, the Basque Government decided to postpone indefinitely the execution of the three German airmen who were sentenced to death for their part in the bombing of Guernica." Even on the biased reports of the trial, it was clear that *not one of them admitted the bombing of Guernica* and that no proof of any one of them having done so was given or even attempted except by leading questions which were not successful in their object. The use of the word *the* in connection with the Guernica affair has been standard practice in the Red propaganda, the idea being to prejudge the verdict of any subsequent investigation, the promised—but postponed—commission of inquiry.

Guernica had one good result. To those already suspicious, it confirmed the existence, and showed some of the inner workings, of the machine.

Another curious technique of the Red International Bureau was rather puzzling at first. When there was a big Nationalist success, so big that it was bound to be obvious in spite of every effort, it was given out that they had reached a point in advance of where they had, in fact, reached. This was done through the official *communiqué* from Salamanca made no such claims—in fact pointed out their falsity when it became repeated. The object? It enabled fictitious counter-attacks to be announced, heroically driving back the enemy to some point which hadn't yet been reached in force, or even seriously attacked. This made epic defences out of panic-stricken flights, and protected the prestige of the Internationals and the "Generals".

Incidentally it was wonderful what importance they ascribed to their "prestige". On one occasion they produced a marvellous story of the attack by an heroic Red aviator who sank the *España* by descending and dropping bombs down the funnel at terrible risk. However, as the British Admiralty later announced, *she had hit a mine*.

How does the B.B.C. check its news?

"The expected offensive on Madrid has begun. The Spanish Government reports that this morning insurgent planes carried out a heavy raid on the centre of Madrid. . . ."

"It was perfect. Sitting in the cold furnitureless sitting-room of my hotel in Toledo I heard the cultured voice of the B.B.C. announcer raqible on, 'The centre of Madrid! ' I

had seen the raid. It was nowhere near the centre of Madrid. It was on the Cuatro Caminos, a quarter stiff with Red artillery and troops, and fair game for any attack."¹

On February 12th, 1938, the B.B.C. gave two versions of the attack on Moncloa, Madrid. *No mention* was made of the big Nationalist advance in Badajoz province near Zamalea, which was part of the same official Nationalist communique.

On February 7 th, in their 7 p.m. and 9 p.m. news, the B.B.C. announced: the Nationalists "claimed" an "important success" the Government "admitted" the loss of the village of Alfambra, but had "captured an important hill west of Teruel", and in a bombardment of Figueroas by Nationalists twenty people had been killed. The real news that night, as we ourselves gathered from elsewhere, was as follows:

The Nationalists had captured some twenty towns and villages, about 230 square miles of territory, 3,000 prisoners in one day, and enormous quantities of war material. Eight enemy aircraft had been brought down. The operation had probably been the most important of the war since July 1936. There was no element of surprise about it. We had been waiting for it. The only surprising feature was the astonishing rapidity of the Nationalist advance in a sector where anyone following the position knew that the Red concentrations were very strong.

The important point about the B.B.C. news is that because it comes over the air from the B.B.C., a semi-governmental organization, the vast majority of listeners regard it as "gospel". They assume it is (1) official, (2) unprejudiced. We consider it of the most urgent importance that the B.B.C. should announce, *every night*, the limitations of their news service. It is not sufficient to say that their reports come from Reuter, B.U.P., Central News or Press Association. They should further state whether their news has been checked. It has been current talk for several years that the B.B.C. has, at least, a definite streak of red tinge about it. The *Morning Post* took up this question several years ago. The *Daily Mail* also. And others. Maybe it is different to-day, but the impression is still current. In their own interests the B.B.C. would be wise to dispel any such fears. For the B.B.C. must be impartial. The public relies on it, and it has a monopoly. Has it, for that very reason, been made an object of attack in

¹ Tangyc, *Red, White, and Spain*,

hon'it ièce\ es, or from whom it receives, or by whom it selects the news it is to give out?

The Red iècoid being what it was, and the officials having no intention of stopping their "necessary liquidation", they had to find some sort of counterpoise. Can one conceive anything possible sufficient to create the impression of "equal barbarity on both sides"? Even *they* must have despaired. But they seemed soon to have regained hope, and, indeed, wild optimism. In *communiqué* 'after *communiqué*' they announced the bombing of hospitals. *The Times* leader-writer felt impelled to condemn, impartially, "the massacre of defenceless citizens on the one side" and the "ruthless bombing of hospitals on the other". This was at a time when Franco had a great inferiority in aircraft: and as a soldier he would in any case be fully aware of the futility of wasting his few precious bombs on Red hospitals. Why should he? It was purely the Red machine at work. Was it the bureau, the agency, the correspondent, the bad selection, lack of sense, or something wrong in the office? We don't know. Nor was this a ver}' important case, but we mention it as it illustrates how hard it is to sort out the real causes and responsibilities.

The next great Red "wail" was the bombing or bombardment of "open" towns. Before we give examples, we will mention a few facts about their own work in that direction. We have already mentioned how they bombed sixteen towns before General Queipo de Llano retaliated in the south. Here are some more details.

Granada, as Helen Nicholson testifies, was bombed practically daily so long as she was there (some six weeks). Sometimes twice.¹ The town had no anti-aircraft guns, and certainly presented no huge factories or stores like Barcelona, where part of the Metro itself was a depot; nor was it in the front line like Madrid. Was there any indignant outburst by people like Mr. Noel Baker? There was not! We have also mentioned the bombing of the Moorish quarters which did so much to make the Moors anxious to help against the "Government".

Cordoba suffered the same fate as Granada. There was, in fact, hardly a town in the Nationalist territory which was not bombed. And though our Press mentioned only a very small proportion of bombings if they were on Nationalist towns, we will quote merely some of those in *The Times* in

¹ Nicholson, *Death in the Morning*.

the first few days. *The Times*, August 3rd, 1936, stated: "On July 22nd Pollensa had an air-raid (six killed); on the 23rd Palma twice bombed, several killed. *From then on there were regular raids twice a day on Palma.* On the 30th July the Reds shelled San Sebastian; also Ceuta (six killed, thirty wounded). Melilla 22nd July; Algeciras also (eight killed and wounded). Ceuta was shelled at long range. Cadiz also from the sea (24th July), 21st July, twenty casualties, including four children." Not bad for those reported in eight days!

The *Jaime I*, as we have already stated, wandered about slaughtering at will. One case was reported on August 4th when she shelled Marbella and Estcpona.

On August 10th the Island of Iviza was simply overwhelmed by bombers. Need we mention Oviedo and Teruel where, with no neutral zone, the towns were methodically destroyed over a period of more than a year? Vitoria, Avila, Segovia, Burgos, Salamanca, Seville, Pamplona were all bombed by the Reds—the list is literally interminable. And sometimes by machines flying from France—their whole itinerary was given by Nationalist observers, but not published in England. At Valladolid one Red machine, disguised as Nationalist, bombed the centre of the town in the afternoon from the lowest safe altitude, and had a fine haul of children. None of all this stirred our Press. Curious. Why?

Now, as we have said, General Franco is a soldier, and he bombs military objectives. More than that, he very often mentioned what they were in the *communiques'*, of which the B.B.C. seemed ignorant and which our Press did not publish. They were such things as the aerodromes at Reus, Bujaraloz, Lerida, or Sariñena, or the sole railway left to the Reds from Barcelona towards Madrid passing through Viñaroz, Benicaló, Oropesa and similar places, which therefore were heavily bombed. Yet one would hear the B.B.C. bleating the absurdity that the Nationalist bombed So-and-so, causing many casualties, and the Government "in retaliation" or "in reprisal" bombed "military objectives" at Valladolid or elsewhere. This was typical and deliberate, or unbelievably blind "colouring". It was not merely once. It was repeated. Nor was it even always covered by the phrase "the Government claims", but given as a mere statement of fact. Not that it mattered when it did. That would merely be cementing an apparent collusion, when the thing is obviously an impertin-

ence. To repeat it was merely to give it a semi-official British backing.

During the phase from November 1936 there was a new development, later tremendously exploited. Madrid was chosen for defence to fan revolutionary zeal—the “tomb of Fascism”. It was purposely made part of the front line. Franco defined a neutral zone and respected it, though the Reds used that zone for arms and men and kept the people out of it. But the great news, almost daily at one time, was the civilian casualty list and “ sob-stuff ” stories of bombing and shelling. The real reason for this intensive “plugging”—exaggerated, though based on actual casualties—was to make the word “Madrid”, by sheer weight of publicity and repetition, stand for a symbol of “Fascist aggression” instead of a byword for the awful Communist massacre which had been organized there.

This propaganda about (Red) women and babies enabled “ neutrals ”, whilst recording “ the early excesses of the masses ”, to condemn at least as strongly, or more so, “ the ruthless bombing of civilians by Italian and German airmen ”. The whole of this propaganda was based upon false premises. The “ masses ” were fighting as much, if not more so, for the Nationalists as for the Valencia Government—but they did not count as “ masses ” unless they were “ Red ” masses. The information and the outlook was Red.

And, looking back, does it not seem strange that the Reds, according to their *communiques*,¹ bombed and hit only military objectives, whilst the Nationalists never hit any military objectives, but only, and deliberately, priests saying Mass in Vizcaya, nuns in their convents, waiters in cafés, queues of starving women, girls’ schools and babies?

It was the same with Malaga. Thousands of men and women, priests and nuns, had been foully done to death. So we had the headline, “ Franco enters Malaga and the slaughter has begun ”. (Our italics.) And that was followed by a “ghosted interview” “by a Russian trained young lady” quoting Dr. Norman Bethune on the experiences she attributed to him among the refugees fleeing Malaga.¹ Her well-written interview told of the “inconceivable ferocity of the barbarian invaders”, the “innumerable scenes of horror created by the foreigners”, and the “terrible tragedy of these

¹ Knoblaugh, *Correspondent in Spain*, p. 177.

countless thousands forced to flee their homes ", And Mr. Knoblaugh adds, " It did not mention, of course, that the ones who did the forcing were the Loyalists (Government). ... As later at Bilbao—many who did not want to leave were executed as ' counter-revolutionaries '."¹

Of course, the ghosted interview was " plugged " in England and deceived numerous Deans and other people. Did the editors know nothing of the Red Bureau or its methods? And were they, many of them, still ignorant in 1938?

It was the same when Santander fell. The slogans plugged were " Franco shoots one in ten "—with a note that he had 90,000 prisoners²—" Franco's death courts ".³ Why was there this solicitude for a few dozen cold-blooded murderers? It was because *thousands* of murders had been done by Communists. That was not news for us. " Our" solicitude—the big news—was for the Communists. They must be saved to migrate for the next war by the Internationals against England, France, Germany, Austria or where you will! The awful truth must be lost in a smoke-screen and side issues. The *Daily Worker*, of course, is far more concerned over the possible fate of men like Garcia Atadell than all the horrors they had perpetrated. On October 25th we read :

" It will be some time before we shall know what frightful horrors have taken place this week-end in Gijon. How many thousands of miners and their wives have been wiped out by Franco. . . . The prophecy that the greatest massacre of modern times will take place at Gijon will unfortunately have been realized. The declaration of the *commanding Italian Officer in Salamanca* that it will be ten years *before the Spanish language is heard again in Asturias* may by this time also be well on its way to fulfilment." This is a typical product of the brain of an International.

And the French fleet was urged to intervene, of course.

This is what thousands of people are being fed on daily. And " respectable " papers will be found supporting the same side, and the same policies, and, more respectably, putting up the same " news policy ", This news is from the same factory, but adapted to the class of reader.

The *Gringoire* accused, 22nd October, 1937, by name,

¹ Knoblaugh, *Correspondent in Spain*, p. 177.

² *Daily Telegraph*.

³ *Daily Herald*.

eight French Ministers of being pledged to push France into war on behalf of the Grand Orient and the Comintern. The paper begged them to deny the allegations of the agreement and as to where it was made, and requested them to issue a writ for libel. The challenge was not met.

Another typical example of Communist Press methods concerned the defence of the Alcazar at Toledo. So heroic was the defence and so foul the murder of General Moscardd's son that the Marxists put out a version by Ilya Ehrenbourg (the Russian F.A.I. boss) to say that they were "not trying" for fear of killing their own wives and children whom the military gangsters had seized and used as a shield of hostages. This version is repeated in an article by A. Koestler in a six-penny pocket monthly magazine named Lz/hpuZ (January 1938, Vol. 2, No. 1). Though every man, woman and child in the siege will swear to its falsity, and though the padre, Serior Camarassa, who visited them to hear their last messages when they thought themselves doomed, has stated, from safety in France, that this story is false, its currency is not thereby stayed. It originated in an effort, as with Malaga, Madrid, and so many other cases, to cover an infamy by inventing an inversion.

When General Queipo de Llano was broadcasting, his words were hung upon literally by millions of people. His evening chat was the event of the day in Spain, in the big towns and in the humblest villages. He was listened to eagerly throughout Spanish Morocco, and what he had to say was easily picked up on the short wave-length in South America. The General very frequently gave extracts from the English newspapers, when they were helping the Marxist cause and putting across false news or propaganda contrary to every fact known to his listeners. Thus it is possible to sift the "chaff" from the corn in the English news. For if the English Press announced fighting between Falangist and *Requetés* or Italians and Spaniards, in San Sebastian or in Seville, and the news was utterly false, it was known to be false when the General came to the microphone and said: "Heavens! We have had a bad day! All my friends in Seville know I am telling the truth when I say that there was a pitched battle in the High Street yesterday afternoon. It must be true—it says so in the *Daily Herald*!" And all his listeners laughed heartily; for the people of Seville know the facts about their own tow'n.

Referring to the "Franco shoots one in ten" slogan, General Queipo de Llano both gave the facts and commented on our newspapers—harshly, indeed, but justly. It made one ashamed.

Incidentally, Queipo de Llano is neither an epileptic buffoon nor a drunken brute. He is so described by those he flays alive with his tongue. But he is abstemious in habit and very sound in argument, and if he makes a mistake he always corrects it when he learns of the error. Some of our papers might well copy him. Marxists all loathe him. He refers to them as "The little children of the *Pasionaria*" and jokes about "the unknown soldier" of the Madrid monument as "doubtless one of the Passion Flower's little sons". And his stories point the moral. One night, just before the fall of Bilbao, he said, "I am informed that in Bilbao they say that if General Queipo de Llano and God Almighty were both going to broadcast at 10.30 p.m. on different wave-lengths, the Reds would tune in to me. However, I am not flattered—for Marxists don't believe in God."

Queipo was several times quoted by our Press, but usually falsely, as we were able to verify both from his actual words and the Spanish Press.

On January 26th, 1938, the *Daily Sketch* devoted its full front page, with an eighteen-point banner heading, to "Franco Gamble Nears Its End". The article, bearing the authority of the *Daily Sketch* diplomatic correspondent, stated, *inter alia*, that the Civil War was "nearer collapse than anyone had dreamed possible a few weeks ago".

"After the Basque victories", wrote the diplomatic correspondent, "of the insurgents, even the French General Staff believed Franco's victory to be certain. Now France is confident of a Government victory."

"Desertions from the insurgent forces have become a serious affair. . . . Europe believes that the Civil War is entering its last phase and that the rebellion will fail."

A friend of ours sent a letter to the *Daily Sketch*, which we reproduce because it illustrates our point of view:

"DEAR SIR,—I feel that I cannot neglect to write to you with regard to the article on your front page to-day by your 'diplomatic correspondent', because the statements in it are such a complete inversion of the facts known to me that I feel



< COLONEL SANCHEZ

2. GENERAL TELLA

3. GENERAL ARANDA

•1- GENERAL KINDELAN, WITH THE AIR " ACE ", COMMANDANTE GARCIA MORATO

5- GENERAL MONASTERIO

6. GENERAL GARCIA ESCAMEZ



that, in the long run, such articles can only lower the prestige and circulation of your paper.

" He states, ' that the insurgents . . . must break the Republican line at Teruel or lapse into a defensive I have followed the fighting carefully with large-scale maps, and from that, and the Madrid and Bilbao newspapers, I know that it was *the Government* troops who were attacking; that in large numbers they attacked a position not held in great force and with hardly any artillery; that they advanced well to the west of the town as a consequence, cutting the road and rail to Daroca, so that they could only be driven back by troops from Albarracin. Yet, in spite of the weather conditions and the poor communications from Albarracin, the insurgents advanced to beyond their original lines south of Teruel, and some five miles beyond the original lines north of it, completely dominating both the road from Teruel northwards to Vivel del Rio and south-west to Cuenca. In what sense could this have been a gamble on Franco's part? though the facts are consistent with it having been a gamble, which has failed, on the part of the Government.

" Who has suggested that he intends to attack from Teruel at all? And is not the front line, excluding minor sinuosities, some nine hundred miles long?

" If the French General Staff believed Franco's victory certain after his Basque victories, how can France be now confident of a Government victory as a result of these operations? For the French General Staff, unlike the British public, have large-scale military maps. Why should it have worried Germany and Italy that as soon as equal forces met, the Republicans have been driven back through difficult country on nearly a twenty-mile front and for a depth varying from three to seven miles?

" In view of the above, your diplomatic correspondent's ignorance about the Spanish Government's sudden clemency to deserters comes as no surprise. I have myself heard the Government broadcasts offering leave and pay to all deserters, with a bonus for equipment such as rifles; these tactics have been employed almost from the commencement, including pay at ten pesetas in lieu of the highest scale of three pesetas in the insurgent forces. But the desertions, nevertheless, have not been numerous.

" For your information I should state that I have it upon

the most reliable first-hand information that the morale to-day in insurgent territory was never higher. There are no signs of war-weariness, and none, of course, of food shortage.

"If I may be permitted to say so, this article is not news; it is the purest propaganda, and its whole suggestion is contrary to the facts as known to anyone who is conversant with the correct news of events in Spain."

This letter was not published.

What is it which can have given a diplomatic correspondent so false an idea of the position, as was proved within a week of this letter being sent?

Correspondents in Red territory are beset with enormous difficulties if they have not a "Communist" ideology. They must not be objective. They must do as they are told, and simply send the "dope" and the "hand-outs" given them by the fiction factory—or they had better leave the country, if they value their lives. Dr. Borkenau was one who left, though not physically terrorized, at least after "pressure".

Mr. Knoblaugh describes the *desiderata* for the independent correspondent on the Red side thus. "If the correspondent does as he is expected—if he joins the legion who, from personal conviction or resignation to their lot, have become little more than rubber stamps for Popular Front policies—he will, indeed, find the sailing smooth. He will continue to be a most honoured guest, and his assignment will be a series of wonderfully pleasant adventures. But should he show his ingratitude by insisting upon putting into practice the fine old American newspaper tradition of investigating and corroborating the Government's news report before sending them, there will be rough weather ahead. . . . He will not ask these or many other of the perplexing questions that are bound to occur to him even after a short stay in Loyalist Spain. If he wants to get along harmoniously he will, even though it may cost him some effort, manifest trusting confidence in the Loyalist cause. He will be extremely careful what he writes even if he gets a short leave outside Spain and feels an urge to let off steam once the fetters of censorship are left behind."¹

Mr. William Carney of the *New York Times* was "one of

¹ Knoblaugh, *Correspondent in Spain*, pp. 150 *passim*.

the first to feel the inhospitality of the Loyalists towards netsspaceimen who could not be educated ' to write as they are expected to write ', Mr. Knoblaugh says. After several clashes with Government officials, Mr. Carney's apartment was visited by a group of riflemen who demanded to search his rooms, despite the United States Consulate seal on the door. When asked for their authority, the leader made reply, pounding his rifle on the floor, " This is our authority." They were let in, but could find nothing incriminating. " He was arrested several times and held for hours without explanation. Finally he received a tip that the Government no longer would be responsible for his safety. He left Loyalist territory at once. Roland Winn, correspondent for Reuter's, similarly had to leave in a hurry. John Allwork, another Reuter man, left after being arrested seven times. Jane Anderson, American freelance, escaped a firing-squad by a hair."

Mr. Knoblaugh's finale was in itself dramatic. He had written, at the direct request of his New York office, an article on the George Washington Battalion of the International Brigade. This incurred the wrath of the Red censors. Then curious things happened. First he realized that he was being " shadowed " everywhere. Then one night a bullet came through his window'. Shortly after, a man was killed as he passed Mr. Knoblaugh's house. As he tersely puts it: " When an ' accident ' starts ' looking for someone ' in Spain, it generally finds him." He left while he still could.

Another interesting case was that of Yves Dautun.

We have referred elsewhere to how the correspondent of the *Paris Soir*, Louis Delaprée, was shot down while returning to France, because he had seen " too much " and because, with him, was the representative of the Red Cross, carrying the evidence which he felt it his duty to lay before various people in Geneva to indicate the real nature of the Madrid Government. Yves Dautun nearly met the same fate for the same reason. We give his story by extracts from his own account, and practically in his own words:

" My chief, thinking he was entrusting me with an important mission, sent me one day, in the utmost good faith, into the hands of the most sinister *maffia*. On the day I left, I was a condemned man. If I escaped, it was contrary to all that was logical. ... I humbly excuse myself for still having the desire to live."

M. Dautun was sent to Spain as correspondent of the *Petit Parisien* in December 1936. "This is not a case of a war correspondent who must expect merely the relations of a jailer and captive. . . . A long stay in either camp can only reinforce this humiliating but inevitable subjection. . . . It even occurs that both sides decide that they want the head of the correspondent, as happened to my comrade, Emile Condroyer . . . having been with the Nationalists at the beginning of the war he was condemned by Madrid . . . and when he did not hesitate in the columns of the *Journal* to castigate the rebels through some atrocities he had witnessed, Burgos condemned him to death. . . .

"I was condemned even before I placed my foot on Spanish soil. . . . All Paris, like myself, was ignorant of it, except, in my belief, Mr. Araquistain, the Valencia Government Ambassador in Paris. . . .

"They furnished me with a 'safe conduct'—or rather a sentence of death—asking the authorities of the Republic, and I am still looking for them—and the militia of the Popular Front—that is, some hundreds of militia who cannot even read—to give me all facilities . . . but they had not obtained the agreement from Comrade Stalin, and the blessing of the Valencia Cheka."

At the Spanish frontier a Russian named Vladimir attached himself to M. Dautun as a shadower. At the frontier he received the counter-w/sfl of the Regional Committee of the C.N.T. and the F.A.I. The Comrade Vladimir spent his time trying to elicit expressions of opinion not compatible with the Red doctrines and propaganda.

At Valencia M. Dautun's passport was taken from him, and, later, he was told to call for it. Meanwhile his shadow was arrested as a Fascist. It suddenly struck him that he might be arrested for consorting with a "Fascist." The danger was obvious, for marked inside the jacket of his "Fascist" friend, who shared his room at the hotel, he had seen the Communist badge. He rang up the French Consulate. By sheer accident—for it was late at night—the First Secretary of the Consulate happened to be in. He rushed round to the hotel (the Hôtel Victoria) arriving just after two armed militia had come to "conduct" M. Dautun to fetch his passport.

"You are lucky," said the First Secretary. "You have no papers, no name, no nationality—you never would have seen

France again." When he made himself known, the militia withdrew.

The First Secretary conducted him to the Police Headquarters, where Juan Cobo, nominally Chief of the State Police, was conferring with a Russian, who completely dominated him and gave him his orders. Thanks to the First Secretary's presence he was given a receipt to say his passport had been deposited.

One day a certain M. Charbonnier—well known as the hero of the French colony in Valencia for the manner in which he watched after missing members of it—took him to see some of the sights of Valencia. (M. Charbonnier has since gone to a lunatic asylum as a result of his dreadful experience.) The next morning Dautun was summoned to the police station. Full of presentiments of evil, he informed the French Consulate, and the First Secretary was to meet him outside the police station. Ostensibly he was to collect his passport, but he found himself face to face with a Tribunal, who spoke amongst themselves sometimes in French, sometimes in Spanish, and at others in Russian. They put him through an interrogation.

"Do you deny that you are a representative of the *Petit Parisien*, a Fascist newspaper?" he was asked by the anonymous leader of this body. He admitted his paper. He had declared it in Paris. It was on his papers. It was his purpose in Valencia. There was nothing to add; he rose to go. Two automatics were pressed against him, and he was told to be seated.

"So you say you are personally impartial? You have no fixed views? Do you know what we do here with neutrals? We kill them!"

He tried to play for time. Shortly afterwards the French First Secretary came into the building. M. Dautun was given his passport and returned to the hotel.

He had decided, however, to try and do some work as a journalist, trusting to the protection of the French Consulate, and asked for a safe conduct to the Madrid front. He received warning clandestinely on no account to take the car that would be put at his disposal, for he was told "the heads of the Cheka are Russians, and so also the skeleton heads of all the Administrations of the Republic".

Later that day, an emissary from the Cheka came and

offered him money to send news favourable to the Reds, as put out by the Official Propaganda Bureau. This he refused.

That night an attempt was made to break into his room. But he had secured the door, and the callers left after an argument with some militia guarding Ministers in adjoining rooms. As in the case of Carney, the "legitimate" Government had sent the necessary "uncontrollables" to indicate how their work could be done without it being laid at the doors of the officials. Again, he sought the French Consul, M. Marcassan, who told him "the State Police have just telephoned me. Under pressure from Extremists, they state that they are quite unable to protect you for more than twenty-four hours. You will have to leave. I will arrange for you to leave on a French warship."

Accompanied by the First Secretary he paid his last call upon the Ministry of State, and there he took his leave of the nominal chief, Rubio Hidalgo. That unfortunate "Minister", completely dominated by the Russian-controlled Cheka, took his leave as follows:

"Yes, go back to France, and as soon as possible. And when you are there"—(and he looked me straight in the eyes)—"tell everything." And he repeated it—"Tell everything." And to Dautun's "*au revoir*", he replied, "For ever."¹

And this explains one little part of why England is not receiving the proper news. But it does not explain everything: it is only one end—the Spanish end—of the telephone-wire.

The Fleet Street editors should be fully aware by now of the position described by Dautun, Knoblaugh and others, and yet there is this continued support for the Communist-controlled Government—and the preference for its "news" in the case of so many of them.

It is so difficult to sort all these things out. Even when an evening paper poster proclaims, "ITALIANS USING POISON GAS", and you buy the paper, to find that no claim of any such thing is mentioned, it may have been a slip or malice by an office boy or an underling. And it isn't always as easy as that case must have been to trace.

One might have expected a story like Delaprée's—the essence of a William Le Queux story, if ever there was one—

¹ Yves Dautun, *Valence sous la botte rouge*.

to have blazed across the pages of the Press. But no—" Protest sent to Franco " was almost all its publicity.

An interesting example of the machine at work in Spain was the great drive to " invert " the news of trouble at home between Anarchists, " Poums " and Communists.

We refrain from giving the details in each case, for the sake of brevity, but the stories are in all cases based upon standard patterns, namely, that Fascist aeroplanes were seen flying over the place concerned behind the Nationalist lines, bombing the town or village; that sentries on outpost duty heard heavy gun firing, but no shells came over, so that presumably the Nationalists were bombarding workmen's cottages, or disaffected elements. Sometimes the rumour is concocted upon bursts of machine-guns or rifle firing, and even on one or more isolated shots heard; smoke seen rising from behind the lines; and occasionally it is based on " a report from one recently escaped from the Nationalist terror ".

These reports of dissensions in Nationalist territory commenced, in an intensive form, during the early part of August.

Starting from the 10th August, 1937, *La Politica* of the 11th August reports mutinies, etc., at Malaga, El Carpio (on the Tagus), Segovia, Granada.

La Politica, 12th August, published a note of the Valencia National Defence Ministry, summarizing the rumours collected to date, and even giving the tenuous evidence of the type referred to above. The disaffected spots included the Sierra Elvira, Albalate and Pinos Puente in the south. In Teruel, shots south-west of Torrente; fires visible at Frias. In the north, at Alta de la Maza, and even amongst the advancing troops attacking Santander. (The extent of this revolt may perhaps be gauged by the immediately subsequent results of the Santander offensive!)

La Politica, 13th, at San Martin del Montalban; Toledo. Near Gargantilla on the Somosierra front. In Vizcaya, at Valmaseda and Garbea. On the Buena Vista front (Motril sector), south of Granada.

La Politica, 14th; at Castilla de Malpica (Tagus); Germans revolt and seize the customs at La Linea and Algeciras; mutiny at Ceuta, and a pitched battle at Tetuan, Morocco; " incidents " throughout Galicia; fighting in Galicia; fighting in San Sebastian (Guipuzcoa province) mainly by Falangists. (This organization is fighting Moors, Italians, or Carlist *Reqrietés*

at San Sebastian at regular intervals of a few days each, according to the Red Press). At Motril, Laujan, and in Granada province; at various points in the Guadalajara province.

The *J.J.B.C.* of the 15th August at Anovér (Tagus front).

The *Vanguardia* of the 17th August extends the geographical scope, as the idea is developed, to Vitoria. It also mentions Granada, Motril, Toledo, Talavera, and various places in Zaragoza province, including Perdiguera. It reports rebels machine-gunning their own troops at La Herbosa on the Santander front; and Sarinenă (Aragon).

El Sol of the same date reports an insurrection at Zaragoza, and mutiny by the Belchite garrison.

(About half these reports were incorporated in the official Valencia war *communiques* to give them an "official" status, the others were in official statements by "National Ministries", the propaganda bureau, or by quotation from other papers who have been good enough to give them the material. In most cases there were front page headlines with huge block capitals.)

El Sol of the 19th August has an article on the uprisings in Vitoria and San Sebastian, *put dozen by Moors*.

On the 21st, *La Vanguardia* reports "similar trouble on the Porcuna and Bujalance fronts" (Cordoba); also at Jaca in the north-east.

On the 22nd, *El Sol* reports explosions in Zaragoza (a new outbreak) and firing at Orjiva (Granada province, but a new sector).

One announcement said all Spaniards were disarmed in the south. Only Moors, Germans and Italians were allowed arms, which were for suppressing the rebellious inhabitants.

The systematic reporting of these events, over a period of some ten days, will be seen to have covered practically the whole of the geography of Nationalist Spain. But the reports have been only *too* carefully distributed. So systematic is the scheme that in one official *communiqué* a separate section was started, apart from news interspersed with the military operations, beginning—"In the rebel lines to-day firing was heard at-----"; and later this same formula was used equivocally so that it could be implied that reports of firing relating to military operations referred to similar incidents of mutiny amongst the Nationalists.

The above summary' was very far from exhaustive. If the trouble was as extensive as it was intended to imply, there would be few aeroplanes or guns left to the Nationalists for their military' operations, which nevertheless were proceeding very satisfactorily. The incidents covered the provinces of Cadiz, Seville, Malaga, Cordoba, Badajoz, Granada, Jaen, Galicia, Leon, Santander, Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Alava, Segovia, Guadalajara, Teruel, Aragon and Zaragoza.

The above analysis has been done at such length in order to indicate the degree of credibility to be attached to the reports from Red sources and in the English Press derived from them; for in some cases precisely the same intensive "plugging", for reasons of policy, seems to be devoted to the mere mention of Moors, Germans and Italians. The object is apparently to mask the foreign intervention, particularly by France, Russia and Czechoslovakia on behalf of the Valencia Government. The foreign invasion was by *them*, and by them first. Similar methods were in evidence in the frequent references to the destruction of trains, where the apparent object was to show the skill and activity of the Red air force, which in point of fact was usually so low in morale that combat was usually declined.

One last example to illustrate the desperate efforts, by the above means, to put heart into the disintegrating Red rear-guard and forces. *El Sol* of the 27th August published an official war *communiqué* for the day in which *no less than one half the text was a relation of fighting by the rebels amongst themselves!*

" Centre. . . . On the Guadalajara front, in the enemy position at Portillejo, as far as the railway line, rifle and machine-gun firing and a great outcry in the Rebollar lines was heard yesterday evening. . . . It lasted thirty minutes. Half an hour afterwards four mu filed discharges were heard at intervals of eight minutes each.

" South. . . . From Pitres, explosions of hand-grenades and rifle firing were heard within the rebel lines of Plaza de Toros and the advance lines of La Cñada and La Sangra. In the Arjona sector for a quarter of an hour rifle and machine-gun fire was heard in the enemy posts at San Cristobel. . . . Rebel aircraft flew over the position, throwing a great number of bombs.

" Similar incidents occurred also in the enemy positions

in front of Cabertilla Ridge and the Manar Sierra in the sector of Padul."

And Queipo from Seville had all Nationalist Spain laughing when he read it to them.

But *The Times* Barcelona correspondent summarized some of these rumours in an article published under date 13th August, 1937. It might well have shaken anyone who did not know better. It even shook the leader-writer, who proceeded to draw a doubtful picture of the Nationalist hopes. Whose fault was this? The correspondent could not check up. It was "hand-out" news. But the London office should have been better informed. We believe the leader-writer genuinely believed it: but in that case surely these articles should be done by someone in touch and reading both sides' papers—or not at all. It may lay a paper open to being hoaxed very seriously if those they trust to write the leaders are not informed on the subjects on which they counsel the public.

The Nationalists on their side have arrested several correspondents and made no secret about the reason, as a rule. There was Mr. Arthur Koestler whom they found in Malaga, and a French correspondent; but they finally released them. Others they have expelled. But they did not murder them, like Delapréé of the *Paris Soir*, or threaten to murder them, like Dautun, or "withdraw protection from the uncontrollables" as with Knoblaugh and Carney. They are very strict with the journalists, admittedly, and with good reason. For Left Wing newspapers and others sent swarms of spies to "report", and they had to be carefully watched. The correspondents themselves are the first to admit the difficulties in that respect.

It is, of course, an acknowledged fact that the Soviet propaganda services have laid down as a principle that it is necessary always to accuse one's opponents of any infamy which has been or is about to be perpetrated by oneself, with the resultant "inversion" of news so frequently to be observed. One may go so far as to say that whenever a publicity stunt is launched by the Reds, a little careful consideration will generally lead to a surprising discovery of the intentions of the Reds, or conditions in their territory, merely by re-inverting the news or its implications.

There is, therefore, a simple explanation for the amazing story launched in October 1937 concerning a proposed in-

vasion of France by the "Franco" Basques. The idea itself was, of course, fantastic. But really it was an inversion, for the real intention was to try and raise the south of France, and pour the men over the frontier, after working up a blind crusading spirit by intensive Communist propaganda. Only a European war could save the Reds, and this might have provoked it. French resentment might assist a *French* rising. A similar rumour was spread in March 1938 with similar hopes when Franco's attack on Catalonia was rushing forward.

We are informed by eye-witnesses that even obviously unnecessary earthworks and anti-aircraft protection were initiated near Irun, and east of it, to give colour to the scheme.

The most blatant inversion of all, perhaps, was the news also published to the effect that the Nationalists were establishing secret centres for organization at Perpignan, which, as even' reasonably informed person is aware, is the Red centre of the Non-Intervention "racket".

The following particulars we have taken from the *Politica*, October 9th, 1937:

"FASCIST AUDACIES

"THE MANCINI PLAN FOR THE INVASION OF THE FRANCO-BASQUE COUNTRY"

(Charles Reber, special reporter of *Regards* of Paris, is the author.)

" . . . With documents and irrefutable proofs which are to-day in the hands of the Government, we revealed in *Ce Soir* that the Italian General Mancini, who commanded the Italians in their offensive against Santander, had elaborated a complete plan for overrunning and an *armed invasion of the French Basque country*,¹ with a view to assisting the 'French National Movement' against the Popular Front Government.

" For weeks past the *Mancini plan*¹ was known in high circles, and this resulted in the adoption recently of visible measures of security in the French Basque country. We are now able to give important details about this famous plan.

" In Burgos on the 14th April ... the Italian General laid before Franco's General Staff his scheme for letting loose

¹ Note the inversion.

a revolt in France,¹ which would at once have repercussions on Catalonia. High German officials of the Reichswehr were present.

"The plan consisted of *nothing less than spreading TERROR during August and September amongst the inhabitants of France*¹ by means of outrages so that the French 'Nationalists' could exploit them politically. The decisive blow was planned for the night of 5th October. The French Fascists were to take up arms, making use of the consignments in vast quantity which have been *smuggled as contraband over the Pyrenees*¹ frontier. It is known that at the commencement of September four wagon-loads of arms and munitions, of German origin, were situated on the other side of the Pyrenees for the immediate introduction into French territory.

"This arms contraband traffic was directed by Troncoso, by Ibanez, his assistant, who worked in conjunction with various German officers, and a certain Echenique.

"It is interesting that some of this *contraband had been successfully introduced into French territory*.¹ Depots of arms—German repeating pistols of 9-mm. bore—were accumulated in Paris, in Angers, and in numerous villages of the Pyrenees, especially in Asquin. . . . The police and Customs Authorities have material proofs that this contraband was intensified and reached its peak in recent weeks.¹

"It was decided that on the evening of 8th October disorders should be created in Hendaye and Saint Jean de Luz, provoked by the Basque Fascists. During the night, and at a previously agreed time coinciding with high water, the armed units of the French Fascists . . . joining up with troops of Franco, were to cross the frontier and occupy the national road No. 10. Simultaneously, various motorized columns were to cross the International Bridge at Hendaye and Behovia, after reducing to impotence the mobile guards, the Customs men and the police. Other armed groups were charged with crossing the Pyrenees by the Rhune, which had been fortified by German engineers, in order to go to the assistance of the French 'Nationalists'.

"Meanwhile, in Fuenterrabia, Pasajes and San Sebastian, numerous transport vessels were concentrated for transportation to the other side of the River Bidasoa and disembarking

¹ Inversion.

at various points on the Basque coasts armed units who were to attack the defenders of Hendaye from the rear.

"General Mancini considered that two hours would be sufficient for carrying out this manoeuvre. The immediate object was that a 'National' rising in the French Basque country should be discussed, *taking advantage of the situation* which such a thing *thus produced in France*,¹ to carry out other bold strokes and thus make an end of Republican Spain.

"... This plan of *terrorist aggression*¹ by General Mancini is precisely the same as occurred in Yugoslavia . . . when the Duce . . . ordered an armed invasion against Liki in Dalmatia. . . . The scheme of invasion of the French Basque country¹ is almost an exact twin of the movement by the 'Ustachis' in Yugoslavia and the attempted invasion of Dalmatia. And when one mentions the fact already known to the French police that the Italo-German terrorist organizations of Franco are manufacturing bombs at Pasajes for outrages in France, is it necessary to bring forward further proofs?

"The Mancini plan has failed, thanks to the disclosures which were made. . . . To re-establish the position in the French Basque country¹, energetic measures are necessary. The frontier with rebel Spain must be closed . . . and responsibilities must be exacted from those responsible for this condition of civil war. . . . The purge has commenced and must be continued without hesitation."

Here is the perfect specimen of inversion.

It will be observed that almost every sentence contains an inversion of the real position in the French Basque country¹, where open recruitment for the Red army has been proceeding since the commencement of the Civil War. Not one single man has been prosecuted for enlistment, or prevented by proceedings from enlisting. And it is most important, too, that the atmosphere could have been so prepared that an article of this kind was seriously published, without fear of it being so ridiculed as to damage its own objects.

Most people only read one morning newspaper. They are bound to be influenced by what they read in the paper of their choice. Especially is this true in such a paper as the *Nexus Chronicle*, which can boast among its subscribers many who would certainly, and with justification, consider themselves

¹ Inversion.

"enlightened". Here are two newspapers reporting the same story on the same day:

The News Chronicle: "British warship to the rescue. Rebel warships are reported to have *attacked* the steam yacht *Goizeko-lzarra*, *transporting* Basque children to France. The yacht was *saved* by a British -warship and *sought refuge* in Saint Jean de Luz." (The italics are ours.)

The Daily Telegraph: "British yacht pursued. The British yacht IVarnor, formerly the Basque yacht *Goizeko-lzarra*, *lately engaged* in evacuating children from Bilbao, *returned hastily* to Saint Jean de Luz to-day and reported that off the north coast of Spain she had been pursued by Nationalist armed vessels. . . . The *Warrior* made off to French territorial waters, wirelessing at the same time for help to a British warship. When the latter arrived on the scene the Nationalist ships put about and ceased the pursuit."

We have mentioned the two inversions concerning the German occupation of Morocco and the Italian seizure of Majorca. The campaign in connection with the former was openly stated to have cost 10,000,000 francs, and there was great rejoicing in the circles in which the money was distributed. Yet the legitimate Government itself was hawking these Spanish territories in the Chancelleries, and our own Foreign Office disclosed details of how they were offering the Balearics weeks before the hypocritical campaign was launched.

Before passing from the ordinary Press output we will very briefly refer to two other items of news, the "Basque children" and the "destruction of Cangas de Onis".

The "Basque children" was designed as a Communist stunt to obtain wide publicity and to give a peg upon which to hang "sob stuff" and "heart interest". If it had any useful object other than this, so far as the Communists were concerned, it was to get British support and protection for exporting children to Russia and Mexico. And they sent thousands to be trained as Communists, so that they could one day return, with no knowledge of their parents, to spread the doctrines of infamy in their native country—unfortunate creatures, taken away to be fed upon the same kind of "information", "history" and "doctrine" as we have described in these pages. We do not propose to deal further with this subject except to state that in the *Catholic Herald* the fullest details

were given of the plot, and the advantages described by Señor Lizana of the Basque (Euzkadi) delegation in London to be derived by arranging this act of "Non-Intervention" as regards its propaganda value.

The other and last example to which we propose to revert of the many which we give relates to the alleged bombing and wanton destruction by General Franco of the town of Cangas de Onis. Some details of this are given in Chapter XI. The north of Spain was virtually in the hands of the Nationalists. As they knew, though it was concealed in England, nothing could have stopped them there, or, later, in the rest of Spain. General Franco's sole object was to avoid unnecessary destruction and the necessity for rebuilding. At times they have done so at the cost of valuable time and lives. As usual, with that in mind, the Nationalists left this town well to the rear before they occupied it; and when they found they had to fly, the anarchists tried to destroy the most important parts of the town. Radio Toulouse itself, Red enough to suit the most ardent Communist, announced the fact. The defenders were merely carrying out the ordinary first principles of the anarchists enjoined on them by Belarmino Tomas and their other leaders. They were doing no more than they had done at Irun, Guernica, Rodiezmo, Pola de Gordon, Amorebieta, Tarna, Rigoitia, Eibar, Santa Elena, Campo de Caso, Felmin and the dozens of villages of Leon, and at a hundred other places. But the Reds had suffered another obvious defeat, the town was an important one, and the messages went out that here was another "Fascist atrocity"—"a second Guernica".

The falsehoods propagated by this enormous machine were so numerous that it would be impossible for any investigator to unravel all of them. But perhaps one of the most eloquent proofs of its operation was the letter, of which we have seen a facsimile, from Belarmino Tomas himself to his wife just before he fled to Gijon, stating that so far he had been safe, for the Nationalists had never bombed any part of Gijon except where there had been obvious military objectives and the harbour. Is that the impression received in England?

Passing from the ordinary daily papers, we come to the innumerable pamphlets printed and circulated by the Communists and their friends. We have not space to deal with many, and therefore refer to two only—one in England and one abroad issued under the name of M. Bayet, better known


in France than in England, to justify the *thousands* of Communist atrocities. By the usual method of inversion, they point out that all the cases quoted are due to the "Fascists"; and in case that is not enough, where Right Wing people have been murdered the cases are ascribed to "Fascist" *agents provocateurs*. Even the murder of Calvo Sotelo was ascribed to "Fascist" *agents provocateurs* in the pamphlet *Spain To-day*.¹

It would be difficult to imagine a more absurd suggestion. One could understand, for example, the Russian Communists ordering the murder of Léon Blum. For, when a man of his type has served his purpose, a man reputed to be of great wealth, they have lost nothing, and he is merely a cipher from then onwards. But parties of the Right Wing have no need nor incentive to murder their leaders and the most valuable men fighting for their cause. Quite apart from that, the facts are perfectly well known, and the Government, cynical though it was, was finally forced to arrest members of their private army, the Shock Police, for the part they played in these assassinations. Apparently also the "Fascist" *agents provocateurs* had called for Señores Gil Robles and Goicoechea at their houses, but had not found them at home. These well-known facts—well known in Spain—do not prevent the obvious nonsense of this suggestion about "Fascist" *agents provocateurs* from being repeated in that widely circulated and expensively got up pamphlet, prominently displayed and sold on the bookstalls in England.

It is interesting too, that, in this same pamphlet, the dreadful atrocities so irrefutably evidenced in the Nationalist official report are reproduced as if they had been the work of the "Fascists".


This wave of dirty water is of such volume that one despairs of finding a means of ever removing all its evil effects. So much of these "facts" is bound to remain. The scenes of the most unspeakable Red atrocities are made to appear as by-words of "Fascist terrorism", not by a relation of fact, but by a mere repetition of statements without evidence or foundation. One thing, however, we can state, namely, that to an innocent-minded person reading such material, indignation might be stirred to the point of violence, as indeed occurred in

¹ *Spain To-day*. Price 2d. It was excellently produced, and profusely illustrated. The contributors included Professor J. B. S. Haldane.



AI.IAGA (THE MON'TAI.BA.X FRONT), TERUF.I.

facing page 464



Spain, under the urge of the wave of similar publications. Is that the object?

The typical propaganda pamphlet, *Attentats et Terreur*, with a preface by Albert Bayet, is issued by "The Franco-Spanish Committee, Paris". It may be assumed that the authors have missed nothing which they could quote to prove

"Fascist terrorism, which is supposed to have provoked "the populace", "the democratic masses" or "the people" in Spain in 1934, 1935 and 1936. Summarized, it is as follows:

In 1934» in seven months, a claim that, in all, Fascists were responsible directly or indirectly for eight deaths. They included the death of an anti-Fascist who, it was claimed, was shot by a fascist because the former tried to prevent the latter from distributing tracts. In other words, there was a man killed during a dispute following an aggression by the man killed. Another was a young Communist shot by Civil Guards; and two others, peasants, who, they claimed, were shot by Civil Guards. In other words, these two cases where the ordinary forces of law and order came into violent conflict in circumstances not described, also come under the heading of "Fascist aggressions".

In 1935, twelve months, the total list numbers five killed and two reported unsuccessful attempts to kill. This is the total they had been able to ascribe to the "Fascists", including cases which, on the face of it, are likely to have been internal squabbles between rival gunmen or members of the fiercely antagonistic secret societies of the secret organizations.

In 1936, the total is brought up to nineteen, up to the 13th July—i.e. in just over six months, ascribing everything that rightly or wrongly could be ascribed to "Fascists", the best they can produce is a claim of nineteen victims out of the hundreds of people killed by the Left Wing organizers and supporters throughout the country, during this period of "revolutionary effervescence" which was being fomented.

These figures, taken from an acknowledged Communist propaganda pamphlet (printed by the Co-operative Ltoile) are in themselves the final answer to the inversion of the facts so freely invoked by the friends and agents of the Communist

International, and their subsections and societies. This evidence of inversion is all the more reinforced by the facts which can be certified by anyone who wishes himself to consult the *Mundo Obrero* or the more moderate *Vanguardia* or *El Sol*, from which it will be seen that *everybody who is anti-Communist* comes under the description of a "Fascist", including even extreme Marxists like the P.O.U.M. or any rival labour organization usually described as "Fascists in the pay of Franco". In every violent dispute or riot at an election meeting, the casualties are similarly ascribed to the enemies of the Comintern, in order to fan the flames of popular resentment and class hatred and identify themselves with the defence of "the People".

Another example of "Fascist" atrocities, recounted in this same pamphlet, this time as regards Italy, is of an anarchist student, Pietro Paolo Antoni, "arrested in connection with a Fascist-anarchist plot"(!), in whose car two bombs were found (23rd March, 1921). Here was a case where the evidence so clearly proved that it was an anarchist, that even the compiler of these records was compelled to invent the term "Fascist-anarchist".

And as an example of a Fascist attack in France on the 24th September, 1937, we have "General Miller disappears. His collaborator, Scobline, is in flight. His wife is arrested on the demand of the comrades of General Miller!"

Reducing the figure to whatever it ought to have been, we may now compare this record of the "Fascists" in Spain, admitting all the Communist claims, with the lists of murders and aggressions in the country during the disastrous history of the Republic and the last four and a half months of organized Communist terror. No less than 350,000 non-combatants have since been murdered in cold blood, so far as we know to-day. As for the earlier period we refer to Chapters II, IV, VII and VIII.

So much for Justice.

In the same way it will be appreciated that the International Communist point of view and the influence which it exerts upon English opinion by continuous repetition depends upon creating a monopoly, or at least a heavy preponderance, of the written matter circulating in this country. For this some measure of complicity must necessarily have been arranged. To obtain this necessary preponderance it is

amazing to what lengths they will go and how detailed is their organization. To give one example: at the end of 1937, for a period of nearly two months, the ordinary Nationalist newspaper *was sent off in the usual way failed to reach* those to whom they were addressed in England. Sometimes they could be obtained through roundabout routes, but only with additional delay, but those dispatched by the ordinary short route through France arrived but rarely.

The reason lies in the fact that, as part of a wide and far-seeing strategy, the Communist machine concentrated upon communications *of all kinds* even to the institution and use of cells within the postal organizations. It was by this same influence that for months at the beginning of the war it was impossible to send letters to Nationalist Spain *except through Barcelona*. This was not publicly announced. The letters were posted and were simply sent by that route, so that the Reds could censor, peruse, copy and utilize the contents.

It will, perhaps, also be remembered that in the early stages of the war hardly any news was coming through from Nationalist Spain by wireless, for their stations were few and weak, and subjected to heavy jamming, by no means usually from Spanish Red stations. For this reason arrangements were made for Spanish news to be broadcast from the friendly Portuguese territory. And as a result, to keep the news to other channels they were influencing, the Communist organizations made an effort by means of bombs to destroy both the radio installations in Portugal, and nearly succeeded.

As regards books, the position is hardly more satisfactory. One of the chief distributors of extreme Left "ideology" is the Left Book Club. We do not propose to give our own views upon this club; we merely quote from a pamphlet issued by the Pro-Deo Commission of Liverpool:

"BEWARE OF THE LEFT BOOK CLUB!"

" 1. The ORGANIZERS are admittedly ' *whole-heartedly in favour of the Popular Front* ', for which the L.B.C. is to prepare the ' mass basis ' (V. Gollancz, at Albert Hall Rally, February 7th, 1937). One of them, John Strachey, is an *official spokesman* of the Communist Party.

" 2. In the CHOICE OF BOOKS the preponderance is on the side of *Communist* publications.

" 3. Of twenty-six principal SPEAKERS at L.B.C. meetings, as announced in *Left News*, between March 15th and June 25th, 1937, *fifteen* were members of the Communist Party, *five* were associated with subsidiary organizations of that party, and *three* were active supporters of the Communist United Front.

" 4. The WORKERS' BOOKSHOP (Communist headquarters in London) is described as ' Subscription Agents ' of the L.B.C. (*Daily Worker*, June 1st, 1936).

" 5. The *Daily Worker*, organ of the Communist Party, has strongly and consistently *supported* the L.B.C.—' that excellent venture' (May 5th, 1936), and *issued appeals* for membership.

" 6. Comrade H. POLLITT, the Communist leader, highly commends the L.B.C. as ' a means for spreading far and wide knowledge of facts and ideas valuable to our movement ' (*Daily Worker*, May 9th, 1936); and as ' a means of bringing forward writers who influence big sections of the population for Marxism '. (Speech at Albert Hall Rally.)

" So the L.B.C. is an organization *inspired and utilized by the Communist Party* to win over the people, and especially the *middle classes*, to the United Front, of which ' *only the Communist Party* is at bottom the initiator, the organizer and the driving force '. (Dimitrov, General Secretary, at Seventh World Congress of Communist International.)"

We are not the slightest bit surprised that under the auspices of Mr. Gollancz a sort of off-shoot of this club was being formed early in 1938 as a " Christian Book Club ", nor that the Dean of Canterbury—the value of whose evidence we have briefly indicated above—should be a prominent figure in that movement. As Mr. Gollancz—or the Dean—said, " God bless the Left Book Club. "

There have also been a number of books intended to indicate the extent of the atrocities committed by the Nationalists, and perhaps one of the most advertised of these was the one by Ramon Sender. We do not suggest that there have been no atrocities in Nationalist territory. In a civil war it would be incredible if incidents could not be found at least to give colour to that suggestion. But they have been rare indeed. That is very different to the picture which this book presents. Just as we dealt with the book of Carlos Prieto in Chapter I

by taking one incriminating but damning example so we propose to deal with Ramon Sender's. He states that 'behind the lines, in cold blood, the Nationalists have slaughtered 750,000 people! To make up this total, arbitrary figures are allotted to various provinces. On the argument that no one knows what might perhaps have occurred, there must be a temptation for a member of the *Cultura Popular* to fill in the figure considered most convenient. But really, it is going a little far to put the shooting *in Pamplona* at 17,000 people. Navarre rose as a man to put down Marxism in Spain. Navarre was solid for Franco. But 17,000 people would have, shall we say, 170,000 friends and relatives; and the whole population of Navarre was less than 500,000. We have seen Navarre in the course of this war, and we repeat that this author must have been blinded by his "ideology", that he has had no means, or has not wished, to check up his facts or those given to him by the Red propaganda official bureau. And unfortunately statements of this kind, "compered" by people whose names are accepted as reliable, come to be quoted as if they were authoritative, or at least based upon some sort of foundation of truth.

One quotation is perhaps sufficient to show the nature of another egregious work. It indicates the kind of information upon which the authoress relies and the standards of her judgment and credulity: "By September news had been received of the death of an evangelist who had been arrested by two officers (friars in uniform) and had been told he must confess his sins to a priest. As he refused to do so, he was clubbed to death by the officers and their men."¹ Shades of Maria Monk!

As is to be expected, the Duchess repeats the usual suggestion that it was customary for men to be shot in Nationalist territory merely for being in possession of a Trades Union card. Almost every workman was a member of one of the Unions; is it suggested that they are *all dead*? We can assure the Duchess that within our knowledge there are Labour leaders and Labour and Government representatives on the old Mixed Juries—who would thus have been married men—still working with their firms and enjoying the same salaries

¹ Duchess of Athol J., *Searchlight on Spain*, p. 254, Penguin Books Ltd. It is the fourth of a new "Penguin Special" Series. The previous three were by Edgar Mowrer, G. T. Garratt and Mine Tabouis.

and privileges as in the past. This slogan of the "death penalty for having a union card" looks suspiciously like the methodical inversion of the usual fate, at the hands of the Reds, of so many who were found to be in possession of a religious emblem.

After studying the methods of the "factory" for a little while, it is amazing how one can almost always forecast the kind of thing -which would be next in the news. A Government defeat would be followed almost invariably by the announcement of some dreadful slaughter of prisoners, already, or about to be, committed by the Nationalists, or a Government victory where there was no movement of the front line; or tremendous casualties from the bombardment of Madrid, or from the bombing of some town or village, with harrowing details of the civilian casualties. The list of (Red) casualties varied where the "carrier" *was even* more enthusiastic than the official who gave out the machine-made messages. If things were desperate, you could confidently expect some act of piracy⁷, or an effort to cause a war by the announcement of some aggression against "a French interest", with a view to justifying action by French Communist Ministers. They nearly succeeded when they bombed the *Deutschland*; and they would have succeeded in March 1938 if restraint had not been put on the French Government when certain Ministers wanted to send regular divisions of the French Army across the Pyrenees.

In order to understand the nature of this fiction factory, one should recall the words of Mr. Baldwin. As he said of Communism, so also the real Communist, the *Marxista puro*, will "kill rather than brook opposition". He is a fanatic who will stick at nothing. Respect for life does not weigh with him, far less respect for truth. For the sake of the party no lie is too unscrupulous. Imagine, therefore, the output of this factory, very cleverly and intelligently conducted by evil people of Oriental origin, with international aims, determined to smash national ideals to achieve their purpose — the men to whom perversion is almost a beloved art, a second nature. And, with regret, we feel there is overwhelming evidence that they have powerful assistance in England.

There are many people, with far better information than ours, who have been forced to the same conclusion. We

repeat here what we stated in Chapter V—the words of Pius XI:

"There is another explanation for the rapid diffusion of the Communistic ideas now penetrating into every nation, great and small, advanced and backward, so that no corner of the earth is free from them. This explanation is to be found in a propaganda so truly diabolical that the world has perhaps never witnessed its like before. It is directed from one common centre. It is shrewdly adapted to the varying conditions of diverse peoples. It has at its disposal great financial resources, innumerable organizations, international congresses, and countless trained workers. It makes use of newspapers and pamphlets, of cinema, theatre and wireless, of schools and even universities. Little by little it penetrates into all classes of the people, even the more influential who perhaps have not noticed the poison which increasingly pervades their minds and hearts."

And again:

"A third powerful factor in the diffusion of Communism is the conspiracy of silence on the part of a large section of the non-Catholic Press of the world. We say conspiracy, because it is impossible otherwise to explain how a Press usually so eager to exploit even the little daily incidents of life has been able to remain silent for so long about the horrors perpetrated in Russia, in Mexico, and even in a great part of Spain; and that it should have relatively so little to say concerning a world organization as vast as Russian Communism. This silence is due in part to short-sighted political policy, and is favoured by various occult forces which for a long time have been working for the overthrow of the Christian social order."

Once more also let us quote words of Victor Serge, to corroborate these views of the Pope's. It would be a brave man who suggested they were in any way in league with each other:

"Never has there been brought into play, the one against the other, such low and demoralizing methods as those of Stalinism (and the Third International, its instrument) in a continuous stream and at long range without heed for the truth. The method of repetition and cynicism have become almost mechanical. . . . The Soviet bureaucracy is plotting this procedure on an international scale. Every infamy given out by a correspondent of *Izvestia* at Valencia is at once taken

up in a chorus by the special papers in Paris, Stockholm, Oslo, Brussels, London, New York, Melbourne and Buenos Aires. . . . Millions of copies of infamous lies are circulated, the only information for millions of Soviet workers. English, American, Chinese and New Zealand papers reproduce them (by order). . . . Advanced intellectuals who think they are anti-Fascist will appear to believe them. . . . One sees that a formidable enterprise of demoralization is functioning in the universe, and I find pitilessly just the words of Trotsky that the Stalinite Comintern propaganda is a ' syphilis of the workers' movement '.¹

It will be observed that the words of the Marxist writer once more faithfully reflect the same views and conclusions as the Holy Father, though his wording differs.

And in case even two such authorities do not carry sufficient weight, we would add that the same views have been publicly expressed and published in France by M. Flandin. But, as we fully expected, his sensational pronouncement was not blazoned across the pages of the British newspapers. As to the reason why, we offer no prize for the answer.

It took time for all this to become apparent to men disposed to take their news in good faith. But after a year and a half, it became sufficiently apparent to drive Dean Inge on to the public platform for the only time to refer to this "systematic organized lying".

If the facts we have related in the previous thirteen chapters, the facts of the battles like Brunete and all the other "curious" news, come as new to the reader, he may well ask himself what else could be the reason but what these men and ourselves are forced to believe.

And we would ask our readers also calmly to look back over the past year (1937) and consider whether they have not seen repeated, frequently repeated, efforts, in all directions, and in the most ingenious ways, to promote ill-will between the nations, and efforts, even more direct than that, to cause a general war, and as often as not in the name of Peace!

We may take it, then, that there are these accomplices—whether they are labelled Communist or under whatever other guise they may adopt. We do not suggest that all these

¹ Maurin, *Revolution et contrerevolution en Espagne*, footnote by Victor Serge.

accomplices are fully conscious of where things are going. The very nature of the Press itself to-day has made the task of perfecting the machine a simple one. When John Swinton left from the editorship of the *New York Tribune*, he was called upon to reply, at the banquet given in his honour, to the toast of "An Independent Press". He said: "There is no such thing in America as an independent Press. You know it, as I know it. There is not one of you who would dare to write his honest opinions, and if he did, you would know beforehand it would never appear in print. I am paid two hundred and fifty dollars a week to keep my honest opinions out of the paper I am connected with. Others of you are paid similar salaries for similar work. The business of the journalist is to destroy the truth, to lie outright, to pervert, to vilify, to fawn at the feet of Mammon, and to sell himself, his country and his race for his daily bread. You know this, and I know it; and what folly is this to be toasting 'An Independent Press'?"

What most of us see in the paper we usually take, or in the several papers which many of us take, is bad enough. But it is nothing to the spate of information quietly circulated, without the knowledge of those others who do not move in the circles approached by the propagandists—small factories, isolated areas and individual trades. And always with the same inspiration, the same disregard for truth and actively malignant intention—to stir up hatred between man and man. And under cover of noble sentiments and aspirations, atmosphere and opinion amongst the *majority of the voters* is being insidiously moulded. That moulding has many obvious dangers, and not the least is the fact that these people are the voters who return the Members to Parliament, and upon whom the political lives of our Ministers are therefore dependent. The temptation to the careerist is very strong, even where no other inducements are forthcoming.

Are not the dangers of this self-evident? The sincere Communist is a sincere "International"—whatever that may mean. Every branch of his party is under the orders of the Comintern and the group which control both it and Russian policy. If the order came, would they not feel bound to sabotage our war industries, to break down the discipline and machinery of our armies, in the cause of the proletarian Work Revolution? The answer, which their own text-books supply,

is in the affirmative. If they follow their text-books, as may be assumed, they are a secret organization pledged to work as spies in the interest of policies which no sane man could identify with British policies. And from whom would their political leaders feel disposed to take their orders?

CHAPTER XV

THE DRAGON IS MORTALLY WOUNDED

WITH the fall of Gijon towards the end of October 1937, the Asturian and the whole northern front had ceased to exist. But there was much clearing up to be done and the troops needed time for reorganization and rest after months of heavy fighting.

Until mid-December there was little military activity, but the collapse of the north had consequences in other quarters which close observers had anticipated. An effort was made once more to break down Non-Intervention, in the hope that a European war might yet save the day, and labour leaders and others in several countries were approached in order to get them to use their influence to urge upon their Governments policies which would tend towards that end. On the 5th November *77ie Times* reported that the Labour Party was calling for arms for the Spanish "Government" through its Spain Campaign Committee, and a month later we find Mr. Attlee in Madrid blessing the British units and the International Brigade, together with Miss Ellen Wilkinson and Mr. Noel Baker. "As the Internationale was played, they all joined in the clenched fist salute."¹ The visit was a forerunner to the one paid by British Labour Members of Parliament to Barcelona in January concerning w'hich the local newspaper, *Solidaridad Obrera*, of 13th January, reported remarks by Mr. Shinwell, M.P. (following speeches by a Mr. Strauss, M.P., and others), as follows:

"‘ For us there has been no other Government but that of the Republic. Perhaps we also shall not be long in treating the British Government and Mr. Eden as you are now treating Franco, the Italians and the Germans ’ (enormous ovation).”

A similar offensive, with the same inspirations, was opened in France, as may be confirmed by reading the Press of that

country, and also elsewhere, notably in the U.S.A.

At the same time word seems to have been given that there was no longer such need to conceal in the Press the extent of the French intervention. It was time to come out more into the open, and the fine Red French example was a good thing *pour encourager les autres*.

Meanwhile General Franco showed no signs of military activity, and suddenly on 15th December the Reds attacked the Teruel salient with very large forces and an enormous amount of equipment. "General Franco short of men", had cried the Reds; but at this stage they had not started the cry "The Government short of munitions." That cry was only emphasized after the crushing defeat which followed.

It would take too much space to describe the operations in detail, and we will, therefore, state merely that in five days of hard fighting the Reds reached the suburbs of Teruel by a huge concentration of men and sheer weight of munitions. Very few guns were captured, which indicates the nature of the defence, which consisted of posts spaced at intervals of about one kilometre or more. The Nationalist counter-attack developed from the north-east and north along the high road, and in the south from Albarracin, and in this first trial of strength they succeeded in pushing the enemy back several miles. From then onwards there were a series of violent engagements, for now the two forces engaged were more equal in numbers. Gradually the Reds were pushed back, sometimes a mile, sometimes two miles, and by 31st December contact with the beleaguered garrison in Teruel was temporarily established and commanding positions occupied in a semicircle round the town. But at this stage heavy snowstorms and a temperature far below zero rendered troop movements practically impossible, and the remains of Teruel fell to the Reds on the 7th January.

On the 17th January General Aranda captured important positions north of the city which enabled a brilliant stroke to be initiated on the 5th February. In three days, by a lightning converging movement, they captured the whole of the Sierra Palomera, and destroyed as a fighting force the enemy army opposed to them on that front. This done, by a further series of desperate engagements they steadily pushed back the enemy from the heights to the east of the town, which was completely surrounded and was entered on 22nd February.

STAGES OF THE TERUEL-PYRENEES OFFENSIVE, FEBRUARY-MAY, 1938

1. Alfambra battle Feb.
1938-
Area 240 square miles.

—
2* and 2^b. Advance south
of Ebro River.
Commencing line, 9th
March.
— line 12th March.
Finishing line, 15th
March.
Area 2,000 square miles.


—
3®. Advance north of the
Ebro.
Commencing 22nd March.
— line 27th March.
— line 31st March.
Finishing early April.

—
3^b. Mountainous area
cleared after 7th April.

—
4. The drive to the
Coast.
— line at 12th April.
Finishing line, 20th April.
Area 2,000 square miles.


—
5. Mountainous area
cleared during May.
Area 1,000 square miles.

—
Total area captured, over
10,000 square miles.



Areas 2®, 2^b, 3® and 3^b together are some 8,000 square miles—rather larger than the whole of Wales. Every useful bridge was destroyed, and the roads were not available for heavy traffic, artillery, etc., till June.


The finishing line north of the Ebro through Lérida, Balaguer, Tremp and Sort was the scene of a tremendous but unsuccessful Red offensive at the end of May against the bridge-heads.





SNOW ON THE TERUEL FRONT

{facing page 478



The recapture of Teruel was of little importance territorially. The roads to it from the north-east and on towards Madrid to the west were already cut. Its strategic importance to the Reds—the shortening of the road to Madrid from Catalonia—had already been nullified. What mattered was that the great Red offensive had been shattered and the Red army brought to engagement and demoralized. Over 400 square miles of territory were captured by the Nationalists, much of it held by the Reds since the earliest days of the war; 17,000 prisoners were taken in February alone; some 10,000 enemy dead had been buried off the field; and the total losses of the Reds could not have been less than the very conservative estimate of 55,000, given by the Nationalist High Command.

Every effort was made to minimize the Nationalist success. It was stalemate, and Franco's plan for his great offensive had been shattered. According to one "military correspondent" of some standing—and he was not alone—it almost appeared as if Franco was rather worse off than before: "So far as there has been any marked change in the *stalemate* during recent months, it would seem *militarily* to be in favour of the *Government* side. It would seem that the food situation on the Government side is improving. . . . Should this continue and go far enough to relieve the present belt tension, Franco's prospects may increasingly wane" (note the "increasingly"!). . . . "This does not *necessarily*¹ mean that the Nationalist position would *collapse*. So powerful is the grip of the modern machine-gun, and consequent resisting power, that the frustration of offensives may continue long enough to convince the most resolute enthusiast on either side that *there is more to be lost than gained by persistence* in them."²

It would seem that the military correspondents of several of our papers were no better guides than some of the special "diplomatic correspondents" whose effusions appeared in other papers from time to time. We do not attack their good faith, but we would point out how they and their opinions were consistently misled by the preponderance of news conveying a false impression. And when that occurs even with military and diplomatic experts, the ordinary man is indeed in an unfortunate case.

The direct consequences of this Teruel battle were felt

¹ On 7th February, 1938, after the Palomera (Teruel) bank.

early in March, about a fortnight later, when a series of operations was begun by successive Nationalist armies thrown into the battle on a front of over two hundred miles. The cry "Franco short of men" gave place to the cry—equally false, "The Government short of munitions". In six weeks the Nationalist columns swept like a great arm, based upon Vivel del Rio, clearing the country south of the Ebro from below Zaragoza to Alcañiz and Caspe, with a radius of some fifty miles and a penetration of about the same distance. Then a violent attack from Huesca diverted attention north of the Ebro and threatened the rear of the Red lines before Zaragoza. The Ebro was crossed in the rear of the Red Huesca-Zaragoza line at its southern end, the river being crossed, from the newly won territory on the right bank, by 1,000 men sent across secretly in boats at night to form a bridge-head whilst a pontoon was being flung across the river, 100 yards wide, for the Moroccan Army Corps to dash forward into the heart of the enemy's country. They swept forward until well over 2,000 square miles of territory had been taken, and, before the Reds could recover, the great bridge-head and fortifications along the line of the Cinca River were penetrated and taken in reverse in the course of a single day's fighting.

Then, south of the Ebro, the troops burst through from Alcañiz and severed Catalonia north of the Ebro from the rest of Red Spain. Finally, in April, a new army corps suddenly came to life north-east of Teruel to help the Galicians who had swung round to face south-west after they had reached the coast. In the north two armies pushed forward almost to the limits of Andorra and completely destroyed the Red forces opposed to them. The whole of the provinces of Huesca and Zaragoza were freed, and Lerida and Castellon provinces were invaded. By the end of March—in three weeks—9,000 square miles of territory had already been occupied and over 18,000 prisoners taken in that month alone.

Needless to say, in every town or village captured the Nationalists found the same things as usual where the Reds had been in authority—churches systematically desecrated and used as stables or munition dumps, and evidence of the terror by the local Chekas. In towns like Lerida and Teruel, or the small villages of the Sierra Palomera—everywhere it was the same story. For example, when Belchite fell to the Reds, a triumphal entry was made by the "great General",

the *Campesino*, and by the *Pasionaria*. On the 21st September, 1937th local "authority", commonly known as the "Melancholy One", suppressed money and took over all bank funds in exchange for "Municipal Bonds Three hundred and twenty-five people were shot in the first week, including every one of the eighteen café proprietors except a Red, who obtained the monopoly. At Caspe sentences had been entrusted to a boy of fourteen to carry out, and the clergy—Capucins—burnt alive with petrol. One thousand seven hundred were condemned to death, including twenty-eight of the thirty ecclesiastics. For thirteen months Bujaraloz was a "libertarian republic" founded by Durruti; details are unnecessary.

Fraga and Barbastro—it was the same. They were shooting their victims at the rate of two hundred a day at one time in the latter place—or otherwise destroying them—for it was a sort of local "capital". They flogged its twenty-seven ecclesiastics through the streets to the cemetery, where they cut off the Bishop's hands, and then told him to bless them, if he could. He did so with the stump before they shot him. And, of course, they had their last fling before they bolted, and those of the inhabitants "who could not escape into the country and hide were, as usual, threatened with death if they tried to remain behind. And many, of course, were slaughtered in cold blood.

We must leave the rest of this tragedy untold. Our indignation and disgust at the cynical silence of our Press and its mechanical substitution of the Red propaganda to cover the terrible story is too great for us to express in words. The "peace" maintained by terror and "elimination" has filled with admiration so many Red apologists. We leave the verdict to the future, when the full story can obtain a proper hearing.

Neither artificial lines of fortifications, more formidable than the Iron Belt, nor natural defences like the river valleys and ravines had been able to stay the tremendous *élan* of General Franco's troops. If, however, there had previously been any doubt as to the final issue—and after the fall of Asturias there could have been little—this offensive placed it beyond question. The Reds were deprived of their last coal-field, half their rice-producing area, and the source of most of the electric power required for their industries, and the


striking power of their best troops, the International Brigades, was utterly destroyed. General Franco said: "The war is ended."

By counter-attacking after the enemy had been demoralized by their unsuccessful attack, and striking whilst the reserves were engaged elsewhere, and by the terrific speed with which the Sierra Palomera was surrounded and the Moroccan Army Corps rushed through Fraga on the Cinca during the enemy rout, General Franco was able to capture seemingly impregnable lines, and thus saved many lives. It was not in heavy artillery that the secret lay, for heavy artillery could not move at such a pace nor be used in the mountainous country on either flank of the long line when once the advance was well begun. Nor did the secret lie in material preponderance. For example, let us quote from *The Times* military correspondent on the question of transport—and, as we have remarked, his article is clearly not biased in favour of the Nationalists:

"In both *quality* and *quantity*¹ their (i.e. the Government's) motor-transport would seem to be superior to that of the other side."

There is ample reason to endorse this statement. Chassis and engines had been pouring over from France in thousands. As regards war material generally, we would quote from the leading article of *The Times* of 25th February, 1938, only a fortnight before the March offensive: "The Republican complaint that the Nationalists have been better supplied with war material from abroad reads strangely." Admittedly Franco was attaining a superiority in war material, but that is because he has the whole of his original rearguard working for him heart and soul, and now also the whole output of the industrial provinces along the north coast. He now had also the whole of the equipment captured from the Red armies in the northern campaign. The Reds were short of competent industrial experts, admittedly. You cannot get work out of those you have murdered. But as to supplies from abroad, whatever the regulations, they were not likely to cease reaching the Reds from France and elsewhere until every penny of the "Government's" foreign currencies had disappeared. It was cynically suggested to us early in 1937 ^{at the} war would not be permitted to cease until all that money had gone;

¹ Our italics.



/Reproduced from Heraldo de Aragon

PROPOSED CROSS AT VFNTA DE FARINAS, ON THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN ARACON AND CATALUNA. THE WELL, 10 FEET IN DIAMETER AND OVER 40 FEET DEEP, WAS FOUND IN APRIL 1938 FULL OF BODIES, ESTIMATED TO NUMBER AT LEAST 400

and there is little doubt this view was correct.

Nor was it the "Germans and Italians" (*pace* Mr. Shinwell) "who won the day. Seven great army corps were set in motion, and of these a part of one only was composed of Italian volunteers — namely, the "Volunteer Army" of General Garcia Escamez, composed of four divisions, one of which was a mixed division, 95% Spanish, and another was the 15th Volunteer division of Spanish shock troops. The Italians numbered less than 25,000. The other six armies were: General Solchaga's army corps of Navarre; General Moscardo's army corps of Aragon; General Yagiee's army corps of Morroco; a division under General Garcia Valinõ, partly made up of Basque troops; General Aranda's army corps of Galicians; and General Varela's army corps of Castilla. There were also some Falangist units and General Monasterio's cavalry brigade, which did some amazing work, largely in providing machine-gun units. And, if they were wanted, there were many troops in reserve, and along the further seven hundred miles of front.

Whatever foreign pressure might be brought to bear, and whatever its results, in the great fight on the field of battle the Dragon was mortally wounded.

Brilliant and considered audacity in strategy and tactics achieved this extraordinary victory, which bore the stamp of General Franco at every stage. It was principally due to superior generalship, infinitely better morale, and more and better trained men. It was the *spirit* throughout both the higher and the lower ranks. Neither the high command nor the troops were fighting with one eye on a line of retreat into France. Incidentally, whilst east of Andorra the poor civilians who sought to escape the terror in Catalonia were turned back by the frontier guards to be slaughtered or conscripted unwillingly and driven into action, tens of thousands of the Red militia cut off west of Andorra fled across the frontier, more often than not without firing a shot, and were sent back by the French round the other side of Andorra to fight again. There were 9,000 reported on one day alone. The officials of the south of France were, indeed, strictly neutral!

That, in brief, is the explanation of this decisive phase of the Spanish Civil War. Its story is, in our view, the justification of almost everything we have already said in these pages. If one might regard the two territories as temporarily two nations, the fault in the Red nation was its national philosophy

—in so far as it was absorbed from its “Authorities” by a part of the inhabitants—and lack of support by the remainder. National philosophy and morale are largely, if not principally, a question of the right type of leadership. And as General Duval stated of the earlier operations elsewhere in Spain: “On the one side there was Franco—on the other, nothing.”

CHAPTER XVI

“ARRIBA ESPAÑA!”

IN 1936, before the Civil War broke out, any Spaniard who cried in public, “*Viva España!*” invited insult and persecution; not infrequently, death. After the outbreak, in “Government” territory, it meant death for a certainty. The explanation of the whole conflict was proclaimed by the war-cries which each side adopted—heard upon all sides, published in the Press, placarded on the walls of the buildings—on the one side “*Viva España!*” and “*Viva Cristo Rey!*” “Christ the King!” on the other “*Viva Rusia!*” “Long live the Dictatorship of the Proletariat”, “Long live the World Revolution”, or the anarchists’ and Communists’ slogan, “Unite, Proletarian Brotherhood” (“U.H.P.”). All the past wars of kings, dynasties, or nations, all the wars for conquest, commerce, or religion, compare but feebly with this civil war in Spain, for the reason that its roots go deeper than those of any previous war in history. It was the resistance of a nation in defence of its whole spiritual and material heritage against a depraved, alien philosophy.

Never before has such intensive and carefully thought out use of disorder and evil itself been employed in so cold and calculating a manner, as a means of attaining to Government, and as the preliminary stage leading up to the eventual tyranny. Spain was “the victim of a vast Communist plot”, a plot which set out to destroy her soul, to exploit her weaknesses, to ruin even her material well-being, to bring about the necessary “pre-requisite conditions” for the fulfilment of the ultimate aims.

The chief weapon employed was propaganda. Propaganda in the Press; articles in papers with apparently quite different ideals and standards; wireless broadcasts from abroad, pamphlets that only the proselytes received, unknown to others; emissaries who preached openly, adapting the strength and

nature of their arguments to their audiences; men who preached secretly in the widely organized political clubs; and, perhaps above all, by clandestine transmission of thoughts and programmes through the medium of the Communist and other cells which were created throughout the country. So far as organization and concentrated effort and money could achieve it, opinion in every stratum of society was thus moulded in the service of the Cause of the "Party". It was an attack not merely upon the opinions, but upon the very soul of the nation.

It is indeed amazing what an effect can be produced upon a nation, or within a country, by concentrated propaganda. Many readers will no doubt remember its effect upon their own minds in the course of the Great War of 1914. It may safely be said to-day that it was not merely the attack by Germany upon the liberties and rights of the Belgians which animated the British Government to declare war, nor led each individual who volunteered to volunteer, nor the soldiers of all kinds to fight to their utmost, even to death. Why then did they do it? It was very largely the moulding of opinion, and the Government's ability to do so, which produced the unanimity in the nation. And this argument holds good without attacking the soundness of the grounds upon which we entered the war. Greater violations of rights and aggressions against national or individual liberties have many times before failed to produce a similar reaction, and will fail many times in the future, whether it be a war of material interests, or, what is vastly more important, a war for the defence of great ideals.

So it has been in Germany. The German nation has had the best possible grounds for desiring to reunite its members; but the great national surge, and the undoubted support of the Führer by a major part of the nation, could never have been produced, nor could his policies ever have been pursued successfully without this great weapon, the moulding of the opinion of the people by propaganda.

It is the same in Russia. Whatever terrorist means have been employed—as they had been in a previously unheard-of manner—to maintain the autocratic Soviet Government in power, it is probably true that, by reason of the intensive shaping of the views and the direction of the people's activities and aspirations, the majority of the inhabitants in that country

would vote on a free plebiscite for the Government at present in power.

It was the same, too, in Italy. Italy, like Germany, was faced by the spectre of Communism, largely as a result of these same methods as they are employing to-day, though the machinery was at that time perfected to a far less degree. Mussolini was able to come into power through a certain instinctive reaction by the Italian nation; and though this reaction sprung from some quality in the very soul of man, there would not have been the degree of support which is behind his alternative social and political system, nor for the various policies which the Duce has pursued if the State had not controlled the Press, and used it as the instrument for moulding the views and the will of the nation.

In April 1938 there was a plebiscite in Austria and Germany. And whilst it would be unfair to say that the result was due to intensive propaganda—for that would have been impossible in the short period between Germany's entry into the country and the plebiscite itself—it is certainly curious that less than 1 % voted against the union with Germany. Yet, relying principally upon propaganda, the Schuschnigg administration had also apparently been quite prepared—or at least professed that it was—to put the question of the *Anschluss* to the country upon a plebiscite.

Whole nations, composed of individuals with freedom of judgment, are adopting, almost unanimously, quite contrary philosophies and theories. It has depended upon the direction given to this moulding force.

In Spain there was once, at least nominally, a free Press. Through its medium the Communists did the preliminary work. Under the Republic came the next stage. The expression of views hostile to the objects of the Third International was discouraged. The principal papers through which such views could be expressed were persecuted, and the editors thrown into prison or otherwise victimized; the remaining Press became the docile instrument to mould the will of the people to do the final bidding of the Internationals.

This was coupled with every other conceivable open or underground method which conduced to the same end. This, perhaps, more than anything—partly by obtaining direct adhesion to their principles, partly by luring the unsuspecting, partly by obtaining short-sighted and fatal alliances with those

who did not share their views—was what enabled the “vast Communist plot” to come so near success.

Once the Avar had broken out, the country became divided roughly into two areas, and each side subjected the inhabitants within their areas to propaganda. They were, quite naturally, steadily presented with one side of the question at issue. By this we do not mean that the propaganda was of equal intensity or of the same kind. The Generals rather despised the whole idea of such methods. It was not their natural mentality, and moreover, the Nationalists, in spite of the inevitable occasional “war lie”, never descended to the systematic, methodical campaign of falsehood which has been such a characteristic of the Marxist Government. But, upon both sides of the battle line, there is no doubt of the effect of the propaganda—except occasionally where it was patently false. It resulted in a great enthusiasm in quarters where previously there may have been a lack of defined ideas, or even apathy. The mere existence of war conditions creates a disturbed frame of mind, rendering people peculiarly susceptible, and particularly good-minded people who will only question repeated statements where they have very good reasons clearly put before them.


And as regards England, the machine is also at work. We have an “independent” Press. It is “free”. There are those, however, who would say that most of its units are merely instruments for promoting the views and objects of individuals; or that many of the units, far from being free, are very expensive. They are businesses with a commodity—publicity—for sale, and it is not inconceivable that some of them, as a matter of business, might possibly sell to the highest bidders. There are others quite frankly subsidized, or indirectly subsidized in the many ways known to the publicity, advertising, and Press experts. The national Press of such countries as Germany and Italy has obvious weaknesses and undesirable features. They could be made powerful instruments in the service of policies far from desirable or good in themselves. But it is hard to believe that they could deliberately be anti-national. Yet that is one of the dangers of a “free and independent” Press. It might come to be at the service of a non-national policy. It might desire to urge upon England the pursuit or defence of causes dear to the hearts of those controlling the Press, or contributing its major output. It

might even conceivably become a weapon for the furtherance not merely of a non-national or a neutral policy, but even of an anti-national one. And if the Communist directors have the power with the Press which the Vatican, the Trotskyites, M. Flandin, the Fiihrer, the Duce, and many other observant persons attribute to them, the consequent danger to England and to the British Empire, and our whole civilization, is indeed grave.

Perhaps it is by reason of the influences at work in our Press that we hear so much of the evils, but so little of the good points, in foreign Governments which are anti-Communist. One of these is the Portuguese.

In Portugal they founded a system of Government and effected a social reorganization which have done great things for that country. Whether its success will be permanent must depend on many factors; and not the least of its difficulties is the fact that the Third International, the Grand Orient, and the Internationals, if they have the intelligence which we attribute to them, must know that their chief danger lies in Portugal's example; and they may therefore endeavour to concentrate overwhelmingly upon this particular field. We doubt their success to-day, after their failure in Spain. The two are far too closely connected. They have failed in Spain, which was far less well-equipped to resist than is Portugal to-day; and though they concentrated for twenty years intensively, to say nothing of the previous spade-work, they are unlikely in our view to score a triumph to-morrow in the Iberian Peninsula. Nationalist Spain, like Portugal, Germany, Italy, and other countries, is seeking a new social order. As General Franco, the *Caudillo*, has stated, this governmental system will be "a garment cut to fit the national requirements of Spain". It will have certain features in common with that of Portugal, and with that of the two Fascist States, but that does not mean that it will be Fascist. It means that it will be in the nature of a Corporative State, which is a very different thing. It is "Fascist" only in the Communist vocabulary—i.e. it is *not Communist*.

In Spain they are already to-day taking the first steps towards the realization of the New Plan. The principles behind it and its broad outline are worthy of consideration. It may not be the solution of everybody's troubles, but there seems to us much that deserves the closest study.



FARMING : SANTANDER PROVINCE

[*Facing page* 490]



Broadly speaking, it is based on the concept that "democracies" carry within themselves the seeds of their own destruction. Society is becoming divided into distinctive horizontal layers, with labour as the largest stratum at the bottom of the formation. At the same time there is government, generally on the party system, with universal suffrage to elect the Government. It is as if, in a business slowly built by initiative and scientific application, it was decided that everyone concerned should be called together, each person given equal powers in the administration of the whole, and the employees were asked whether, with the voting majority in their hands, they desire to take complete charge of the whole business, its direction, and its future development. The idea is effective as a means of destroying something existing, with a view to new people taking control. But then the principle ceases to apply—as Russia has so vividly demonstrated. Such a policy must necessarily have obvious, and, sooner or later, fatal, dangers; just as also the direction of a business, without the interests of the employees being adequately represented and protected, must prove equally fatal in the end.

Spain is a Catholic country, and the inspiration of the basis upon which to build has been taken from the principles laid down in successive encyclicals from the Vatican for many years past, and notably *Rerum Novarum* in the year 1891 and *Quadragesimo Anno* of Leo XIII in the year 1931, forty years after. These principles are largely restated in that of the present Pope in the encyclical *Divini Redemptoris* in which he refers to the "liberalistic" system in the following manner:

"... The means of saving the world of to-day from the lamentable ruin into which a moral liberalism has plunged us, are neither the class-struggle nor terror, nor yet the tyrannical abuse of State power, but rather the infusion of social justice and Christian love into the social-economic order. And the genuine and chief function of civil authority consists precisely in promoting this mutual harmony and collaboration of all citizens to the best of its ability.

"Not bloody revolution, but the inner force of her teaching made the proud Roman matron see in her slave a sister in Christ .

"We need but recall with what constant firmness and energy our predecessor, Leo XIII, vindicated for the working

man the right to organize, which the dominant liberalism of the more powerful States relentlessly denied him. . . .

"Social justice cannot be said to have been satisfied so long as working men are denied a wage that will enable them to secure proper sustenance for themselves and for their families; so long as they are denied the opportunity of acquiring a modest fortune and avoiding that pauperism which is so widespread; so long as they cannot make suitable provision through public or private insurance for old age, for periods of illness and unemployment. In a word, to repeat what has been said in our encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*: 'Then only will the economic and social order be soundly established and attain its end, when it oilers, to all and to each, all those goods which the wealth and resources of nature, technical science and the social organization of economic affairs can give. These goods should be sufficient to supply all necessities and reasonable comforts, and to uplift men to that higher standard of life which, provided it be used with prudence, is not only not a hindrance, but is of singular help to virtue.'

"It happens all too frequently, however, under the wage system, that individual employers are helpless to ensure justice unless, with a view to its practice, they organize institutions the object of which is to prevent competition incompatible with fair treatment for the workers. Where this is true, it is the duty of masters and employers to support and promote such necessary organizations as normal instruments enabling them to fulfil their obligations of justice."

Actuated by these wise principles and bearing in mind the necessity for maintaining the regional character of the industries, and the encouragement of personal initiative, the mainspring of most prosperity, the Nationalist State-builders have gone back and studied the possible application of the ideas behind the Guild System of the Middle Ages. They have devised, from this study what they broadly term the vertical distribution of society, with government by representatives of all classes, of all degrees of authority, and with social justice and co-operation as its basis, in place of the doctrine of class hatred and "horizontal distribution". This is the aim of the New Plan which it is hoped will come into force.

In its broadest outlines, the idea is that every business is a vast guild. Local difficulties and potentialities may often render impracticable the application in every locality of hard

and fast regulations, and even wage rates, or the same scale of profits participation. They have, therefore, devised a scheme whereby, to take one example, the building industry would be a "National Corporation". This National Corporation would be made up of representations sent to it by the Regional Corporation—a Region corresponding to one of our counties, for example. The Regional Corporation would be made up of representatives sent to it by what is known as the "Pre-corporation"—the local group representing the building trade in, say, the individual towns within each of the Regions or counties. These Pre-corporations are the most important feature of the whole scheme.

The Pre-corporation is made up of three bodies, representing the employers and owners, people belonging to professions, and representatives of labour. According to requirements, the local employer's group, known as a Corporation Union, may be elected from syndical sub-sections, as also may be the group representing the local Labour.

The Regional Corporation is, as we have stated, made up of representatives sent from the Pre-corporation. These representatives consist also of people elected from each of the three groups—employers, the professions, and Labour. Each of these groups of the respective representatives within each Regional Corporation is known as a Regional Federation.

So again, these Regional Federations of Labour, the professions, and the employers, send each their chosen delegates to the National Federation. Thus the National Corporation of the Building Trade is made up of representatives of all three groups interested in the trade no less than is the Pre-corporation in the local town or village.

This National Corporation of the Building Trade would be a section of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce, which sends a total of ninety-six representatives to the Parliament of the Nation. Eight of that ninety-six would be from the Building Trade.

From this example it will be seen that, whilst it is true that, on a mere counting of heads, the labourer does not have the same say in the Government of the nation as those higher in authority when reckoned *per capita*, nevertheless Labour is equally represented with those who represent personal initiative as interpreted by capital investment. Both carry the same weight as the professions which, in general, enjoy good

incomes but are not possessed of great capital. The National Parliament is made up of the elected of the nation as a whole, but through the above machinery.

It may seem a small point, but one of the great dangers to-day is that, following Lenin's belief that the *bourgeoisie* will always work (under his scheme of preparation) for its own destruction, it usually crawls downwards towards the majority vote. They crawl downwards, like a certain type of newspaper, towards what they think must logically be the winning side, whether it is for the better or no. And often, if not usually, the decision is reached without consciously being actuated by any such motive. In any event, conscious or not, the result is the same.

Under the scheme proposed, the National Parliament would consist of some 342 Members. The Members forming it would be elected from five Chambers of Commerce—the Rural with 108 Members, the Marine with 30, Industry and Commerce with 96, Public and National Services with 48, and "Culture" with 60. Each would be subdivided, e.g. the Rural into nine Sections, each with 12 representatives, the separate Sections being cereals, the wine business, olive oil, fruits, etc., *agrios* (bitter fruits), sugar, wood and fibres, cattle, and miscellaneous agricultural produce. The other Sections would be subdivided similarly. The 60 representatives of the Chamber of Culture would consist of five elected delegates from each of the twelve State Universities.

There are many other details of the scheme to provide liaison between the Pro-corporations and the Regional and National Corporations, and to instruct the subdivisions in the effect and application of decisions of the National Parliament. But, speaking broadly, there would be little or no direct communication between one Pre-corporation and another, or one local owners' or Labour Union and that of a totally different part of the country, except by passing upwards to a controlling body and down the other branch radiating from the common trunk.

There are obvious advantages in such a system, if it can be satisfactorily worked. Experiments already made, notably in Portugal, show that it may well be workable in practice. In the first place, it maintains complete contact between employers, the professions, and Labour at all stages. This alone should help to remove that great spectre looming over the

world to-day, class hatred and lack of comprehension of the true difficulties each has to meet. Such contacts, especially in the Pre-corporation, must mean that local problems have to be settled in a spirit of co-operation, and with a nice balance of interests. For example, where a brick factory working under local difficulties owing to poor quality, insufficiently stimulated demands, or problems of transport and distance, finds itself faced with having to take a decision to close down the works and throw men out of employment, or alternatively to make a sacrifice of benefits on the part of all parties concerned, at least it would leave that compromise open and for the best mutual interests of all concerned. Under many alternative systems, the situation might result in the enforcement of an uneconomic—too high—wage level which would necessitate the closing of the brick works and the consequent unemployment of the men. It is said to be impossible to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear; at all events it is not possible to sell indefinitely a brick costing fivepence for threepence-halfpenny.

The system would also help to meet another great danger of many existing systems, a danger which, incidentally, will one day face England. Such countries have been governed for many years nominally under a system with a democratic Parliament elected by universal suffrage; yet, for various reasons, the country has continued to be ruled by a governing class. We have never had a Labour Government in England. A nominal Labour Government, maintained in power only by a Liberal minority which held the balance, is not a Labour Government. Extravagant legislation would have lost Labour the support of the Liberal group, whereby it was maintained in power. One day, however—and probably, as in Spain, by a sudden attack upon the rural vote which has maintained the Conservative Party as the strongest in the House of Commons—there will be a sudden change. It would have needed less than three-quarters of a million votes turn-over to give Labour a majority of actual votes cast at the last election in 1935, though the Conservative Party had an overwhelming majority in the House. That position is an anomaly, and one unlikely to endure for many more elections.

Under the universal suffrage system, as we have seen, Labour sooner or later must have absolute sway. We are therefore heading to-day for a change over from the old administration

by a ruling class, with the men in general well trained and fitted for the task—and it may be abrupt. That change might well suit the plans of disruptive forces, and people untrained in government or even trained in misgovernment, though camouflaging their Communist affinities, may be called upon to take power suddenly to govern the country.

It will be appreciated that this argument is not intended to suggest that representatives of Labour are as such unfitted to govern. On the contrary, our argument is that such representatives should *always* form part of any Government and should be trained for that purpose. They should, in like manner as the representatives of the professions and the employers, gradually reach Parliament, as, for example, from the Pre-corporations and upwards through the Corporations and Chambers. This co-operation at all stages would facilitate a just appreciation of the mutual difficulties and points of view. It would provide a true Parliament of the nation.

There is another great advantage which the proposed Spanish system would afford. It would be more difficult under this system for men of the type of, say, Trebitch Lincoln (or whatever was his proper name) to manage to be appointed representatives of the nation. In the past, in England, it has been only too easy both for that to occur, and for them even to purchase a title which often disguises their origin from the not well-informed, and clothes them with a dignity which they often little deserve. No doubt there would inevitably be jobbery under any system, but at least, under this, a legislator in Parliament would neither be a professional politician nor some candidate thrown straight into Parliament from the tribune which he mounted in the market-place. The member of Parliament would have to reach the top as a representative of an industry of the country, and usually find his way through all the various stages, from the town that knew him, from amongst the county and representatives of Labour, the professionals and the employers, and finally through the National Corporation and the Chamber which would elect him as one of the final representatives. Considering the brief total "business" lifetime of the purely professional politician, his low official salary and high expenses, and the number of years he is out of office, his elimination would generally be a great benefit.

And—perhaps the greatest heresy of all, according to

popular present-day theories—Parliament would tend to consist largely of men of mature age and experience. This was the practice with the ignorant ancients, almost from time immemorial. The benighted Greeks, the ignorant niggers, the uncomprehending Romans, the Hebrew Sanhedrin, and even the mercenary Carthaginians used to govern through bodies of Elders. It has been a good electioneering and "recruiting" manoeuvre to pander to youth and extol its wisdom. The benighted and ignorant Spaniard is disposed to believe that a system which would tend more in the direction of these ancient systems, at least in this respect, might perhaps be not entirely without wisdom.

There is one other interesting point about the system. Statesmen and legislators are not made in a day. They may perhaps rapidly acquire a reputation, but not the necessary preparation. This corporative system should at least act as a sieve for sifting the applicants, and, in its operation, should prove a school for statesmen, gradually training them through the various stages from the village to the House of Parliament.

As we have stated, the foundation of this scheme is the Pre-corporation, the maintenance of the trade or guild spirit, the emphasis on local difficulties, and the preservation of the possibilities for individual initiative which must always in the end be the chief basis of progress. The State may assist by organized research and by advice; but even so it is the initiative of the individual which must be the basis of success, both as regards the State advisers, and those they advise.

Such, broadly, is the scheme which the Nationalists of Spain have in mind as their experiment to meet the great problems facing their country. One thing they will not have is a system which is likely to lead to the growth of a doctrine of class hatred, or government by the successful orator; nor will they permit the abuses of unrestrained capitalism, or organized uninstructed Labour, nor the evils of a "Liberalistic" system which might force the best intentioned employer in the world to cut his workmen's wages to starvation limit in order to maintain them in employment in face of competition, through local or other disadvantages. The basis is the corporative state. The corporative state does not imply of necessity any kind of dictatorship or Fascism. The Government is by the elected of the people as a whole, operating through the great interests and industries of the country. They reject


totally the Communist ideal which tends, in the terms of the Pope, towards the production by collectivized Labour of purely material goods and without a spiritual ideal, or, in the terms of Maeterlinck, to introduce the civilization of the beehive, the ant-hill, or the termitary—that dreadful final picture of a blind, atheistic, eugenic subordination of everything to the alleged good of a tyrant State.

The new Spanish State would thus eventually be governed by a Parliament composed of men elected by the nation. It is not an abolition, but a remodelling of the electoral system, providing better guarantees that those governing the nation would be suited to do so. It should abolish the evils of party politics, and probably, to some extent, professional politicians. Parliament's main concern would be with the business of the country, watched by men understanding its problems. We should not again see the dreary farce of sudden changes in "policy" at each election, or, as happened in Spain, at each change of Ministry—sometimes every few weeks. Such conditions merely impede development, and the only increased production is of the politicians anxious to line their pockets as rapidly as possible during their brief period of office. There was a time in Spain when things were so bad that it was considered more profitable to be in opposition than in office. The man in opposition knew what those in office were up to, so that the Ministers were unable to get away with loot without paying tribute, and at the same time stood to receive all the odium if things went awry.

When this "Civil War" broke out into open conflict in 1936—it had been in progress, though undeclared, for many months before then—the Nationalists did not advocate any particular social theory or programme. Their sole object was to drive out the men who had allied themselves with the Third International for the undoing of Spain. They guaranteed to Labour all the advantages it had obtained in the past up till that date. Even during the progress of the hostilities they have attempted to introduce something on the outlines of the system we have described. Already some progress has been made in the adaptation and development of the scheme. It will take some years for it to come into full operation.

The Nationalists, as early as April 1937, drew up a twenty-seven-point programme which was adopted by the National Party. It respects property and the right of the individual to

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GENERALISSIMO FRANCO, WITH HIS WIFE AND DAUGHTER

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own property, but it rejects any capitalist system which ignores the necessities of the people, or which "dehumanizes private property and huddles workers into shapeless masses, ripe for misery and despair". It states that it refuses to stand by "in face of domination of the weakest class by the strongest", It will protect the State against speculators and money-lenders. It has no objection to the nationalization of banks, or to the nationalization, through corporations, of the big public services.

This programme is not a mere demand, a statement of rights by any one class or group, it is the enunciation of the sound principle that no man should have rights without duties, and a civilized State should see that both are justly harmonized. And although the right to private property is proclaimed and capital will have its function within the system, Spain will be in essence a Socialist State.

In his admirable book, dedicated "to all who desire to understand and who do not hate", Herr Sieberer says, "Spain was sick." The decay of patriotic feeling, the fostering of Regional ambitions, the regrettable absence of *esprit de corps*, the inefficiency and corruption of the functionaries who desired to do as little as possible and to administrate by a system almost entirely based upon favouritism, the contempt for the regulations and legislations which had become almost "good form" in Spain, the destruction of the Monarchy, and the loss of prestige and influence on the part of the Church—all these things had helped in the demoralization of the country. "When the common aims which alone can provoke collective enthusiasm reach the stage where they are about to disappear the time of internal dissensions has arrived."

Spain, up to the Republic, may be said to have relied on three cardinals: patriotism, religion and a central rallying point. For the first time since then, through trial and tribulation, they have found a defender of the faith, a patriot above suspicion, and a proven man in times of trouble—General Franco. Spain, at last, is finding her true self. She has rejected the pernicious regime and principles of Marxism. With those who adhere to the Marxist principles they will not, they cannot, be reconciled. Rather than live under such a system, abandoning every ideal the country has cherished in the past, they would rather die, as they have done, in their thousands. They know in Spain what many of us in England

do not fully appreciate—that Europe and the whole world have been in the gravest danger. In Spain the movement fostered by the Internationals had reached its high-water mark, a great flood directed intensively for nearly twenty years against this unfortunate country.

Against this invasion the Nationalists formed a living barrier. There are many differing political ideas amongst them, but, in essentials, they are unanimous as to their guiding motives. It is sufficient proof to pick up the Nationalist newspapers and read the thousands of mourning notices which proclaim what those guiding forces have been. A simple cross above the name: then “Killed on the Teruel front on the day of _____”, or “Martyred in Madrid . . .”, or “on the Zaragoza front” and below “For Spain”, or “In the cause of Christianity”, or, in most cases, “For God and my Country”, or sometimes, just the one word—Franco’s motto—“PRESENT”.

The people throughout the Nationalist zone are guided by that one combined thought—for the good of *Spain* and the defence of religion. This spirit or these sentiments are not evidenced in the Red zone. However much they may camouflage their objects for “foreign consumption”, the whole driving force behind their movement has been International Atheistic Bolshevism aiming at world domination.

It seemed as if the revolutionary wave must overwhelm Spain, but the unconquerable character of the nation managed to hold on until the tide had turned. Perhaps it is the turn of the tide not merely in Spain, but for Communism throughout the world, even in Russia itself. Such a regime as they possess in Russia is not likely to thrive upon defeat. The whole of Russia knows of the great venture in Spain towards which the savings, efforts and the production of the Soviet workers were directed. Sooner or later, though “the wells of truth have been poisoned”, in Russia the truth of the great failure must come to be at least in part appreciated.

It will probably take nearly a generation to undo the principal work of the Internationals—to try and give back ideals to those they have morally and spiritually ruined. The most notable achievement of the Internationals was that they literally corrupted the souls of men, and it is not clear whether it will be possible, within a generation, to render them sane again. It is not easy to reconcile to orderly living and a dis-

ciplined outlook those who have been taught that everybody should do precisely what he thought fit, with no restraints, without légard for the rights of others, and to hate with his w'hole being.

These Internationals, who have degraded so many people and deluded so many brave men, and brought the country face to face with the horrors we have witnessed, are themselves far from heroes. When the victorious Nationalist forces had swept across Aragon and were nearing the sea in Castellon province, the Internationals acted as we had always expected:

"The departure from Barcelona, without fanfare or trumpets, of the G.P.U., with its headquarters' staff, its agents and its luggage, is typical of the Soviet way of behaving: they do not fight, they make others fight; they do not risk their skins, but the skins of others; they do not themselves light the fires, but arc content to furnish the torches or the money with which to purchase the torches; they do not themselves pay, they pay only with advice.

"Then when things turned out badly, when the police began to get together, when the electricity began to run short, when bread was rare, when the unhappy country that had been stirred up to revolution is nothing more than quivering flesh, and shot to shreds, they retire in good order with their emissaries, their tracts and their funds. Operations will be carried on in some other region. Or they proceed to Geneva, camouflaged as a member of the nations, to talk there about rights, contracts and security.

"Never in the recent history of the world has a more ignominious example of cowardice been seen. Never has there been more cynical evil-doing. But even the depths of abjection have their limits, and the Russian Soviet, with its G.P.U., is beginning to reach the bottom. The day is not now far off when civilized Europe will decide to have done with this blood-stained vileness."¹

Spain knows that her salvation must lie in the hands of a man she can trust. She has placed her trust in General Franco, a man ~~with nn nprsonal~~ ambitions, with no guiding impulse but the good of his country. A modest man of retiring disposition, and perhaps one of the few who have risen to power in Spain and exerted the vast authority and powers vested in

¹ *Le Matin*, 14th April, 1938.

them without that rancour and vindictiveness which have so often characterized the governors of the country.

However quickly the corporative system may develop, for a time the Government must be a dictatorship. Inevitably it would have been so, whether it had been of the Right or of the Left. This dictatorship must be a constructive effort to govern for the good of the whole country by the use of machinery where class, and class hatred, shall not split the nation into violent, hostile camps. Not a Government acquiring its "mandate" by appealing for its support to the baser instincts whereby the demagogues of all ages have achieved power, to the ruin of their native lands.


The people of Spain have been given back their ideals and the promise of order, peace and justice. They have found common objects and ends which, however they may work out in practice, are certainly upon a sound moral base. At last they have the "collective aim" of which they so stand in need, and which they have expressed in the words of the hymn of the *Falange*. Nor is it mere words. It is the regeneration, the resurrection of a nation through the cleansing fires of self-sacrifice and battle:

" Face to the sun, wearing the tunic
 Which yesterday you embroidered,
 Death will find me, if it calls me
 And I do not see you again. . . .
 The victorious standards will return
 With the joyful steps of peace,
 And the arrows of my emblem¹
 Will bear five roses as adornment.
 Once more shall we see the smile of spring
 Which the heavens, the earth, and the sea await.
 Arise, battalions, and conquer!—For Spain has
 begun to awaken.

SPAIN—UNITED ! SPAIN—GREAT !
 SPAIN—FREE! SPAIN—ARISE! ”

And to this they add, with all their hearts—and we join with them in spirit—"VIVA ESPANA!" "VIVA FRANCO!"

¹ The emblem of the *Falange* is five arrows bound together in the centre of a yoke.



1. TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY THE NATIONALIST ARMY ON JULY 19th, 1936 (apprux.)

2. " " " " " JULY 19th, 1937

3. " " " " " OCTOBER 23rd, 1937

4. " " " " " MAY 30th, 1938

5. " " " " " REDS ON MAY 30th, 1938

(CASTELLON FELL ON JUNE 13th, 1938)



INDEX

A.B.C. (Madrid), 81, 456
A.B.C. (Seville), 354
 Abdalagis, Sierra de, 279
 Abd-el-Krim, 77
 Abortion in Red Spain, 417
 Abortion in Russia, 417
 Abraham Lincoln Battalion, 393
 r\cademy, Zaragoza Military, 81
 Accbndo, 107, 108
 Acorns, 24
Action Fran(aise, yj?
 Acton, Lord, 140
 Adalc Heights, 337
 Adami, 138
Against the Current, 188
 Agrarian Reform, 156-8
 Aguada, Major, 233
 Aguilas, Cerro del, 341
 Air force, 245, 395
 Air France, 377
 A.I.T. (Workers' International Association), 47, 50
 Alamin, El, estate, 25
 Alarcon, 234
 Alava, 274. 279
 Alba, Duke of, Foreword by, 5-7; note by, 386
 Albacete, 222, 306, 311
 Albaicin, 236
 Albaida, Marquis de, 156
 Albalate, 234, 455
 /Xlbarracin, 356, 476
 Albin\ana, Dr., 86
 Albornoz, Alvaro de, 54
 Alcal\a. Battalion of, 301
 Alcald de Hcnares, »99»²⁶¹
Alcala Galiano, 244
 Alcal\a Zamora, 154*,⁸⁸ *93
 Alcan\iz. 325, 480
 Alcarria, 332
 Alcaucin, 323
Alcazar, 243
 Alcazar, Toledo. *See ~ Toledo*
 Alcazares. Los, Aerodrome, 246⁶
 Alcira, 224
 Alconchel, 238
 Alembert, d', 14¹
 Al\es, 382

Alfambra, 442, 477
 Alfonso XIII, 42, 58, 76, 92
 Algeciras, 241, 305, 444, 455
 Alhaurin, 328
 Alhucemas, 77
 Alicante, 93, 378
 All work, John, 451
 Al-Mansur, 36
 Almargen, 291
 Almeria Province, 25, 242, 320, 398
Almirante Cervera, 242
Almirante Ferrandiz, 245
 Almodovar del Rio, 236
 Almoguera, Lieut.-Col., 226
 Almudevar, 356
 Alora, 328
 Alto de Leon Pass, 285
 Alto de Somosierra Pass, 286
 Alvarez del Vayo, 262
 Amadco, 380
 Amboto, Mount, 334
 Amelot, M., 394
 Amerkrem, Mount, 78
 Amnesty Bill, 196
 Amorcibeta, 334, 345, 463
 Amunecar, 305
 Anarchism, 34-6
 Anarchists, 107
 Andalusia, 25, 119, 275, and *passim*
 Andalusians, 33
 Anderson, Miss Jane, 451
 Andorra, 484
 Andrade, Juan, 115
 Andujar, 305
 Angeles, Cerro de los, 304
 Angers, 460
 Anglo-Spanish Construction Company, Ltd., the, 285
 A hover, 456
 Anso, 234
 Antequera, 290, 319
 Anti-Imperialism, 367
 Anti-Marxist Front, 273, 311
 Antoni, Pietro Paolo, 466
 Anual, 73
 Anvar, 74
 Arabayona (Salamanca), 163
 Arabs—Pan-Arabia, 423

Aragon, 274
 Aragonese, 33
 Aramayona Valley, 337
 Aranda, General, 206, 217 *et seq.*,
 297-8, 476
Arango, 244
 Arangués del Puerto, 234
 Araquistdin, 415, 452
Arar Mendi, 376
 Archanda, 340
 Ardales, 329
 Arenas, 350
 Arenas de San Pedro, 225
 Arenas, Las, 340
 Argecilla, 331
 Argentine, 389
 Arija, 346
 Arjona, 457
Arms for Red Spain, 381, 384
 Army, the, 46, 181, 199, 206, etc.
 Aro Lumbralc, Major, 235
 Arocha, Flores, 291
 Arquer, Jordi, 115
 Arraras, J., 72, 182, 195, 200
 Arrechavaleta, 334
 Arredonda, Major, 230
 Arriondas, 361
 Asceticism, 37-8
 Ascnso, Cabanillas, Colonel, 283
 -----, Torrado, General, 283
 Asquin, 460
 Assault Guards, 175, 209
 Asturian Rebellion, 92, 127-8, 169, 176
 Asturians, 33
 Asturias, 23, 161, 341
 -----, Prince of, 57
 Atenco, the, Madrid, 83
 Ateneos, 170, 186
 Atheists, League of, 137
 Atholl, Duchess of, 393, 438, 469
 " Atlantis ", lodge, 272
 Atlas Mountains, 16
Attentats et Terreur, 465
 Attlee, Major, 156, 327, 410, 438, 475
 Attorney of Barcelona, 413
*Augurios Estallido y Episodios de la
 Guerra Civil*, 198
Au pays de la Terreur Rouge, 303
 Austria, 122, 165, 174, 403, 435, 488
 Avarice, 229
 A vend. Joseph, 402
 Avila, 224 *et seq.*, 253, 279, 444
 Aviles, 177
 Avseenko, Antonelf, 255, 385
 Axdir, 78
 Azaha, 83, 85, 92, 96, 102, 153, 175,
 >89, 193, 205» 207» 209» 4>4
 Azuaga, 251

BAAMONDE DE FRANCO, DORA PILAR, 6G
 Badajoz, 24, 210, 238, 253, 283
 Badajoz Province, 161, 311

INDEX

Bacna (Cordoba), 163
 Baides, 330
 Bailen, 281
 Baker, Mr. Noel, 443, 475
 Bakunin, 47
Bakunin, 50 *n.*
 Balaguer, 477
 Baldwin, Lord, 129
Baleares, 242
 Balearic Islands, 175, 207, 407
 Balfour, Lord, 146
 Baltic States, 423
 Banco Hipotecario, 311
Bandera Roja, La, 185
Banhutte, 144
 Bank of Spain, gold, 276, 316, 385, 415
 Barajas Aerodrome, 246
 Barbadun, River, 340
 Barbastro, 424, 481
 Barbusse, Henri, Battalion, 393
Barcaiztegui, 212
 Barcelona, 51, 162, 164, 248, 311, and
 passim
 Barccna, 350
 Barcia, Agostin, 402
 Bardoux, Jaques, 268
 Bari (Radio), 325
 Baroeul, 395
 Barrazar Pass, 334
 Barron, Colonel, 283
 Barroso, Antonio, 372
 Bartlett, Vernon, 439
 Basch, Prof. V., 439
 Basque children, 334, 401, 463
 Basque provinces, 23
 Basque Republic, 119, 279
 Basque statute, 84
 Basques, 20, 33, 120, 217, 279, 313
Batalla, La, 113
 Battalion of Crime, the, 301
 Batet, General, 177
 Bayet, Albert, 463
 Bayonne, 376
 B.B.C., 320, 325, 440, 441, 442
 Beaverbrook, Lord, 437
Behind the Spanish Barricades, 419
 Behovia, 460
 Bela Kun, 122, 140, 144, 155
 Bclchite, 356, 456, 480
 Belgium, 377, 389
 Bell, Aubrey, 27
 Belligerent Rights, 399
 Belloc, Hilaire, 149
 Bcnavente, 231
 Beni-bu-Ifrur, 74
 Benicarld, 444
 Beni-Said tribe, 74
Benot, 244
 Bdraud, H., 194
 Berbers, 20
 Berengucr, Damaso, 89
 -----, Fernando, General, 69, 89
 Bermeo, 315, 335

Bermudez Moro, 354
 Berriatua, 334
Bess, The, 377
 Besteiro, 56, 118
 Bethune, Dr. N., 445
 Béziers, 382
Bicharracos Clericales, 186
 Bidasa, 460
 Bilbao, 51, 110, 159, 217, 313, 333 *cl seq.*, 366, 377, 446
 Bizcargui, Mount, 334, 338
 Black Hand, die, 107
 Bloch, J. R., 433
 -----, Messrs., 376
 Blum, Leon, 102, 143, 194, 370, 374, 379, 438, 464
 Boag, G., 47, 49
 Boal, Evelio, 114
 Boca del Asno, 278
Bolshevist, The, 104
 Bombing of hospitals, 443
 Bombing of towns, 203, 304, 443-4
 Boncour, Paul-, 402
 Bonnet, 141
 Borah, Senator, 438
 Borchgrave, Baron, 259
 Bordeaux, 394
 Borkcnau, Franz, 58, 158, 426, 450.
See also Spanish Cockpit
 Borodin, 122
 Bosch, Brig.-Gcn., 230
 -----, Pedro, 380
 Bosche, Major van den, 396
 Bourg-Madame, 381
 Bourges, 395
 Brandt, Etablissement, 378
 Brereton, Mr. Geoffrey, 108
 Brihuega, 330, 332
 British United Press, 437
 Brockway, Fenner, 393
 Brunete, 342 *et seq.*, 472
 Brussels, 47, 472
 Bryant, Mr. Arthur, 242, 251, 432
 Budapest, 185
 Budin, 332
 Buena Vista (Motril), 455
 Buenos Aires, 358, 472
 Buharrax, 76
 Bujalance, 456
 Bujaraloz, 444, 481
 Bulgaria, 122
 Bulgarians, 392
Bulletin de la Grande Loge de France, M3
Bulletin du Grand Orient de Belgique, M4
 B.U.P., 437
 Burgohondo, 225, 253
 Burgos, 28, 204, 275, 444
 Burguillos del Cerro, 252
 CABALLERO, LARGO. *See* Largo Caballero

Cabanás de Virtus, 346
 Cabanellas, General, 100, 204, 274
 Cabaneros, estate, 25
 Cabcrtila Ridge, 458
 Cabeza, Sanctuary of the Virgen de la, 263
 Cabrinovic, 145
 Cabuernica, 348
 Caceres, 24, 239, 253, 311
 Cadiz, 93, 157, 231, 311, 444
 Calatayud, 233
 Calvct c Hijo, 380
 Calvo Sotelo, 96, 121, 128, 188, 197, 200
 Camacho, Colonel, 182
 Camara, Manuel de, 323
 Camarassa, Senor, 447
 Camillas de Albarda, 323
 Campanal, Luis, 364
 Campanazar, 337
Campesino, El, 481
Campesino Battalion, 355
 Campillos, 291
 Campoamor, Clara, 184, 256
 Campo de Caso, 463
Campo Libre, 34, 425
 Campo Manes, 182
 Canada, La, 457
Cañadas, 19
 Canadians, 393
Canarias, 242, 244
 Canary Islands, the, 199, 207, 237
Candide, 378
 Cangas de On is, 345, 362, 463
 Cano Lopez, Deputy, 100
Canovas, 243
 Cantabrian Mountains, 23, 278, 333, 346, 360
 Cantelbasos, 338
Canterbury', Dean of, 438, 468
Capital, 172
 Carabanchel Bridge, 136
Carabineros, 209, etc.
 "Cara al Sol", 502
 Camarazo, Fr., 296
 Carbineers. *See* *Carabineros*
 Cardozo, Harold, 63, 240. *See also* *March of a Nation, The*
 Carlists, 63, 239, 287
 Carlos, King, of Portugal, 144
 Carlos Marx Division, 355
 Carney, William, 450-1
 Carpio, El, 455
 Carr, E. H., 50
 Carrascosa, Colonel, 277
 Cartagena, 222, 241, 245, 253
 Cartama, 329
 Carthaginians, 21
 Casablanca, 245
 Casabona, 73
 Casa del Campo, 393
 Casanellas, 84, 155, 160
 Casares Quiroga, 197, 203

Casa de San Galindo, 331
 Casas Viejas, 161-2
 Casaviejo, 253
 Cascajo, Señor (Cordoba), 236
 Caspe, 480, 481
Casteljón de Henares, 331
 Castellon, 24, 233, 311
 Castello y Garrigo, 380
 Castilblanco, 94, 98
 Castile, 26, 206, 274
 -----, New. *See* New Castile
 -----, Old. *See* Old Castile
 Castilians, 33, 40
 Castillejo, Prof. Jose, 33, 37
 Castillo, Cristobal del, 372
 Castres Artillery Park (French Army), 386
 Castro del Rio, 236
 Castropol, 298
 Castro Urdiales, 250, 346
 Catalan-Balearic Federation, 115
 Catalan Communist Party, 115
 Catalan Separatism, 119
 Catalonia, 24, 159, 167, 173, 313, and *passim*
 Catalonians, 33
Catholic Herald, 249, 462
Catholics and the Spanish State, 30 n.
 Cavalry Regiment No. 8, 222
 Cebreros, 254
 Ccda, 89
 Celts, 20
 Cercle, 377, 387
 Cerro de los Angeles, 304
Cervantes, 242
Cervera, 243
 Genera, Vice-Admiral Juan, 244
 Cette, 385
 Ceuta, 70, 76, 203, 216, 320, 444, 455
Ceux de Barcelone, 210, 281
 C.G.T. (French), 143, 371
Chaos in Spain, 268
 Chapic, 288
 Charbonnier, M. Andrd, 418, 421, 453
 Chautinps, M. Camille, 418
Chemises noires brutes vertes en Espagne, 331
 Chile, Bank of, 358
 China, 122, 423, 435, 472
 Christian Book Club, 468
 Church, the, 85, 86
 Church property, 29
 Churchill, Rt. Hon. W., 97, 438
Churruca, 232, 242
 C.icmpozculos, 300
 Ciganovic, 145
 Cinca River, 4⁸⁰
 Cincovillas, 234
Ciricia, 244
 Cirre Jimenez, Jose, 221
Cister, 3²¹
Ciudad de Alicante, 244
Ciudad de Cadiz, 244
 Ciudad Real, 25, 239, 311
 Civil Guards, 181, 209
 Clartd Lodge, 371
 Clerk, Sir George, 370
 C.L.U.E.R., 426
 C.N.T. (National Confederation of Labour), 36, 48, 5L 89, 102, 108, 113, 166, 168-9, *7!> >74> 4*9> 452
 Cobo, Juan, 453
 Cockburn, Claude, 320
 Cogniot, 411
 Cogolludo, 330
 Cohen-Adria, 194
 Coin, 328
 C.ollot d'Herbois, 104
Columna de Hierro. *See* Iron Column
 Comillas, Marquds de, 25
 Comintern, *passim*
Comisars, 92, 129, 385
Comitds Paritarios, 53
Comment la franc-rna^onnerie fait une révolution, 402
Commune de Paris Battalion, 393
Communiques, 434
Communist Atrocities in Spain— Official Book of, 242, 252
Communist International, The, No. XIII, 107
Communist International (April 1934), 167
 Comorera, Joan, 411
Compania Arrendataria de Tabacos, 29
 Companys, 89, 169, 414
 Condorcet, 141
 Condroyer, Emile, 452
Conflict in Spain, 94, 107, 108, 160, 162, 167, 170, 248
Conjuration anti-chrdticne, 140, 143
Consorcio Economico, 52
 Constitution, the, 84
Contemporary Russia (January 1938), 181, 195
 Continental Freemasonry, Chapter VI *passim*, 315, 371, 402, 435
Convent du Grand Orient, 140
 Conze, E., 183, 189
 Co-operatives, the (C.W.S.), 388
 Corconte, 348
 Cordoba, 22, 03, 236, 305, 443
 Cordoba Province, 25, 37, 157, 253, 290
 Corporative State, 490, 492 *et seq.*
Correspondent in Spain, 65, 102, 128, 161, 169, 186, 189, 258-61, 359, 43°» 445, 446, 450
 Corrctchr, Captain, 214
Cortes Constituyentes, 84, 86
 Cortes Gonzalez, Captain Santiago, 263
 Coruna, 110
 Cot, Pierre, 372-3, 377
 Coto de Donaña, estate, 25

Count Your Dead—They Are Alive.
436
 Covadonga, 361
 -----, Sierra, 361
Credo of the Legion, 71
Crisis of Our Civilization, The, 149
 Cristofol, Jean, 380
 Croft, Sir H. Page-, 394
 C.R.T. (Regional Federation of Labour), 48
Cruelle Espagne, 185
 Cruz Marin, 375
 Cuadra, Lieut., 228
Cuarto Vientos, 246
 • Cuba, 67, 337
 Cuenca, 226, 233, 278, 311, 449
 Cuesta de la Reina, 342
 Cultura Popular, 187, 469
 Czechoslovakia, 100, 389, 457
 Czemin, Count, 146
Daily Express, The, 424
Daily Herald, The, 88, 413, 446, 447
Daily Mail, The, 284, 400, 433, 434,
 435» 439» 442
Daily Sketch, The, 448
Daily Telegraph, The, 36, 72, 84, 120,
 >33» 174» 243> 3⁶²> 43b 44>» 446,
 462
Daily Worker, The, 331, 446, 468
 Daladier, M.» 265, 376
 Dalmatia, 461
 Dany, M. Marcel, 284
 Daroca, 449
Dalo, 241, 244
 Dauray, M. Jean, 57, 100, 137
 Dautun, M. Yves, 221, 417, 421, 451
 Davies, Mr. Langdon, 419
 Davila, General, 337
 Deakin, F. B., 109
 Death-duties, 31
Death in the Morning, 170, 443
 Death penalty, 355
 Decree Laws, 87
 Defence of the Republic, Law for, 85
 Delaprec, M. Louis, 262, 451, 454
 Delassus, Henri, 140, 155
 Dclbos, Yvon, 185, 370
Derechos reales (land taxes), 23
 Dcrthet, M. Jaques, 284
 Deutsch, Julius, 194, 317
Deutschland, 398, 470
Dia Grafico, El, 133
Diario de Burgos, 359
Diario de Navarra, 331
 Diaz, Jos£, 411
 Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, 55,
 >36
Dictature de la Franc-Ma^onnerie sur la France, La, 132, 143
 Diderot, 141
Diluvio, El, 420
 Dima, 335

Dimitrov, Georges, 107, 138, 187, 248,
 439, 468
 Dingle, R. J., 187
 Discipline, 281
Divini Redemptoris, 123, 490
 Dombrovsky Battalion, 362
 Domi, C., 47
 Doriot, M. Jaques, 377
Douze Mois Sublimes, 307
*Doy Fe, 2*JS*
Drama of Spain, The, 187
 Duff, Charles, 29 n.
 Dumont, 393
 Duran Alejandre, Don Placido, 251
 Durango, 334, 336
 Duron, 332
 Durruti, 51, 357, 416, 481
 Durruti Division, 355
 Dutrey, M. Marcel, 250, 301
 Duval, General, 206, 335, etc. *See also Lemons de la Guerre d'Espagne*
 EBRO RIVER, 477, 480
Echo de Paris, 265
 Eden, Mr. Anthony, 399, 438
 Edgar Andrd Battalion, 316
Edith, 400
 Education, 54, 153, 414
 Ehrenbourg, Ilya, 221, 296, 412, 439,
 447
 Eibar, 313, 334, 335, 345, 463
 Eisner, Kurt, 144
 Elections of 1936, 188 *et scq.*, 2j2-\$,
 3¹¹
 Electoral Register, 56
Eleventh Plenum, 110
 El Ferrol, 241
El Sol. See Sol, El
 Elvira, Sierra, 455
 Enchortas Peaks, 336
 Encyclopaedists, 141
Endymion, 400
 Enghcls, 122, 172
 England, Imperial Communications,
 408
 -----, Communist programme against,
 123, 138, 368, 408
 Epila, 234
 Erice, Señor, 376
 Esbly, 395
 Escamplcro, 298
 Escorial, the, 167, 184, 279, 341
 Escribano, Captain, 213
 Escudo Pass, 346-7
Espagne! Espagne!, 433
Espana, 242, 441
 Espante, 361
 Espera, La, estate, 157
 Espicl, 305
 Estepona, 318, 444
 £tablissments Brandt, 378
 Estremadura, 24, 156, 239
 Estremadurans, 33

Evening Standard, The, 149, 167, 362,
393». 437
Experience Rouge, L'rtº, 185
Euzkadi. *See* Basque Republic

F.A.I., 90, 221, 323, 452
Fal Conde, Señor, 240
Falange, 61, 63, 88, 129, 275, 288, 321,
502
Fanelli, 47
Fanjul, General, 200
Farnesio Cavalry' Regiment, 228, 286
Fascism in Spain, 61, 88, 115-16
Febus Agency, 362, 439
Federalism, 119
Felmin, 463
Ferdinand III, 41
Ferdinand and Isabella, 7
Fernandez, Amador, 217
Fernandez Arias, Adelardo, 136
Fernandez Perez, General, 76
Fernandez Sanz, Lieut., 227
Fernandez Vega, Señor, 324
Ferrer, Francisco, 154
Ferrol, El, 67
Fifth Regiment, the, 397
Figueras, 442
Finkelstein, Leo, 194
Finland, 423
Finlay, Sir M., 146
First International, 47
Fischer, Louis, 108, 156, 327, 410, 439
Flandin, M., 472
Florence (Radio), 325
Fiota Republican Radio, 389
Fondak, 73
Fonteriz, Luiz de, 256
Ford, Richard, 40-1
Foreign Legion, 207
Foros, 27
Fraga, 481, 482
Francatal Aerodrome (Toulouse), 385
France, 22
-----, "invasion" of, 100, 131, 316,
457
Franc-Ma^onnene Fran^aise et la' Y reparation de la Revolution, La, 135,
>37
Franc-Mafonnerie Rouge, La, 134
Franco, Francisco, 6, 15, 52, and
passim
Biography to end of Moroccan War,
60 *et seq.*
Order to Military Academy, 80, 81
Letter to A.I.C. (1937)»⁸¹
In charge against rebellion of 1934»
175 *et seq.*,
In the Balkans, 175-6
Operations in Asturias, 1934» *77
Reorganizes the Army, 182 *et seq.*
Draws up orders for State of War
(Feb. 1936)⁸⁸
Sent to Canaries, 199

Franco, Francisco—*continued*
Warns Government of Army unrest
(June 1936), 199
Flies to Tetuan, 200
Proclamation, 21st July, 1936, 200
In Morocco July 1936, 216
Tribute by a Tenerifeho, 237
Head of the State (Sept. 1936), 297
His choice before Madrid, 308
Attacks Malaga, 314
Decides to clear Northern Provinces,
333
Invitation to Journalists, Biscaya,
337
Attacks "Iron Belt", 338
The Santander Scheme of Campaign,
346
Strategy in Asturias, 3G0
Treatment of prisoners, 178, 353
His policy of avoiding loss of life and
property, 345, 365, 463
His supreme value to Nationalists,
365
Sends protest to League of Nations,
405
Refusal to barter Spanish Territory,
407
The Aragon offensive: typical tac-
tics, 480
His type of interim Government,
427, 502
National support, 272, 501
Franco, Nicolas, 66
-----, Pilar Baamonde de, 66
-----, Ramon, 66
Franco's Spain, In, 111
Franz, 411
Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, 145
Freemasonry, distinction between
English and Continental. *See* Con-
tinental Freemasonry
Free-Thinkers, League of, 138, 248
French Revolution, 141
Friar, 455
Fuengirola, 318, 323
Fuentecovejuna, 252, 305
Fuentes, Captain, 214
Fuller, Brig.-Gen., 293
Furnemont, 144

GALA, MARY DE LA, 253
-----, Sebastian de la, 253
Galan, Fermin, 98
Galarza, Angel, 411
Galddcano, 340, 366
Galicia, 244
Galicia, 23, 24, 26, 27, 274, 298, 455
Galician Statute of Autonomy, 84, 119
Galicians, 33
Galle, 411
Garabitas, Mount, 341
Garbca, 455
Garcia, Atadell, 446

Garcia Escamcz, 484
 Garcia Gonzalo, Valentin, 331
 Garcia Hernandez, 98
 Garcia Morato, Major, 247
 Garcia Oliver, Jose, 413
 Garcia Valino, 484
 Gargantilla, 455
 Garibaldi Battalion, 315, 331
 Garratt, G. T., 469
 Garrido, 416
 Garrote, Senor, 229
 Gastcluinendi, 338
 Gastone Sozzi Battalion, 393
Gatherings from Spain, 41
 Gaul, 21
 Geneva, 402
 George Washington Battalion, 393, 451
 Grassi, Tito, 412
 Germans in Spain, 315, 320, 455
 Germany, 122, 130, 174, 403, 435, 487
 Gerona, 311
 Getafe, 246
 Gibraltar, 351
 Gijon, 172, 176, 212, 364
 Gijon Bank robbed, 51, 358, 446, 463
 Gil Robles, Don Jos Maria, 65, 80,
 96, 128, 1G6, 175, 181, 188, 195, 198,
 464
 Giral, Don Jos6, 372
 Gnome engines, 378
 Goats, 19
 Godden, E. M., 94. *See also Conflict*
 in Spain
 Goded, General, 100, 200, 249
 Godless, League of, 137
 Goering, General, 149
 Goicoechea, 198, 464
Goizeko-Izarra, 462
 Goldschild, 194
 Gollancz, V., 467
 Gomez Bajuclo, Don Gil, 37
 Gomez Caminero, General, 230
 Gomez Morato, General, 203
 Gonzalez, Lieut., Valladolid, 231
 Gonzales, Ceferino, 371
 Gonzalez, Pena, 217
 Gorba, Chiqui, 334
 Gorgucs, 76
 Gourovitch, 138
 Grado, 177, 298
 Granada, 93, 236, 246, 290, 305, 443,
 45®
 Grand Council of Falangc, 427
 Grand Orient Masonry, 100. *See also*
 Continental Freemasonry
 Granja de Torrehermosa, 252
 Crania, La, 278
Gravina, 245
 Graziani, 78
 Grazalema, 291
Great Contemporaries, 99
 Credos, Sierra de, 279, 293
 Greeks, 21
Gringoire, 139, 194, 268, 446
 Groves, Brig.-Gen., 353
 Grulle Massif, 298
 Gruzcl, 380
 Guadalajara, 278, 311, 315, 330, 456
 Guadalajara Regiment, 222
 Guadaluquivir River, 26
 Guadarrama Mountains, 279, 285, 293
 Guadarrama River, 342
 Guernica, 334, 335-6, 362, 438, 463
 Guipuzcoa, 217, 303
 Gyomai', Imre', 194
Hacia la Secunda Revolution, 51, 112,
 166
 Hadrian, Emperor, 21
 Haldane, Prof. J. B. S., 439, 464
 Hannibal, 21, 106
 Hausscer, 194
 Havana, Bank of, 358
 Haya, Senor, 247
 Hccho, 234
 Hcdilla, Manuel, 63
 Hcnchc, 332
 Hendaye, 376, 460
 Henny, Dr., 262
 Herbosa, La, 456
 Hericourt, Pierre, 381, 384
 Hermann, 194
 Hermits, 37
 Hernandez, Jesus, 411
 Herrero, Don Juan, 332
 Ilcriot, 142, 374
 Hervd, Gustave, 143
 Hcurtz & Co., 376
 Hidalgo, Diego, 175-6
 -----, Rubio, 454
Higuera de la Calatrava, 434
Hiram couronne d'dpines, 142
 Hirsch, 194
 Hitler, 52, 149, 174, 4°3» 435
 Holland, 382
 Hotchkiss, 375
 Hostages, family, 359
 Huclin, Captain, 321
 Huelva, 234, 253
 Huesca, 233, 35®» 431> etc.
 Humbert-Droz, 108
 Hungary, 103, 122, 140, 403, 435
I Accuse France, 379, 386
 Ibanez, Pascual, 376
 Ibarruri, Dolores, 127, 186, 197, 358,
 410, 439» 448> 4^{SI}
 Iberian Anarchist Federation. *See*
 F.A.I.
Iconoclasts and Martyrs, 253
 Iglesias, Pablo, 48
Illustration, L', 201
Im Welt-Krieg, 14®
 India, 368, 423
 Inficsto, 361
In Franco's Spain, 111, >54» 237

INDEX

Inge, Dean, 472
 Inquisition, the, 37
 Instituto de Reforma Agraria, 157, 326,
³⁹¹
 International Brigades, 263, 306, 315,
³⁹³
 International. *See* First International,
 Second, etc.
 International Masonic Association, 402
Internationale, L', Lodge, 143, 371
 Intervention. *See* Non-Intervention
 Inversion, 345, 435, 459, 460, 463
 "Iron Belt", the, 280, 335 *et seq.*
 Iron Column, the, 355, 358
 Irrigation, 18
 Irun, 276, 287, 288, 292, 345, 377, 463
 Isidro. *See* San Isidro
 Ismael, 36
 Isoba, 279
 Istan Mountains, 319
If Can Be Done, 411
 Italians in Spain, 314, 319, 334
 Italy, 130, 403, 435, 488
 Iviza, 253, 444
 Izarduy, 69
Izvestia, 471

JACA, 233, 362
 Jaca rising, the, 98, 114
 Jacquier, M. Pierre, 394
 Jadraque, 331 *et seq.*
 Jaen, 162, 263, 305, 311
 Jaen Province, 161
Jaime Priñero, 241, 444
 Japan, 423
 Jarama River, 330
 Jata, Mount, 334
Jc Parle au Peuple, 396
 Jerez, 164, 216
 Jerrold, Douglas, 178, 416
 Jesuits, 93, 153
 Jcumont, 382
 Jews, 100, 146, 315, 404, 435
 Jidrucque, 332
 Jimenez Asua, 84
 Jouhaux, M. Ldon, 378, 402
 Jouin, M., 141, 143
Jour, Le, 394, 395
Journal, Le, 159, 452
Journal de Genève, 191, 317
 Jouvencal, de, 402
 Jumel, M., 140
Jyllandsposten, 318

KABYLES, 20
 Kaminski, IL-E., 210, 281
 Ranter, 194
 Karfunkelslein, Leo, 194
 Karl Liebknecht Battalion, 346
 Kerensky, 189
 Keyserling, Count, 139
 Kindelan, General, 246
 Kleber, General, 261, 385, 396

Knoblaugh, 65, 162, etc. *See also* Correspondent in Spain
Ko ba Darsa, 75
 Koestler, A., 297, 329, 439, 447, 458
Koutoubia, 245
 Kuntzelmann, 194

LABOUR ORGANIZATIONS, growth and nature of, 46 *et seq.*

Lafargue, 107
 Lafucntc, Colonel Vincente, 230
 Landrove, Senor, 228
 Langco, 170
 Lantoinc, Albert, 142
 Larache, 76
Larache, 243
 Laredo, 346
 Largo Caballero, 89, 96, 100, 102, 161,
^{189, >95-} 238, 277, 289, 396
 Larrabczua, 338
Latifundia, 22, 88, 156
 Latin, 21
Lau. Sec Wad Lau
 Laujan, 456
Lauria, 243
 Lavin, Senor, 228
 Law, Spanish, the attack on, 87
 Lawson, Lancelot, 181, 195
 Layrc, 89
 League against Imperialism, 367
 League for the Rights of Man, 404
 League of Free Thinkers, 248
 League of Nations, 132, 262, 355, 368,
⁴⁰²
 League of the Godless, 86, 248
 League of the Militant Atheists, 248
Lemons de la Guerre d'Espagne, Les,
^{206, 211, 272, 287, 338}
Lectures on the French Revolution, 140
Lectures to Young Workers, 103
 Left Book Club, 467
Left News, 468
Left Wing Communism, 96
 Legionaries, the, 71
 Lemona, 335
 Lemoniz heights, 335
 Lenin, 95, 96, 103, 104, 109, 172, 494
Lenin (Trotsky), 103
 Leo XIII, Pope, 491
 Leon, 176, 229. 245» 278, 298
 Leon Province, 23, 274
 Lconcsc, 33
Lepanto, 242
 Lercna, 161
 Lerida, 159, 162, 311, 480
 Lerroux, Don Alejandro, 137, 166, 200
 Levan to, the, 24
^{-----, people of, 33}
 Lewis, Wyndham, 436
Li her tad, 242
 Liebana, Senor, 226
 Liebermann, 194
 Liemann, 138

INDEX

5¹¹

Lijas, 343
 Liki, 461
 Lille, 395
Lilliput, 447
 Lima, Magalhaes, 144
 Lincoln, Trebitch, 496
 Linca, La, 455
 Linz, 174
 Lisbon, 285
 Lister Brigade, 355
 Lizana, Señor, 463
Llcra, Dona Felisa de, 253
 -----, *Donas Piedad and Ventura de*, 252
 Lliga Catalana, 166
 Lloyd George, Rt. lion. D.» 314, 325, 420, 438
 Logrono, 110, 234, 246
 Loja, 319
 London, 472
 Londonderry, Lord, 149
 Lopcra, 305
 Lopez Guerrero, 213
 Lopez Linares, Canon, 323
 Lopez Ochoa, General, 81, 100, 136, 169, 177
 Losovsky, A., 109, 138
 Loucheur, 402
 Loyola Barracks, 217
Lucha, La, 188
 Lucia, Señor, 222
 Lugo, 163, 177
 Lukacz, 385
 Lumbralcs, Major Aro, 235
 Lunn, Arnold, 355* 4M» 432
 Lyautcy, Marshal, 67

MAD A LENA PEAK, 347
 Madariaga, 107, 153
 Madeleine, La, 395
 Madrid, 51, 56, 93, 167, 173, 254, 304, 307, 445, and *passim* 268,
 Madrid Province, 25
Madrid ba jo el Terror, 136
 Madrid Caceres-Portugal Railway, 49
 Maeterlinck, 498
 Magalhaes Lima, 144
 Magaz, Marquds de, 77
 Magno Battalion, 281
 Mahon, 176
 Majorca, 176, 275, 305
 Malaga, 51, 93, 230, 242, 253, 29b 3°» 312, 34» 319 *cl seq.*, 455
 Malmusi Alto, 78
 Malpica, Castilla de, 455
 Manaria, Sierra de, 334, 458
 " Mancini " Plan, 459
 Mandayona, 332
 Mangada, General, 182, 226
 Manoel, King of Portugal, 144
 Manso, 217

Manuilsky, 138
 Manzanares River, 304
 Maqucda, 280, 293, 299
Mar Catabrico, 380
 Maragatos, 20
 Marbella, 318, 444
 Marcassan, M., 454
March of a Nation, The, 64, 191, 193, 197> 215, 241, 243, 282, 284, 286, 287, 290, 293, 297, 337
 Marmontel, 141
 Marquen, 395
Marquds de Chavarri, 321
 Marques-Riviere, M., 272, 402
 Marquez Rey, M., 354
 xMarquina, 334
 Marquina Palatios, R., 354
 Marseillaise, La Lodge, 143, 371
 Marseilles, 377
 Martin, Colonel Alonso, 298
 -----, G., 135, 137
' Martinez, Señor, Deputy for Asturias, 169
-----, Josc Maria, 171
Martinez Barrio, 199, 222, 322, 420
Martinez Monge, General, 222
Martinez de Velasco, 374
Marty, Andre, 142, 274, 307, 393, 411, 439
Marx, Carl, 47, 124
Mascgoso, 332
Massanat de Cabrcnys, 381
Matin, Le, 142, 501
Maurin, 51, 112, 165, 167, 186, 323.
See also Flacia la Secunda Revolution
 Maza, Alta de la, 455
 McCullagh, 111, 154
 McGowan, Gault, 326
 McNeill-Moss, Major, 284, 296
 Medina Sidonia, Duque de, 26
 Melbourne, 472
 Melendez, Captain, 215
 Melilla, 68, 73, 202-3, 444
 Merida, 283, 292
 Merino, 19
Merry del Vai, Marques de, 208
 Mesa, Don Rafael, 324
Mdtropole, La, 434
 Mexico, 103, 126, 316, 404, 471
 Miaja, General, 182
 Miajadas, 239
 Michel, A. G., 132, 142
 Miclche, Hakon, 318
 Micros, 170-1, 364
 Milan (Radio), 325
 Military Academy, Zaragoza, 81
 Military Brotherly Union, 100
 Millan Astray, 7°, 75
 Miller, General, 466
Minifundia. See Latifundia
 Minor, Robert, 411
 Mirabeau, 14¹

INDEX

Mirabucno, 332
 Miralrio, 331
 Miravalles, 340
 Mitchell, Mairin, 184
 ----, Sir Peter Chalmers, 118, 163,
 329
 Mizian, Major, 304
 Moati, Serge, 194
 Modi, 194
 Modesto Brigade, 355
 Mola, Captain, 198
 ----, General, 6, 57, 98, 100, 110, 122,
 134, >98> >99> 200> *73> 285⁶> 293>
 337
 Molero, General, 198, 228
 Mollina, 290
 Monarchy, 119, 136
 Monastrio, Colonel, 293, 484
 Mondragon, 313
 Mongayia (Asturias), 171
 Monino, 382
 Monmousseau, 411
 Monson, Ronald, 440
 Montero, Hoyos, 354
 Montevideo, 358, 413
 Monthonos, 377
 Monjuich, 114
 Montoro, 305
 Montovnes, Count, 24
 Moors, 207-8
 Moors in Spain, 21-2
 Morena, Sierra, 263
 Moreno, Don Angel, 331
 ----, Captain, of the Assault Guards,
 197
 ----, Enrique, 30 n.
Morning Post, The, 88, 155, 160, 161,
 44²
 Moroccan War, 50, 52, Chapter III
passim
 Morocco, 161, 173, 202, 207, 407
 Moscardo, General, 295, 447, 484
 ----, Luis, 295
 Moscow, 417, and *passim*
 Motril, 305, 319, 320, 456
 Moulin, M., 378
Movimiento National, El, 226
 Mowrer, Edgar, 469
 Mudejars, 22
 Mula (Murcia), 161
Mundo Obrero, 466
 Munguia, 335
 Munich, 185
 Mura, Vicente, 250
 Murcia, 93, 222
 Murcia Province, 51, 161, 311
 Muro, 22G
 Mussolini, 52, 314, 403

Nation, La, 193
 Napoleon, 106
 Narranco, Monte, 218, 298

National Confederation of Labour
 See C.N.T.
 Naucr, 76
 Navalagambla, 342
 Navalcarnero, 299, 341
 Navalpedral, 225
 Navarre, 23, 206, 239, 469
 Navarrese, 33
 Navas, Captain, 230
 ----, Corporal, 325
 Navy, the, 204, 241
 Negrin, 414
 Nelken, Marguerite, 195
 Nervion River, 340
 Nevada, Sierra, 17
 Neves, Senhor Mario, 284
 New Castile, 25, 156
 New York, 388, 472
New York Sun, 326
New York Times, 450
New York Tribune, 473
 New Zealand, 472
 News agencies, 436
News Chronicle, The, 297, 461-2
 Nicholson, Helen, 170, 443
 Nicolau D'Oliver, 153
 Nicoli, 194
 Nin, Andres, 112, 167, 413
Nineteenth Century and After, The,
 108, 178
 Non-Intervention, 333, 370 *et seq.*, 476
 Numantia, 106
 Nuñez del Prado, General, 233

Observer, The, 433, 435
 Ochandiano, 280, 334
 Odiel, 235
(Euvre, L', 436
(Euvre, Latino, L⁹, ffl, 100, 137
 Oil contracts, Russian, 84, 101
 Old Castile, 23
 Oliveira, Ramos, 187
 Olympic Games, Barcelona, Popular,
 274
 Ontaneda, 350
 Orcanes Lopez, 235
 Orduna, 345, 351
 ** Oriamendi ", 287
Origines de la Revolution Espanola,
 >49
 Orizana, Señor, 226
 Orjiva, 45G
 Orland, Vivienne, 134
 Orlé, 395
 Oropcsa, 253, 292
 Oropcsa (Castellon province), 444
 Orotava, Puerto, 237
 Ortega y Gasset, 105
 Ortiz, Colonel, 235
 Oseja de Sajambre, 279
 Oslo, 472
 Ostrer, 436

Otero, 298
 Otuinba Regiment, 222
 Oudard, G., 331
Ourselves and Germany, 149
 Oviedo, 70, 163, 169, 176, 217 *et seq.*,
 229, 278, 297-8, 305, 310, 311, 352,
 434> 444
 PACKARD, MR. REYNOLDS, 284
 Padul, 458
 Page-Croft, Sir H., 394
 Pajares Pass, 360, 362
Palabra, La, 185
 Palencia, 230, 275
 Palma, Majorca, 305, 444
 Palmas, Las, 311
 Palmeras, Las, 224
 Palo, 323
 Palomera, Sierra, 476, 480, 482
 Palomcs mountain, 78
 Pamplona, 110, 234, 275, 444, 469
 Pando, 220
 Panticosa, 234
 Paraman, Julien, 380
Páramos, 17
 Pardo barracks, El, 277
 Paris, 21, 135, 437, 472
Paris Soir, 451
 Parliamentary Government, 43, 495
 Party system of Government, 43-5
 Pasajes, 4Go
 Pascual, Valentine, 331
Pasionaria, 127
 ----, *La*. See Ibarri
 Patxot, General, 322
 Pavia, General, 48
 Peace Leagues, 132
 Pedro Abad, 305
 Peers, Prof. E. A. (*see Spanish Tragedy*), 85, 162, etc.
 Peman, Jose Maria, 6
 Peña, 250
 ----, Gonzalez, 217
 Peñaflor, 177
 Peñarroya, 305
 Peñarrubia, 291
 Penguin Specials, 469
 Peninsular Army, 207
 Perdiguera, 456
 Perez Madigral, 198, 273
 Perez, Major, 213
Peril judeo-mafonnique, Le, 141
 Perpignan, 373
 Perth us, Le, 381
 Pestana, Angel, 48
Petit Parisien, Le, 452, 453
 Phalanx. *See Falange*
 Pharos, 145
 Philosophic Positive Lodge, 371
 Phoenicians, 20
 Pico, Puerto del, 293
 Picos de Europa, 360
 Pina, 358
 Pinos Puente, 455
 Pinto, J. M., 290
 "Piracy", 401
 Pistoleros, 89, 92
 Pitres, 457
 Pius IX, Pope, 124
 Pius XI, Pope, 123, 369, 471
 Pízarra, 329
Plenum XI, English Edition, 110
Plenum XII, English Edition, 110
 Plus Ultra Lodge, 143, 371
 Pola de Gordon, 4G3
 Poland, 403, 435
Politicia, La, 455, 459
 Pollensa, 444
 Pollitt, H., 468
 Pontevedra, 311
 Ponton Defile, 362
 Ponjins, Vicomte Lion de, 104, 144
 Popescu, 138
Populaire, Le, 284
 Popular Tribunals, 257, 300, 326
 Porcuna, 305, 415, 456
 Port Bou, 387
 Portalis, Salvatore, 380
 Portela Valladares, 192, 199
 Portillejo, 457
 Portugal, 123, 403, 490
 Potes, 345
 Potez aeroplanes, 373
 P.O.U.M., 113, 422, 466
 Pozas, General, 198, 322
 Prat del Llobregat Aerodrome, 371
 Prats de Mollo, 381
Pravda, 160
 Press, the, 275, 306, 345, 352, 356, 429
 et seq., 490 *et seq.*, and *passim*
 Press control, 425
 Priego, 305
 Prieto, Carlos, 29 n., 468
 ----, Indalccio, 84, 96, 101, 102, 106,
 191, 2t7, 414
 Primo de Rivera, General, 40, 42, 43,
 50, 52 *et seq.*, 76, 88, 89, 100, 109,
 160
 ----, Josd Antonio, 63, 165
 Prisoners, treatment of, 178, 353
 Private prisons, 413, 421
 Pro-Deo Commission, 467
Proletary No. 2, 103
 P.S.U.C., 116, 123, 413
 Puebla (Salamanca), 163
 Puerto Orotava, 237
 Pujo, M. Maurice, 377, 394
 Pyrenees, 16

Quadragesimo Anno, 491, 492
 Queipo de Llano, General, 6, 100, 200,
 205, 212 *et seq.*, 232, 254, 271, 282,
 290, 305» 311» 331* 380» 412» 426» 443>
 447* 458
 Quemadas, Las, estate, 157

Qucseda (Jacn), 161
Quicbra Fraudulenta de la Republica,
 47
 Quijorna, 342
 Quinto, 356

RADICAL PARTY, 166, 178, 183
 Railways of Spain, 47
 Rakosi Battalion, 288, 362
 Ramales, 346
 Reber, Chas., 459
 Rebollar, 358
 " Red Aid ", 381
 Red Cross, 261
Red Terror in Madrid, 256-8, 260-1
Red, White, and Spain, 442
Regards, Paris, 459
Regulares, 69
 Reichswehr troops (*not* in Spain), 316
 Rcinosa, 279, 346, 366
 Rens, Raphael, 144
 Renteria, 313
Report of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, 95, 108
 Republic of 1873, 40
 Requescns, 381
Rcquetes, 287
Rerum Novarum, 491
 Reus, 444
 Reuter, 437, 439
Revolution Espagnole vue par une Républicaine, La, 256
Revolution et contrerevolution en Espagne, 472
Revue Internationale des Societds Secrètes, 145
 Rhone engines, 378
 Ribadesella, 361
 Ribbentrop, Herr von, 149
 Riffs, 73, 77, etc.
 Rigoitia, 345, 463
 R.I.L.U., 109
 Riofrio, 280
 Riobdo, Schor, 228
 Rios, Fernando de Los, 372
 Riquelme, Colonel, 182
 Robledo de Chavcla, 343
 Robles, Gil. *See* Gil Robles
 Roda, La, 290
 Rodiezmo, 463
 Rodriguez, Gustavo, 371
 Rogers, Theo, 212, 249
 Roman plough, 20
 Romans, 21
 Rome (Radio), 325
 Romcales, General, 202-3
 Roncal valley, 234
 Ronda, 291
 -----, Sierra de, 279
 Rooy, P. van, 249
 Rosanbo, Comte de, 140
 Rosas, Las (Madrid), 344

INDEX

Rosenberg, Moses (Marcel), 255, 308,
 385> 433
 Rosenfeld, 194
 Rothstein, Andrew, 431
 Roubaix, 382
 Royan, 395
 Rozas, Las (Santander), 347
 Rubio, Major, 245
 Rueda Garcia, Lieut., 263
 Ruhr, the, 208
 Ruiz Villaplana, 186, 275
 Ruquilla, 332
 Russ.a, 101, 126, 316, 404, etc.
Russia No. 1 (Report to Parliament, 1919), 146

SAAVEDRA, CAPTAIN, 322
 Saborit, 56
 Sachs, Kraft, 380
 Sagunto, 106
 Saint Andrd, 395
 St. Jean de Luz, 460, 462
 St. John, Brothers of, 323
 Saja, 348
 Saklatvala Battalion, 393
 Salacrc Moro, 354
 Salamanca, 24, 444
 Saler, 421
 Salesians at Malaga, the, 323
 Saliquet, General, 200, 227
 Salient, 234
 Sama de Langco, 169
 San Cristobel, 457
 San Felipe Point, 232
 San Isidro Pass, 361
 San Javier /Xcordrome, 246
 San Justo. *See* San Isidro
 San Martin de Montalban, 455
 San Martin de Valdeiglcias, 251, 293
 San Pedro, 350
 San Pedro de Arenas, 253
 San Sebastian, 94, 163, 217, 288-9, 444,
 447
 ----, pact of, 57
 Sanctuary of the Virgen de la Cabeza,
 37» 263
 Sangra, La, 457
 Sanjurjo, General, 6, 75, 100, 136, 200,
 204
 Santa Cruz, 237
 Santa Elena, 463
 Santander, 23, 110, 250, 277, 278, 346
et seq., 446
 Santandcr-Meditcrdnco Railway, 28
 Santiago de Compostella, 298
 Sarabia, 182
 Saragossa. *See* Zaragoza
 Sargentes, 351
 Saron, 350
 Sbcrt, 414
 Schermann, 194
 Schick, 138
 Schiff, 194

Schlesscer, 194
 Schuschnigg, 488
 Scobline, 466
Searchlight on Spain, 469
 Secano, 18
Second Thoughts on Democracy in Spain, 187
Secret Powers Behind the Revolution,
The, 144, i₅₅
 Security Corps, 209
 Segangan, 74
 Segovia, 278, 341, 444, 455
 -----, Captain, 230
 Segui, Salvador, 48
 Selaya, 350
 Sella River, 361
 Sencourt, Mr. R. (*see Spain's Ordeal*),
 16, etc., 431
 Sender, Mr. R., 118, 163, 210, 273, 468
 Senegalese, 394
 Separatism, 52, 84, 119
 Scrajevo, 145
 Serge. *See Victor Serge*
 Scrrador, Colonel, 285
 Seville, 51, 84, 93, 159, 162, 205, 212
 et seq., 253, 290, 311, 314, 444, 447
 -----, Duke of, 319
 Shannin, Mr., 160
 Sheep, 19
 Shinwell, M.P., Mr., 475
 Sidi Hamed Gaumia, 203
 Siebercr, Herr, 499
Siege of the Alcazar, *The*, 284
 Sigüenza, 301
 -----, Bishop of, 302
Silvia, 384
 Simancas barracks, 217
Sin Dios, 86
Sindicalo Unico, 49, 50
 Sixth February Battalion, 393
 Social Democratic Alliance, 47
 Solans, Captain, 203
 Solchaga, General, 334, 484
Sol, El, 65, 197, 260, 264, 325, 378,
 411, 456, 466
Solidaridad Obrera, 48, 256, 410, 475
 Sollubc, Mount, 334
 Somosierra Pass, 286
 Soria, 28, 163
 Sort, 477
 South America, 152, 195, 447
 Spain, inhabitants, climate, etc., Chapter I, etc.
Spain, 293
Spain at War, 29
Spain: A Tragic Journey, 249, 255,
 288-9
Spain: Impressions and Reflections, 170
Spain's Ordeal, 50, 51
Spain To day, 109, 464
Spanish Cockpit, *The*, 58, 117, >59»
 303» 357
Spanish Front, 29 n.

Spanish Galicia, 27
Spanish Rehearsal, 355, 414
Spanish Republic, *The*, 93, 162
Spanish Tragedy, *The*, 85, 93, 94, no,
 160, 169, 170, 185
Stalin, 132
 Stalin, 52, 114, 393
 " Stancroft ", 372
 Steer, G. L., 438
 Stella, 411
 Stevens, Pembroke, 72
 Stockholm, 472
Storm Over Spain, 184
 Strachey, John, 467
 Strauss, M.P., Mr., 475
 Styria, 174
 Succession, Laws of, 31
 Succa, 224
 Suevi, 21
 Sumclza Pass, 234
Sunday Referee, 436
Sunday Times, *The*, 314, 325
 Swinton, Mr. John, 473
 Switzerland, 389
 Sylvestre, General, 73
 Syndicalists, 48
 Szamuclsky, 103, 144
 TABLADA AERODROME, Seville, 246
 Tabouis, Madame, 320, 436, 469
 Tagus, 279, 294
 Tahuima, the, Bandera, 203
 Ta jo. *See Tagus*
 Talavera, 292, 456
 Tangier, 65, 76, 216
 Tangye, Mr. Nigel, 442
 Tankosic, 145
 Tanks, 344
 Tardieu, M. Andrd, 194
 Tarifa, Duque de, 26
 Tarna, 463
 Tarna Pass, 279, 361
 Tarragona, 163, 311
 Tartars, 307
 Tasca, 194
 Taxes, 31
 Teba, 291
 Tejeda, Sierra de, 279
 Tella, General Cantos, 202, 206, 283
Tempestad Calma Intriga y Crisis, ft-
 98. 135
 Tena, valley of, 234
 Tencrifcnδ, 237
 Tercio Estranjero. *See Foreign Legion*
 Teruel, 233. 279, 305, 34^c. 35^b- 444-
 449, 455, 47^b
 Tcttian, 65, 76, 200, 203. 210. -455
 Thaelman Battalion, 315
 Tharaud, Jean, 185
 Theriot, 104
 Third International, 85, 367, ana
 passim
 Thorez, 411

Thorpehall, 399
 Tictar Valley, 253
 Tilfaruin, 75
Times, The, 82, 84, 88, 92, 101, 102,
 112, 113, 130, 152, 153, 154, 161, 162,
 164, 165, 183, 188, 189, 196, 377, 389,
 408, 422, 434, 438, 439> 443, 444,
 458* 475* 179, 482
 Titterton, W. S., 431
 Tizzi-Assa, 74
 Toledo, 183, 434, 447
 Toledo Province, 25, 253, 294, 456
 Tolera, Roger, 380
 Tolosa, 110, 303
 Tolusit, 65
 Tomas. Belarmino, 463
 -----, Jos6, 187
 Toni, Rev. T., 253
 Torrclavcga, 350
 Torremolinos, 318
 Torrente, 455
 Torrijos, 295
 Torrox, 329
 Totozas, Mount, 227
 Toulouse, 385
 Toulouse f Radio). 463
 Tour de Carol, 386
Traca, La, 186
 Tremp, 477
 Triana, 235
 Troncoso, Major, 460
 Trotsky, 103, 112, 132, 472
 Trubia, 172, 366
 Trueba Battalion, 355
 Tudela, Nogueras C., 354
 Turkey, 403
 Turrini, 138
 Tusquets. J., 149
Twelfth Plenum, 110

Uad-Kert, 244
 Uad Lau. *See* Wad Lau
 U.G.T., 47, 48, 53, 89, 171
 Uisan, Mount, 74
 Ulibarri, Captain, 222
 Unamuno, Professor, 137, 201, 358
 Unemployment relief, 38
 Union of Democratic Control, 410
 Union Patriotica, 52
 Urdues, 234
 Uribe, Vincent, 411
 Urquiola Pass, 334
 Urrusti, 338
 U.S.A., ^89
 Ustachis, 461
 Utande, 332

VADE, M., 394
 Vaillant-Couturier, 411
 Valdelagran, Marquds de, 25
Valdes, 242
 Valdez, 138
Valence sous la Botte Rouge, 418, 454

Valencia, 24, 51, 93, 119, 162, 168, 221
 cl seq., 233, 242, 311, 417
 Valenzuela, Colonel Rafael, 75
 Valfermoso de las Monjas, 332
 Valladolid, 24, 226, 230, 444
 Vallcsa del Mandor estate, 24
 Valmaseda, 340, 455
 Vandals, 21
Vanguardia, La, 456, 466
 Varela, General, 199, 231, 283, 290,
 292-3, 342, 484
 Varez, 250
 Vargas, 350
 Vatican, the, 84, 368
 Vega de Pas, 350
 Vega, I.a (Asturias), 172
 -----, Major, 234
Velasco, 242, 244
 Venta de Farinas, 483
 Vcntaniclla Pass, 361
 Versailles, 80
Vicente Puchol, 212
Victoire, La, 143
 Victor Serge, 51, 112, 122, 471
Vida Nueva, 324
 Vienna, 135, 174
 Vigneau, M. Albert, 134, 371
 Vigo, 285
 Villa Abrillc, General, 213
 Villaciervos (Soria), 163
 Villa Cisneros, 285
 Villa del Rio, 305
 Villafranca (Cordoba), 236
 Villafranca del Castillo, 342
 Villaharta, 305
 Villalba, General, 182, 319
 Vi I la mayor, 356
 Villamcsias, 239
 Villanueva de la Canada, 342
 Villanueva del Fresno, 238
 Villanueva del Pardillo, 342
 Villareal (Alava), 310, 334
 Villarrubia, 236
 Villaverde, 346
 Vifaroz, 444
 Vincent-Auriol, 102
 Virgen de la Cabeza, Sanctuary of, 263
 Visigoths, 21
 Vitoria, 279, 310, 444, 456
 Vivcl del Rio, 449, 480
 Vizcaya, 333 *et seq.*
 "Vladimir", 452
 Voltaire, 104, 141, 431
 Vorochilov, 411

WAD LAU, 71
 Wandl, Herr, 440
War of Ideas in Spain, 33 n.
War in Spain, The, 118, 274
 Waterloo, 436
Week, The, 320
 Wcil-Rcynal, 194
 Weintrauben, 138

INDEX

5*7

Weygand, General, 300, 36s
Wheat-growing, 19, 20
Why Spain Fights On, 410
Wilkinson, Miss Ellen, 475
Wilson, Sir Arnold, 438
Winn, Mr. Roland, 451
Women Miliita, 304
Workers* Alliance, 115, 165, 167, 168
Workers and Peasants Block, 115
Workers' Front, 393
Workers' International Association, 47
Workers' Mutual Association, 46
World Trade Union Movement, The,
 IOQ
Wiirmscr, 194

XAUEN, 76

Ximenez Asua. *See Jimenez*
YAGÜE, GENERAL, 177, 202, 238, 484
Yanko, Julio, 250
Yellow Plain, 202
Youth Leagues, 367
Yugoslavia, 461
Yunteros, 156

ZAMALEA, 442
Zamora, 24, 275
Zaragoza, 51, 232, 311, 355, 456
Zocœl-Arbaa, 76
Zorita (Salamanca), 163
Zucra, 356
Zwingelstcin, Andr6, 303
Zyromski, 194, 378

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